Jennifer T. Carrington v. Levinson Associates LP and Texas Workforce Commission

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 12, 2006
• Docket: 01-04-00424-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued January 12, 2006

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-04-00424-CV

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JENNIFER T. CARRINGTON, Appellant

V.

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION AND LEVINSON ASSOCIATES, L.P., Appellees

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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 799666

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          In this unemployment compensation appeal, appellant, Jennifer T. Carrington, challenges the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellees, Texas Workforce Commission (“TWC”) and Levinson Associates, L.P. (“Levinson”). In three issues on appeal, Carrington argues that (1) the administrative agency’s final determination was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) genuine issues of material fact precluded the trial court from granting summary judgment in favor of appellees; and (3) the trial court failed to consider material evidence before rendering judgment.

          We affirm.

Background

          Carrington began working for Levinson on February 12, 2001. During the next year, Carrington received unfavorable reviews from her supervisors. On June 21, 2002, Carrington gave her two-week notice that she was resigning to start a family and to have a shorter commute to work.

          On November 19, 2002, Carrington applied for unemployment benefits with TWC. By letter dated December 4, 2002, TWC denied Carrington’s request for benefits because it found that she left work for personal reasons. The letter informed Carrington that if she wanted to appeal, she had to do so by December 18, 2002.

          Carrington appealed TWC’s decision to the Appeals Tribunal via a letter dated March 14, 2003. On March 19, 2003, the Appeals Tribunal dismissed Carrington’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because her appeal was untimely. The dismissal letter informed Carrington that she could appeal the dismissal to the Commission, but she had to do so by April 2, 2003. Carrington appealed the dismissal, which the Commission affirmed on June 11, 2003. The Commission also informed Carrington that she could appeal no later than June 25, 2003.

          Carrington then sought judicial review of TWC’s dismissal to the county court. Levinson moved for summary judgment, contending that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because Carrington failed to timely appeal TWC’s initial determination. The trial court granted Levinson’s motion for summary judgment on February 18, 2004, and this appeal ensued.

          On June 10, 2004, Levinson filed a motion for damages pursuant to Rule 45, which we ordered to be taken with the case. See Tex. R. App. P. 45. On the same day, Levinson filed a motion to strike an affidavit attached to Carrington’s appellate brief. By order dated July 2, 2004, we granted Levinson’s motion.

Unemployment Benefits

          The trial court reviews a TWC decision de novo to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support that decision. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.202(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986); City of Houston v. Morris, 23 S.W.3d 505, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the evidence. City of Houston v. Tippy, 991 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Under the substantial-evidence review, the issue is whether the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time of TWC’s decision that reasonably support the decision. Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998); Morris, 23 S.W.3d at 507. The party seeking to set aside a TWC decision has the burden of proving that it is not supported by substantial evidence. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831. In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support an agency’s decision, the trial court determines whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion the agency reached. Dotson v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 612 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. 1981); Morris, 23 S.W.3d at 507. Whether TWC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence is a question of law. Morris, 23 S.W.3d at 508. The trial court may set aside a TWC decision only if the court finds that the decision was made without regard to the law or the facts and, therefore, was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Mercer, 701 S.W.2d at 831; Morris, 23 S.W.3d at 508. Because the determination of whether TWC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence is a question of law, we review the trial court’s determination de novo. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 1999). We look at the evidence presented to the trial court, not to the agency record. Nuernberg v. Texas Employment Comm’n, 858 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 1993).

          In its motion for summary judgment, Levinson argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over Carrington’s suit because Carrington failed to timely appeal TWC’s initial determination that was rendered on December 4, 2002. According to her affidavit, attached to her response, Carrington received TWC’s initial letter denying her benefits about a day or so before the appeals deadline. Carrington states that she called TWC immediately and was told that her account would remain open. The trial court granted Levinson’s motion for summary judgment without stating its reasons.

          Whether the county court had subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Failure to exhaust all administrative remedies, including the timely filing of a motion for rehearing, is jurisdictional “because the filing of the motion for rehearing defines and restricts the kind of case a district court may hear.” Hill v. Board of Trustees of the Ret. Sys. of Tex., 40 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). The trial court is generally without jurisdiction if the plaintiff fails to exhaust her administrative remedies. Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998). A party claiming to be aggrieved by a final decision of the commission may not obtain judicial review of the decision unless the party has exhausted the party’s remedies before the commission. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.203 (Vernon 1996). “Failing to timely appeal the initial determination leaves both the [TWC] and the trial court without jurisdiction to hear the case.” Brown v. Texas Employment Comm’n, 801 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The Austin Court of Appeals has held that the statutory 14-day deadline in section 212.201, which is similar to section 208.23, defines and restricts the kind of case that district courts may hear. See Heart Hospital IV, L.P. v. King, 116 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). In Heart Hospital, the court stated,

The district court is generally without jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision unless and until the plaintiff files a petition for judicial review within the statutorily prescribed fourteen days. Id. If the fourteen days expire and the plaintiff has failed to file a petition for judicial review, the Commission’s decision becomes final and unappealable. See Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Wilson, 22 S.W.3d 612, 613–14 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). No trial court can review the Commission’s decision at that point; hence, the scope of the trial court’s jurisdiction is limited. Therefore, we hold that the statutory fourteen-day deadline is a jurisdictional statutory prerequisite and a party’s failure to comply with it deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decision.

Id.

          Here, the record reflects that Carrington received TWC’s initial letter that denied her request for benefits. Carrington knew that she needed to file an appeal by December 18, 2002. Carrington failed to file written notice of appeal from TWC’s initial denial of benefits determination until approximately three months after the appeals deadline. Thus, TWC’s decision became final 14 days after the decision was mailed. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.053 (Vernon 1996).

          After reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court, we agree that the trial court did not err in granting Levinson’s motion for summary judgment because the evidence shows that Carrington did not timely appeal TWC’s initial determination. Although Carrington submitted her affidavit stating that she received TWC’s letter denying benefits about one or two days before her appeal deadline, the record reflects that she did not file an appeal until March 14, 2003, nearly three months after her deadline. The initial determination letter clearly stated in boldface type that if she disagreed with the decision, she had to fax or file her appeal postmarked no later than December 18, 2002. Carrington does not give any reason why she did not appeal sooner, other than stating that she did not get the denial letter until one or two days before the appeal deadline. She also avers that after she received TWC’s letter, she immediately called TWC’s office and that a TWC employee told her that because she responded before the expiration date, her account would remain open. Carrington’s allegation that a TWC employee told her that her account would remain open does not excuse her failure to comply with the emphasized requirements on TWC’s letter, specifically, the requirement that if she disagreed with TWC’s decision she had to appeal, in writing, by December 18, 2002.

          Carrington next relies on the letter she received from TWC after the appellate deadline had passed as evidence that she filed a timely appeal. Although Carrington maintains that the TWC letter, dated March 18, 2003, shows that her account was still open, the letter gives instructions only on Tele-Serv Filing and is no evidence that she filed a timely appeal.

          Our conclusion that Carrington failed to appeal TWC’s initial decision timely is also supported by Carrington’s March 14, 2003 letter to TWC, in which she stated, “I am appealing the determination on payment of unemployment benefits given by the Texas Workforce Commission. I have new evidence that supports a different conclusion and would like for you to hear my case.” She also stated, “With the documents that I have found I am ready to appeal the determination on payment of unemployment benefits given by the Texas Workforce Commission.” Carrington’s letter shows that she filed her first and only written notice of appeal to TWC on March 14, 2003. Noticeably absent from her letter is any mention that she had previously called TWC to make known her intention to appeal or that she had received TWC’s letter only one or two days before the appellate deadline.

          Because Carrington failed to timely appeal TWC’s initial determination on the merits within 14 days, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her appeal. See Brown, 801 S.W.2d at 8 (holding that the failure “to timely appeal the initial determination leaves both the [TWC] and the trial court without jurisdiction to hear the case”). We conclude that the trial court had substantial evidence to support TWC’s decision to dismiss Carrington’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

          We overrule Carrington’s first issue on appeal.

Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We overrule all pending motions.

                                                             Evelyn V. Keyes

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Keyes, and Hanks.