FILED
Sep 18 2026, 8:47 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Jennifer E. Chadd,
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
September 18, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-2546
Appeal from the
Tippecanoe Superior Court
The Honorable
Randy J. Williams, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D01-2407-F2-29
Opinion by Senior Judge Crone Judge Vaidik concurs.
Judge Felix concurs with separate opinion.
Crone, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] A jury found Jennifer Chadd guilty of dealing in methamphetamine and theft of
a firearm. She appeals her convictions, challenging the admission of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction of theft. She also asserts that her sentence is inappropriate. Finding that Chadd has failed to establish reversible error in either the admission of evidence or the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm her convictions. Finding that she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that her sentence is inappropriate, we also affirm her sentence.
Issues [2] Chadd presents three issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Chadd’s uncharged misconduct;
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Chadd’s conviction of theft; and
III. Whether Chadd’s sentence is inappropriate.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In July 2024, Officer Dalder of the Lafayette Police Department observed a
vehicle being driven by Richard Ruhlander, whose driving privileges the officer knew to be suspended. The officer also recognized Chadd as Ruhlander’s passenger. Officer Dalder contacted Officer Stoneking for assistance, and Officer Stoneking initiated a traffic stop.
[4] A K-9 unit was called to the scene and alerted to the presence of narcotics. The officers then searched the vehicle, which was registered to Chadd, and found a backpack behind the driver’s seat which contained a black case containing two bags with a substance that was later identified as methamphetamine, a digital scale, approximately one hundred small plastic baggies, filters, pipe cleaners, a razor blade, a purple hair barrette, and boxes of both 9mm and .380 ammunition. In addition, Chadd had two cell phones and approximately $1,100 in cash in her possession, and Ruhlander had about $1,500 in cash. The officers also located a locked safe under the passenger seat where Chadd had been seated. Officer Stoneking later opened the safe with a key from Chadd’s keychain. The safe contained a Bersa Thunder .380 handgun with a loaded magazine and a 9mm Smith & Wesson handgun which was loaded. Further investigation revealed that the Smith & Wesson handgun was reported stolen on May 2, 2024 by Richard Brown.
[5] The State charged Chadd with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 felony theft of a firearm, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Prior to trial, the State filed its notice of intent to offer Rule 404(b) evidence of Chadd’s uncharged misconduct of selling and using methamphetamine. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the State’s motion to allow the evidence, with one exception not relevant here.
[6] At trial, Officer Stoneking testified about the traffic stop. The State’s evidence also included Exhibit 13, the Certificate of Analysis from the Indiana State Police Laboratory, which was admitted by stipulation of the parties. Exhibit 13 shows that the two bags of methamphetamine found in the backpack weighed 16.38 and 1.58 grams. Ex. Vol. IV, p. 65.
[7] Additionally, the State presented the testimony of Detective Phelps with the West Lafayette Police Department concerning drug use, sales, and terminology. At the time of Chadd’s offenses, Phelps was assigned to the Tippecanoe County Drug Task Force, where his primary assignment was identifying and infiltrating drug trafficking organizations. Detective Phelps testified that in determining whether an individual is a drug user or a drug dealer, factors considered include: weight of the drug, presence of baggies, presence of a scale, number of phones, and amount of cash. Tr. Vol. II, p. 230. He specified that typically a user would have up to 3.5 grams (known as “an eight ball”) and that a dealer would have more than 3.5 grams. Id. In addition, dealers generally have a large amount of unused plastic baggies for packaging and distribution of the drug while users might possess a few used baggies. Id. at 230-31. When asked his perception of State’s Exhibit 2, which is a photo of the black case, baggies, scale, drugs, and utensils found in the backpack in Chadd’s car, Detective Phelps declared, “This is a travel case for narcotic sales.” Id. at 233.
[8] Detective Phelps then gave testimony more specific to Chadd. He indicated that the police conducted forensic downloads on the two cell phones that were seized from Chadd. Through the detective’s testimony, the State introduced Exhibits 15, 16, and 17, which were the subject of its notice of intent to offer Rule 404(b) evidence. Exhibit 15 depicts messages between Chadd and a person named Frank on June 7, 2024 between 12:46 a.m. and 3:14 a.m. Ex. Vol. IV, pp. 75-79. Frank asked Chadd: “Can you hook me up[?]” Id. at 75. Chadd inquired how much Frank wanted to spend and told him, “I got you.” Id. at 76. Chadd then asked Frank what he wanted, to which Frank responded, “Ball.” Id. at 77. Detective Phelps reiterated that a “ball” refers to 3.5 grams of a narcotic. Tr. Vol. II, p. 236. Later that day, Frank messaged Chadd and asked: “What could take [sic] do me a half z for[?]” Ex. Vol. IV, p. 79. Chadd responded, “Half is 270.” Id. at 80. The detective testified that “zip” is lingo for one ounce and that “half z” is 14 grams. Tr. Vol. II, p. 236.
[9] On June 16, Chadd texted Frank: “If he would answer me I could get it and bring it over. He is with his wife again so I don’t know if he will even respond to me.” Ex. Vol. IV, p. 81. And then: “Great I just had to buy this from him he is back with his wife again and you’re asleep. I’m stuck with this shit[.]” Id. When Frank responds, “I’ll take it,” Chadd messages: “That was short .2 so I have been waiting for him to respond and make it right.” Id. at 82. Detective Phelps testified that Chadd’s message meant that the amount of methamphetamine was slightly less than the full amount Frank paid for, so Chadd was trying to make it right. Tr. Vol. II, p. 238.
[10] On June 23, Chadd texted Frank that she “got burnt with hot rail juice” and had a blister. Ex. Vol. IV, p. 83. Detective Phelps explained that rail juice is residue that is created when methamphetamine, which must be heated to a very high temperature, is heated in a glass pipe with a large bowl on the end. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 238-39. He affirmed that Chadd’s statement about being burnt by hot rail juice was in reference to using methamphetamine. Id. at 239.
[11] State’s Exhibit 16 consists of text messages between Chadd and Ruhlander. At 1:47 a.m. on June 16, Ruhlander messaged Chadd, “Whatever u want idk how much ur charging them.” Ex. Vol. IV, p. 85. A few hours later, Ruhlander told Chadd that he had been “walking around making sales.” Id. at 86. And at 2:36 a.m. on June 17, Ruhlander stated that he “just gotta sell another ball n a half.” Id. at 87. The detective testified that these messages concerned the sale of narcotics. Tr. Vol. II, p. 240.
[12] State’s Exhibit 17 is a note from one of Chadd’s cell phones that states: “$230 Rick money on cash Inkk app +$25 5/28/24.” Ex. Vol. IV, p. 89. Detective Phelps testified that, based on his training and experience, the note was a “ledger.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 241.
[13] Chadd’s defense theory was that Ruhlander was the person to blame and that she was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time because she “had the misfortune of accompanying her boyfriend.” Id. at 156. Defense counsel told the jury that this was “a case of Jennifer Chadd making a poor relationship decision nothing more,” id., and that “Richard Ruhlander isn’t a good person.
Richard Ruhlander is a bad person. By his own admission, he was an addict, a user and a dealer.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 35. As the sole defense witness, Ruhlander stated that he had pleaded guilty to his charges and claimed that Chadd had no knowledge of what was in the backpack. He further testified that Chadd supported him financially and that he hoped “she wouldn’t get in trouble for something I did.” Id. at 12.
[14] The jury found Chadd guilty of dealing in methamphetamine and theft of a firearm, and the court sentenced her to an aggregate sentence of eighteen years. She now appeals.
Discussion and Decision I. Evidence Rule 404(b)
[15] Chadd contends the evidence of her uncharged misconduct contained in State’s
Exhibits 15, 16, and 17 was highly prejudicial and inadmissible for any purpose. Chadd first acknowledges that her argument is subject to waiver because, although the trial court heard her objection to this evidence at the pre-trial hearing, her counsel did not renew the objection when the evidence was offered at trial. See Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 n.1-1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (stating that defendant waived appellate review of claim that trial court erred in admitting other-acts evidence where defendant filed pre-trial motion to exclude evidence but did not object when evidence was introduced at trial and noting that Evidence Rule 103(b) inapplicable for same reason), trans. denied. Nevertheless, Chadd asserts that her claim should not be waived because the trial court “had a full opportunity to address the objection during a pretrial hearing,” making a further objection at trial unnecessary because the grounds for her objection were presented to the trial court and stated in the record. Appellant’s Br. p. 17.
[16] Chadd also notes that Evidence Rule 103(b) was recently amended and suggests
1
that we apply the amended version here. Our Supreme Court amended
Evidence Rule 103(b), effective July 1, 2026, to provide:
(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before trial or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. This includes a ruling on a motion in limine.
Ind. Evidence Rule 103(b) (emphasis added).
[17] The hearing on the State’s notice of intent to offer Rule 404(b) evidence was held only one week prior to the start of trial. The court considered the matter during that week and announced its ruling the morning of the first day of trial. As the issue was carefully weighed by the trial court, it appears that the logic for not finding waiver in this case—i.e., the pretrial objection to the evidence was
1 The prior version of Evidence Rule 103(b) which was in effect at the time of Chadd’s trial, provided:
(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof. Once the court rules definitively on the record at trial a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. (Emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2546 | September 18, 2026 Page 8 of 21 fully considered by the trial court and thus does not need to be renewed during the course of trial—is the same rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s recent amendment to Rule 103(b). In light of this fact and given our preference to decide cases on the merits, Hoback v. State, 225 N.E.3d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), we exercise our discretion to decline to hold that Chadd waived for appeal any argument regarding the inadmissibility of the evidence of her prior conduct and to address the merits of her argument.
[18] We now turn to Chadd’s challenge to the trial court’s admission of Exhibits 15, 16, and 17 containing text messages and a note from her cell phone. The admission of evidence is a decision within the discretion of the trial court. Wilhelmus v. State, 824 N.E.2d 405, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). We will reverse a trial court’s decision only when it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. In reviewing the court’s decision, we consider only the evidence in favor of the court’s ruling and any unrefuted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Id.
[19] Chadd claims that the text messages and note are inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) specifically bars the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts allegedly committed by the defendant to prove she acted in a consistent manner in the current case. Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). However, the rule permits the admission of such evidence for other purposes, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Evid. R. 404(b)(2).
[20] Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent the jury from assessing a defendant’s present guilt on the basis of her past propensities, the so-called “‘forbidden inference.’” Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 218-19 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied. To assess the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, the trial court must (1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Rule 403 states, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” “To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we employ the same test.” Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[21] To convict Chadd of dealing in methamphetamine, the State had to prove that she, either alone or in concert with Ruhlander, knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine in an amount of at least ten grams with the intent to deliver it. Appellant’s Amended App. Vol. II, p. 82 (charging information); Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2)(e)(1). State’s Exhibits 15, 16, and 17 concerning Chadd’s prior drug transactions and use just weeks before to her arrest on these charges were relevant to matters at issue here other than her propensity to commit the charged act. They helped to connect Chadd to the drugs and paraphernalia in the backpack and establish her motive for possessing them as well as her plan and opportunity to sell them.
[22] Chadd argues that the exhibits were “extremely prejudicial.” Appellant’s Br. p. 19. However, we note that all evidence that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is inherently prejudicial and that Rule 403 bars only evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that the evidence here was highly relevant, and, while it was undoubtedly prejudicial, it was not unfairly prejudicial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence [23] Chadd next asserts that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction of theft of a firearm. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. Labarr v. State, 36 N.E.3d 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction after a jury verdict, “the appellate posture is markedly deferential to the outcome below . . . .” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016).
[24] To convict Chadd of theft in this instance, the State had to prove that she (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) exerted unauthorized control (3) over a Smith & Wesson handgun (4) that is the property of Richard Brown (5) with the intent to deprive Richard Brown of any part of the use or value of the handgun. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 84 (charging information); Ind. Code § 35-43-4- 2(a)(3). Chadd challenges her conviction, alleging that the evidence merely showed her possession of the stolen firearm and not that she had knowledge it was stolen.
[25] To be sure, knowledge that property is stolen may not be inferred solely from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property. Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Barnett v. State, 834 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). However, such possession may be considered with other evidence, including circumstantial evidence, to establish knowledge of the stolen character of the property. Id.
[26] Here, the evidence most favorable to the verdict showed that Chadd knew the handgun was stolen. Brown testified that during the first week of May 2024, his Smith & Wesson handgun was stolen from his van. Tr. Vol. II, 194. In addition, Brown provided the serial number of his stolen handgun, which matched the number on the Smith & Wesson handgun found in Chadd’s possession. Id. at 195. Brown testified that he did not know Chadd and had not given her permission to possess his handgun. Id.
[27] The jury additionally heard evidence of Chadd’s straightforward responses to Officer Stoneking regarding her purchase of the Bersa Thunder handgun from a gun shop. In contrast, the officer also testified to her vague responses to his questions about her acquisition of the Smith & Wesson handgun. Chadd claimed she bought the Smith & Wesson in March or April from someone she would not identify. Id. at 165.
[28] The jury further watched video of Chadd that was recorded on the squad car’s interior rear-facing camera while she was restrained in the back seat of the car. On the video, Chadd revealed her knowledge of the stolen nature of the Smith & Wesson. The officer was not speaking to Chadd at the time but was in the car preparing paperwork when Chadd blurted out, “Theft of a firearm? I didn’t steal a firearm; I bought a firearm. Maybe possession of stolen property, but not theft of a firearm. That’s crazy and absurd.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 200-01; Ex. Vol. IV, Ex. 12R.
[29] Finally, the jury heard the testimony of the sole defense witness, which conflicted with the responses Chadd had provided to the officers. In answering jury questions, Ruhlander testified that the stolen firearm was his and that he got it from his dad. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 20-21.
[30] From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred Chadd’s knowledge of the stolen characteristic of the Smith & Wesson handgun. Barnet, 834 N.E.2d at 172 (“Possession of recently stolen property when joined with attempts at concealment, evasive or false statements, or an unusual manner of acquisition may be sufficient evidence of knowledge that the property was stolen.”). Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Chadd’s conviction of theft of a firearm.
III. Inappropriate Sentence [31] Chadd next challenges her sentence as inappropriate. Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B) authorizes us to revise a sentence if we determine it to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Although Rule 7(B) requires us to consider both of these factors, the appellant is not required to prove that each of them independently renders his sentence inappropriate. Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Rather, they are separate inquiries that we ultimately balance to determine whether a sentence is inappropriate. Id.; see also Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (confirming that while reviewing courts must consider both factors, defendant need not necessarily prove sentence is inappropriate on both counts).
[32] Our determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for rare and exceptional cases. Wilmsen v. State, 181 N.E.3d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018)).
[33] Our Supreme Court has long said that sentencing is “‘principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.’” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222). This deference prevails unless overcome by “‘compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’” Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that her sentence is inappropriate. Reynolds v. State, 142 N.E.3d 928, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.
[34] Our analysis of the nature of the offense starts with the advisory sentence, as it is the starting point selected by the legislature as an appropriate sentence for the crime. Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Chadd was convicted of a Level 2 felony, for which the sentencing range is between ten and thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Chadd was also convicted of a Level 5 felony, for which the range is between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The court imposed concurrent terms of eighteen years for the Level 2 felony and two and one-half years for the Level 5 felony. Thus, Chadd’s aggregate sentence is a mere six months more than the advisory sentence for her highest level felony conviction.
[35] In assessing the nature of the offenses, we also look to the details and circumstances surrounding them and her participation therein. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In this case, there is nothing particularly remarkable about Chadd’s offenses.
[36] Turning to Chadd’s character, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant’s qualities, including the defendant’s age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In support of her request for a sentence reduction, Chadd submits her age of forty-five, her lack of criminal history, her education, and her consistent work history.
[37] However, Chadd’s claim of a clean record is tempered by her recent actions. Her presentence investigation report shows that she was out on bond in two felony cases involving methamphetamine when she committed the current offenses. Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. III, pp. 48-49. Then when she bonded out in the current case, she allegedly committed additional felony methamphetamine offenses. Id. While perhaps not yet convictions, Chadd’s actions while on bond reflect poorly on her character.
[38] Chadd cites Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) to support her request for a sentence revision. There, the appellant was convicted of dealing in a narcotic drug as a Class B felony and dealing in a narcotic drug as a Class A felony and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of forty years. On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s sentencing order and remanded with instructions to impose concurrent advisory sentences for an aggregate sentence of thirty years. In doing so, we noted that Schaff’s criminal history of six felonies and six misdemeanors is significant but stated that his offenses were “relatively minor as drug deals go” because both sales involved a confidential informant, monitoring by law enforcement, very small amounts of heroin, personal delivery in only one transaction, and active solicitation in only one. Id. at 1045.
[39] Chadd suggests that, if Schaaf received a sentence reduction, so too should she. She points out that, unlike Schaaf, she had no criminal history when she committed these offenses, she had not sold or offered for sale the drugs seized here, no minor children were present, and this incident was not in proximity to a school. Yet, the same could be said for many defendants whose sentences this Court declined to reduce. Moreover, whereas Schaaf’s sentences on both counts were aggravated, and his total sentence exceeded the advisory sentence of his highest felony conviction by ten years, Chadd’s sentence on one count was below the advisory and her total aggregate sentence exceeded the advisory sentence of her highest felony by only six months.
[40] We may, but need not, look to sentences imposed in other cases when deciding whether the instant sentence is inappropriate. See, e.g., Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 2010) (stating that in exercising our review power, we are not precluded from comparing defendant’s sentence with sentences received by other defendants in similar cases). And we have generally found little value in this practice. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(“We should concentrate less on comparing the facts of this case to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant’s character.”), trans. denied.
[41] Chadd has not presented compelling evidence portraying the nature of her offenses or her character in such a positive light so as to overcome the deference afforded to the trial court’s sentencing decision. See Littlefield, 215 N.E.3d at 1089. Accordingly, we conclude that Chadd’s sentence is not inappropriate.
Conclusion [42] Based on the foregoing, we exercise our discretion to decline to hold that
Chadd waived for appeal her argument under Evidence Rule 404(b). And we conclude that State’s Exhibits 15, 16, and 17 evidencing her prior drug sales and use was relevant to something other than showing her action in conformity with that prior misconduct under Rule 404(b)(2) and that, while prejudicial, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the State’s exhibits.
[43] We also conclude that Chadd’s possession of the stolen Smith & Wesson handgun in addition to conflicting and evasive statements and acknowledgement of its stolen character, amounts to sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction of theft of a firearm. Further, we conclude that Chadd’s sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm Chadd’s convictions and sentence.
[44] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., concurs. Felix, J., concurs with separate opinion.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Michael D. Dean Withered Burns, LLP Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Jennifer B. Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Felix, Judge, concurring in result.
[45] I fully concur in Parts II and III of the majority’s opinion, and I respectfully concur in result as to Part I. Chadd waived his evidentiary challenge by failing to object at trial, as required by the then-effective version of Indiana Evidence Rule 103 and our precedent thereon. The Evidence Rules in effect at the time of trial generally control our analysis of evidentiary issues on appeal. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 278 N.E.3d 1170, 1172, 1174–77 (Ind. Ct. App.) (applying version of Evid. R. 103 in effect at time of trial), trans. denied, 280 N.E.3d 253 (Ind. 2026); Dickey v. State, 999 N.E.2d 919, 922 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (same); WESCO Distrib., Inc. v. ArcelorMittal Ind. Harbor LLC, 23 N.E.3d 682, 695 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (applying evidence rules in effect at time of trial), trans. pet. dismissed; Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 880 n.1 (Ind. 1994) (same). I see no reason to diverge from this well-established principle here, regardless of how “carefully weighed” the issue was, ante ¶ 17. That is, we should not “exercise our discretion to decline to hold that Chadd waived for appeal any argument regarding the inadmissibility of the evidence of her prior conduct and to address the merits of her argument,” id.
[46] Evidence Rule 103 required Chadd to “timely object” to the evidence, “state[] the specific ground” for the objection unless that ground is already “apparent,” and receive the trial court’s “definitive[]” ruling on the objection “on the record at trial.” Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a), (b) (effective Jan. 1, 2014, to June 30, 2026). Likewise, Indiana precedent required Chadd to object to the challenged evidence at trial regardless of any pretrial rulings on admissibility. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (citing Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2000); Wagner v. State, 474 N.E.2d 476, 484 (Ind. 1985)), reh’g denied; Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 796–97 (Ind. 2008) (collecting cases), reh’g denied; A.V. v. State, 228 N.E.3d 504, 508 (Ind. Ct. App.), reh’g denied, trans. denied, 244 N.E.3d 901 (Ind. 2024); Bailey v. State, 131 N.E.3d 665, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied; Reed v. Bethel, 2 N.E.3d 98, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[47] Chadd’s failure to object at trial means his evidentiary claim is reviewable for only fundamental error. I agree with the majority’s analysis of the merits of Chadd’s evidentiary claim, so Chadd has not established fundamental error.
[48] For these reasons, I respectfully concur in result as to Part I.