Jenish v. Weaver

676 S.W.2d 526, 1984 Mo. App. LEXIS 4051
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 4, 1984
DocketNo. 47880
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 676 S.W.2d 526 (Jenish v. Weaver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jenish v. Weaver, 676 S.W.2d 526, 1984 Mo. App. LEXIS 4051 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinion

GAERTNER, Presiding Judge.

Charles R. Jenish instituted this action in Small Claims Court pursuant to § 482.300 et seq. RSMo 1978. Denominated as defendants in the caption of the petition were Rodger C. Weaver and Mrs. Reah Weaver “as the last known officers of the Type-house, Inc.” After Jenish obtained a judgment against Rodger Weaver in the sum of $700 in Small Claims Court, Weaver appealed for a trial de novo. Rule 154.01. Weaver now appeals from the entry of judgment against him in the sum of $350 after the trial de novo. We affirm.

Weaver’s sole point on appeal is that plaintiff did not make a submissible case because of the absence of any proof regarding the legal existence or non-existence of the Typehouse, Inc., or of Weaver’s capacity as a last known officer of Type-house, Inc. His attack is misdirected. “The caption is no part of the petition....” Cook v. Wheeler, 218 S.W. 929, 931 (Mo. App.1920). “Generally the body of the pleading, not the caption, determines the [527]*527parties necessary to the prosecution of the action.” Watson v. Watson, 562 S.W.2d 329, 332 n. 2 (Mo. banc 1978). The character of a cause of action must be determined from the factual allegations of the pleading without regard to the caption or name assigned by the pleader. State ex rel. Maddox v. Garner, 459 S.W.2d 40, 45 (Mo.App.1970). The petition alleged “On February 2, 1983, Rodger C. Weaver agreed to a five day severance pay of $700 which had not been paid to me.” Plaintiff testified “I had been working for him [Rodger Weaver] for twenty months prior to this,” and that on February 2, 1983, Weaver told him “I’m letting you go, Chuck, I’m giving you your vacation pay and five days severance pay.” Weaver admitted making the statement and later recanting upon that part of his promise regarding severance pay. There was no variance between the allegations of the petition, the evidence or the judgment against Rodger C. Weaver without further description. Judgment affirmed.1

SMITH and STEPHAN, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McBee v. Gustaaf Vandecnocke Revocable Trust
986 S.W.2d 170 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1999)
Estate of Dawes
891 S.W.2d 510 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1994)
Temple v. McCaughen & Burr, Inc.
839 S.W.2d 322 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1992)
Young v. Williams
824 S.W.2d 124 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
676 S.W.2d 526, 1984 Mo. App. LEXIS 4051, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jenish-v-weaver-moctapp-1984.