Jeremiah Lee Johnson v. Chilton County Jail

• Court: District Court, M.D. Alabama
• Decided: December 1, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00382
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

JEREMIAH LEE JOHNSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-CV-382-RAH-CSC ) CHILTON COUNTY JAIL, ) ) Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jeremiah Lee Johnson, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. On May 29, 2025, the Court issued an Order directing Plaintiff to file a certified prison account statement no later than June 12, 2025. Doc. 3. The Court specifically cautioned Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the terms of that Order would result in dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute or comply with an Order of the Court. Id. at 2. Nevertheless, nearly six months have passed since the imposed deadline, and Plaintiff has not filed an account statement as directed.1 A district court “may . . . dismiss a case under its inherent authority, which it possesses as a means of managing its own docket so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” McNair v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 1301, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). The authority of courts to impose sanctions for failure to comply with

1 Plaintiff has filed numerous letters to the Court (see Docs. 4–9), which the undersigned has reviewed. Although Plaintiff’s letters are at times difficult to discern, it does not appear that Plaintiff has proffered any reason for his failure to comply with the Court’s Order. court orders and failure to prosecute is longstanding and acknowledged by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962)

(finding this authority “necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts”); see also Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that “dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion” (citations omitted)). A court’s dismissal under its inherent authority “can be either with or without

prejudice to refiling.” McNair, 143 F.4th at 1306. Dismissal with prejudice as a sanction “is warranted only upon a ‘clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.’” Mingo v. Sugar Cane Growers Co-Op of Fla., 864 F.2d 101, 102 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985)); accord McNair, 143 F.4th at 1306. “A dismissal

without prejudice, by contrast, doesn’t require a finding of willfulness or bad faith because its consequences are less severe.” McNair, 143 F.4th at 1306. In this instance, Plaintiff has not complied with the Court’s Order of May 29, 2025, despite its express directives and admonition. Consequently, this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice. The undersigned concludes that no lesser sanction than

dismissal would be effective. See id. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice. It is further ordered that, on or before December 15, 2025, the parties may file objections to this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual

findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the

Recommendation. Additionally, such failure waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), overruled by Douglass v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),

superseded by statute, Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 111-16, 123 Stat. 1608 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2009)); accord 11th Cir. R. 3-1. DONE this 1st day of December, 2025.

/s/ Charles S. Coody CHARLES S. COODY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE