Jenkins v. Mill

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedOctober 28, 2005
DocketI.C. NO. 355742.
StatusPublished

This text of Jenkins v. Mill (Jenkins v. Mill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jenkins v. Mill, (N.C. Super. Ct. 2005).

Opinion

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The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Ledford and the briefs and arguments before the Full Commission. The appealing party has not shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence or rehear the parties or their representatives. The Full Commission AFFIRMS with some modifications the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

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RULINGS ON EVIDENTIARY MATTERS
At the hearing before the Full Commission, plaintiff made a motion to admit additional medical records. Defendants filed a response to plaintiff's motion and a motion to strike. As plaintiff's additional evidence is not "newly discovered evidence" within the meaning of Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and would prejudice defendants if made part of the record, plaintiff's motion to admit additional medical records is hereby DENIED.

In addition, transcript exhibit pages 44 through 55 were inadvertently left out of the record and are hereby admitted into evidence.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matter of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner as:

STIPULATIONS
1. The parties were subject to and bound by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. An employee-employer relationship existed between the parties on January 6, 2003.

3. American Home Assurance Co., Inc., is the carrier on the risk and AIG Claims Services is the adjusting agent.

4. Plaintiff's average weekly wage is $377.02, yielding a weekly compensation rate of $251.36.

5. On January 6, 2003, plaintiff sustained a low back injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer. Defendants have paid plaintiff total disability benefits at a rate of $251.36 per week from January 20, 2003 through the present.

6. Plaintiff last worked for defendant-employer on January 10, 2003.

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Based upon the competent evidence of record herein, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On the date of the Deputy Commissioner's hearing, plaintiff was 57 years of age and resided in Surry County with his wife. He graduated high school in 1966 and has no other formal education. Plaintiff's training is limited to on-the-job training he received over the years.

2. Plaintiff has a long work history beginning in 1966 with physical labor, including work in textile mills. From 1966 through January 10, 2003, plaintiff worked for defendant-employer on three separate occasions, for a total of approximately 23 years. Plaintiff worked as a knitting machine mechanic, which would be characterized as medium to heavy duty work, and involved the constant use of his hands, frequent bending at the waist, twisting back motions, and occasional lifting of machine parts weighing up to approximately 75 pounds.

3. On Monday, January 6, 2003, plaintiff was sitting on a stool repairing one of the knitting machines when his pliers fell out of his pocket and onto the floor. As plaintiff leaned over to pick up the pliers, he suffered the onset of low back pain, followed by radiating pain into his right leg and right testicle.

4. Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by accident to his back on January 6, 2003. Defendants accepted his claim as compensable and paid plaintiff temporary total disability benefits for the time he missed from work. Defendants did not file a Form 60 until March 29, 2004, nine days before the Deputy Commissioner's hearing. Although defendants failed to file a Form 60 in a timely manner, plaintiff was not prejudiced and there is no evidence that he failed to receive his compensation in a timely fashion.

5. On January 8, 2003, plaintiff received initial medical treatment from his family practitioner, Dr. Randall Keith. Dr. Keith noted a decreased range of motion and mild tenderness in plaintiff's right lumbar region, provided him with prescription medication, and at that time, permitted him to return to work.

6. Plaintiff returned to work on January 9 and 10, 2003. On January 11, 2003, however, plaintiff was unable to continue to perform his duties due to pain. Plaintiff has not worked since January 11, 2003 and has received temporary total disability benefits since that time.

7. On January 13, 2003, Dr. Keith ordered a lumbar MRI and prescribed Vicodin for plaintiff's pain. The lumbar MRI revealed bulging discs, bilateral facet overgrowth and spinal stenosis at the L2-3, L3-4 and L4-5 levels of plaintiff's spine. At the L4-5 level, an annular fissure was identified and the L5-S1 disc was noted to be completely degenerated with a mild mass effect on the thecal sac.

8. Based on plaintiff's MRI results, Dr. Keith diagnosed plaintiff with "back pain" and declined to recommend surgical intervention. Instead, Dr. Keith recommended plaintiff participate in a course of physical therapy treatment, which was authorized by defendants. On March 14, 2003, after attending eleven therapy sessions, plaintiff was discharged from the program with mild symptomatic improvement. Dr. Keith referred plaintiff to a neurosurgical specialist for further evaluation.

9. On April 22, 2003, plaintiff was seen by neurosurgeon Dr. J.M. McWhorter of Carolina Neurosurgical Associates. Dr. McWhorter advised plaintiff to increase his physical activities and did not recommend surgical intervention. On June 5, 2003, plaintiff returned to Dr. McWhorter's office with no change in his condition. Dr. McWhorter noted that plaintiff's neurological examination was completely within normal limits and released him to the care of his family physician, Dr. Keith.

10. Defendants arranged for plaintiff to be evaluated for a second opinion by Frank L. Cuce, D.O. Dr. Cuce recommended plaintiff first have a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) by a physical therapist. Defendants arranged for Doug Coe at Northern Hospital of Surry County Rehabilitation to perform the FCE on August 7, 2003.

11. During the August 7, 2003 FCE, Mr. Coe noted plaintiff's self-limiting behavior. Overall, the FCE tended to show that due to his low back pain, plaintiff was limited to very short periods of time he could sit, stand or walk. The FCE also showed that plaintiff was able to frequently lift 23 pounds from knuckle to shoulder level, which qualified him for the medium physical work demand level, which is 20 to 25 pounds of force frequently. Mr. Coe assessed plaintiff as capable of returning to work in a medium capacity position with restrictions of occasional carrying, pushing, pulling, sitting, standing, walking, stair climbing, reaching, and fingering; occasional to frequent lifting; and no stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling or ladder climbing. With respect to plaintiff's work restrictions of sitting, standing and walking, Mr. Coe gave significant restrictions, in that plaintiff could only sit for 18 minutes, stand for 3 minutes, and walk for 3 minutes before changing positions.

12. On August 12, 2003, Dr. Cuce examined plaintiff and reviewed the FCE results. Dr. Cuce interpreted plaintiff's lumbar MRI to reveal generalized degenerative disc disease with spinal stenosis at multiple levels, as well as an annular fissure at L4-5. Dr. Cuce assessed plaintiff with chronic low back pain secondary to work injury, degenerative lumbar disc disease with spondylosis, and asymmetric reflexes, lower extremities.

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Related

Kennedy v. Duke University Medical Center
398 S.E.2d 677 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1990)
Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co.
348 S.E.2d 336 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
Jenkins v. Mill, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jenkins-v-mill-ncworkcompcom-2005.