Jenson v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 24-7307
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-7307 JORDAN JENSON, D.C. No. 4:23-cv-05027-LRS Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Lonny R. Suko, Senior Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 27, 2026** Richland, Washington

Before: SUNG, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jordan Jenson appeals the district court’s order affirming

an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Jenson’s application for childhood

social security benefits. We review the district court’s decision de novo. Luther v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). We will not overturn the ALJ’s

decision “unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon

legal error.” Id. Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” but only

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated

Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the treating

provider’s medical opinion. “Under governing regulations, the ALJ must assess

the persuasiveness of each medical opinion after considering specified factors,” the

most important of which are supportability and consistency. Stiffler v. O’Malley,

102 F.4th 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing, inter alia, 20 CFR § 404.1520c(a),

(b)(2)). Supportability looks at whether “a medical source supports a medical

opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi,

32 F.4th 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Consistency looks at “the

extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with the evidence from other

medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” Id. at 792 (cleaned up).

The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how other factors were considered. 20

CFR § 416.920c(b)(2).

2 The ALJ reasonably found that the medical opinion was not persuasive

because it was not supported by the provider’s own examination notes and was

contradicted by other record evidence. Multiple examination notes reflect that

Jenson was oriented to time, place, and person; had clear and normal speech; had a

normal thought process; denied having hallucinations or suicidal or homicidal

thoughts or ideations; had good recent and remote recall; and had sustained

attention and concentration. Two of Jenson’s teachers reported that he had no

limitation in acquiring and using information. And Jenson testified that he did not

struggle with hygiene during the closed period for which he requested benefits.

Jenson is correct that the ALJ should not have considered his testimony that he

graduated from high school and obtained a job because those events fell outside the

closed period, but this error was harmless given the substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s determination. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are

harmless.”).

2. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that Jenson’s

impairments did not meet or medically equal Listings 112.04 (depressive, bipolar,

and related disorders), 112.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), and

112.11 (neurodevelopmental disorders). Contrary to Jenson’s arguments on appeal,

the ALJ cited considerable evidence discussing Jenson’s history of self-harm,

3 suicidal ideation, absenteeism, and failing grades. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d

1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of

evidence” and need not “discuss evidence that is neither significant nor probative.”

(cleaned up)). The ALJ also considered evidence that Jenson made progress at

school and often reported only mild or moderate anxiety and depression with no

suicidal ideation. Taken together, this evidence supports the ALJ’s finding.

3. Substantial evidence further supports the ALJ’s finding that Jenson’s

impairments did not functionally equal these listings. See 20 CFR § 416.926a(a).

Jenson’s argument that two teacher questionnaires showed that he had marked

limitations in two domains is unavailing. Though the questionnaires noted

Jenson’s absenteeism, lack of organization, and need for accommodations, they

also reflected the teachers’ beliefs that Jenson did not have marked limitations in

most dimensions and that he exhibited “age appropriate” behaviors. “If the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s

conclusion that must be upheld.” Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1106 (quoting Ford v. Saul,

950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020)). Thus, the questionnaires, as well as the

evidence discussed above, support the ALJ’s finding.

4. The ALJ did not err by discounting Jenson’s subjective symptom

testimony. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.

See Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that an ALJ

4 must provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting claimant’s

testimony where there is no evidence of malingering and claimant has shown that

their conditions could produce some degree of the alleged symptoms). Among

other things, objective evidence contradicted Jenson’s claims of marked

impairment, and his symptoms improved with treatment. His memory,

concentration, and attention were routinely found to be intact. He often reported

mild depression symptoms and minimal to no symptoms of anxiety. And he

reported that his medications were effective and helped treat his symptoms.

5. The ALJ did not improperly discount the lay evidence. The ALJ

appropriately rejected the portions of the lay witness statements involving medical

conclusions that the lay witnesses did not have the qualifications to make. Tobeler

v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 2014). And substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s determination that the witnesses’ other observations were not inconsistent

with the findings of less than marked limitations.

AFFIRMED.