Jenkins v. Mangano Corp.

774 So. 2d 101, 2000 WL 1755116
Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided December 4, 2000·No. 00-CC-0790·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

774 So.2d 101 (2000)

Evelyn JENKINS, et al.
v.
MANGANO CORPORATION, et al.

No. 00-CC-0790.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

November 28, 2000.
Concurring Opinion December 4, 2000.

Malinda Frances Holmes, III, Kenner, Counsel for Applicant.

Lindsey M. Ladouceur, New Orleans, Stephen Nolan Elliott, Robert A. Knight, Ann M. Sico, Metarie, Counsel for Respondent.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Lemmon, December 4, 2000.

*102 TRAYLOR, Justice.

We granted this writ to resolve the issue of whether the parent of a tort victim has a right of action to recover in a wrongful death action when the tort victim is survived by an informally acknowledged adult illegitimate child and that child has not judicially asserted filiation timely.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 1997, plaintiff, Evelyn Jenkins, filed the instant wrongful death and survival action on behalf of her son, Melvin Jenkins, pursuant to La. Civ.Code arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2. She alleged that the negligent treatment of her son by defendant, Long Term Care Managers, Inc. d/b/a Manhattan Guest House (hereinafter referred to as "Manhattan Guest House"), resulted in his death on July 8, 1996. Throughout the proceedings, plaintiff has maintained that she is the proper party to bring this action on her son's behalf since he never married nor fathered any children. In fact, in plaintiffs amended petition, she specifically stated that Melvin Jenkins had never been married, or lived in open concubinage at any time, and that he never made an acknowledgment of any illegitimate children, under either Louisiana Civil Code Article 203 or Article 204.[1]

On December 7, 1998, two years after the death of Melvin Jenkins, Manhattan Guest House filed an exception of no right of action contending that under La.Civ. Code arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, Teresha Shaffer, as the daughter of the decedent, was his sole heir and only party entitled to bring a wrongful death action on his behalf.[2]

In support of its exception, Manhattan Guest House submitted plaintiffs answers to interrogatories as well as the deposition testimony of Teresha Shaffer; Teresha's mother, Joyce Schamburger; and plaintiff. Manhattan Guest House also attached a copy of Melvin Jenkins' obituary and an affidavit of the funeral director stating that plaintiff informed him both in writing and orally that Melvin Jenkins was survived by a daughter named Teresha Shaffer. While Manhattan Guest House acknowledged that Teresha was the illegitimate daughter of Melvin Jenkins, it argued that Teresha's mere existence as the daughter of the deceased precludes plaintiff from bringing the action on her son's behalf.

Plaintiff opposed the exception, contending that Teresha had not been legitimated under La. Civ.Code art. 203, nor had she instituted a timely proceeding for filiation under La. Civ.Code art. 209. Further, plaintiff asserted that defendant failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the decedent had informally acknowledged Teresha Shaffer as his daughter.

After the hearing, the trial judge denied defendant's exception finding that the decedent, Melvin Jenkins, never acknowledged Teresha Shaffer, never married nor lived in the state of open concubinage with the mother of Teresha Shaffer. The trial judge also noted that any evidence of a relationship between Evelyn Jenkins, the mother of the decedent, and Teresha Shaffer was insufficient to show an acknowledgment on the part of Melvin Jenkins. The trial judge concluded that the conduct of the grandmother cannot be considered to constitute any informal acknowledgment by the alleged father.

The court of appeal reversed the ruling of the trial judge finding Manhattan Guest House presented clear and convincing evidence that Melvin Jenkins informally acknowledged Teresha Shaffer and that Teresha Shaffer was the proper party to *103 bring any wrongful death suit. Jenkins v. Long Term Care Managers, Inc., 99-386 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/16/00); 758 So.2d 863. This court granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision. Jenkins v. Mangano, et al, 00-CC-0790 (La.5/26/00); 762 So.2d 626.

DISCUSSION

Defendant's Burden of Proof

Manhattan Guest House challenges plaintiffs right of action to proceed under La. Civ.Code art. 927, claiming that her standing to proceed, as Melvin Jenkins' mother, is preempted by the existence of Melvin's daughter, Teresha Shaffer. It is worthwhile to note that Manhattan Guest House is not asserting this action on behalf of Teresha, it is only noting her existence in support of its exception of no right of action. Therefore, because Manhattan Guest House is the party asserting the existence of a child as a basis for its exception, it must prove that Teresha Shaffer is the child of Melvin Jenkins by clear and convincing evidence. La. Civ.Code art. 209; Chatelain v. State, DOTD, 586 So.2d 1373, 1377 (La.1991).

Who is a Child under 2315.2

In Chatelain, this court determined that the critical requirement for classification of a person as a child under Article 2315.2 is the biological relationship between the tort victim and the child. Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813, 814 (La. 1974). Once the biological relationship is established, an inquiry must be made as to whether the child is classified as legitimate or illegitimate. Civil Code Art. 178. It is of no consequence that the child is legitimate or illegitimate for purposes of deciding whether the child may bring an action under Article 2315, all children have the right to bring an action for wrongful death and survival action. See Levy v. Louisiana, 253 La. 73, 216 So.2d 818 (1968). However, if the child is illegitimate, Article 209 requires that the child prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent informally acknowledged the child during his lifetime.[3]

Informal Acknowledgment

In discussing informal acknowledgment, appellate decisions have generally referred to the standards set forth in the original La. Civ.Code Article 209 for proving paternity. Such factors include the alleged father's acknowledgment of the child in formal writings or in public or private conversations, causing the education of the child as his own, and living in concubinage with the mother in his home at the time of the child's conception. Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, et al., 97-0785 (La.12/12/97); 705 So.2d 724; Chatelain, 586 So.2d at 1378. Other conduct which has been considered to constitute informal acknowledgment by the alleged father includes rearing the child in his home, naming the child in his will, giving the child his surname, and holding the child out in the community as his own. Keene, Irregular Successions in Louisiana, 7 Loy. L.Rev. 94, 102-3 (1954) However, courts have been reluctant to recognize an informal acknowledgment for purposes of filiation unless the father has recognized the child as his own unequivocally and on several occasions. Succession of Vance, 110 La. 760, 34 So.

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Jenkins v. Mangano Corp., 774 So. 2d 101, 2000 WL 1755116 (La. 2000).

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