Jelber Ediveth Diaz Osorio v. Timothy S. Robbins, et. al.

Opinion

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV-26-01601-ODW (AGR) Date: February 23, 2026 Title Jelber Ediveth Diaz Osorio v. Timothy S. Robbins, et. al.

Present: The Honorable: Alicia G. Rosenberg, United States Magistrate Judge

K. Lozada n/a Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Respondents: n/a n/a

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS DUPLICATIVE

Petitioner has a pending petition for writ of habeas corpus. Diaz Osorio v. Robbins, et al., CV 26-0757 ODW (AGR) (C.D. Cal.) (filed January 24, 2026) (hereinafter “Diaz Osorio I”).

This second habeas action (Diaz Osorio II) has been opened in this district after a transfer order dated February 13, 2026 transferring this action from the Eastern District of California to the Central District of California for the reasons cited therein.1 (Dkt. No. 14.)

“Plaintiffs generally have ‘no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.’” Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). A district court may dismiss the second case without prejudice. Id. at 692 (“Dismissal of the duplicative lawsuit, more so than the issuance of a stay or the

1 The court refers to the second habeas action opened in this district as Diaz Osorio II even though the petition in that action was first filed in the Eastern District of California before the petition in this district. CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. CV-26-01601-ODW (AGR) Date: February 23, 2026 Title Jelber Ediveth Diaz Osorio v. Timothy S. Robbins, et. al. enjoinment of proceedings, promotes judicial economy and the ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation.’”).

To determine whether a suit is duplicative, “we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Id. at 689. The court considers four criteria in considering whether the two suits assert the same causes of action: “‘(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.’” Mendoza v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l, 30 F.4th 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “The ‘most important’ factor is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.’” Id. (quoting Adams, 487 F.3d at 689). The fact that the second suit “involves somewhat different legal theories and a somewhat broader range of related conduct and damages does not alter the underlying fundamental identity of the suits.” Id.

A review of the two habeas actions reveals that Diaz Osorio II is a duplicative action. Both petitions assert a single claim for relief based on violation of the Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process, and both petitions seek the same relief. (Compare Petition, Dkt. No. 1 in Diaz Osorio I with Petition, Dkt. No. 1 in Diaz Osorio II.) The parties in the two habeas petitions are identical except that Diaz Osorio II names the Warden of California City Detention Facility, where Petitioner was apparently never in custody, instead of the Warden of Adelanto Processing Center, who was correctly named in Diaz Osorio I as custodian of Petitioner.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner show cause in writing, on or before March 9, 2026, why the court should not dismiss this action without prejudice as a duplicate action. The filing of a stipulation and proposed order of dismissal without prejudice by March 9, 2026 shall be sufficient to discharge this order to show cause.

Initials of Preparer kl