Jenkins Petroleum Process Co. v. Herthel

102 F.2d 965, 26 C.C.P.A. 1047, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 127
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 30, 1939
DocketNo. 4003; No. 4004
StatusPublished

This text of 102 F.2d 965 (Jenkins Petroleum Process Co. v. Herthel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jenkins Petroleum Process Co. v. Herthel, 102 F.2d 965, 26 C.C.P.A. 1047, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 127 (ccpa 1939).

Opinion

Garrett, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

We have here appeals from decisions of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office reversing decisions of the Examiner of Interferences in two interference proceedings, priority being awarded by the board to the junior party Herthel in both cases. The subject matter relates to oil cracking, the counts being process counts.

Both interferences were declared June 30, 1980, between an application of Jenkins, serial No. 723,144, filed June 30,1924, and an application of Herthel, serial No. 167,716, filed February 12, 1927. In interference No. 60,087 there was originally a third party who was [1048]*1048eliminated by judgment rendered June 9,1933. It is assumed that the? necessity for two interferences grew out of the fact that the third party was involved as to only three of the counts.

The testimony covering both cases was consolidated in a single record along with that in a third case (Gray v. Jenkins, Suit- No. 3997, decided by us January 23,1939, 26 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 804, 101 F. (2d) 196). The record is quite voluminous and embraces a number of exhibits in addition to the oral testimony. While the subject matter of the two interferences is quite similar in character it will conduce to clearness to treat the cases separately. As hereafter will! appear, the principal difference in the counts of the respective interferences resides in definitions of the elements used to present nuclei for the deposit of carbon during the cracking process. In that respect the counts of interference No. 60,087 are broader than those of No. 60,089. In the counts of the former the element is referred to as-“a finely divided mineral substance,” or as “a cracking agent * * * to present nuclei * * In the counts of the latter the element is limited to “fuller’s earth.”

It may be remarked that the reasons of appeal are substantially the same in each of the cases and in each they are quite numerous-During the progress of the proceedings in the Patent Office there were-motions by-Herthel -to dissolve both interferences, one ground' of such motions being that Jenkins had no right to make the counts because of lack of disclosure of certain elements in his application as originally filed, and, as will be seen, the decisions of the board were based largely upon its findings, contrary to that of the Examiner of Interferences, that this contention of lack of disclosure was well-founded.

Our task of writing an opinion (or opinions) on review of the case is made complex, not alone by the issues involved but also by the manner in which the cases were dealt with by the respective-tribunals of the Patent Office.

The Examiner of Interferences handed down his final decisions on'the'-'merits-in both cases- oil"the-same day, December-21, 1935. His most elaborate discussion of both law and facts is contained in. his decision in interference No. 60,087 which contains the broad counts. The Board of Appeals likewise rendered its decisions in both cases on the same day, May 4, 1937, but its principal opinion was written in interference No. 60,089, the counts of which are limited to fuller’s earth.

As a consequence we necessarily are compelled to indulge in some repetition of numbers and of language in an effort to attain clarity.

[1049]*1049Afpeal No. JflOS — Interference No. 60,087

This interference involves three counts which, read as follows:

1. In an oil cracking process in which carbon-forming material is produced, the steps of charging into a body of oil subjected to cracking conditions additional oil and a finely divided mineral substance having a characteristic adsorptive action for carbon-forming material; dispersing said finely divided mineral substance in said body of oil; withdrawing from said body of oil during said process a portion of said oil and dispersed mineral substance; the amount of said finely divided mineral substance charged into said body of oil being so regulated as to permit of its intimate contact in suspension with said carbon-forming material.
2. The process of converting a heavy petroleum oil into a light one which consists in circulating the heavy oil in a closed ring, continuously heating a portion of the ring, maintaining a pressure on the portion of the ring so heated, continuously taking off light vapors from the ring, continuously adding oil to the ring, continuously adding a cracking agent to said ring to present nuclei for the deposition of carbon, agitating the whole to maintain said nuclei in a state of suspension, and withdrawing residuum including part of said cracking agent with its deposited carbon.
3. The process of converting a heavy. petroleum oil into .a light- one .which consists in circulating the heavy oil in a closed ring, continuously heating a portion of the ring, maintaining a pressure on the portion of the ring so heated, continuously taking off light vapors from the ring, continuously adding oil to the ring, continuously adding a cracking agent to said ring to present nuclei for the deposition of carbon, agitating the whole to maintain said nuclei in a state of suspension, and continuously withdrawing residuum including part of said cracking agent with its deposited carbon.

It is thought that the process sufficiently appears from the counts and that no detailed analysis is here n,ecessar-y.

Upon the basis of testimony cited and quite fully reviewed by him the Examiner of Interferences awarded the party Jenkins conception “as of the end of October 1923” and reduction to practice “no later than January 81, 1924.” Since these respective dates were earlier than the respective dates (December 1, 1923 to January 20, 1924 for conception and February 5 to April 1, 1924 for reduction to practice) claimed by Herthel in his preliminary statement, priority was awarded Jenkins.

The principal opinion by the board was written in interference No. 60,089 but its discussion there was deemed by it fully applicable to the instant case and in both cases the reversals were based largely upon the same grounds; so we must go to that decision to determine what is meant in the decision of interference No. 60,087. While the board stated that the questions raised “are numerous and require very careful consideration, including a rather painstaking investigation of the records in the light of the arguments advanced by the parties,” it confined its discussion largely*to the question “whether [1050]*1050the party Jenkins’ application as filed discloses the inventen,” and held, in effect, that he failed to disclose in his application as filed a teaching of circulating the oil at such a speed that the mineral substance or cracking agent “will remain in intimate admixture during the circulation.” It was further held by the board that, upon the record presented, Jenkns did not establish a circulation in his 1923 experiments which was more rapid than that disclosed in his application filed June. 30, 1924; hence Jenkins was denied the date of October 1923 which had been awarded him for conception by the Examiner of Interferences. As we understand it, the effect of the board’s decision was to deny Jenkins the benefit of his filing-date for either conception or reduction to practice because of the board’s opinion that the application failed to disclose or teach a sufficient speed of circulation.

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102 F.2d 965, 26 C.C.P.A. 1047, 41 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 1939 CCPA LEXIS 127, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jenkins-petroleum-process-co-v-herthel-ccpa-1939.