Jensen (ID 129686) v. Brown

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedSeptember 4, 2025
Docket5:25-cv-03180
StatusUnknown

This text of Jensen (ID 129686) v. Brown (Jensen (ID 129686) v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jensen (ID 129686) v. Brown, (D. Kan. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

JOSHUA JENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 25-3180-JWL

TOM BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Plaintiff and state prisoner Joshua Jensen filed this pro se civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas. With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3.) Because the request was not on the required, court-approved form, the Court issued a notice of deficiency, directing Plaintiff to resubmit the motion on the required form. (Doc. 6.) The Court provisionally grants Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains obligated to resubmit his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the required form and to submit the required financial information by the October 2, 2025 deadline set forth in the notice of deficiency at Doc. 6. The failure to comply with the notice of deficiency by the deadline may result in the dismissal of this matter without further prior notice to Plaintiff. The Court has begun the statutorily required review of the complaint and has identified deficiencies, identified below, that leave the complaint subject to dismissal in its entirety. The Court therefore will grant Plaintiff time in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified herein. If Plaintiff fails to do so in the allotted time, this matter will be dismissed without further prior notice to him. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of class counsel (Doc. 4), his motion for joinder of parties (Doc. 5), and his motion to subpoena (Doc. 7), which will be denied for the reasons set forth below. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff names as Defendants in this matter Tom Brown and Wade Younkin, both of whom are Unit Team Managers at Norton Correctional Facility (NCF) in Norton, Kansas. (Doc. 1, p. 1-

2.) As the background to this case, Plaintiff asserts that NCF staff have a pattern or practice of failing to comply with K.A.R. 44-12-601, they violate his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his papers by censoring his mail, they do not afford him due process, and they treat him differently than “all other Americans” whose mail is not censored by the State. Id. at 2. As Count I, Plaintiff asserts the denial of his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his papers and his right to due process. Id. at 3. In the section of the form complaint for stating the facts that support Count I, Plaintiff states only, “No court in the United States has taken my right to be secure in my papers away.” Id. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Id. As supporting facts for Count II, Plaintiff states only,

“Kansas does not censor the entire population’s mail.” Id. In Count III, Plaintiff asserts a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 4. As supporting facts for Count III, Plaintiff states: “Aside from the illegal censorship allowed in K.A.R. 44-12-601; N.C.F. staff do not even follow their own state mandated regulations.” Id. As relief, Plaintiff seeks “[a]ll remedies and relief the Court deems access[i]ble; plus whatever the class would agree to.” Id. at 5. II. Screening Standards Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and provisionally proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required by statute to screen his complaint and to dismiss it or any portion thereof that is frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). During this screening, the Court liberally construes this pro se complaint and holds it to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d

910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff’s behalf.” See Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). “[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Furthermore, a pro se

litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted.) The Court must determine whether Plaintiff has “nudge[d] his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not met his or her burden. Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). III. Discussion This matter is subject to dismissal in its entirety because the complaint (Doc. 1) fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief against any Defendant. “To state a claim,

a complaint must ‘make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.’” Stone v. Albert, 338 Fed. Appx. 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)). “[I]t is incumbent upon a plaintiff to ‘identify specific actions taken by particular defendants’ in order to make out a viable § 1983 . . . claim.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013). Conclusory allegations of involvement are not sufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

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Related

West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
McNeil v. United States
508 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Chavez v. Huerfano Cty Corr.
195 F. App'x 728 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Anderson v. Blake
469 F.3d 910 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents
492 F.3d 1158 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Smith v. United States
561 F.3d 1090 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Stone v. Albert
338 F. App'x 757 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Pahls v. Thomas
718 F.3d 1210 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Northington v. Jackson
973 F.2d 1518 (Tenth Circuit, 1992)

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Jensen (ID 129686) v. Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jensen-id-129686-v-brown-ksd-2025.