Jennifer Neal v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 21, 2023
DocketAT-0714-20-0742-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jennifer Neal v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Jennifer Neal v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jennifer Neal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JENNIFER NEAL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0714-20-0742-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: July 21, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Neil C. Bonney, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

Joy Warner, Karla Brown Dolby, and Sophia E. Haynes, Esquire, Decatur, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s performance-based removal, taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714. For the reasons set forth below, we DISMISS t he agency’s petition for review as moot.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

¶2 Effective August 10, 2020, the agency relied upon 38 U.S.C. § 714 to remove the appellant from her GS-11 Field Examiner position for unacceptable performance. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 17, 19-22. The appellant challenged her removal in the instant appeal. IAF, Tab 1. After developing the record and holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge ruled in favor of the appellant, reversing her removal. IAF, Tab 55, Initial Decision (ID). In short, the administrative judge considered a related decision by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) finding that individuals, such as the appellant, should have been afforded performance improvement periods (PIPs) prior to a removal based on unacceptable performance, and thus the appellant’s removal was not in accordance with law. 2 ID at 2-6. ¶3 The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 9. The agency has filed a reply. PFR File, Tab 11. Due to intervening events and representations while this appeal was pending on review, including some about the FLRA decision the administrative judge considered, the Office of the Clerk of the Board issued multiple orders seeking information about whether this appeal may have become moot. PFR File, Tab 16, 19, 23. These orders and the parties’ responses addressed developments stemming from two different series of arbitration and FLRA decisions pertaining to 38 U.S.C. § 714 and performance-based actions and the agency’s bargaining obligations regarding the implementation of the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017. PFR File, Tabs 14, 16-20, 22-28; see U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Veterans Benefits

2 The administrative judge ordered the agency to provide interim relief if either party filed a petition for review. ID at 7-8. The parties made various arguments about interim relief on petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 1, 7, 10. After the administrative judge issued her initial decision, the Board held that interim relief is precluded in actions taken under 38 U.S.C. § 714. Schmidt v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 40, ¶¶ 9-16; see 38 U.S.C. § 714(d)(7). In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not discuss this issue further. 3

Administration v. American Federation of Government Employees National Veterans Affairs Council #53, 71 F.L.R.A. 1113 (2020), recon. denied 72 F.L.R.A. 407 (2021) (PIP decisions); American Federation of Government Employees National Veterans Affairs Council #53 v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 71 F.L.R.A. 410 (2019), recon. denied 71 F.L.R.A. 741 (2020) (duty to bargain decisions). ¶4 Even though an action may have been within the Board’s jurisdiction, subsequent events may render an appeal moot and foreclose the Board’s review. Price v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 8 (2012). Mootness can arise at any stage of litigation, and an appeal will be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, the Board cannot grant any effectual relief in favor of the appellant, as when the appellant, by whatever means, obtained all of the relief she could have obtained had she prevailed before the Board and the reby lost any legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the appeal. Id. The agency’s unilateral modification of its personnel action after an appeal has been filed cannot divest the Board of jurisdiction, unless the appellant consents to such divestiture or the agency completely rescinds the action being appealed. Id. For an appeal to be deemed moot, the agency’s rescission must be complete, i.e., the appellant must be returned to the status quo ante and not left in a worse position as a result of the cancellation than she would have been in if the matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed. Id. ¶5 While its petition for review remained pending, the agency determined that the appellant was entitled to relief pursuant to the FLRA’s PIP decision s, including retroactive cancellation of her removal. PFR File, Tab 18 at 4-5, 84-85, Tab 22 at 4, 7-11. Both parties have now indicated that the agency cancelled the appellant’s removal, returned her to duty, and altogether made her whole. PFR File, Tab 27 at 4, Tab 28 at 4-5. Both parties have further indicated that the only issue that remains is attorney fees. PFR File, Tab 27 at 4, Tab 28 at 4. However, the incurrence of costs and attorney fees will not prevent dismissal of an appeal 4

as moot because an attorney fee award under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) is considered to be separate from relief on the merits. Price, 118 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 8 n.2. ¶6 Because the agency has granted the appellant all the relief the Board could have afforded her in this appeal, the petition for review is dismissed as moot.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for at torney fees and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
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2022 MSPB 40 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Jennifer Neal v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jennifer-neal-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2023.