FILED May 18 2026, 9:06 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Jennifer Lynn Goetz, Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Respondent
v.
James L. Goetz, Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Petitioner
May 18, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-DC-2101 Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court The Honorable Mark A. Smith, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32D04-2105-DC-330
Opinion by Judge Vaidik Judges Bailey and Scheele concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 1 of 24 Vaidik, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Jennifer Lynn Goetz (“Mother”) and James L. Goetz (“Father”) had four
children together before divorcing in 2022. In this high-conflict post-dissolution
proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to modify
school placement, calculation of Father’s income for purposes of modifying his
child-support obligation, denial of her request for attorney’s fees, and finding
that she was in contempt. Father cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
in denying his request for sole legal custody as to educational decisions and
instead ordering joint legal custody.
[2] We affirm as to Mother’s claims. But because Mother and Father have made
the children’s schooling a battleground, an award of joint legal custody as to
educational decisions imposes an intolerable situation upon Mother and Father
and is therefore not in the children’s best interests. Thus, we reverse the order of
joint legal custody as to educational decisions only and remand for the trial
court to award Father sole legal custody as to educational decisions.
Facts and Procedural History [3] Mother and Father married in 2011 and have four children: S.G., born in April
2012; P.G., born in December 2013; L.G., born in June 2016; and G.G., born
in December 2018. S.G., P.G., and L.G. have all been diagnosed with dyslexia
and ADHD. During the marriage, Mother homeschooled the children once
they reached school age. After Father filed for divorce in May 2021, Mother Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 2 of 24 and Father disagreed about whether S.G., P.G., and L.G. should attend public
or private school for the 2021-2022 school year (G.G. was not yet school age).
At the time, Mother worked as an aide in the Avon Community School
Corporation, which is the district the family lived in, and she wanted to enroll
the children there. Ultimately, S.G., P.G., and L.G. began attending public
school in Avon that fall. All three children “started significantly below grade
level.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 164.
[4] In April 2022, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution awarding Mother
primary physical custody and the marital home in Avon. The court awarded
Mother sole legal custody with the limitation that “[t]he children shall remain
in public school at the Avon Community School Corporation.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. 2 p. 45. At the time of the decree, Father worked for Biggby Coffee as
an area developer and also owned a share of a Biggby Coffee franchise. The
court ordered Father to pay $213 a week in child support and to maintain
health insurance for the children. The order also provided that the parties would
split the costs of tutoring and extracurricular activities according to income
shares (Father would pay 73% and Mother would pay 27%) and that Mother
would pay the first 6% of annual uninsured medical expenses, with the rest to
be split based on income shares.
[5] In March 2024, Mother, pro se, filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment”
requesting that the trial court vacate the provision of the dissolution decree
requiring the children to remain in Avon public schools. Id. at 114
(capitalization omitted). She asserted that Avon schools weren’t meeting the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 3 of 24 children’s educational needs. By that time, Mother was no longer working as an
aide. Father opposed the motion, and then in April, he filed a motion for rule to
show cause, alleging that “Mother has involved all of the girls in the dispute
about their school choice.” Id. at 181. Father, who was living in Plainfield,
wanted Mother to consider keeping the children at the same school. Mother
filed her own motion for rule to show cause including a myriad of allegations
against Father. The court set a hearing on the motions for November and
reappointed guardian ad litem (GAL) Betty Harrington, who’d served as GAL
while the dissolution was pending.
[6] In her report, GAL Harrington explained that although S.G., P.G., and L.G.
had academic challenges, especially with reading, they’d made significant
progress since entering public school. GAL Harrington noted that Mother had
shared her negative opinions about Avon schools with the children and that the
children “have been placed in the middle of an adult decision.” Appellee’s App.
Vol. 2 p. 79. She recommended that “Mother should not be permitted to move
the Girls from their current schools within Avon.” Id. at 80. At the time of the
report, G.G. was five years old and was supposed to be starting kindergarten in
the fall, but Mother later decided “she did not want [G.G.] to begin school in
2024.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 60.
[7] Mother hired counsel and, a week before the November hearing, filed an
amended motion for rule to show cause and another motion to modify the
requirement that the children attend Avon public schools. This time, she
claimed she could no longer afford to live in the marital home and wanted to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 4 of 24 move out of Avon, which would affect the children’s eligibility to attend Avon
schools because Father doesn’t live there. Father opposed Mother’s motion,
arguing that it was an improper notice of relocation and “request[ing] that the
court review and, if appropriate, modify the current custody, parenting time,
and child support order.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 p. 104.
[8] At the November 7 hearing, Mother withdrew her request to modify the
requirement that the children attend Avon public schools. See Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2 p. 31. In its order on the hearing, the court reset the matter for a hearing
on January 17, 2025, and noted that because Mother hadn’t filed a formal
notice of relocation, it didn’t intend to hear issues of relocation at the next
hearing. The court also ordered Mother and Father “not to have any
discussions with [the] children regarding the pending motions, school choice,
custody, parenting time or other adult matters related to the ongoing issues in
this case.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 p. 111.
[9] Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate in December stating that she’d sold
the marital home in Avon and was moving to the Washington Township school
district in Indianapolis. The day after filing the notice, Mother’s attorney
emailed Father’s attorney that Mother “is looking into schools in Washington
Township.” Id. at 128. Father moved for a temporary injunction prohibiting
Mother from unenrolling the children from Avon schools and again requested
that “[a]fter [a] hearing, the Court permanently modify Mother’s
custody/parenting time.” Id. at 120. Mother moved into her new home in
Indianapolis on January 5. Around that time, Mother took the children to a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 5 of 24 Washington Township school with the intention of enrolling them, but the
school was closed that day.
[10] The parties addressed Father’s motion for an injunction at the January 17, 2025
hearing. After the hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Mother from unenrolling the children from Avon schools or
enrolling them in any other school district until a final hearing on the merits.
The court again admonished Mother and Father “not to have any discussions
with [the] children regarding the pending motions, school choice, custody,
parenting time or other adult matters related to the ongoing issues in this case.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 31.
[11] In February 2025, Father filed a notice of intent to relocate, explaining that he
planned to move to a home in the Avon school district so the children could
remain enrolled there. He also asked the court to “modify the parties’ custody
and parenting plan as needed.” Id. at 33. Mother obtained new counsel and
filed another motion to modify the dissolution decree’s requirement that the
children remain in Avon public schools. She also filed another motion for rule
to show cause alleging that Father wasn’t maintaining adequate health
insurance for the children and wasn’t paying his share of their uninsured
medical expenses or the costs of their extracurricular activities and camps.
Mother explained that she had to take out secondary insurance plans to provide
coverage for the children, so she asked the court to modify child support to
reflect the insurance costs. The court scheduled a hearing on all pending
motions for July.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 6 of 24 [12] GAL Harrington submitted a supplemental report in May. She explained that
“Mother has created difficult relationships with teachers and staff at [Avon
Community School Corporation]” which “cannot be repaired.” Id. at 72. For
example, Mother was confrontational with teachers and front-office staff at
S.G.’s school, and P.G. and L.G.’s school had to implement a communication
plan whereby all communications from Mother are forwarded to the principal.
Additionally, Mother “requested accommodations for [S.G.] but then does not
want [S.G.] to use them,” questioned the credentials of the teachers at P.G. and
L.G.’s school, and accused the school of falsifying records related to the
children’s progress. Id. at 47. GAL Harrington explained that these actions
“demonstrate[] to the Children [Mother’s] disapproval of their schools.” Id. at
72. She found that Mother and Father can’t make joint decisions about the
children’s education and accordingly recommended that Mother not participate
in school-related decisions, Father be awarded sole legal custody with respect to
education, and the children remain in Avon public schools.
[13] At the July 2025 hearing, GAL Harrington reiterated that Father should be
awarded sole legal custody over educational decisions and recommended joint
legal custody as to all other matters, possibly with the help of a parenting
coordinator. She testified that the children were adjusted to both Mother’s and
Father’s new homes. She opined that Mother “thwarts the efforts” of the
children’s schools; for example, she doesn’t make the children do their
homework because “[s]he doesn’t believe in homework.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 17. GAL
Harrington explained that the children “are very involved in knowing what’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 7 of 24 happening in the education realm,” “they talk about how they’re at the wrong
school, and they know that [Mother] is trying to get them out of Avon.” Id. at
21. Additionally, she opined that it was “absolutely the incorrect decision” not
to enroll G.G. in kindergarten for the 2024-2025 school year because being the
oldest student in her class will “have such a psychological impact on her.” Id. at
25. During its questioning of GAL Harrington, the court remarked:
[I]f we were educating Judges about how to make decisions about joint legal custody, the Goetz[es] would not be a case that we would refer people to and look and say, hey, this is [a] successful co-parenting arrangement. It’s never been. There’s so much history here of distrust, distaste, dislike. Any decision with regard to joint legal custody to me seems a[nti]thetical to what joint legal custody is about in this case.
Id. at 36. The court also commented that a “parenting coordinat[or] works in
just a very small percentage of cases. . . . And it usually works in cases where
parties are willing to change, because you have to have a heart change before
there’s a head change. And I see no heart change here.” Id. at 36-37.
[14] Mother presented evidence of S.G.’s, P.G.’s, and L.G.’s testing and proficiency
scores, which had fluctuated over their years at Avon schools. But Susan Hurt,
the Special Education Director for Avon Community School Corporation,
testified that overall, the children have “made great strides” given that they
started significantly below grade level, and they can perform at grade level with
accommodations. Id. at 164. She explained that S.G. started below proficiency
in reading and math but was above proficiency in both by 2024, P.G. was above
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 8 of 24 proficiency in both reading and math by the winter of the 2024-2025 school
year, and L.G. started below proficiency in reading but was approaching
proficiency by the winter of 2024-2025 and was above proficiency in math. Hurt
noted that although G.G. wasn’t yet enrolled, she had a service plan and could
seek speech services through Avon. Hurt also testified that S.G.’s, P.G.’s, and
L.G.’s teachers have reported that they are respectful, have friends, and get
along with other students. She explained that research shows that changing
school systems can disrupt children’s learning and progress. She testified that
Father had been collaborative with the children’s schools and that she believed
she could work with him to continue implementing services for the children,
but she couldn’t say the same for Mother. Hurt noted that Avon had offered to
provide summer sessions with a special-education teacher for S.G., P.G., and
L.G. to prevent them from “slip[ping]” during summer break, but Mother
declined. Id. at 175.
[15] Mother submitted a child-support worksheet proposing an obligation of $575
for Father. She used $4,480.77 as Father’s weekly gross income, but she didn’t
explain how she arrived at this amount or provide any supporting
documentation. Mother denied making negative comments to the children
about Avon schools but said she’d told them to “not be down on themselves
because of the lack of appropriate interventions.” Id. at 224.
[16] Father requested sole legal custody related to educational decisions and joint
legal custody as to all other matters. By that time, Father was no longer a
Biggby Coffee franchisee and was working solely as an area developer. Father’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 9 of 24 proposed child-support obligation worksheet listed his weekly gross income as
$2,466.09, and he provided an income summary and supporting
documentation. Father’s 2024 tax return showed a gross income of $233,773,
but he explained that his “income was inflated” for that year because he’d sold
a business interest in 2024, so the income amount included the proceeds from
the sale. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 89.
[17] In August 2025, the trial court issued an order (1) denying Mother’s request to
remove the children from Avon schools; (2) denying Father’s request for sole
legal custody as to educational decisions and instead ordering joint legal
custody on all matters; (3) appointing a parenting coordinator and ordering the
parties to split the costs evenly; (4) modifying Father’s child-support obligation
to $336 per week based on an annual income of $128,232 (weekly gross income
of $2,466 x 52 weeks), but ordering that if Father’s annual gross income exceeds
$128,232, he shall pay Mother 24% of the excess; (5) ordering Father to
reimburse Mother for his share of uninsured medical expenses but declining to
find Father in contempt because there was no evidence of a request by Mother
for the correct reimbursement amount; (6) finding Mother in contempt for
involving the children in the school-choice dispute; (7) ordering the parties to
split uninsured medical expenses and tutoring costs according to income shares;
(8) capping Father’s annual contribution for camps and extracurricular activities
at $1,500; and (9) ordering the parties to pay their own attorney’s fees. After
Father filed a motion to reconsider, the trial court amended the order as to child
support. In light of Father’s irregular earnings, the court found that his support
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 10 of 24 obligation “would be more accurate if the parties reviewed the amount [of his
income] each year,” so it ordered that “an annual ‘true up’ be performed to
accurately reflect the exact amount of child support Father should pay.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 121.
[18] Mother, now pro se, appeals, and Father cross-appeals.
Discussion and Decision [19] Mother appeals the trial court’s rulings on school placement, child support,
attorney’s fees, and contempt, and Father appeals the court’s award of joint
legal custody. We address each challenge in turn.
I. Mother’s Appeal A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s request to modify the children’s school placement
[20] Mother first argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to modify
the children’s school placement. The parties’ dissolution decree awarded
Mother sole legal custody but included the limitation that the children remain
in Avon public schools. Thus, in moving to modify this requirement of the
dissolution decree, Mother was requesting modification of a child-custody
order. 1 We review a trial court’s ruling on custody modification only for an
1 Mother frames this argument as a challenge to the trial court’s ruling on her relocation request and contends that the relocation statutes (Indiana Code chapter 31-17-2.2) govern our analysis. But the trial court didn’t deny Mother’s relocation request; it allowed her to relocate with the children (which she’d already done) but denied her motion to modify the dissolution decree to remove the requirement that the children remain in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 11 of 24 abuse of discretion. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020), trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness
credibility, and we view the evidence most favorably to the judgment. Id.
[21] A trial court may not modify a child-custody order unless the moving party
shows that (1) modification is in the best interests of the child and (2) there is a
substantial change in one or more of the factors that the court may consider in
originally determining custody. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-21(a). As relevant here,
those factors include the parents’ wishes, the child’s “interaction and
interrelationship” with the parents and others, the child’s adjustment to their
school and community, and the mental and physical health of all involved. I.C.
§ 31-17-2-8.
[22] Here, Mother sought to modify the dissolution decree to allow her to remove
the children from Avon schools, while Father wished to keep the children
enrolled there. GAL Harrington testified that the children are adjusted to both
Mother’s and Father’s homes. Hurt, Avon’s Special Education Director,
testified that S.G., P.G., and L.G. are respectful, have friends, and get along
with other students and that research shows that changing school systems can
disrupt children’s learning and progress. Although S.G.’s, P.G.’s, and L.G.’s
testing and proficiency scores fluctuated throughout their years at Avon schools
and they still had some challenges with reading, they’ve “made great strides”
Avon public schools. Accordingly, Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21, which governs modification of a child- custody order, is the applicable statute.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 12 of 24 overall, especially given that they started significantly below grade level after
coming from homeschool. Hurt testified that they can perform at grade level
with accommodations. By the 2024-2025 school year, S.G. and P.G. were both
above proficiency in reading and math, and L.G. was approaching proficiency
in reading and above proficiency in math.
[23] Although the children made comments that “they’re at the wrong school,”
GAL Harrington opined that “the children have been influenced by Mom’s
perspective.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 21, 24. Indeed, many of the issues with Avon
schools appear to have stemmed from Mother’s actions. Mother was
confrontational with teachers and front-office staff at S.G.’s school, and P.G.
and L.G.’s school had to implement a communication plan due to excessive
emails from Mother. As GAL Harrington explained, Mother “thwarts the
efforts” of the children’s schools—she “requested accommodations for [S.G.]
but then does not want [S.G.] to use them,” questioned the credentials of the
teachers at P.G. and L.G.’s school, accused the school of falsifying records
related to the children’s progress, declined Avon’s offer to provide summer
sessions with a special-education teacher, and doesn’t make the children do
their homework because she doesn’t believe in homework. Despite Mother
thwarting Avon’s efforts, S.G., P.G., and L.G. have made academic progress
overall. As the trial court concluded, “[w]hile arguably not perfect in their
implementation, the strategies employed” by Avon schools “have resulted in
successful outcomes, despite the continued resistance from Mother.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 107.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 13 of 24 [24] Mother has failed to show that it is in the children’s best interests to modify the
requirement that they remain in Avon public schools. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s request to modify school placement.
B. The trial court did not err in determining Father’s income for purposes of calculating child support
[25] Mother next argues that the trial court erred in calculating Father’s income for
purposes of modifying his child-support obligation. A trial court’s calculation of
child support is presumptively valid, and we will set aside the modification of a
support obligation only if it is clearly erroneous. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d
733, 738 (Ind. 2015). In reviewing a modification order, we consider only the
evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. Id. The Indiana
Child Support Guidelines recognize that “[t]here are numerous forms of
income that are irregular or nonguaranteed,” and “[c]are should be taken to set
support based on dependable income.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A), cmt.
(2)(b). “When the court determines that it is not appropriate to include irregular
income in the determination of the child support obligation, the court should
express its reasons.” Id.
[26] In calculating Father’s support obligation, the trial court used a weekly gross
income of $2,466 for Father, which amounts to an annual income of $128,232.
Mother contends that the trial court erred by excluding from Father’s gross
income the proceeds from the 2024 sale of his business interest because it didn’t
make a “finding that the 2024 proceeds were truly one-time,” and Father
“produced no . . . documentation to substantiate his claim that these proceeds
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 14 of 24 are non-recurring.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 46, 47-48. Although the court
acknowledged that Father’s 2024 tax return reflected a gross income of
$233,773, it accepted Father’s testimony that this amount “was inflated and an
outlier” due to the sale of his business interest. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 pp. 105-
06. In other words, the court found that the proceeds from the sale weren’t
dependable income. And Father’s documentation supports the use of $128,232
as his annual income. His income summary and paystubs show that he was
earning this amount at the time of the hearing, and his testimony that his
income was inflated in 2024 substantiates that his gross income is $128,232, not
$233,773.
[27] In any event, even though the court didn’t include the 2024 proceeds in its
determination of Father’s weekly gross income, it still provided a mechanism to
incorporate any irregular income into Father’s support obligation—it ordered
the parties to perform an annual “true up” whereby Father will have to verify
his income for the previous year, and that amount will be used to determine his
support obligation. This mechanism satisfies the Guidelines’ requirement that
support reflect dependable income. By anchoring the base obligation to Father’s
current earnings while building in annual reconciliation, the court accounted
for irregular income without inflating the weekly obligation with a one-time
windfall. The trial court did not err in calculating Father’s income for purposes
of modifying his support obligation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 15 of 24 C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney’s fees
[28] Mother also contends that the trial court erred in ordering the parties to pay
their own attorney’s fees instead of ordering Father to pay her attorney’s fees.
In post-dissolution proceedings, the trial court may order a party to pay a
reasonable amount toward the opposing party’s attorney’s fees. Van Wieren v.
Van Wieren, 858 N.E.2d 216, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also Reel v. Reel, 231
N.E.3d 915, 925-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“Indiana Code Section 31-17-7-1 . . .
allows the award of attorney’s fees in post-dissolution cases . . . .”). “When
making such an award, the court must consider the resources of the parties,
their economic condition, the ability of the parties to engage in gainful
employment and to earn adequate income and other factors that bear on the
reasonableness of the award.” Hendricks v. Hendricks, 784 N.E.2d 1024, 1028
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The decision to grant or deny attorney’s fees is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and a decision to deny attorney’s fees will be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Van Wieren, 858 N.E.2d at 224.
[29] Mother argues that in light of the trial court’s finding that “[t]here is a very large
disparity in gross weekly income in Father’s favor,” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p.
106, the court should have ordered Father to “pay all or a substantial portion”
of her attorney’s fees under Section 31-17-7-1, Appellant’s Br. p. 53. 2 But “the
2 Mother makes this same argument under Section 31-17-7- 1 as to the GAL fees, parenting-coordinator fees, uninsured medical expenses, and tutoring and camp costs. But Section 31-17-7-1 doesn’t apply to these expenses; it concerns only awards for the cost of maintaining and defending an action, attorney’s fees, and mediation services. GAL fees are governed by Indiana Code section 31-17-6-9, and costs like tutoring, camp,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 16 of 24 economic condition of the parties is only one factor bearing on the
reasonableness of a fee award.” Reel, 231 N.E.3d at 926. Indeed, “misconduct
that directly results in additional litigation expenses may be properly taken into
account in the trial court’s decision to award attorney’s fees.” Hendricks, 784
N.E.2d at 1028. The trial court here found:
Mother caused an increase in fees by first representing herself, then withdrawing her request to modify school choice only to re- file the same about 5 months later. Mother caused an additional increase in fees by failing to properly follow the relocation statute. Father incurred significant attorney fees seeking discovery, efforts which resulted in 2 separate orders compelling Mother to respond. Mother was found in contempt for involving the children in the school choice dispute.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 106. In light of these facts, the trial court acted
within its discretion in declining to award fees to either party. The court did not
abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney’s fees.
D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt
[30] Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding her in contempt for
involving the children in the school-choice dispute. Generally, a person who
willfully disobeys an order lawfully issued by the court of record or the proper
uninsured medical expenses, and parenting-coordinator fees are covered by the Indiana Child Support and Parenting Time Guidelines. See Ind. Child Support Guidelines 7-8; Ind. Parenting Time Guideline V(C)(6). Mother doesn’t cite any of these authorities. Because the sole basis for her challenge to the trial court’s allocation of GAL fees, parenting-coordinator fees, uninsured medical expenses, and tutoring and camp costs is Section 31-17-7-1, which doesn’t apply, this part of Mother’s argument is without merit.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 17 of 24 officer of the court is guilty of indirect contempt. See I.C. § 34-47-3-1; Henderson
v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “It is soundly within
the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and
we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.” Steele-Giri v.
Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016).
[31] GAL Harrington noted in her 2024 report that the children were “placed in the
middle of an adult decision” because Mother shared her negative opinions
about Avon schools with them. In its order on the November 7, 2024 hearing,
the trial court admonished the parties “not to have any discussions with [the]
children regarding the pending motions, school choice, custody, parenting time
or other adult matters related to the ongoing issues in this case.” The court
included this same admonition in its order on the January 17, 2025 hearing. 3
Before the court ruled on Mother’s request to remove the children from Avon
schools, Mother sold the marital home in Avon and moved to the Washington
Township school district. Mother admitted that around the start of the 2024-
2025 spring semester, she took the children to a Washington Township school
with the intention of enrolling them, but the school was closed that day. She
also acknowledged that she’d made comments to them about “the lack of
appropriate interventions” at Avon schools. GAL Harrington testified that the
3 In her reply brief, Mother argues that the January 2025 order was not sufficiently clear. See, e.g., Deel v. Deel, 909 N.E.2d 1028, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“A party may not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an ambiguous or indefinite order.”). But Mother didn’t challenge the clarity of the January 2025 order in her opening brief, so this argument is waived. See Naville v. Naville, 818 N.E.2d 552, 553 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“A party may not raise an argument for the first time in its reply brief.”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 18 of 24 children “are very involved in knowing what’s happening in the education
realm,” “they talk about how they’re at the wrong school, and they know that
[Mother] is trying to get them out of Avon.” And GAL Harrington explained
that “Mother has created difficult relationships with teachers and staff at [Avon
Community School Corporation],” which “demonstrates to the Children her
disapproval of their schools.” All these facts support the trial court’s finding that
Mother involved the children in the school-choice dispute. The court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt.
II. Father’s Cross-Appeal [32] On cross-appeal, Father argues that the trial court erred in ordering fully joint
legal custody rather than granting him sole legal custody as to educational
decisions. At the outset, Mother contends that legal custody was “not properly
at issue under the pleadings” because Father never petitioned for modification
of legal custody. Appellant’s Br. p. 30. But under Trial Rule 15(B), “[w]hen
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.”
[33] Father requested that the trial court modify the parties’ custody arrangement in
his November 1, 2024 objection to Mother’s improper notice of relocation, see
Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 p. 104, his December 23, 2024 motion for a temporary
injunction, see id. at 120, and his February 7, 2025 notice of intent to relocate,
see id. at 156. GAL Harrington recommended in her supplemental report and at
the July 2025 hearing that Father be awarded sole legal custody with respect to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 19 of 24 education. At the hearing, Father requested sole legal custody as to educational
decisions and joint legal custody as to all other matters. And Mother testified
about what she’s “afraid of if [Father] is given legal custody regarding the
girls[’] educational decisions.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 144. Clearly, the issue of
modification of legal custody was tried by consent of the parties and thus is
properly before us for review. See Ellenburg v. Kropp, 175 N.E.3d 1208, 1212
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“Father’s pleadings . . . sufficiently place the issue of legal
custody before the court. . . . In addition, the parties presented arguments and
evidence which put into question the issue of legal custody.”), trans. denied.
[34] As noted above, we review a custody modification for an abuse of discretion.
McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288. We will reverse only if the trial court’s decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may award joint legal
custody if the court finds that such an award “would be in the best interest of
the child.” I.C. § 31-17-2-13. In determining whether an award of joint legal
custody is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider:
(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint custody;
(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child’s welfare;
(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 20 of 24 (4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;
(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:
(A) live in close proximity to each other; and
(B) plan to continue to do so; and
(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.
I.C. § 31-17-2-15. The second factor—whether the parents are willing and able
to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child’s welfare—is particularly
important in making a legal-custody determination. Rasheed v. Rasheed, 142
N.E.3d 1017, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Where the parties have
made child-rearing a battleground, joint legal custody is not appropriate. Id.
Therefore, while we are reluctant to reverse a trial court’s grant of joint legal
custody, “we will do so when the evidence indicates a clear abuse of trial court
discretion in that the joint custody award constitutes an imposition of an
intolerable situation upon two persons who have made child rearing a
battleground.” Swadner v. Swadner, 897 N.E.2d 966, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(quotation omitted).
[35] Here, the trial court found that modifying legal custody to joint is in the
children’s best interests. But because Mother and Father have made child-
rearing—specifically the children’s schooling—a battleground, an award of joint
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 21 of 24 legal custody as to educational decisions imposes an intolerable situation upon
them. As the trial court noted, “Throughout the history of this case, the parties
have had significant and repeated problems communicating and effectively co-
parenting.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 92. GAL Harrington, who’s worked
with the parties since the dissolution proceedings began, described Mother and
Father as “oil and water.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 28. She concluded that they can’t make
joint decisions about the children’s education and accordingly recommended
that Father be awarded sole legal custody with respect to educational decisions.
The court remarked during the July 2025 hearing that Mother and Father’s
relationship has “never been” a successful coparenting arrangement and that
awarding joint legal custody “seems a[nti]thetical to what joint legal custody is
about.” The court also commented that a parenting coordinator “works in just a
very small percentage of cases,” usually “in cases where parties are willing to
change, because you have to have a heart change before there’s a head change.
And I see no heart change here.” Yet despite these observations, the court
concluded that Mother and Father having joint legal custody while working
with a parenting coordinator is in the children’s best interests. With respect to
education, this decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court—especially given that the children will be
remaining in Avon schools, and the court found that “Mother’s relationship
with Avon Schools has completely broken down and [is] likely irreconcilable.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 p. 94. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding
joint legal custody as to education.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 22 of 24 [36] Instead, the evidence supports Father having sole legal custody as to
educational decisions. Special Education Director Hurt testified that Father had
been collaborative with the children’s schools, and she believed she could work
with him to continue implementing services for the children. But Hurt couldn’t
say the same for Mother. GAL Harrington recommended that Mother not be
allowed to participate in school-related decisions because “Mother has created
difficult relationships with teachers and staff at [Avon Community School
Corporation]” which “cannot be repaired.” As detailed above, Mother has
thwarted Avon’s efforts to help S.G., P.G., and L.G. And although G.G. was
supposed to be in kindergarten for the 2024-2025 school year, Mother later
decided not to start her in school for another year. GAL Harrington opined that
this was “absolutely the incorrect decision” because G.G. being the oldest
student in her class will “have such a psychological impact on her.” And before
the court ruled on Mother’s request to remove the children from Avon schools,
she sold her home in Avon, moved to Washington Township, and tried to
enroll the children there. Mother has shown that she is not willing or able to
cooperate in advancing the children’s welfare as it relates to education.
Accordingly, an award of joint legal custody as to educational decisions is not
in the children’s best interests.
[37] Father requested (and GAL Harrington recommended) sole legal custody only
with respect to educational decisions. Although Mother and Father have
problems communicating and coparenting, because there is insufficient
evidence in the record of conflicts as to other matters (such as health care or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 23 of 24 religion), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding joint
legal custody entirely. We therefore reverse the award of joint legal custody as
to educational decisions only, affirm joint legal custody as to non-educational
matters, and remand with instructions for the trial court to award sole legal
custody to Father with respect to education.
[38] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE PRO SE Jennifer Lynn Goetz Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT Melinda O’Dell O’Dell Family Law, LLC Brownsburg, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-2101 | May 18, 2026 Page 24 of 24