Jenkins v. Astrue

836 F. Supp. 2d 211, 2011 WL 6826411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148752
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 28, 2011
DocketNo. 4:10-CV-2410
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 836 F. Supp. 2d 211 (Jenkins v. Astrue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jenkins v. Astrue, 836 F. Supp. 2d 211, 2011 WL 6826411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148752 (M.D. Pa. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIAM J. NEALON, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff Roderick Clinton Jenkins’s claim for social security supplemental security income benefits. For the reasons set forth below the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.

Supplemental security income (SSI) is a federal income supplement program funded by general tax revenues (not social security taxes). It is designed to help aged, blind or other disabled individuals who have little or no income.

Jenkins was born in the United States on December 13, 1972. Tr. 149.1 Jenkins attended regular education classes until he was taken out of school and incarcerated during the twelfth grade. Tr. 55, 169 and 177. Jenkins testified at the administrative hearing which was held in this case on June 16, 2009, that he did not obtain a General Equivalency Diploma (GED). Tr. 55. However, he previously told Ali Nourian, M.D., who examined Jenkins on behalf of the Bureau of Disability Determination2 that he obtained his GED while incarcerated. Tr. 298. Jenkins admitted that he can read, write, speak and understand the English language. Tr. 167 and 201.

The record reveals that Jenkins has a long history of criminal activity as well as a history of using cocaine, crack and marijuana. Tr. 248, 258, 408, 413 and 494-495. His criminal history includes convictions for aggravated assault and drug trafficking. Id. He reported that he last used cocaine and marijuana in early 2006. Tr. 489 and 494.

Jenkins has a limited work and earnings history. Tr. 157-163. He has past work experience as a dishwasher, packer, construction worker, and a telemarketer. Tr. 169. He also worked for various temporary employment agencies. Id. Records from the Social Security Administration indicate that he worked in 1987 earning $257.95, 1992 earning $1264.80, 1993 earning $1403.43, 1994 earning $2098.74, 1998 earning $6221.29, 1999 earning $9170.79, 2000 earning $7446.85, 2001 earning $520.00, 2006 earning $11,456.00, and 2007 earning $327.25. Tr. 157. His total earnings were $40,167.10. Id. A vocational expert testified that all of Jenkins’s past employment was unskilled, sedentary to medium work.3 Tr. 75-76.

[213]*213On February 27, 2007, Jenkins protectively filed4 an application for supplemental security income benefits. Tr. 13, 149-156 and 197. Jenkins alleges that he became disabled on October 1, 2002, because of an HIV infection and mental illness. Tr. 91 and 168. He contends he has blackouts, seizures, migraines and fatigue. Id. The record reveals that Jenkins last worked in 2008. Tr. 15. In that year Jenkins started a masonry business. Id. The administrative law judge found that this work was substantial gainful activity but that because it “was short-lived and ceased” it “would likely be considered an unsuccessful attempt to return to work.” Tr. 15.

Jenkins’s alleged disability onset date of October 1, 2002, has no impact on Jenkins’s application for supplemental security income benefits because supplemental security income is a needs based program and benefits may not be paid for “any period that precedes the first month following the date on which an application is filed or, if later, the first month following the date all conditions for eligibility are met.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.501. Consequently, Jenkins is not eligible for SSI benefits for any period prior to March 1, 2007.

On June 13, 2007, the Bureau of Disability Determination denied Jenkins’s application for SSI. Tr. 13 and 91-95. On August 13, 2007, Jenkins requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. Tr. 96. After approximately 22 months had passed, a hearing was held on June 16, 2009, before an administrative law judge. Tr. 25-81. On June 25, 2009, the administrative law judge issued a decision denying Jenkins’s application for SSI benefits. Tr. 13-24. On August 21, 2009, Jenkins filed a request for review of the decision with the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration. Tr. 7-9. After 13 months had passed, the Appeals Council on September 21, 2010, concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant Jenkins’s request for review. Tr. 1-4. Thus, the administrative law judge’s decision stood as the final decision of the Commissioner.

On November 19, 2010, Jenkins filed a complaint in this court requesting that we reverse the decision of the Commissioner denying him supplemental security income benefits. The Commissioner filed an answer to the complaint and a copy of the administrative record on January 31, 2011. Jenkins filed his brief on April 15, 2011, and the Commissioner filed his brief on [214]*214May 18, 2011. The appeal5 became ripe for disposition on June 6, 2011, when Jenkins elected not to file a reply brief.

Standard of Review

When considering a social security appeal, we have plenary review of all legal issues decided by the Commissioner. See Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security, 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir.2007); Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir.1999); Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir.1995). However, our review of the Commissioner’s findings of fact pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is to determine whether those findings are supported by “substantial evidence.” Id.; Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.1988); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.1993). Factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir.2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.1981) (“Findings of fact by the Secretary must be accepted as conclusive by a reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence.”); Keefe v. Shalala, 71 F.3d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir.1995); Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir.2001); Martin v. Sullivan,

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Bluebook (online)
836 F. Supp. 2d 211, 2011 WL 6826411, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148752, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jenkins-v-astrue-pamd-2011.