1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jennifer Elaine Myles, No. CV-25-00810-PHX-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 The Court now considers Plaintiff Jennifer Elaine Myles’s appeal from the Social 16 Security Administration’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security 17 income (“SSI”). The Court reviewed the briefing, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and 18 the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision (AR 18–30). The Court affirms the 19 ALJ’s decision for the following reasons. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff applied for SSI under Title XVI of the Social 22 Security Act alleging a disability onset date of August 1, 2022. (AR. 18.) Plaintiff’s claims 23 were denied initially and on reconsideration. (AR 18.) After an administrative hearing, an 24 ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 15, 2024, finding Plaintiff not disabled. 25 (AR. 30.) The Appeals Council denied review of that decision, making the ALJ’s 26 determination the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 27 Administration. (AR. 1–3.) Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision 28 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 3 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 4 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 5 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 6 the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If 7 so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines 8 whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 9 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. 10 Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 11 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 12 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is 13 automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, 14 the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines 15 whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 16 § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, 17 the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the claimant can 18 perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 19 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant 20 is disabled. Id. 21 The Court only reviews the issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s 22 decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will 23 uphold an ALJ’s decision “unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial 24 evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is 25 more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance” and is such that “a reasonable 26 mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (first quoting Bayliss v. 27 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); and then quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 28 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). As a general rule, if the “evidence is susceptible to 1 more than one rational interpretation,” the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision. Burch, 2 400 F.3d at 679. That said, the Court should “consider the entire record as a whole and 3 may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orne, 495 4 F.3d at 630 (citation modified). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 7 (Doc. 10 at 12.) 8 An ALJ employs a two-step process in evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony. 9 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, “the ALJ must determine 10 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 11 impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 12 alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). 13 Second, if there is such objective evidence, and “no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can 14 reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering 15 specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation modified). “The standard 16 isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear 17 enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 18 2022). 19 Here, The ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: a 20 depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and a 21 trauma related disorder.” (AR 21.) The ALJ found “that the claimant’s medically 22 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged 23 symptoms.” (AR 24.) However, the ALJ found that “the claimant’s statements concerning 24 the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 25 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 24.) 26 The ALJ summarized Platiniff’s testimony as follows: She is 31 years old. She has a high school education. She is not attending 27 school presently. She has never worked full time. She lives in a house with 28 her parents. Her mother works (in between jobs) and her father is disabled 1 (both physical and mental disability). She does not help care for him. The claimant testified that she does not do dishes, rarely goes to the grocery store, 2 does not cook, and does not do laundry. She testified drawing as a hobby. 3 She does not do volunteer work or odd jobs for money. She has no current source of income. She has a driver’s license but does not drive (last drove 4 maybe 10 years ago). She is 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighs 250 pounds. She 5 is prevented from working due to severe anxiety and depression interfering with her ability to function. She receives mental health treatment with a 6 therapist and psychiatrist.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Jennifer Elaine Myles, No. CV-25-00810-PHX-SMB
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 The Court now considers Plaintiff Jennifer Elaine Myles’s appeal from the Social 16 Security Administration’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security 17 income (“SSI”). The Court reviewed the briefing, the Administrative Record (“AR”), and 18 the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision (AR 18–30). The Court affirms the 19 ALJ’s decision for the following reasons. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff applied for SSI under Title XVI of the Social 22 Security Act alleging a disability onset date of August 1, 2022. (AR. 18.) Plaintiff’s claims 23 were denied initially and on reconsideration. (AR 18.) After an administrative hearing, an 24 ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 15, 2024, finding Plaintiff not disabled. 25 (AR. 30.) The Appeals Council denied review of that decision, making the ALJ’s 26 determination the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 27 Administration. (AR. 1–3.) Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision 28 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 3 follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 4 proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 5 v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 6 the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If 7 so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines 8 whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 9 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. 10 Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 11 impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 12 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is 13 automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, 14 the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines 15 whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 16 § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, 17 the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the claimant can 18 perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 19 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant 20 is disabled. Id. 21 The Court only reviews the issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s 22 decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will 23 uphold an ALJ’s decision “unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial 24 evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is 25 more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance” and is such that “a reasonable 26 mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (first quoting Bayliss v. 27 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); and then quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 28 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). As a general rule, if the “evidence is susceptible to 1 more than one rational interpretation,” the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision. Burch, 2 400 F.3d at 679. That said, the Court should “consider the entire record as a whole and 3 may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orne, 495 4 F.3d at 630 (citation modified). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 7 (Doc. 10 at 12.) 8 An ALJ employs a two-step process in evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony. 9 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, “the ALJ must determine 10 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 11 impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 12 alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). 13 Second, if there is such objective evidence, and “no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can 14 reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering 15 specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation modified). “The standard 16 isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear 17 enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 18 2022). 19 Here, The ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: a 20 depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and a 21 trauma related disorder.” (AR 21.) The ALJ found “that the claimant’s medically 22 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged 23 symptoms.” (AR 24.) However, the ALJ found that “the claimant’s statements concerning 24 the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent 25 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 24.) 26 The ALJ summarized Platiniff’s testimony as follows: She is 31 years old. She has a high school education. She is not attending 27 school presently. She has never worked full time. She lives in a house with 28 her parents. Her mother works (in between jobs) and her father is disabled 1 (both physical and mental disability). She does not help care for him. The claimant testified that she does not do dishes, rarely goes to the grocery store, 2 does not cook, and does not do laundry. She testified drawing as a hobby. 3 She does not do volunteer work or odd jobs for money. She has no current source of income. She has a driver’s license but does not drive (last drove 4 maybe 10 years ago). She is 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighs 250 pounds. She 5 is prevented from working due to severe anxiety and depression interfering with her ability to function. She receives mental health treatment with a 6 therapist and psychiatrist. Things go wrong when she tries to work that she 7 described as anxiety attacks, memory problems (does not remember what people are telling her to do), and brain fog. She last worked 7 years ago for 8 a few weeks; she keep having panic attacks and ended up quitting. Her panic 9 attacks last anywhere from 20 minutes to a couple of hours. She can have panic attacks everyday if she does not keep herself distracted. She takes 10 depression and anxiety medication. She has OCD and does things in 11 increments of three (e.g., touching a doorknob, counting steps). She has suicidal ideations every day. She does okay interacting one on one with 12 people, but later added that it depends on the person. 13 (AR 23–24.) 14 Plaintiff first argues that “the ALJ failed to connect anything specific in the medical 15 record to a specific inconsistency with any particular portion of Myles’s work-preclusive 16 symptom testimony.” (Doc. 10 at 13.) Plaintiff then argues that “the ALJ ignored that the 17 record contained findings showing Myles’s depression, anxiety, OCD, and PTSD caused 18 severe symptoms and were consistent with Myles’s written statements and hearing 19 symptom testimony.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff’s symptoms improving 20 with medication “is an insufficient reason to reject Myles’s symptom testimony as this 21 record does not show that Myles’s mental health symptoms overall were improved with 22 treatments on a long-term basis such that her symptom testimony was invalid or that she 23 could return to work.” (Id. at 17.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance on 24 Plaintiff’s daily activities was insufficient to reject her symptom testimony because 25 “[t]hese activities, however, were not inconsistent with Myles’s symptom testimony when 26 none of these activities were performed outside of the house she shared with her parents, 27 and all were performed on an occasional basis and/or with varying amounts of required 28 attention.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s arguments are unconvincing. 1 To start, the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff improved with 2 treatment. This is a recognized basis for discounting subjective symptom testimony. 3 Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical 4 treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”) The ALJ 5 points to multiple instances in the record reflecting that Plaintiff reported that medication 6 helped mitigate her symptoms. (AR 24, 400, 402, 722.) 7 The record also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s reported symptoms 8 are not as severe as alleged. This is a recognized basis for discounting subjective symptom 9 testimony. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–60 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 10 inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective medical evidence is a clear 11 and convincing reason for discounting claimant’s testimony). The ALJ points to multiple 12 mental status exams containing generally normal findings and various instances of 13 Plaintiff’s self-reported improvements. (AR 24, 680–81, 724, 792, 879, 884, 1073.) 14 The record also supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s daily activities 15 contradict her symptom testimony. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 16 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh 17 inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, 18 and work record, among other factors.”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 19 2012) (“Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be 20 grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims 21 of a totally debilitating impairment.”). Despite Plaintiff’s testimony, the record reflects 22 that Plaintiff cooks, takes care of pets, engages in a variety of hobbies, maintains a social 23 life, and performs some household duties such as babysitting. (AR 25–26, 395–405, 641, 24 643, 670–71, 683, 794, 796, 806, 1065.) 25 Viewed as a whole, the ALJ adequately identified which aspects of Plaintiff’s 26 testimony that were inconsistent with the record and provided clear and convincing 27 reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting his subjective symptom 28 allegations. Though the evidence in this record may be fairly “susceptible to more than 1 || one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Burch v. 2|| Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). It is not the role of this Court to reweigh the 3 || evidence; it is only to consider whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. 4|| Mata v. Kijakazi, No. 22-35482, 2023 WL 3836421, at *1 (9th Cir. June 6, 2023). The 5 || ALJ’s evaluations were proper, and her findings are supported by substantial evidence in 6 || this record. IV. CONCLUSION 8 Accordingly, 9 IT IS ORDERED affirming the ALJ’s March 15, 2024 decision. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 11 |} consistent with this Order and close this case. 12 Dated this 20th day of February, 2026. 13 Se . ~P 14 SO 15 Alonorable Susan V [. Brnovich United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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