Jeffry Thul v. Department of the Interior

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMay 15, 2024
DocketAT-1221-18-0519-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jeffry Thul v. Department of the Interior (Jeffry Thul v. Department of the Interior) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeffry Thul v. Department of the Interior, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JEFFRY THUL, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-1221-18-0519-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DATE: May 15, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jeffry Thul , Ooltewah, Tennessee, pro se.

Cecelia Townes , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). On review, the appellant raises a 5 C.F.R. § 1207 allegation of disability discrimination against the administrative judge. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-16. He alleges that the administrative judge violated the “Board’s facially-neutral, non-discriminatory policy regarding pro se litigants” by reaching a jurisdictional determination without a hearing despite his “numerous pleas for help.” Id. at 4, 9-14. The appellant further alleges that the administrative judge engaged in prohibited discrimination by ignoring his request for a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 4, 15-17. The appellant had filed a motion during the proceedings below, seemingly asking the administrative judge to order the agency to provide him with the “services of a practicing attorney to assist and present, before the Board, his allegations of [a]gency violations of [p]rohibited [p]ersonnel [p]ractices.” Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 1. In a subsequent request for a status conference, the appellant again asserted that the agency was required to provide his requested accommodation of legal representation. IAF, Tab 17 at 5. An appellant has the right to be represented by an attorney or other representative. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2). However, no statute or regulation requires the Board to appoint a representative for an appellant, and it is generally the appellant’s obligation to secure his own representative. See Yanopoulos v. 3

Department of the Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 470 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Brum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 5 (2008); cf. Vaughn v. Department of the Treasury, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 17 (2013) (holding that the Board has the authority to request pro bono representation for an appellant in a disability retirement appeal who is found to be incompetent). The appeal form completed by the appellant and the acknowledgment order notified him of his right to representation. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 2 at 2. To the extent that the appellant felt disadvantaged by a lack of representation, it is well established that an appellant who chooses to proceed pro se must accept the consequences of that decision. See Yanopoulos, 796 F.2d at 470; Brum, 109 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 5. 5 C.F.R. § 1207.170(b) sets forth procedures for a party who believes that he has been subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in the adjudication of his Board appeal. If the administrative judge to whom the case was assigned has issued an initial decision by the time the party learns of the alleged discrimination, the party may raise the allegation of discrimination in a petition for review. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.170(b)(4). However, because the “accommodation” the appellant seeks is neither within the administrative judge’s authority to provide, nor something to which he is entitled, we find that he has failed to articulate a 5 C.F.R. § 1207 allegation of discrimination and he has provided no basis for disturbing the initial decision. See Vaughn, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 17; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b) (stating that a petition for review must include all of the filing party’s legal and factual arguments objecting to the initial decision and must be supported by references to applicable laws or regulations and by specific references to the record). To establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant must have exhausted his administrative remedies before the Office of Special Counsel and make nonfrivolous allegations of the following: (1) he made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the 4

disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a), (e)(1); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016); see Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

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Related

Theodore Yanopoulos v. Department of the Navy
796 F.2d 468 (Federal Circuit, 1986)
Mohammed Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs
242 F.3d 1367 (Federal Circuit, 2001)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Jeffry Thul v. Department of the Interior, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeffry-thul-v-department-of-the-interior-mspb-2024.