Jeniqua Knuckles v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 15, 2024
DocketCB-7121-18-0008-V-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jeniqua Knuckles v. Department of the Army (Jeniqua Knuckles v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeniqua Knuckles v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JENIQUA IRENE KNUCKLES, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, CB-7121-18-0008-V-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: March 15, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jeniqua Irene Knuckles , Summerville, South Carolina, pro se.

Christopher M. Kenny , Fort Eisenhower, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d), the appellant has filed a request for review of an arbitrator’s decision, which found that the grievance of her removal action was not appealed to arbitration in a timely manner and, therefore, was not arbitrable. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the appellant’s request for review and SUSTAIN the arbitrator’s decision.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND The agency removed the appellant, an Office Support Assistant at its Dwight David Eisenhower Army Medical Center in Fort Gordon, Georgia, effective March 7, 2014. Request for Review (RFR) File, Tab 1 at 54-55. On March 25, 2014, the appellant, through her union representative, filed a step three grievance challenging her removal and raising discrimination claims in accordance with negotiated grievance procedure. Knuckles v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. CB-7121-14-0025-V-1, Final Order at 2 (May 27, 2015). In a step three grievance decision dated May 20, 2014, the agency affirmed the removal action, finding the action justified by the evidence and reasonable under the circumstances. Id. On September 5, 2014, the appellant filed a Board appeal in which she requested the Board’s review of the step three grievance decision. Id. In a final order dated May 27, 2015, the Board dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1. The Board found that there was no final decision to review because the step three grievance decision was not a final decision within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d). Id. at 3-7. Subsequently, on a date after September 30, 2016, the union appealed the step three grievance decision to arbitration. RFR File, Tab 1 at 33. In a decision dated December 5, 2017, the arbitrator found that the grievance was not arbitrable because it was not appealed to arbitration in a timely manner. Id. at 43. On January 9, 2018, the appellant filed the present appeal in which she requested review of the December 5, 2017 arbitrator’s decision. RFR File, Tab 1 at 2. She raised claims of discrimination and harmful procedural error. Id. at 5. The agency filed a response to the appellant’s request. RFR File, Tab 9. It argued, among other things, that the arbitrator’s conclusion that the arbitration request was untimely filed could not be found to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion. Id. at 8. 3

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board has jurisdiction over a request for review of a final grievance or arbitration decision under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d) when the following conditions are met: (1) the subject matter of the grievance is one over which the Board has jurisdiction; (2) the appellant either raised a claim of discrimination in connection with the underlying action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) in the negotiated grievance procedure, or raises a claim of discrimination in connection with the underlying action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) for the first time with the Board if such allegations could not be raised in the negotiated grievance procedure; and (3) a final decision has been issued. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.155(a)(1), (c); see Jones v. Department of Energy, 120 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 8 (2013), aff’d, 589 F. App’x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We find that the appellant satisfies the jurisdictional criteria. Specifically, her grievance challenges a removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7512, a subject matter over which the Board has jurisdiction; she raised a claim of discrimination in the negotiated grievance procedure; and the arbitrator issued a final decision in the matter. 2 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(1), 7513(d), 7702(a)(1); RFR File, Tab 1 at 23-55. Consequently, we find that we have jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s decision. See Brookens v. Department of Labor, 120 M.S.P.R. 678, ¶ 4 (2014). The Board’s standard of review of an arbitrator’s award is narrow; such awards are entitled to a greater degree of deference than initial decisions issued by the Board’s administrative judges. Sadiq v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 450, ¶ 7 (2013); Fanelli v. Department of Agriculture, 109 M.S.P.R. 115, ¶ 6 (2008). The Board will modify or set aside an arbitration decision only when the arbitrator has erred as a matter of law in interpreting civil 2 The agency argues in its response to the appellant’s request for review that the appellant should be collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue previously addressed by the Board—that the union declined to arbitrate the appellant’s grievance. RFR File, Tab 9 at 7-8. Even if we were persuaded by this argument, the Board need not apply the doctrine in all cases, and, given our disposition, we would not do so here. See, e.g., Kroeger v. U.S. Postal Service, 865 F.2d 235, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 4

service law, rule, or regulation, and, absent such legal error, the Board cannot substitute its conclusions for those of the arbitrator, even if it would disagree with the arbitrator’s decision. Sadiq, 119 M.S.P.R. 450, ¶ 7. Moreover, an arbitrator is uniquely qualified to interpret a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which is the source of the arbitrator’s authority. Id. Thus, an arbitrator’s decision that “draws its essence” from the CBA is entitled to deference and should only be vacated when it manifests an infidelity to this obligation. Id. In making this determination, any doubts concerning the merits of the arbitrator’s decision must be resolved in favor of the decision. Id. Here, the arbitrator found, pursuant to Section 12a of Article 34 of the relevant CBA, that a request to refer a grievance to arbitration must be in writing and received “not later than 20 workdays following receipt of the final decision.” RFR File, Tab 1 at 36, 39. The arbitrator found that the union did not refer the appellant’s grievance to arbitration in writing until years after receipt of the step three grievance decision. Id. at 39. He concluded, therefore, that the grievance was not timely referred to arbitration and was not arbitrable for that reason. Id. at 39-42.

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Hutchinson J. Kroeger v. United States Postal Service
865 F.2d 235 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board
589 F. App'x 972 (Federal Circuit, 2014)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Jeniqua Knuckles v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeniqua-knuckles-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2024.