ACCEPTED 03-14-00795-CV 5566141 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/5/2015 2:27:17 PM June 22, 2015 JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-14-00795-CV
Third Court of Appeals RECEIVED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS at Austin AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/5/2015 2:27:17 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
Jennifer Samaniego, Appellant, v.
Alieda Silguero, Appellee.
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County Trial Court No. C-1-CV-13-004032
Corrected Brief of Appellant Jennifer Samaniego
Leif A. Olson State Bar No. 24032801 leif@olsonappeals.com The Olson Firm, PLLC PMB 188 4830 Wilson Road, Suite 300 Humble, Texas 77396 (281) 849-8382 Counsel for Appellant Jennifer Samaniego
Identity of Parties and Counsel Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer Samaniego Leif A. Olson State Bar No. 24032801 leif@olsonappeals.com The Olson Firm, PLLC PMB 188 4830 Wilson Road, Suite 300 Humble, Texas 77396 (281) 849-8382 Counsel on appeal Anthony J. Colton State Bar No. 24064564 acolton@coltonlawfirm.com Colton Law Firm PLLC 301 Fair Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78223 (210) 593-8717 Counsel in trial court Defendant-appellee Alieda Silguero Nadia Ramkissoon State Bar No. 24076635 nadiaramkissoon@farmersinsurance.com Clark, Price & Trevino 1701 Directors Blvd., Suite 920 Austin, Texas 78744 (512) 445-1591 Counsel on appeal and in trial court
2
Table of Contents Identity of Parties and Counsel ............................................................ 1 Table of Contents ................................................................................ 2 Index of Authorities ............................................................................. 3 Statement of the Case .......................................................................... 5 Statement on Oral Argument ............................................................... 5 Issues Presented................................................................................... 6 Timeline of Facts ................................................................................. 7 Summary of Argument: The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment because Samaniego pursued her case diligently. ........................ 11 Standard of Review ............................................................................ 13 Argument ........................................................................................... 13 A. The analogous cases demonstrate that Samaniego was diligent. .................................................................................... 14 1. Proulx. ................................................................................. 14 2. NETCO v. Montemayor. ...................................................... 16 3. Auten v. DJ Clark. .............................................................. 18 4. Other cases. ........................................................................ 20 B. Silguero’s cases are inapposite. ............................................... 21 Conclusion and Prayer ....................................................................... 22 Certificate of Compliance .................................................................. 23 Certificate of Service ......................................................................... 24
3
Index of Authorities Cases Auten v. DJ Clark, Inc.
209 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)......... 12, 13, 14, 15 Butler v. Ross 836 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) ....................... 9, 16 Franklin v. Bullock, No. 03-07-00511-CV 2008 WL 3539949 (Tex. App.– Austin Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) 7, 14 Gant v. DeLeon 786 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1990) ........................................................... 9 Hamilton v. Goodson 578 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) .................... 16 Hansler v. Mainka 807 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) .............. 9 International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. State, No. 03-09-00539-CR 2010 WL 4366910 (Tex. App. – Austin Nov. 3, 2010, no pet.) ....... 8 NETCO, Inc. v. Montemayor 352 S.W. 3d 733 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ..................10, 11, 15 Parsons v. Turley 109 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2003, pet. denied) ............... 16 Perry v. Kroger Stores, Store No. 119 741 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1987, no writ) ....................... 16 Proulx v. Wells 235 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. 2009) ........................................ 7, 8, 9, 10, 15
4
Tate v. Beal 119 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) ....... 14 Trice v. Tentzer, No. 03-99-00775-CV 2000 WL 1125246 (Tex. App. – Austin Aug. 10, 2000, no pet.) ... 14 Valdez v. Charles Orsinger Buick Co.
715 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1986, no writ) ................ 15 Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) ........................................................... 7 Webster v. Thomas 5 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ..................... 9, 16 Statutes Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003 .................................... 7
5
Statement of the Case Nature of the case Car accident
Trial court Travis County Court at Law No. 2 Judge Eric M. Shepperd Trial court Samaniego sued Silguero in May 2013 for rearproceedings ending her car. 1 Her attorney suffered a stroke;
at least four other lawyers declined to take her case. 2 She finally obtained substitute counsel in April 2014 and obtained substitute service six weeks after that. 3
Trial court Silguero sought summary judgment on lack-ofdisposition diligence grounds. 4 On that motion, the trial court adjudged that Samaniego take nothing. 5
Statement on Oral Argument
Samaniego doesn’t believe that oral argument is necessary.
1 CR 6–9.
2 CR 66, 84–85.
3 CR 24, 51; CR 44–45.
4 CR 34–37.
5 CR 81 (referring to claims as “dismissed with prejudice” rather than adjudged ).
6
Issues Presented
A plaintiff’s attorney suffered a stroke, and she was unable to retain new counsel for six months. Immediately after her new counsel was retained, she attempted to serve the defendant. She achieved substitute service six weeks after her new counsel appeared.
Did the trial court err in summarily adjudging that the plaintiff was not diligent in pursuing service?
7
Timeline of Facts
Date Event
2 May 2011 Jennifer Samaniego is driving on IH-35 in Austin.
She is attempting to exit to Riverside Drive when
Alieda Silguero rear-ends her. 6
May 2011– Samaniego works with Silguero and Silguero’s insur-
April 2013 er to resolve her damages claims. Those attempts fall through. 7
2 May 2013 Samaniego’s attorney, acting on her behalf, files Sa-
maniego’s lawsuit against Silguero and asks the clerk to issue a citation. 8
May 2013 A process server attempts to serve Silguero at on two
different occasions at two different addresses but cannot find her. 9
6 CR 20.
7 CR 50, 84.
8 CR 6–9, 95.
9 CR 50, 65, 84.
8
Date Event
Oct 2013 Samaniego receives a letter from White’s office. He
has suffered a stroke and will no longer be practicing
law. Thomas Crosley will review White’s files and
“may be able to take over the handling” of some of
White’s cases, including Samaniego’s. 10
Nov 2013 Crosley tells Samaniego that he will not represent
her. 11
Jan 2014 Samaniego contacts lawyer Robert White. He responds that he cannot take the case and refers her to
the State Bar. 12
Feb 2014 Samaniego contacts the State Bar and is referred to a lawyer whose name she cannot remember. He in-
forms her that he will not take her case and refers her
to the Austin Bar Association. 13
10 CR 66.
11 CR 85.
12 CR 85.
13 CR 85.
9
Date Event
Feb 2014 Samaniego contacts the Austin Bar Association (pre-
sumably the Lawyer Referral Service of Central Tex-
as) and is given the names of two lawyers. She con-
tacts them both. Neither will take her case. 14
Apr 2014 A family friend refers Samaniego to Anthony Colton.
Colton accepts her case. 15
22 Apr 2014 Colton appears in the case for Samaniego. He files an
amended petition that includes a request for disclosures . He asks the clerk to issue a new citation. 16
23 Apr 2014 The clerk issues a new citation. 17
17 May 2014 The process server serves Silguero’s father (who at that point is a defendant). He tells the process server
that the home is still Silguero’s permanent address
but she is currently living elsewhere. 18
14 CR 85.
15 CR 85.
16 CR 16 (appearance), 11–15 (amended petition), 19–23 (corrected amended petition ), 18 (request for new citation).
17 CR 25.
18 CR 26, 28.
10
Date Event
3 June 2014 The process server files the return of service for Sil-
guero’s father. Samaniego moves for substitute ser-
vice. 19
6 June 2014 The trial court orders that Silguero can be served
through substitute service. 20
16 June 2014 The process server serves Silguero. 21
26 June 2014 Silguero answers and moves for summary judg-
ment. 22 The sole basis for her motion is that the “eleven[-]month delay” between filing and service
“establishes, as a matter of law, a lack of due dili-
gence.” 23 She sets a hearing for October 13. 24 6 Oct 2014 Samaniego files her opposition to the summary-
judgment motion. 25
13 Oct 2014 The trial court hears the motion. 26
19 CR 25–26 (return of service), 27–29 (motion for substitute service).
20 CR 32.
21 CR 45.
22 CR 33–37.
23 CR 36.
24 CR 48.
25 CR 49– 56.
26 See CR 70.
11
Date Event
17 Nov 2014 Samaniego moves to set her case for trial on the jury
docket. 27
18 Nov 2014 The trial court summarily adjudges that Samaniego
take nothing. (It refers to this judgment as a “dis-
miss[al] with prejudice.”) 28
Samaniego requests findings of fact and conclusions
of law. 29
4 Dec 2014 Samaniego moves to reconsider the trial court’s summary judgment. 30
16 Dec 2014 Samaniego files her notice of appeal and a notice of
past-due findings of fact and conclusions of law. 31
Summary of Argument:
The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment because Samaniego pursued her case diligently.
Silguero and her insurer knew that Samaniego had a claim against
them for the injuries she received from Silguero in the car wreck. For
two years after the wreck, Samaniego worked to coax payment out of
27 CR 73.
28 CR 81.
29 CR 79.
30 CR 82– 86.
31 CR 88, 90.
12
them to compensate her for her injuries. It was only when the statute
of limitations had almost run and she still had not been paid and that
she hired a lawyer.
Samaniego did not idle while Silguero went carefree along her way.
The very day that she filed her lawsuit, she had a citation issued. Two
attempts at two different addresses were made to serve Silguero with
that citation within the same month. Once Samaniego received word
that her attorney’s successor would not take her case, she contacted other lawyers, lawyer referral services, and lawyers whose names she
was given by those services. When she finally found a lawyer to take
her case, that lawyer requested a new citation the very day that he appeared on her behalf. He then had a process server attempt service,
requested and received permission to use substitute service, and
served Silguero within the span of six weeks.
Litigation is an unusual circumstance for almost all clients — and it
is the rare client indeed who must navigate the black-swan occurrence
that is the debilitation of her attorney by a stroke. Under the circum-
stances — an intractable insurer, an incapacitated attorney, repeated
attempts to find a replacement — Samaniego exercised reasonable dil-
igence. At the very least, reasonable minds can differ: When Sama-
niego’s attorney was felled by a traumatic brain injury, did she dili-
gently pursue her case when the lawyer who finally agreed to represent
her, after several other lawyers declined, obtained citation, permission
13
for substitute service, and substitute service all within six weeks of his
appearance?
A reasonable juror could answer “yes.” The trial court erred, and
Court should reverse.
Standard of Review
The court reviews a grant of summary judgment — here, on limita-
tions — de novo. 32 It takes as true all evidence in favor of the claimant
and, when undisputed evidence is susceptible of multiple inferences, it
indulges all reasonable inferences, and resolves all doubts, in the
claimant’s favor. 33
Argument
Statutes of limitations bar lawsuits by a plaintiff who doesn’t im-
plead a defendant within a specified period. In this personal-injury
suit, that period is two years. 34 Service relates back to the filing date
and defeats a limitations defense if she is diligent in attempting to
serve the defendant. 35 That diligence is generally a question of fact:
Given the circumstances, did the plaintiff act like a reasonably prudent
32 See Franklin v. Bullock, No. 03-07-00511-CV, 2008 WL 3539949 at *1 (Tex. App.– Austin Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.), citing Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
33 Id., citing Valence, 164 S.W.3d at 661.
34 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003.
35 Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2009).
14
person? 36 A plaintiff’s diligence is missing “as a matter of law only
when a delay in service is ‘unexplained or patently unreasonable.’” 37
Diligence — not the mere passage of time — is the question. Sil-
guero, though, sought summary judgment only on the basis of an
“eleven month delay” between filing and service, “which conduct establishes , as a matter of law, a lack of due diligence.” 38 The circum-
stances surrounding that delay belie that contention and cannot sup-
port the trial court’s ruling. The summary judgment must be reversed.
A. The analogous cases demonstrate that Samaniego was diligent .
1. Proulx.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Proulx v. Wells establishes the
framework the courts must use to answer questions about diligence. Whether a plaintiff was diligent is generally a question of fact, and
courts must examine “the time it took to secure citation, service, or
both, and the type of effort or lack of effort the plaintiff expended in procuring service.” 39 The plaintiff there took nine months to serve the
defendant, and the defendant contended that that period, and inde-
36 Id. at 216.
37 Intl. Fidelity Ins. Co. v. State, No. 03-09-00539-CR, 2010 WL 4366910 at *2 (Tex. App. – Austin Nov. 3, 2010, no pet.), citing Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216.
38 CR 36.
39 235 S.W.3d at 216.
15
pendent gaps within it — particularly a nine-month gap between the
plaintiff’s learning that he had the wrong address and hiring a private
investigator to find the right one — disproved diligence as a matter of
law. 40 The Supreme Court disagreed: “that some periods of time
elapsed between service efforts does not conclusively demonstrate that [the plaintiff] was not exercising diligence in his efforts to locate
[the defendant].” 41
Here, Silguero urged the trial court to grant judgment nearly on the basis of the passage of time with no analysis of the reasons the time
was passing without service. That contradicts the Supreme Court’s
framework for determining diligence. Indeed, the Court cited four
counterexamples of delays that did constitute a lack of diligence as a
matter of law. Those counterexamples — no explanation for thirty-
eight months of delay; four months of no effort to have citation issued; five-and-a-half months of unexplained inactivity; five-month gap be-
tween filing suit and requesting service — are nothing like Sama-
niego’s situation. 42 Samaniego’s attorney was incapacitated, and she
40 235 S.W.3d at 216–217.
41 Id. at 217.
42 Id., citing Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990) (38 months); Webster v. Thomas, 5 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (no effort); Butler v. Ross, 836 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (inactivity); Hansler v. Mainka, 807 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (not requesting service).
16
nonetheless continued to pursue her case. Unlike the plaintiffs in the
Supreme Court’s Proulx counterexamples, Samaniego raised a fact is-
sue about her diligence. The Court should reverse.
2. NETCO v. Montemayor.
The gaps here are similar to gaps that the First Court of Appeals
analyzed in NETCO v. Montemayor. 43 There, Montemayor sued
NETCO in April 2007 but did not serve it until April 2008. During
May and June, Montemayor made four attempts at service. From mid-
June until limitations expired in December, she made no further attempts . In January, she asked the Department of Insurance to serve
NETCO but was told that title insurers need not register with the de-
partment. NETCO amended its registered-agent statement in mid- February; Montemayor hired a process server on March 31 to attempt
service, and was told that same day that the agent was no longer at the
address given to the Secretary of State. A process server unsuccessfully tried to serve NETCO’s president personally in Illinois the next
day. Montemayor finally served NETCO on April 15 by substituted
service. 44
An almost six-month-long gap separated Montemayor’s fourth at-
tempt at service from her inquiries to the Department of Insurance.
43 352 S.W. 3d 733 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
44 352 S.W.3d at 740.
17
Roughly three months more separated those inquiries from her next
attempt at service. Despite this nine-month gap, the First Court af-
firmed a jury finding that Montemayor had been diligent. 45 Likewise,
Samaniego had a gap of almost six months between her four attempts
at service and her next inquiries. The only difference is that Sama-
niego was asking after lawyers to replace her stroke-stricken attorney
— looking to replace the agent who was knowledgeable about and re-
sponsible for effecting service. And more, just as Montemayor obtained substitute service within two months after discovering how the
defendant could be served, Samaniego’s new counsel needed only six
weeks to move from a requested citation to substituted service.
A year between filing and service, including a nine-month gap, was
not so long as to show lack of diligence as a matter of law. Indeed, the
First Court held that evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff had been diligent. Here, Samaniego has been similarly dili-
gent. And here, the Court should find, as the First Court did, that the
plaintiff’s diligence is a disputed question of fact to be submitted to
the jury. The Court should reverse.
45 Id. at 741.
18
3. Auten v. DJ Clark.
The Fourteenth Court, too, has found fact issues on diligence in
similar situations. The plaintiff in Auten v. DJ Clark filed her suit
three days before limitations ran on her claim. 46 A process server at-
tempted service multiple times over the next few weeks. Shortly thereafter, the only legal assistant for the plaintiff’s attorney, who was
responsible for maintaining the attorney’s files, fell into a coma and
died. The attorney himself then developed a life-threatening infection
and was unable to work for several weeks. By the time the attorney had
hired a new assistant and could return to work, it was five months after
the case had been filed. 47
The trial court found a lack of diligence as a matter of law, and the
Fourteenth Court reversed. The defendants argued that the failures of
the plaintiff’s attorney and his staff did not excuse the plaintiff’s duty to diligently ensure that the defendants were served. The court had
none of it:
The legal assistant and counsel obviously did not abandon the substituted service through mere inaction considering they were both incapacitated during some of this period. We recognize counsel did not explain the steps he took to ascertain the status of his cases while
46 Auten v. DJ Clark, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
47 Id. at 701–702.
19
he was not incapacitated and exactly when he learned the status of this case. Nonetheless, he experienced two unusual hardships during this period. We can reasonably infer that it would take some time for an attorney to resume the normal operation of a law practice after his only assistant lapses into a coma and subsequently dies and after he has been incapacitated due to a serious illness. 48
The court also rejected arguments that snafus in the clerk’s office, which delayed service by another seven months, showed a lack of dili-
gence. 49
Here, the delay was due to the (apparently permanent) incapacitation of the attorney himself. This required a review of all of his case
files by another lawyer – a lawyer who declined to take Samaniego’s
case. Once Samaniego was aware that her attorney could no longer represent her and that his successor would not represent her, she
sought new counsel. She repeatedly sought new counsel. And once she
had located a new attorney, her case went from issuance of new citation to substituted service within six weeks. The total time from the
successor’s rejection of Samaniego’s case to substituted service upon
Silguero was less time in the clerk-office delay by itself in Auten.
48 Id. at 703.
49 Id. at 704–705.
20
The Fourteenth Court found a fact issue about a plaintiff’s dili-
gence when service was delayed for a year because of complications
that began with illness and death in the attorney’s office. Here, service
was delayed for slightly more than a year because of complications that
began with permanent, incapacitating illness in the attorney’s office.
This created a fact issue in Auten. It creates a fact issue here, too. The
Court should reverse.
4. Other cases.
These aren’t the only cases finding a fact issue. For example:
• This Court reversed a summary judgment because a plaintiff raised a fact issue on diligence when they described the efforts they made to locate the defendants during the nine post-filing months passed without service. 50
• This Court also reversed a summary judgment because a plaintiff raised a fact issue on diligence when three months passed between suit and service, including a no-activity gap of roughly a month. 51
• The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment because there was a fact issue on diligence when three months passed between suit and service. 52
50 Trice v. Tentzer, No. 03-99-00775-CV, 2000 WL 1125246 at *3–4 (Tex. App. – Austin Aug. 10, 2000, no pet.).
51 Franklin 2008 WL 3539949 at *3.
52 Tate v. Beal, 119 S.W.3d 378, 381–382 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied ).
21
• The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment because there was a fact issue on diligence when mixups at the attorney’s office resulted in an unpaid citation fee which, in turn, resulted in a defendant that was not served for eight months. 53
There are, of course, more. But as these cases — like Proulx,
NETCO, and Auten — show, a plaintiff with a reasonable explanation
for a delay in service has established a fact issue about her diligence.
Samaniego has a reasonable explanation. He has established a fact issue about her diligence. The Court should reverse.
B. Silguero’s cases are inapposite.
Silguero cited a handful of cases to the trial court to support her
claim that Samaniego didn’t act appropriately. But none of those cases
are comparable. In particular, none of them ask what a prudent person
would do when her lawyer suffers an incapacitating stroke. But more
generally, those cases involved an absolute absence of activity for
months — sometimes years — after the case was filed. Samaniego was not that somnolent. Silguero’s cases (discussed in the order that they
appear in her motion) 54 are inapplicable. The plaintiff in:
53 Valdez v. Charles Orsinger Buick Co., 715 S.W.2d 126, 127–28 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1986, no writ).
54 CR 36–37.
22
• Perry v. Kroger sued the day before limitations expired but took no action to serve until eight months later. 55
• Parsons v. Turley unilaterally decided not to request or serve citation so he could propose a settlement to the defendant. 56
• Webster v. Thomas sought a citation from the wrong clerk’s office for three months, sent the citation to the wrong constable , and waited two more weeks to send a citation to the correct constable when he was told of the mistake. 57
• Hamilton v. Goodson waited for more than six months to have a citation issued and gave no explanation for the delay. 58
• Butler v. Ross received a citation but did nothing to serve it for five and half months. 59
None of these situations mirror Samaniego’s. None of these plaintiffs’
actions mirror Samaniego’s. Samaniego raised a fact issue on her diligence . The trial court’s summary judgment was erroneous, and the
Court should reverse.
Conclusion and Prayer
The Court should reverse judgment and remand to the trial court.
55 Perry v. Kroger Stores, Store No. 119, 741 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1987, no writ).
56 109 S.W.3d 804, 808–10 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
57 5 S.W.3d at 290–292.
58 578 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Tex. Civ. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
59 836 S.W.2d at 836.
23
Samaniego prays for that reversal and remand and for all other re-
lief to which she may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted, The Olson Firm, PLLC /s/ Leif A. Olson Leif A. Olson State Bar No. 24032801 leif@olsonappeals.com PMB 188 4830 Wilson Road, Suite 300 Humble, Texas 77396 Counsel for appellant Jennifer Samaniego
Certificate of Compliance This Corrected Brief of Appellant Jennifer Samaniego was prepared with Microsoft Word 2013. According to that program’s word-count function, the sections covered by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1) contain 3,038 words.
/s/ Leif A. Olson
24
Certificate of Service On June 5, 2015, in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5(b), I served a copy of this Corrected Brief of Appellant Jennifer Samaniego and its Appendix on counsel for appellee Alieda Silguero by e-filing: Nadia Ramkissoon nadiaramkissoon@farmersinsurance.com Clark, Price & Trevino 1701 Directors Blvd., Suite 920 Austin, Texas 78744 (512) 445-1591 /s/ Leif A. Olson
No. 03-14-00795-CV
Third Court of Appeals at Austin
Jennifer Samaniego, Appellant, v.
Alieda Silguero, Appellee.
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Travis County Trial Court No. C-1-CV-13-004032
Appendix of Appellant Jennifer Samaniego
Leif A. Olson State Bar No. 24032801 leif@olsonappeals.com The Olson Firm, PLLC PMB 188 4830 Wilson Road, Suite 300 Humble, Texas 77396 (281) 849-8382 Counsel for Appellant Jennifer Samaniego
CAUSE NO. C-l-CV-13-004032
JENNIFER SAMANIEGO, § IN THE COUNTY COURT Plaintiff, § § § AT LAW NUMBER TWO VS. § § ALIEDA SILGUERO, § Defendant. § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER
The Court conducted a hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and, after considering the Motion, Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion, the pleadings in
this case, and the arguments of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion, in all
respects, should be granted.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and all claims against Defendant Alieda
Silguero in this matter are dismissed with prejudice.
SIGNED onthis the 18th day ofNovember, 2014.
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIINIIllllllllllllllllllllll 000924006
'"'S3
V