Jeffrey Takada v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedOctober 13, 2022
DocketSF-1221-16-0112-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Jeffrey Takada v. Department of Defense (Jeffrey Takada v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeffrey Takada v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JEFFREY TAKADA, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-1221-16-0112-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: October 13, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Amos N. Jones, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Jennifer Kehe, APO, AP, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b)

BACKGROUND ¶2 In this IRA appeal, the appellant alleged that the agency retaliated against him for engaging in protected equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, bot h on his own behalf and on behalf of others, and for disclosing the agency’s violation of the Privacy Act. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tabs 1, 5, 11-12. In his EEO complaint, the appellant alleged that the agency discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin when it denied him the opportunity to compete for an overseas teaching position. IAF, Tab 9 at 15, 30-32, 63-82. He alleged therein that his nonselection involved the agency’s violation of law in hiring local nationals to teach foreign languages in its overseas high schools. Id. at 65-68. Because the administrative judge determined that the appellant’s EEO complaint concerned national origin discrimination and did not itself seek to remedy whistleblowing reprisal, she found that the appellant’s EEO complaint did not qualify as protected activity under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), which only extends to claims of reprisal for filing such complaints seeking to remedy a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). IAF, 3

Tab 15 at 4 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a), 2302(b)(9)(A)(i); Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013)). ¶3 Among the five issues which the administrative judge determined that the appellant had raised before the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), IAF, Tabs 5, 11-12, the administrative judge found that the appellant had made a protected disclosure regarding the agency’s violation of 20 U.S.C. § 901(2)(A) concerning the hiring of local nationals to teach in overseas locations, and that he nonfrivolously alleged that the agency failed to select him twice, involving a promotion and a transfer, IAF, Tab 12 at 5, Tab 15 at 3-6. 2 On the remaining four issues, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make the requisite nonfrivolous allegations that the agency took a personnel action or created a hostile work environment. IAF, Tab 15 at 6-9, Tab 12 at 4-6. ¶4 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 28, Initial Decision (ID). She changed her previous determination that the appellant made a protected disclosure regarding the agency’s violation of 20 U.S.C. § 901(2)(A) because she found that her finding reflected too broad a reading of the WPEA. ID at 6. Because the appellant only raised that issue in his EEO complaint and failed to identify anyone else to whom he made the disclosure prior to the two personnel actions at issue, she instead found that it was not a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and therefore may not serve as a basis for Board jurisdiction over his IRA appeal. ID at 6; cf. Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 10 (2016) (citing Miller v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 626 F. App’x 261, 269 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over an IRA appeal arising out of disclosures made solely during

2 Under the second of the five issues raised before OSC, the appellant alleged four such nonselections, but the administrative judge found that because the appellant had not applied for two of the categories of positions he alleged, the agency could not have taken the personnel action of selecting, or nonselecting, him for those positions. IAF, Tab 15 at 6. 4

grievance procedures and not separately disclosed to the agency) . She also found that because the disclosure in the appellant’s EEO complaint did not attempt to remedy a violation of section 2302(b)(8), it was protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), which is not a source of Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal. ID at 7-8; see Graves, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 12; Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7. The administrative judge further determined that, even if the appellant made the requisite nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction over a protected disclosure regarding the two nonselections, because he also failed to show that the individual with knowledge of his purported disclosure had any input into those selections, he also failed to show that his purported disclosure was a contributing factor in either action. ID at 8-9. ¶5 In his petition for review, the appellant challenges the finding that he failed to nonfrivolously allege that he made a protected disclosure in his EEO complaint, arguing that the administrative judge improperly reversed her prior determination that the disclosure at issue was a protected one. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-6.

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Jeffrey Takada v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeffrey-takada-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2022.