MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 16 2019, 8:38 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Michael R. Auger Karl L. Mulvaney Franklin, Indiana Jan K. Keefer Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jenny Anne Lee, July 16, 2019 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-2737 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Paul William Lee, The Honorable Appellee-Respondent Timothy Oakes, Judge The Honorable Caryl Dill, Magistrate Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D02-1201-DR-209
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 1 of 8 Case Summary [1] After Jenny Anne Lee (“Mother”) filed a notice of intent to relocate and Father
objected, the trial court set the matter for a hearing sixteen days out. Shortly
after the hearing was scheduled, Mother filed a pro se motion to continue the
hearing, claiming that she needed time to find an attorney. On the day of the
hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s motion to continue and proceeded with
the hearing. Mother represented herself while Father was represented by
counsel. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order that, among
other things, denied Mother’s request to relocate and awarded sole legal
custody to Father. Mother appeals, raising several issues, one of which we find
dispositive: whether the trial court erred in denying Mother’s motion to
continue. Finding that the trial court should have granted Mother’s motion to
continue, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History [2] The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Mother and Father
(collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of six children, including O.L., who is
their oldest daughter. Mother and Father divorced in January 2014. Parents
were each represented by counsel throughout the dissolution proceedings.
[3] As of May 2018, Mother had primary physical custody of O.L., with Father
exercising parenting time. Meanwhile, Father had primary physical custody of
Parents’ five younger children, with Mother exercising parenting time. Parents
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 2 of 8 shared joint legal custody of all six children. Father was living in Indianapolis
and Mother was living in a house near a lake outside of Nineveh. On May 14,
Mother filed a pro se notice of intent to relocate to a new house across the lake.
She stated there would be “no negative effects of [sic] the children with this
move, and they are supportive and excited for the opportunity.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 91.
[4] On June 4, Father objected to the proposed relocation, asserting that Mother’s
move “is not for a legitimate purpose, is made in bad faith and not in the best
interests of the children as it is her third move in less than two years.” Id. at 93.
He asked the trial court to set the matter for a hearing and to ultimately bar the
relocation. Father also asked the trial court to modify child support,
emancipate O.L., order Mother to contribute to private-school tuition for the
five youngest children, and find Mother in contempt of the trial court’s previous
order regarding parenting time, child support, and children’s medical expenses
and order her to pay Father’s attorney fees. See id. at 96.
[5] On June 5, the trial court set the matter for a hearing on June 21. On June 11,
Mother filed a pro se motion to continue the hearing, alleging, in part, that she
needed time to retain an attorney. See id. at 100. On June 20, the day before
the hearing, Father filed an objection to Mother’s request for a continuance. He
alleged that Mother “has had sufficient time to retain an attorney to represent
her in this matter” and requested that Mother “be ordered to pay his attorney
fees for the filing of this Objection.” Id. at 107.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 3 of 8 [6] On the day of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a
continuance and proceeded with the hearing. Mother represented herself while
Father was represented by counsel. During the hearing, Mother struggled to
comply with the rules of evidence and trial procedure. For example, after
Father’s attorney asked to admit screen shots of some contentious
communication between Mother and Father, the following colloquy ensued:
[Mother]: I don’t know if I object or it just seems to be going on at this point.
The Court: Well, you may only object. That’s your alternative and it must be a proper objection.
[Mother]: Can I learn how to just object?
The Court: No, we’re not here to teach you how to be your own lawyer.
[Mother]: Okay.
Tr. p. 20. Mother also struggled to present evidence in response to Father’s
assertion that she was in contempt of previous child-support orders:
[Mother]: . . . I would like to call for [sic] witnesses. I don’t know how to do this. I don’t want to be here to be my own attorney.
The Court: Did you bring any witnesses?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 4 of 8 [Mother]: I didn’t know to. I don’t know how to subpoena them.
The Court: [Mother,] you have been in court innumerable times over the years.
[Mother]: Correct.
The Court: You know how this works.
[Mother]: Correct. But they are subpoenaed and I don’t know a way to subpoena.
Id. at 47-48. Furthermore, throughout the hearing, Mother repeatedly asked for
an attorney:
The Court: . . . Again, [Mother,] is there anything you want to talk about, about these issues?
[Mother]: I mean, . . . there is a lot but I need an attorney.
Id. at 51.
[7] In August, the trial court issued an order in which it (1) denied Mother’s
request to relocate, (2) found that O.L. would be emancipated by operation of
law on September 17, 2018, and thereafter Father’s duty to pay child support to
Mother for O.L. would cease, (3) modified Mother’s child-support obligation to
Father for the five youngest children, (4) ordered Mother to pay fifty percent of
private-school tuition for the five youngest children, (5) ordered Mother to pay
fifty percent of children’s extracurricular-activity costs, (6) awarded sole legal Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 5 of 8 custody to Father, (7) found Mother in contempt of the trial court’s previous
order regarding parenting time, child support, and children’s medical expenses
and ordered her to pay $1,000 of Father’s attorney’s fees.
[8] Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [9] Mother contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to
continue. Indiana Trial Rule 53.5 provides, in part, that a motion to continue
“shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or
other evidence.” We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
continue for an abuse of discretion. J.P. v. G.M., 14 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014). An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 16 2019, 8:38 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Michael R. Auger Karl L. Mulvaney Franklin, Indiana Jan K. Keefer Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jenny Anne Lee, July 16, 2019 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-DR-2737 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Paul William Lee, The Honorable Appellee-Respondent Timothy Oakes, Judge The Honorable Caryl Dill, Magistrate Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D02-1201-DR-209
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 1 of 8 Case Summary [1] After Jenny Anne Lee (“Mother”) filed a notice of intent to relocate and Father
objected, the trial court set the matter for a hearing sixteen days out. Shortly
after the hearing was scheduled, Mother filed a pro se motion to continue the
hearing, claiming that she needed time to find an attorney. On the day of the
hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s motion to continue and proceeded with
the hearing. Mother represented herself while Father was represented by
counsel. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order that, among
other things, denied Mother’s request to relocate and awarded sole legal
custody to Father. Mother appeals, raising several issues, one of which we find
dispositive: whether the trial court erred in denying Mother’s motion to
continue. Finding that the trial court should have granted Mother’s motion to
continue, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History [2] The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Mother and Father
(collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of six children, including O.L., who is
their oldest daughter. Mother and Father divorced in January 2014. Parents
were each represented by counsel throughout the dissolution proceedings.
[3] As of May 2018, Mother had primary physical custody of O.L., with Father
exercising parenting time. Meanwhile, Father had primary physical custody of
Parents’ five younger children, with Mother exercising parenting time. Parents
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 2 of 8 shared joint legal custody of all six children. Father was living in Indianapolis
and Mother was living in a house near a lake outside of Nineveh. On May 14,
Mother filed a pro se notice of intent to relocate to a new house across the lake.
She stated there would be “no negative effects of [sic] the children with this
move, and they are supportive and excited for the opportunity.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 91.
[4] On June 4, Father objected to the proposed relocation, asserting that Mother’s
move “is not for a legitimate purpose, is made in bad faith and not in the best
interests of the children as it is her third move in less than two years.” Id. at 93.
He asked the trial court to set the matter for a hearing and to ultimately bar the
relocation. Father also asked the trial court to modify child support,
emancipate O.L., order Mother to contribute to private-school tuition for the
five youngest children, and find Mother in contempt of the trial court’s previous
order regarding parenting time, child support, and children’s medical expenses
and order her to pay Father’s attorney fees. See id. at 96.
[5] On June 5, the trial court set the matter for a hearing on June 21. On June 11,
Mother filed a pro se motion to continue the hearing, alleging, in part, that she
needed time to retain an attorney. See id. at 100. On June 20, the day before
the hearing, Father filed an objection to Mother’s request for a continuance. He
alleged that Mother “has had sufficient time to retain an attorney to represent
her in this matter” and requested that Mother “be ordered to pay his attorney
fees for the filing of this Objection.” Id. at 107.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 3 of 8 [6] On the day of the hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request for a
continuance and proceeded with the hearing. Mother represented herself while
Father was represented by counsel. During the hearing, Mother struggled to
comply with the rules of evidence and trial procedure. For example, after
Father’s attorney asked to admit screen shots of some contentious
communication between Mother and Father, the following colloquy ensued:
[Mother]: I don’t know if I object or it just seems to be going on at this point.
The Court: Well, you may only object. That’s your alternative and it must be a proper objection.
[Mother]: Can I learn how to just object?
The Court: No, we’re not here to teach you how to be your own lawyer.
[Mother]: Okay.
Tr. p. 20. Mother also struggled to present evidence in response to Father’s
assertion that she was in contempt of previous child-support orders:
[Mother]: . . . I would like to call for [sic] witnesses. I don’t know how to do this. I don’t want to be here to be my own attorney.
The Court: Did you bring any witnesses?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 4 of 8 [Mother]: I didn’t know to. I don’t know how to subpoena them.
The Court: [Mother,] you have been in court innumerable times over the years.
[Mother]: Correct.
The Court: You know how this works.
[Mother]: Correct. But they are subpoenaed and I don’t know a way to subpoena.
Id. at 47-48. Furthermore, throughout the hearing, Mother repeatedly asked for
an attorney:
The Court: . . . Again, [Mother,] is there anything you want to talk about, about these issues?
[Mother]: I mean, . . . there is a lot but I need an attorney.
Id. at 51.
[7] In August, the trial court issued an order in which it (1) denied Mother’s
request to relocate, (2) found that O.L. would be emancipated by operation of
law on September 17, 2018, and thereafter Father’s duty to pay child support to
Mother for O.L. would cease, (3) modified Mother’s child-support obligation to
Father for the five youngest children, (4) ordered Mother to pay fifty percent of
private-school tuition for the five youngest children, (5) ordered Mother to pay
fifty percent of children’s extracurricular-activity costs, (6) awarded sole legal Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 5 of 8 custody to Father, (7) found Mother in contempt of the trial court’s previous
order regarding parenting time, child support, and children’s medical expenses
and ordered her to pay $1,000 of Father’s attorney’s fees.
[8] Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [9] Mother contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to
continue. Indiana Trial Rule 53.5 provides, in part, that a motion to continue
“shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or
other evidence.” We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
continue for an abuse of discretion. J.P. v. G.M., 14 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014). An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for
a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for granting the
motion, but no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not
demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial. In re K.W., 12
N.E.3d 241, 244 (Ind. 2014).
[10] Mother has demonstrated good cause for a continuance. Mother’s June 11
motion to continue asserted that she needed time to hire counsel. She likely did
not already have counsel because she could not have anticipated that her May
14 notice of relocation would result in Father requesting a modification of child
support and emancipation of O.L. and alleging that she was in contempt.
Moreover, delaying the hearing to allow Mother to retain an attorney would
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 6 of 8 not have prejudiced Father to an extent to justify the denial of the continuance.
That is, the hearing was scheduled a mere sixteen days after Father objected to
Mother’s relocation and requested that the court modify child support and find
Mother in contempt, among other things. As such, we conclude that good
cause existed at the time of Mother’s motion and that the trial court should
have continued the hearing.
[11] Mother has also shown that she was prejudiced by the denial of her motion. It
is obvious that Mother was unprepared to represent herself, and for good
reason: the trial court denied her motion to continue the hearing the same day
that the hearing was scheduled to occur. And Mother clearly suffered by
representing herself. That is, she did not call any witnesses, struggled to cross-
examine Father, and struggled to make objections. After the hearing, the trial
court not only gave Father everything he asked for, but also gave him
something he did not ask for, namely, sole legal custody. The trial court’s ten-
page order includes numerous findings regarding the evidence presented with
respect to the criteria found in Indiana Code sections 31-16-8-1 (modification of
child support), 31-16-11-1 (attorney’s fees), 31-16-12-6 (contempt), and 31-17-2-
21 (modification of child custody). This case required comprehension of the
law with respect to a parent’s relocation as well as the rules of evidence and trial
procedure. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the denial of
Mother’s request for a continuance deprived her of counsel at a “critical stage in
the proceedings” in a case involving at least some complexity and that Mother
was prejudiced by the denial of her motion to continue. See Hess v. Hess, 679
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 7 of 8 N.E.2d 153, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). We reverse the trial court’s order and
remand for a new hearing.
[12] Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2737 | July 16, 2019 Page 8 of 8