Jennery v. Olmstead

43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 536
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1885
StatusPublished

This text of 43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 536 (Jennery v. Olmstead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jennery v. Olmstead, 43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 536 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1885).

Opinions

Peokham, J.:

The chief question in this case is whether the bank made any profits in the year 1869, from which, under the agreement between the parties, the salary of the president could be paid. The defendants contend that there were profits to the amount of $648.43, while the plaintiff claims that there were none. The method by which the sum above mentioned is arrived at is by taking the •difference between the purchase-price and the market value of certain government bonds then owned by the bank (the value of the bonds having in the meantime appreciated), and calling that appreciation in value profits. The method pursued by the plaintiff [538]*538was to take the actual cost of the bonds, add to that tbe accrued interest on the coupons yet unpaid, and call the total the value of the bonds. JBy this means a difference in the value of the bonds-was made in the sum of $503, being that amount less than made by the defendants.

Both plans, it is perceived, take it as proper to obtain the value-of the bonds, although unsold, as a means of deciding upon the-profits. I agree to the correctness of neither -plan. It is not a proper way to ascertain the fact of profits to estimate the value of bonds yet unsold and upon finding the estimated value to exceed the price paid, to call the difference profits. It is not profits in any true sense of that term. If the bonds were actually sold at such price, the transaction would then be completed and the profits actually realized instead of merely estimated.

It does not appear that defendant’s counsel treats the method pursued by defendants as showing actual, realized profits, but he-terms them estimated profits, and argues that the contract meant estimated profits instead of actual realized profits, for otherwise he-claims that every piece of property of the bank would have to be-sold annually in order to determine whether profits were made,, which he very sensibly states would be absurd. The trouble with, this mode of reasoning lies in the confusion of property with profits. To take an inventory of all the property of the bank and to place a valuation on it, and from it to deduct its liabilities, is-perfectly proper in order to arrive at the financial standing of the-bank as to solvency, and if solvent, how much beyond it the institution may be deemed to be.

Here was a savings bank without capital stock, and with but one resource at first from which to obtain money, viz., deposits, upon which it must pay interest. The means of profit to it were simply the possibility of so investing these moneys as to obtain a greater-return for them than the bank was to pay by way of interest, and in a possible sale of securities or property purchased at a greater price than was paid for them or it. It could not have been contemplated by the parties to the contract that the president should have a right to demand the sale of any property at any particular time-for the mere reason that a sale would then result in a profit, and thus possibly insure him a salary, for that year.

[539]*539The purchase and sale of stocks, as a business and for a profit, is not contemplated as pertaining to a savings bank; and in this case, by the very terms of the charter, only certain securities could be invested in, and could only be sold by the concurrence of a majority of the trustees. The investment in government bonds is-assumed to partake of the character of a permanent investment; and in order to determine the profits of the year it is not necessary either to sell the securities or to estimate their value. The profits-are, as I have said, the amount of money received by the bank from its investments, by way of interest, over and above the amount of interest it has to pay its depositors, ¡together with the amount of any money it had received by the"sale of property over and above-its cost to the bank. If such a sale had been made, then a profit had arisen, but if not, then no profit had accrued simply from the fact that the property, if sold, would have resulted in a profit. It-is as yet an uncompleted transaction, and with not the slightest right on the part of the president to demand its completion in order that he may earn his salary. As I -have said, such right could not have been contemplated by the parties to this contract; and in case-of non-sale, there exists no right to estimate what the profits would have been if the property had been sold and call that a profit made-in that year. Suppose the property were soon after sold at a loss,, the result would show that there had been no profit, but an actual loss, yet the president had received his salary on the basis of a profit. There is no reason, therefore, that I can see why the contract should be read as if it had said that the salary of the president-should be based upon the estimated profits of each year.

It is plain that the same rule does not obtain to the full extent in the case of a loss, for a loss may be sustained without a sale of the property. It may deteriorate permanently and plainly in value, or may be burned up or stolen. In brief, if anything happen by which the bank sustains plainly and permanently a depreciation in, or total obliteration of, the value of property, such depreciation or obliteration must be regarded as a loss sustained, and such loss must be deducted from the profits before a net profit can be arrived at. This is wholly distinct from adding a possible profit 'by the sale of property, if then sold, to the actual realized profits otherwise made, and at the same time keeping the property.

[540]*540In the one case property has been permanently depreciated in value, or actually destroyed, and the amount of such depreciation or destruction is an actual realized loss, while in the other it is simply a fact that if the property were then sold a profit would be made, but as it is not, non constat that when sold a loss may not be met with.

It is claimed that profits are substantially realized by this appreciation in the value of government bonds, if the bonds are unsold, just as much as if they were sold. If unsold, it is said that the value of the bond is as well known by a simple reference to the reports of the stock market as it would be by an actual sale, and that if sold, all that is got in exchange is another article, whose value may also fluctuate from time to time, and hence there is no sense in demanding an actual sale of the bond before asserting a realization of a profit. Nevertheless the bond unsold is only called worth so many dollars, according to the market price thereof, whereas the bond when sold has actually brought so many dollars, and these dollars are in money, which is a standard of value, made so by law, and that money is now on hand.

It can now be determinéd as a fact whether a profit had been made, notwithstanding the other fact that in long periods of time the standard of value itself varies in its own intrinsic value. I therefore, in order to see what profits were made in the year 1869, reject wholly from the account the appreciation in the market price of the government bonds on the day the balance was struck. That appreciation was the sum of $648.43, and without that there was no profit.

The court erred, therefore, in leaving it to the jury to say whether there were profits in 1869 or not. The error did not harm the defendants, for the judge should have decided, as matter of law, that there were no profits, at least so far as this bond transaction was concerned. t ■> *

.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Jennery v. . Olmstead
90 N.Y. 363 (New York Court of Appeals, 1882)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
43 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jennery-v-olmstead-nysupct-1885.