Jenks v. Saul

District Court, S.D. California·Decided August 13, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-01432·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 20CV1432-BLM 11 OSCAR FRED JENKS,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 13 v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING OF FEES OR COSTS 14 ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY, 15 [ECF NO. 7] Defendant. 16

17 18 The instant matter was initiated on July 24, 2020 when Plaintiff filed a complaint “to seek 19 judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision and [to] request[] that this court reverse that 20 decision, or in the alternative, to remand this matter for a new hearing.” ECF No. 1 at 2. That 21 same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 22 Costs. ECF No. at 3. On August 4, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Without Prejudice 23 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Of Fees or Costs and 24 Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend. ECF No. 5. 25 On August 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and refiled his Application to 26 Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF Nos. 6-7. Having reviewed the 27 amended complaint and motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in district court 28 without prepaying fees or costs and finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to survive 1 screening. 2 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 4 States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if 6 she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: 7 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution 8 or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or 9 security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or 10 give security therefor. 11 12 The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's 13 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 14 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 15 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is 16 well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont 17 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his 19 poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for himself and dependents 20 with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must 21 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, 22 ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 23 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to 24 reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to 25 other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff 26 initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement 27 proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because 28 the plaintiff possessed savings of $ 450 and that was more than sufficient to pay the $60 filing 1 fee). Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 2 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 3 Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to IFP status. 4 According to his affidavit in support of application, Plaintiff is not employed, has no income, and 5 receives $194 per month in food stamps. ECF No. 3 at 1-2. Plaintiff does not have a checking 6 or savings account and does not own a home or car. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff spends approximately 7 $194 per month on food, $20 per month on laundry and/or dry cleaning, and $15 per month on 8 transportation. Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not expect any major changes to his monthly income, 9 expenses, assets, or liabilities over the next twelve months. Id. at 5. Based on the foregoing, 10 the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that he is unable to pay the $400 filing fee. 11 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. 12 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) 13 Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are 14 subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 15 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Social Security, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) 17 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a 18 defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 19 1126–27. 20 To survive, all complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 21 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 22 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 23 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 24 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, 25 “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not 26 suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning “the 27 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 28 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 1 at 556, 570)). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 2 veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 3 556 U.S. at 679.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.
550 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ali v. Cuyler
547 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1982)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)