Jeffreys v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company
This text of Jeffreys v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company (Jeffreys v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
22-3059-cv Jeffreys v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the 2 Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 3 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of February, two thousand 4 twenty-four. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 10 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 Mr. Thomas J. Jeffreys, 15 16 Plaintiff-Appellant, 17 18 v. 22-3059 19 20 Deutsche Bank Trust Company, 21 Americans For Rali 2004 Q512, 22 Ocwen Loan and Servicing, LLC, 1 2 Defendants-Appellees. 3 4 _____________________________________ 5 6 7 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Thomas J. Jeffreys, pro 8 se, Waterbury, CT. 9 10 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Marc James Ayers, Evan 11 A. Ward, Bradley Arant 12 Boult Cummings LLP, 13 Birmingham, AL. 14
15 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
16 of Connecticut (Sarala V. Nagala, J.).
17 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
18 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
19 AFFIRMED.
20 Plaintiff-Appellant Thomas J. Jeffreys, proceeding pro se, appeals from a
21 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
22 (Nagala, J.) dismissing his pro se “wrongful eviction” complaint for lack of subject
23 matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and denying his subsequent
2 1 motion for reconsideration. The instant litigation arises from a Connecticut state
2 foreclosure action, in which Defendant-Appellee Deutsche Bank Trust Company
3 (“Deutsche Bank”) successfully foreclosed on Jeffreys’s home, from which he was
4 then evicted. Jeffreys filed a federal complaint in the District of Connecticut
5 against Deutsche Bank and Ocwen Loan and Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen Loan and
6 Servicing”), alleging wrongful conduct by several parties resulting in his eviction
7 and challenging the state court’s foreclosure judgment and eviction order. We
8 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history,
9 and the issues on appeal.
10 “We consider questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo and are not
11 limited in our right to refer to any material in the record.” Platinum-Montaur Life
12 Scis., LLC v. Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., 943 F.3d 613, 616 (2d Cir. 2019)
13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “we review a district
14 court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion and will
15 affirm its decision unless the movant can point to controlling decisions or data that
16 the district court overlooked.” See Contant v. AMA Cap., LLC, 66 F.4th 59, 65 (2d
17 Cir. 2023) (internal alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted). 3 1 We agree with the district court that any direct challenge to the state
2 foreclosure and eviction action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under
3 which a party who lost in state court cannot seek appellate review in a United
4 States district court. This is a “narrow” doctrine that applies only if a four-part
5 test is met: “(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
6 complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites
7 review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state judgment was rendered
8 before the district court proceedings commenced.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th
9 62, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted).
10 An independent review of the record shows that the district court properly
11 dismissed Jeffreys’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to his
12 claims that directly challenged, and invited review of, the state judgment granting
13 foreclosure and eviction. Jeffreys lost in state court, the main injury (loss of his
14 home) was caused by the state court’s foreclosure judgment, the central relief he
15 sought was reversal of the state court’s foreclosure judgment, and the judgment
16 was final before he filed the district court action. Jeffreys’s arguments to the
17 contrary, which primarily dispute the finality of the state judgment, are 4 1 unavailing. Specifically, Jeffreys contends that the state judgment was not final
2 because the trial judge made no certification of finality and the Chief Judge of the
3 Connecticut Appellate Court did not concur. However, this argument
4 misconstrues Connecticut Rule of Appellate Procedure § 61-4(a), which requires
5 those steps only if a court wishes to certify a nonfinal judgment for immediate
6 appeal. By its plain terms, § 61-4(a) does not apply to judgments that dispose of
7 all claims against all parties. See Ahern v. Bd. of Educ. of Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 13, 295
8 A.3d 496, 505 & n.12 (Conn. App. Ct. 2023) (discussing Connecticut’s final
9 judgment rule and the exception to that rule contained in § 61-4(a)).
10 While Rooker-Feldman bars those portions of the complaint that invite review
11 and rejection of the state judgment, we are mindful of the obligation to afford
12 liberal construction to a pro se complaint, reading it to raise “the strongest
13 arguments that [it] suggest[s],” Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)
14 (internal citation omitted). So construed, Jeffreys’s complaint appears to raise
15 claims against Deutsche Bank, state judges, and other unnamed individuals that
16 would not require the district court to sit in a forbidden appellate capacity. For
17 instance, Jeffreys seems to accuse certain defendants of misconduct in connection 5 1 with the then-ongoing state foreclosure proceeding, and claims he was evicted in
2 violation of an alleged automatic stay. 1 Rooker-Feldman might not bar claims
3 arising from alleged misconduct during the underlying state court litigation or in
4 executing the state judgment. See Hunter, 75 F.4th at 67, 71–72 & n.12; Plymouth
5 Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC, 988 F.3d 634, 641–42 (2d Cir. 2021).
6 Nevertheless, the circumstances of this case do not warrant remand as to
7 those claims. On appeal, Jeffreys does not contend that the district court
8 misconstrued his complaint and has therefore abandoned this argument. See
9 LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (pro se appellant’s
10 failure to raise an argument in his appellate brief resulted in waiver).
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