Jenkins, C. v. Jenkins, S.

Opinion

J-S13015-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CORINNE A. JENKINS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : STEWART J. JENKINS : No. 3182 EDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Order Entered November 12, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations at No(s): 0C2500077

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 8, 2026

Corinne A. Jenkins (“Mother”) appeals from the November 12, 2025 final

custody order with respect to her daughter, C.J., born in November of 2021,

whom she shares with Stewart J. Jenkins (“Father”). After careful review, we

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand in accordance with this

memorandum.

We gather the relevant facts and procedural history from the trial court’s

Rule 1925(a) opinion and the documentary evidence, as follows.

[T]he parties met while Father was stationed in Warner Robbins, Georgia, serving in the United States Air Force (“USAF”). N.T., 11/12/25, at 209. Prior to joining the USAF, Father resided in San Antonio, Texas. Id. . . . Prior to living in Georgia . . ., Mother was a lifelong resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 73.

The parties married in October of 2017. See Father’s Exhibit 1, p.9. In May of 2020, the parties moved to Japan pursuant to J-S13015-26

Father’s deployment through the USAF. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 209. C.J. was born in Japan in November of 2021. Id. While still living in Japan [with Mother and C.J.], Father filed for divorce from Mother in Texas in March of 2023. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 210.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 1-3 (cleaned up).

In May of 2023, Mother filed a counterclaim for divorce and custody of

C.J. in Texas. See Mother’s Exhibit 5 at 2 (Texas memorandum opinion). The

Texas trial court issued an order dated June 9, 2023, providing, inter alia: (1)

Mother permission to relocate from Japan to Philadelphia with C.J.; (2) Father

partial physical custody of C.J. as the parties agreed; and (3) the parties would

split C.J.’s unreimbursed medical expenses on a 50/50 basis. See Mother’s

Exhibit 3 at 6, 8, 13. Thereafter, Mother and C.J. relocated from Japan to

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they continued to live at the time of these

proceedings. See id.

The Texas custody litigation resulted in a partially agreed-upon order in

September of 2024, awarding the parties shared legal and physical custody of

C.J. See Mother’s Exhibit 5 at 2. In November of 2024, however, Mother

filed a motion to sever and for a writ of mandamus in the Fourth Court of

Appeals in Texas, seeking to dismiss the custody petition for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction since C.J. had never resided in Texas. See id. at 2-3.

On January 15, 2025, Mother filed a complaint in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County for primary physical and sole legal custody of

C.J., while her petition to sever was pending. On March 5, 2025, the Texas

appellate court filed a memorandum opinion concluding that (1) Texas lacked

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subject matter jurisdiction regarding custody of C.J. since it was not her “home

state” within the meaning of Tex. Fam. Code § 152.201(a)(1)-(4); (2) the

record did not support a finding that Father was permitted to seek custody in

Japan; and (3) Mother’s residency with C.J. in Philadelphia, coupled with her

filing of a custody petition, meant that Pennsylvania had acquired home state

jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(“UCCJEA”). Mother’s Exhibit 5 at 4-7. Thus, pursuant to the instructions of

the Texas appellate court, the Texas trial court dismissed the portion of its

orders related to custody of C.J., but retained jurisdiction over the divorce and

child support proceedings. See id.; see also Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at

2. On August 8, 2025, Father filed an answer and counterclaim for custody in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.

The trial court held a custody trial on the parties’ petitions on November

12, 2025. At that time, Mother had resided in Philadelphia since June 2023,

and Father had resided in San Antonio since February 2024. See N.T.,

11/12/25, at 81, 228. The parties were each represented by counsel and

testified on their own behalf. In addition to the parties’ testimony, the court

admitted numerous exhibits into evidence, which included documentation

related to the Texas litigation. At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued

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findings with respect to the custody factors pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)

on the record in open court.1 See N.T., 11/12/25, at 304-15.

By order dated and entered on November 12, 2025, the trial court

awarded Mother sole legal and primary physical custody of then-three-year-

old C.J. See Order, 11/12/25, at 1-2. The court awarded Father partial

physical custody for two consecutive overnights in Philadelphia with 24-hour

notice to Mother. See id. at 2. The court also awarded Father partial physical

custody of C.J. in Texas, as follows:

During Christmas of 2025, Father shall have partial physical custody of the child from December 28, 2025[,] through January 4, 2026. Father shall arrange for all transportation[,] and the parties shall share the cost of the transportation in accordance with the percentages set forth in the child support order. In all subsequent years[,] Father shall have partial physical custody of the child from December 26 until the day prior to school resuming for the child. Father shall arrange for all transportation[,] and the parties shall share the cost of transportation in accordance with the percentages set forth in the child support order.

During the summer of 2026, Father shall have partial physical custody the second and third week of July. Father shall retrieve the child from Mother on Sunday and return her to Mother two Sundays after. Thereafter, Father shall have the child each year for the entire month of July from the first of the month to the thirty-first of the month. Father shall arrange for all transportation[,] and the parties shall share the cost of transportation in accordance with the percentages set forth in the child support order.

Father shall have the child each year during winter break commencing in 2026, from December 26 at 6:00 p.m. to the day ____________________________________________

1 The Child Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340, which governs child custody actions, sets forth sixteen factors that a court must consider before making an award of custody. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

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before school reconvenes at 6:00 p.m. Father shall arrange for all transportation[,] and the parties shall share the cost of transportation in accordance with the percentages set forth in the child support order.

Father shall have the child each year during the spring break from 6:00 p.m. the day spring break commences to 6:00 p.m. the day before school reconvenes. Father shall arrange for all transportation[,] and the parties shall share the cost of transportation in accordance with the percentages set forth in the child support order. For each custodial exchange, the parent gaining custody shall retrieve the child from the other parent.

Id. at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

As the above text indicates, the trial court ordered that: (1) Father

would “arrange for all transportation[;]” (2) the parties would share the cost

of transportation “in accordance with the percentages set forth in the child

support order[;]” and (3) the parent “gaining custody” of C.J. over spring

break would be responsible for retrieving her from the other parent. Id. As

explained above, the only percentage listed in the Texas child support order

is that the parties are to split any unreimbursed medical costs equally. 2 See

Mother’s Exhibit 3 at 13.

On December 3, 2025, Mother filed a motion for reconsideration,

wherein she raised, for the first time, claims that the trial court had erred by

allegedly refusing to “hear testimony regarding the parties’ income” and the

child support order in Texas. Motion for Reconsideration, 12/3/25, at ¶ 5(a)-

____________________________________________

2 As discussed further infra, the trial court clarified that its intent was for the

parties to equally share the costs of transportation to exchange custody. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 20-21.

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(b). It does not appear that the trial court ruled on Mother’s reconsideration

motion. On December 12, 2025, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal along

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3 The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion

on January 16, 2026.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by improperly delegating to Father unilateral control over all of the essential aspects of transportation regarding the parties and C.J.?

2. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by adopting terms from the parties’ Texas support order for custody travel cost allocation while refusing to consider relevant evidence regarding that allocation?

3. Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by ordering custody exchange terms that are not sufficiently specific and contrary to the best interests of C.J.?

Mother’s Brief at 10 (cleaned up).

“We review a trial court’s determination in a custody case for an abuse

of discretion, and our scope of review is broad.” S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d

396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014). As with all custody-related matters, the

Pennsylvania courts’ “paramount concern is the best interest of the child

involved.” Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 61 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal

citation and quotation omitted).

3 Mother filed the notice of appeal and concise statement pro se and subsequently obtained counsel for this appeal.

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“It is not this Court’s function to determine whether the trial court

reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether, ‘based on the

evidence presented, given [sic] due deference to the trial court’s weight and

credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred or abused its discretion[.]”

King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Hanson v.

Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “Ultimately, the test is

whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the

evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if

they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable

findings of the trial court.” Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61 (citation omitted).

In Mother’s first issue, she argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by delegating to Father the responsibility of arranging the

transportation related to his periods of partial physical custody of C.J. in

Texas. See Mother’s Brief at 23-31. Specifically, Mother contends that this

provision is unreasonable in light of record evidence that she claims

established the existence of communication problems between the parties,

including but not limited to Father’s alleged inability to cooperate with Mother

regarding travel arrangements. See id. at 24-26, 29-30. Mother further

argues that the result of this portion of the trial court’s order is that she has

no control over travel logistics, timing, and costs, which she claims impedes

her ability to comply with the custody order. See id. at 27-28.

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In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that it made Father

“responsible for making the arrangements” for travel during custody

exchanges based upon, in relevant part, its conclusion that Mother “had been

actively preventing Father from developing a relationship” with C.J. Trial

Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 16 (emphasis omitted). The trial court reasoned

that, “Based off Mother’s testimony and demeanor[,] this court did not believe

that she would make a good faith effort to participate in arranging the

transportation for the child to see Father.” Id. at 17.

The trial court’s findings are well-supported by the record evidence. At

the outset, we note that the Texas order awarded Father partial physical

custody of C.J. as the parties agreed from June 9, 2023, until it was vacated

on March 5, 2025. See Mother’s Exhibit 3 at 8; see also Mother’s Exhibit 5.

Despite being awarded partial physical custody by the Texas trial court, Father

testified that Mother refused to allow him to exercise partial physical custody

of C.J. in July of 2023, June of 2024, and during the Christmas season of 2024.

See N.T., 11/12/25, at 222, 230, 234-35, 239-40, 282.

Significantly, Father further testified that, at some point in early 2025,

he was informed that he was going to be deployed from May to October of

2025. See id. at 234-35. Prior to this deployment, Father requested partial

physical custody of C.J. in Texas, which Mother denied. See id. at 235. Father

agreed to come to Philadelphia, but Mother then refused to allow any partial

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physical custody that was not supervised.4 See id. Ultimately, Father was

unable to spend any time with C.J. before his deployment due to Mother’s

refusal. See id. at 282.

As a consequence of Mother’s repeated refusals, Father testified that he

did not have any physical custody of C.J. from December of 2024, until

ordered by the trial court pursuant to an agreement of the parties in October

of 2025. See id. at 234, 239. For this period of partial physical custody,

Father acquiesced to Mother’s supervision demand because it was “the only

way she would allow me to see my daughter.” Id. at 239-40. We also note

that Mother’s own testimony corroborated virtually all of this information. See

id. at 92, 100-01, 103-04, 138-39, 140-41, 168-73, 177-78, 198-200.

Accordingly, Mother’s pattern of obstructing Father’s attempts to exercise

physical custody of C.J. is essentially unchallenged in the certified record.

To the extent that Mother argues that the trial court should have

credited her testimony regarding Father’s alleged inability to cooperate with

her about travel information, our review reveals that the court indeed did

credit her testimony in this regard in its analysis of the Section 5328(a)

4 Mother continued to request supervised physical custody at the trial, which

she testified was to “afford the opportunity to establish a relationship” between C.J. and Father. N.T., 11/12/25, at 138. The trial court found that “there is absolutely nothing . . . that indicates that there is any type of supervision that is recommended, or necessary, or otherwise in the best interest of this child.” Id. at 312. Mother has not challenged this aspect of the subject order in this appeal.

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factors. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 312. Specifically, the trial court concluded

that Father was “not forthright” with Mother regarding custody exchange

matters. Id. However, the court viewed Father’s lack of candor as indicative

of the larger, mutual communication issues between the parties: “[B]ottom

line is there is substantial, substantial distrust. And there is . . . reason[] for

it on both sides.” Id.

Ultimately, the court determined that Mother’s well-documented

refusals to permit Father to exercise custody were of greater concern. See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 16-19. It explained, “Unfortunately, in a high

conflict case such as this[,] the parties are unable to effectively

communicate[,] making it necessary for one party to be responsible for

specific decisions regarding the child[;] in this instance[,] travel details.” Id.

at 19. As far as Mother’s request for this Court to revise the trial court’s

weight and credibility findings in her favor, we may not do so. See Rogowski,

291 A.3d at 60 (“[W]ith regard to issues of credibility and weight of the

evidence, we must defer to the [trial court] who viewed and assessed the

witnesses first-hand.”) (some brackets in original).

Further, Mother’s arguments regarding her inability to comply with the

order due to her lack of control over travel are purely speculative, as they are

predicated upon the presumed occurrence of uncertain future events, i.e., the

ways in which Father might inconvenience her in planning travel for upcoming

custodial exchanges. See Mother’s Brief at 26-28. This Court, however, has

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stated that trial courts should not consider “sheer speculation” in custody

matters. Haraschak v. Haraschak, 407 A.2d 886, 888 (Pa. Super. 1979)

(citation omitted).

Based upon the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s findings that Mother had a history of withholding C.J. from Father and

its resulting conclusion that it was in C.J.’s best interest to delegate the

obligation of making travel arrangements for custody exchanges to Father.

Therefore, Mother’s first issue fails.

Turning to Mother’s second issue, she argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by allocating the travel costs related to custody exchanges

equally between the parties. See Mother’s Brief at 31-44. Mother’s

arguments on this point consist of three separate claims, namely that: (1) the

trial court allegedly precluded Mother from presenting evidence regarding the

costs of transportation; (2) the trial court also allegedly precluded her

testimony about the costs of C.J.’s education, 5 to the extent that it would

make her unable to afford her contribution to travel costs; and (3) the trial

court erred in relying upon the provisions in the Texas support order to

apportion the transportation costs. Id.

With respect to the first aspect of Mother’s arguments wherein she

contends that the trial court erroneously precluded her from presenting

5 As best we can discern, as C.J. was only three years old at the time of the

trial, she attends a daycare or preschool program.

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evidence of the transportation costs, the first time Mother raised this

evidentiary concern was in her December 3, 2025 motion for reconsideration.

See Motion for Reconsideration, 12/3/25, at ¶ 5(a)-(b). “It is well-established

that an issue raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration is not

preserved for appellate review in this Court.” Layton-Herron v. Litke, 352

A.3d 510, 520 (Pa. Super. 2026) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we

conclude that Mother has waived this evidentiary argument. See id.

In addition, even if Mother did not waive her evidentiary claim related

to transportation costs, we would conclude that the record does not confirm

the basis of Mother’s allegations. At the custody trial, Mother was unable to

provide a monetary figure regarding the estimated cost of flying to Texas to

retrieve C.J. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 127-28. Father testified, without

objection, that he had spent “[o]ver $10,000” traveling to exercise custody of

C.J. Id. at 252. Therefore, if not waived, this argument would fail inasmuch

as there is no record support for Mother’s contention that the trial court

excluded, or ignored, evidence of the costs of transportation.

Further, with respect to the second aspect of Mother’s arguments, which

is her assertion that the trial court precluded evidence regarding the costs of

C.J.’s education, we also conclude that Mother has waived this claim. It is

axiomatic that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed, our Supreme

Court has explained, “Requiring issues to be properly raised first in the trial

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court ensures that trial judges have the opportunity to consider a potential

appellate issue and correct any error at the first available opportunity.” Trigg

v. Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020) (citing In

re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1211 (Pa. 2010)). Here, on direct examination,

Mother’s counsel asked Mother about the amount she paid monthly for C.J.’s

education. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 128. The trial court then reminded

Mother’s counsel that it was not considering matters related to child support.

See id. Immediately thereafter, Mother voluntarily abandoned the

questioning. See id. at 128 (“I understand, Your Honor. . . . So I’ll move

on.”). Because Mother failed to raise this issue relating to her testimony

regarding the costs of C.J.’s education in the trial court, depriving the court of

the chance to correct this alleged error, we conclude this claim is likewise

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Trigg, 229 A.3d at 269.

The third part of Mother’s arguments in her second issue contends that

there is insufficient record evidence to support that an equal split of travel

expenses is reasonable. See id. at 35-44. In support of this argument,

Mother has heavily relied upon White v. Malecki, 296 A.3d 1210 (Pa. Super.

2023) (addressing whether the intentional travel cost provisions of a custody

order were manifestly unreasonable). Mother also challenges the trial court’s

utilization of the Texas child support order to allocate the costs of travel. See

id.

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Regarding the apportionment of travel costs between the parties, the

trial court reasoned that dividing the costs equally was the most reasonable

option available, as follows:

Mother works full time as a civilian contractor in the [USAF]. There is a current child support order running in Texas in which Mother is the [o]bligee and Father is the [o]bligor. Mother’s proposal was that Father only be permitted to spend time with the child in Philadelphia and that Father should be solely responsible for his travel costs. Father’s position was that the parties should share the transportation costs. This court found Father’s position to be more reasonable. In the child support order, unreimbursed medical expenses are split evenly between the parties. Though this provision of the child support order pertains only to medical expenses, this court believes that it is reasonable and equitable for the parties to evenly share travel costs related to custody.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).

Stated another way, the trial court concluded that splitting the costs of

custody exchange transportation was warranted based upon: (1) Mother’s

employment; (2) Father’s already existing child support obligations; and (3)

the existing equal split between the parties of C.J.’s unreimbursed medical

expenses. See id. Our review of the certified record reveals sufficient

evidence of record to support these findings.

There is no dispute that the parties are gainfully employed through the

USAF, based upon their respective testimonies. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 109,

208. Additionally, the record is clear that the Texas child support order

financially favors Mother. See id. at 128; Mother’s Exhibit 3 at 8 (“It is

ordered that [Father] pay [Mother] for the support of [C.J.], a child, one

thousand two hundred sixty-three dollars and five cents ($1[,]263.05) per

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month[.]”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Further, this same order

establishes that the parties are equally financially responsible for C.J.’s

unreimbursed medical expenses. See id. at 13. Thus, we reject Mother’s

suggestion that the trial court’s findings were not supported by sufficient

record evidence.

Nonetheless, Mother maintains that the trial court failed to issue specific

findings allegedly required by White, including: “(1) whether the costs are

reasonable or prohibitive, considering the logistics, nature, and distance of the

travel required; and (2) the financial circumstances of the parties; and (3) the

impact o[f] the cost assignment upon the parties’ respective ability to follow”

the custody order. Mother’s Brief at 37-38 (citing White, 296 A.3d at 1216).

However, there is no such passage in White setting forth mandatory factors

that must be addressed in apportioning the costs of child custody

transportation. See generally White, 296 A.3d at 1216-18. To the contrary,

White circumvented the notion that exact evidence is required to render such

decisions: “We acknowledge that the record is devoid of certain particularities.

The parties’ exact incomes are not in the record; neither is there any

testimony about exact travel expenses. Still, the record includes some

details on these subjects.” Id. at 1217-18 (emphasis added). Therefore,

we likewise reject Mother’s contention that White requires specific findings of

fact in this context.

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Moreover, Mother’s overall reliance upon White is also unavailing. In

White, the trial court granted the request of a father stationed in Germany

with the U.S. Army Reserves for primary physical custody of the subject child,

which required the child to relocate from the mother’s residence in

Pennsylvania. See White, 296 A.3d at 1212-13. The order awarded the

mother partial physical custody during annual spring, summer, and winter

breaks. See id. at 1216. Although the mother was medically unable to work,

the custody order made her financially responsible for almost all of the

international flights in order to exercise her custody award. See id. at 1217.

On appeal, this Court in White held that the trial court’s allocation of

travel expenses was “manifestly unreasonable” in light of: (1) the steep costs

of international travel; (2) the parties’ “dramatically different earning

capacities[;]” and (3) the mother’s responsibility to pay for “nearly all” of the

child’s travel. Id. at 1218. Overall, the White court concluded that the terms

of the trial court’s travel provision inhibited the mother’s ability to exercise

her partial physical custody award. See id.

The facts of the instant case are critically distinguishable from the

determinative facts in White. It is undisputed that the travel at issue here is

interstate, not international. Indeed, White explicitly recognized that the

expense of international travel was a determinative factor, which is absent

from the instant interstate controversy. See id. (“The international

transportation costs unique to this case are extraordinary in comparison to

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the costs associated with interstate custody exchanges[.]”). Further, there is

no evidence of significant disparity in the earning capacity of the parties in

this case, as set forth above. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 109, 208. In addition,

there is no indication that either party suffers from an impairing disability.

Most importantly, the trial court’s order in this case did not saddle one parent

with the bulk of the travel costs but split them evenly between the parties.

See Order, 11/12/25, at 3; see also Mother’s Exhibit 3 at 13. Finally, unlike

the appellant in White, the travel cost allocation here will not inhibit Mother

from exercising her custody award since she was awarded primary physical

custody. See Order, 11/12/25, at 2. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude

that White is inapposite and readily distinguishable from the instant case.

Mother also assails the trial court’s adoption of the 50/50 percentage

split from the Texas child support order allocating that the parties equally

share the costs of transportation for Father’s partial physical custody of C.J.

in Texas. See Mother’s Brief at 40-43. In pertinent part, Mother argues that

the medical expense allocation contained in the Texas order was not supported

by sufficient evidence. See id. Specifically, Mother seeks to challenge the

application of the medical expense division based upon a number of alleged

differences between child support findings under Texas law and Pennsylvania

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law.6 See id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5, Pa.R.C.P.

1910.16-6).

Mother’s arguments fail inasmuch as she has relied upon Pennsylvania

court rules concerning child support, however, we emphasize that those

provisions are not applicable to child custody proceedings. See Pa.R.C.P.

1910.1 (“[T]he rules in this chapter govern all civil actions or proceedings

brought in the court of common pleas to enforce a duty of support[.]”)

(emphasis added). Accordingly, Mother’s second issue merits no relief.

Mother’s third and final issue alleges that the custody exchange terms

of the subject order are unenforceable and/or not in three-year-old C.J.’s best

interest. See Mother’s Brief at 44-52. We will address Mother’s arguments

seriatim.

First, Mother asserts that the order’s provision mandating a 6:00 p.m.

exchange time in Texas the day prior to school reconvening is not in C.J.’s

best interest. See Mother’s Brief at 44-45, 50-52. Mother contends that an

exchange time at that point in the evening in Texas, then having to travel to

6 We note that there is no indication that Mother raised these particular arguments in the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). On this ground alone, we may deem the arguments waived. See id. However, we decline to do so insofar as the trial court’s use of language from the Texas child support order did not materialize until after the subject hearing had concluded. See id.

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Philadelphia, disrupts C.J.’s bedtime and would negatively affect her

attendance at school the following day. See id. at 50-51.

The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion explained the following regarding

the 6:00 p.m. exchange time:

There is nothing manifestly unreasonable about an exchange of 6 p[.]m.[,] nor is there any indication that this could possibly be a result of bias or ill will. Unfortunately, the parties’ communication is extremely contentious, which necessitates the court make certain designations of days and times for custody exchanges.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 23-24.

We discern no abuse of discretion. Mother and Father each extensively

testified to their significant issues with communication. See N.T., 11/12/25,

at 85-93, 96-100, 113-23, 129-36, 163-79, 183, 213-15, 219-30, 233-42,

265-67, 269-72, 276, 303. The record is replete with evidence of the parties’

inability to agree on essentially every detail of co-parenting, including: when

and how Father can spend time with C.J.; exchanging information about C.J.’s

medical appointments and preschool; video call times; appropriate

conversations topics for the calls; exchange locations; and issues regarding

C.J.’s diet and car seat. See id.; see also Mother’s Exhibit 4 (the parties’

text message and call logs from AppClose from June 9, 2023, through June

27, 2025). This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the parties’

communication is extremely contentious, from which it determined that an

exact exchange day and time was required in this case. See id. Further, our

review reveals that Mother provided no evidence or testimony at the subject

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hearing with respect to C.J.’s current bedtime, nighttime routine, or the

consequences, if any, of not following it. In the absence of any evidence to

the contrary, no relief is due.

Second, Mother argues that the terms regarding which party is

responsible for the pick-up/drop-off of C.J. are not sufficiently specific, which

she claims renders the order unenforceable pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

5323(f), defined below. See Mother’s Brief at 45-50. Specifically, Mother

points out that the language of the order only specifies the parties’ custody

exchange responsibilities for the summer of 2026 (Father is responsible to

pick up C.J. in Philadelphia and drop her off to Mother) and spring breaks (the

parent receiving custody is responsible to retrieve C.J.). See id. at 47-49.

She asserts that the order fails to specify who is responsible for the physical

transport of C.J. during the summers after 2026 and the Christmas/winter

break periods. See id. Mother highlights that the travel arrangements and

cost share provisions clearly repeat in every applicable paragraph, but the

physical responsibility for the custody exchanges do not. See id. at 48-49.

We must agree.

In its entirety, Section § 5323(f) provides:

Enforcement. In awarding custody, the court shall specify the terms and conditions of the award in sufficient detail to enable a party to enforce the court order through law enforcement authorities.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(f). We also note that Section § 5323(g) provides that

“[a] party who willfully fails to comply with any custody order may . . . be

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adjudged in contempt” and proscribes potential punishments, including fines

and jail time. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(g)(1).

With respect to the exchange responsibilities, the trial court explained:

The plain language of the court’s order speaks for itself. The party who is receiving custody of the child is to pick the child up from the other parent. This means that if Father is picking the child up from Mother, he is to do so in Philadelphia (unless otherwise agreed and arranged). If Mother is picking the child up from Father, she is to do so in Texas (unless otherwise agreed and arranged). ...

This court made clear in the written order that the party who is receiving custody of the child is to pick the child up from the other parent. The specific language of the order states, “For each custodial exchange, the parent gaining custody shall retrieve the child from the other parent.”

Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 16, 18. Respectfully, our reading of the plain

language of the order does not substantiate this explanation.

The order, as written, is not clear about the parties’ custody exchange

responsibilities. While it may have been the trial court’s intention to have the

parent gaining custody to be responsible for retrieving C.J. for all custodial

exchanges, the plain language of the order does not establish this. The

specific language the trial court references, “For each custodial exchange, the

parent gaining custody shall retrieve the child from the other parent[,]” solely

appears in the paragraph relating to spring break. Order, 11/12/25, at 3. The

only other paragraph that includes the parties’ custody exchange

responsibility is for summer of 2026, wherein Father is responsible to pick up

C.J. in Philadelphia and return her to Mother two weeks later, which conflicts

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with the trial court’s explanation of its intended result. See id. There are no

other custody exchange responsibilities delegated in the order. See id.

Conversely, the language about travel arrangements and costs appear in

every paragraph, making it applicable to all custody exchanges. See id.

Further, because the exchange responsibilities are not clearly delineated for

the summer or winter/Christmas breaks, but Father’s obligation to arrange

the travel is, there is a possibility for the order to be construed to mean that

Mother could be completely responsible for the physical transport during those

times if that is what Father arranges. See id.

Therefore, a plain reading of the order indicates ambiguity with respect

to the parties’ custody exchange responsibilities, which we conclude violates

Section § 5323(f) to the extent that the trial court failed to specify the terms

and conditions in sufficient detail to enable a party to enforce the court order

through law enforcement authorities. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(f). We deem

this particularly important in this high conflict case where the evidence

established that the parties have a history of involving the police in relation to

compliance with custody orders. See N.T., 11/12/25, at 96-97; see also

Mother’s Exhibit 4, at 3, 5-6, 19, 59. Further, the ambiguity exposes Mother

to a potential finding of contempt and the corresponding punishments should

she not comply with allowing Father to exercise his partial physical custody

award. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(g)(1).

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In addition, considering the trial court’s finding outlined above that the

parties’ substantial communication issues necessitated explicit designations

for exchange days and times, we find that same reasoning applicable to the

physical custody exchange responsibilities. Based upon the foregoing, we are

constrained to conclude that the trial court’s provisions with respect to the

parties’ custody exchange responsibilities are manifestly unreasonable as

shown by the evidence of record, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.

See Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61. Thus, we must vacate and remand for

the trial court to enter a new order to explicitly clarify which party is

responsible for each custodial exchange.

Lastly, Mother contends that the lack of specifically designated exchange

locations is likewise unreasonable in light of the trial court’s findings that this

case is “high conflict” and “extremely contentious.” Id. at 45-47 (citing Trial

Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 19, 24). Again, we must agree.

In declining to order specific exchange locations, the trial court

reasoned:

This court ordered the parties to enroll in co-parenting counseling within 30 days of the entry of the order. The purpose of the coparenting counseling is to improve communication between the parents. Arranging the details of pick[-]ups and drop[-]offs can be explored in their required sessions. Mother and Father are both highly intelligent and capable adults who should be able to mutually agree to something as basic as an exchange location.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/16/26, at 19-20.

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Regrettably, this reasoning is unsupported by the record and the trial

court’s own findings. We reiterate that the trial court’s finding that the parties’

communication is extremely contentious is well-supported by the record.

Therefore, this is at odds with the trial court’s conclusion, which we agree was

made in good faith and intended to benefit the parties, that the parties did not

require specified exchange locations, yet needed designated exchange days

and times. Thus, the evidence of record shows that the trial court’s failure to

specify exchange locations in this case is manifestly unreasonable, which

constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61. As a

result, we are constrained to remand for the trial court to enter a new order

to specify exchange locations.

In sum, we affirm the provision of the final custody order delegating the

obligation for making travel arrangements for custody exchanges to Father.

We affirm the allocation of travel costs equally between the parties. We also

affirm the provision designating specific days and times for custody

exchanges. We vacate the order to the extent that it is ambiguous with

respect to the parties’ custody exchange responsibilities. We remand to the

trial court to enter a new order clearly stating who is responsible for each

custody exchange and the location where each exchange is to occur.

As Father’s summer 2026 partial physical custody is rapidly

approaching, we direct the Prothonotary of this Court to immediately remit

the record to the trial court. On remand, and after the trial court has received

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the record, the trial court shall, within ten days, enter an order complying with

the instructions of this memorandum.

Order affirmed in part. Order vacated in part. Case remanded with

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 7/8/2026

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