Affirm and Opinion filed May 10, 2022
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00302-CR
JEFFREY LEE PATTERSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1945392-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Osborne, Pedersen, III, and Reichek Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III A jury found appellant Jeffrey Lee Patterson guilty of murder and assessed
his punishment at seventy years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division. In a single issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. We affirm.
Background
Appellant and Ladonna Garcia dated on and off for a number of years. At the
time of Garcia’s death in 2019, she was living with appellant in his home. Video
evidence at trial showed appellant picking Garcia up at a restaurant at approximately
12:45 a.m. on the morning of April 14. A second video then showed the couple stopping at a convenience store shortly after 1:00 a.m. to purchase propane. They
returned home and grilled steaks. Shortly after 3:00 a.m., a friend who lived nearby
stopped at the house, and Garcia gave him a plate of food that he took home to eat.
There is no evidence of any other person being at the house for the rest of that
morning.
At 9:10 a.m., appellant called 911 and reported that Garcia had experienced a
drug overdose. Emergency medical technicians arrived and found Garcia in the
living room; she was not breathing, and her heart was not beating. The EMTs
identified a wound they called a “hole” near her clavicle, attempted to revive her
using a compression machine, and eventually took her to the hospital. Garcia never
regained consciousness. The medical examiner testified that she suffered a number
of recent injuries; she died as a result of a stab wound to her chest, which he ruled a
homicide. The wound struck a major vein and Garcia’s lung, and the medical
examiner testified that a person who had suffered this wound would have died within
an hour.
At the scene, appellant first told the EMTs he didn’t know about Garcia’s
wound, but subsequently he told investigating officers that he had noticed it when
Garcia went into the bathroom to take a shower. Still later, he told an officer that—
sometime around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m.—Garcia had been bringing a plate of steaks into
the house when she tripped, fell on a knife, and cut herself.
–2– The police obtained a search warrant for the house. They found drops and
smears of blood throughout the kitchen, living room, and bedroom. They also found
significant amounts of blood in three places. On the bed, blood had soaked through
the sheets and mattress pad on to the mattress itself; the stained sheets had been
covered by a comforter. In the living room, a large wet blood stain close to the wall
had been covered by a loose piece of carpeting. And a significant pool of blood had
collected where Garcia’s body lay in the living room. The police found a steak knife
in the kitchen sink with blood on the blade. And they found clothes the pair had been
seen wearing earlier that morning in the videos: both appellant’s and Garcia’s clothes
were blood-stained, and Garcia’s shirt and sweatshirt—unlike the shirt she was
wearing when EMTs arrived—were torn in a manner that comported with her
wound. Police found the shower floor dry, and repeated tests found no evidence of
blood in the bathroom.
At trial, the State offered evidence establishing that the blood on the steak
knife belonged to Garcia and that Garcia had DNA from appellant under her
fingernails. The State also offered evidence from a number of witnesses that the
relationship between appellant and Garcia was contentious and that appellant had
acted violently toward her in the past. Indeed, appellant was on bond from a charge
of domestic violence against Garcia at the time of her death.
Appellant offered his own expert testimony from a medical examiner. She
testified that the medical examiner’s opinion that Garcia’s death was the result of
–3– homicide—as opposed to a suicide, or an accident, or an undetermined cause—was
dependent on the history given the medical examiner by the police. She also testified
that no one could know how long a person would survive after suffering the wound
Garcia had suffered: she agreed that such a wound could “bleed out” and cause the
victim to die in as little as ten minutes or as long as two or three hours.
The jury found appellant guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to
confinement for a term of seventy years. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence of Murder
In a single issue, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate the weight of the evidence or replace
the factfinder’s judgment with our own. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). The jury exclusively determines the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). Our charge is to ensure that the evidence presented supports the
jury’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally sufficient case of the offense
charged. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In our
review of the record, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
–4– establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient
to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The jury in this case was instructed that:
A person commits the offense of Murder if the person (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). We address first the section-
19.02(b)(1) definition of the offense and ask whether appellant intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of Garcia. Appellant contends that the evidence
supports neither a finding that he wielded the knife that stabbed Garcia, nor a
finding that he intended to cause her death or knew his conduct was
reasonably certain to do so.
The Criminal Act
Appellant relies on two facts developed at trial to support his argument that
the jury could not have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he
wielded the knife that killed Garcia. It was undisputed, first, that the knife that
stabbed Garcia was dropped in the kitchen sink with no apparent attempt to clean
off the blood. And, second, the State was unable to offer conclusive DNA evidence
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Affirm and Opinion filed May 10, 2022
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-20-00302-CR
JEFFREY LEE PATTERSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1945392-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Osborne, Pedersen, III, and Reichek Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III A jury found appellant Jeffrey Lee Patterson guilty of murder and assessed
his punishment at seventy years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division. In a single issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. We affirm.
Background
Appellant and Ladonna Garcia dated on and off for a number of years. At the
time of Garcia’s death in 2019, she was living with appellant in his home. Video
evidence at trial showed appellant picking Garcia up at a restaurant at approximately
12:45 a.m. on the morning of April 14. A second video then showed the couple stopping at a convenience store shortly after 1:00 a.m. to purchase propane. They
returned home and grilled steaks. Shortly after 3:00 a.m., a friend who lived nearby
stopped at the house, and Garcia gave him a plate of food that he took home to eat.
There is no evidence of any other person being at the house for the rest of that
morning.
At 9:10 a.m., appellant called 911 and reported that Garcia had experienced a
drug overdose. Emergency medical technicians arrived and found Garcia in the
living room; she was not breathing, and her heart was not beating. The EMTs
identified a wound they called a “hole” near her clavicle, attempted to revive her
using a compression machine, and eventually took her to the hospital. Garcia never
regained consciousness. The medical examiner testified that she suffered a number
of recent injuries; she died as a result of a stab wound to her chest, which he ruled a
homicide. The wound struck a major vein and Garcia’s lung, and the medical
examiner testified that a person who had suffered this wound would have died within
an hour.
At the scene, appellant first told the EMTs he didn’t know about Garcia’s
wound, but subsequently he told investigating officers that he had noticed it when
Garcia went into the bathroom to take a shower. Still later, he told an officer that—
sometime around 2:00 or 2:30 a.m.—Garcia had been bringing a plate of steaks into
the house when she tripped, fell on a knife, and cut herself.
–2– The police obtained a search warrant for the house. They found drops and
smears of blood throughout the kitchen, living room, and bedroom. They also found
significant amounts of blood in three places. On the bed, blood had soaked through
the sheets and mattress pad on to the mattress itself; the stained sheets had been
covered by a comforter. In the living room, a large wet blood stain close to the wall
had been covered by a loose piece of carpeting. And a significant pool of blood had
collected where Garcia’s body lay in the living room. The police found a steak knife
in the kitchen sink with blood on the blade. And they found clothes the pair had been
seen wearing earlier that morning in the videos: both appellant’s and Garcia’s clothes
were blood-stained, and Garcia’s shirt and sweatshirt—unlike the shirt she was
wearing when EMTs arrived—were torn in a manner that comported with her
wound. Police found the shower floor dry, and repeated tests found no evidence of
blood in the bathroom.
At trial, the State offered evidence establishing that the blood on the steak
knife belonged to Garcia and that Garcia had DNA from appellant under her
fingernails. The State also offered evidence from a number of witnesses that the
relationship between appellant and Garcia was contentious and that appellant had
acted violently toward her in the past. Indeed, appellant was on bond from a charge
of domestic violence against Garcia at the time of her death.
Appellant offered his own expert testimony from a medical examiner. She
testified that the medical examiner’s opinion that Garcia’s death was the result of
–3– homicide—as opposed to a suicide, or an accident, or an undetermined cause—was
dependent on the history given the medical examiner by the police. She also testified
that no one could know how long a person would survive after suffering the wound
Garcia had suffered: she agreed that such a wound could “bleed out” and cause the
victim to die in as little as ten minutes or as long as two or three hours.
The jury found appellant guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to
confinement for a term of seventy years. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence of Murder
In a single issue, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate the weight of the evidence or replace
the factfinder’s judgment with our own. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). The jury exclusively determines the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). Our charge is to ensure that the evidence presented supports the
jury’s verdict and that the State has presented a legally sufficient case of the offense
charged. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In our
review of the record, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
–4– establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient
to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The jury in this case was instructed that:
A person commits the offense of Murder if the person (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). We address first the section-
19.02(b)(1) definition of the offense and ask whether appellant intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of Garcia. Appellant contends that the evidence
supports neither a finding that he wielded the knife that stabbed Garcia, nor a
finding that he intended to cause her death or knew his conduct was
reasonably certain to do so.
The Criminal Act
Appellant relies on two facts developed at trial to support his argument that
the jury could not have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he
wielded the knife that killed Garcia. It was undisputed, first, that the knife that
stabbed Garcia was dropped in the kitchen sink with no apparent attempt to clean
off the blood. And, second, the State was unable to offer conclusive DNA evidence
that appellant held the knife. Given the totality of the record, however, and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that neither of
–5– these facts would preclude a rational factfinder’s determination that appellant
stabbed Garcia.
The following evidence supports that finding:
• Appellant and Garcia were the only people in the house when Garcia was
stabbed.1 The steak knife that killed Garcia was found in the house,
specifically in the kitchen sink.
• Expert testimony explained that Garcia’s blood on the knife overwhelmed any
DNA transferred by holding the knife’s handle, but the DNA evidence did not
exclude appellant as the person who stabbed Garcia with the knife.
• Appellant offered different and conflicting explanations of the events causing
Garcia’s injury and death:
o On the 911 call, he said had overdosed on drugs.
o Initially, appellant told the EMTs he was unaware of the wound; then
he told an officer he had seen the wound when Garcia showered earlier,
but the shower floor was dry, and no blood was found in the bathroom.
o Still later, he told an officer that she had tripped and fallen on the knife
between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m., but the medical examiner testified that her
wound was inflicted by a downward motion that could not likely occur
1 The only other person to enter the house after1:00 a.m. was the couple’s neighbor, who testified he left shortly after 3:00 a.m., when Garcia—alive and well—had given him a plate of food. –6– in such a fall and that she could not have survived some six hours after
the wound was inflicted.
• Garcia suffered other injuries consistent with a violent encounter before her
death, including many fresh bruises, a blunt force injury to her head, and
hemorrhaging consistent with strangulation or other action that increased the
pressure in her head and neck area.
• A number of witnesses, including friends of both appellant and Garcia,
testified to the contentious nature of their relationship. For example, Angela
Fairchild, a friend of appellant, reported that she was visiting him the night
before Garcia died, and he told her that Garcia had stolen some
methamphetamine from him and gotten a hotel room for a man who had just
been released from jail. When Garcia entered the house, Fairchild testified,
I didn’t see him throw her because it happened so fast because she, like, went across the room and she hit the wall on the opposite side of the room and she, like, crumpled down. At this point she, like, curled up into a fetal position, and she covered her head and he was screaming at her and on top of her. Fairchild twice calmed appellant down, and Garcia left the house.
• Garcia had fresh blood—and both her own and appellant’s DNA—under her
fingernails. Photographs taken of appellant that morning by police indicate he
had scratches on his face.
–7– Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a
rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant stabbed
Garcia. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Mens Rea
To prevail on its murder charge, the State was also required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused Garcia’s death.
PENAL § 19.02(b)(1). Appellant argues that “[e]ven if [he] wielded the knife,” the
placement and size of the wound was such that the risk of death it presented would
not have been readily apparent and, therefore, it was not rational for jurors to
conclude that he inflicted the wound intending to kill Garcia or aware that it was
reasonably certain to kill her. He contends that the blood in the house was solely the
result of chest compressions performed mechanically by the EMTs and that a
layperson could not have known such a small wound could quickly cause the
victim’s death.
“Murder is a ‘result of conduct’ offense, which means that the culpable mental
state relates to the result of the conduct, i.e., the causing of the death.” Schroeder v.
State, 123 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Accordingly, appellant acted
with intent if it was his conscious desire to cause Garcia’s death, PENAL § 6.03(a);
he acted with knowledge if he was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to
cause the result, id. § 6.03(b). “Intent to murder can be proven through
circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s acts and words surrounding the crime.”
–8– Mitchell v. State, No. 05-14-01423-CR, 2015 WL 3751777, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Ex
parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). We consider
whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the
cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to
the verdict. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903.
The following evidence supports the jury’s finding that appellant stabbed
Garcia intentionally or knowingly:
• The wound was in fact fatal.
• Although the width of the wound was only five eighths of an inch, it was two
inches deep. The knife was thrust with sufficient force to pierce Garcia’s right
chest muscles, the right subclavian vein (a large-caliber vein that brings blood
back to the heart from the arm), and—once inside the chest cavity—the top
portion of the right lung.
• The amount of blood at the scene indicates that Garcia bled profusely. And
the location of significant blood pools against a wall in the living room and in
the bedroom—as well as blood drops and smears throughout the house—
establish that she bled heavily before any chest compressions were begun
where she lay.
• The record suggests that appellant attempted to cover up the significant nature
of Garcia’s injuries by covering large blood deposits and by changing her –9– clothes that evidenced the entry of the knife. Appellant also changed from the
gray pants he was wearing earlier that morning into blue pants at some time
before police arrived; the gray pants were found by police in the living room,
with his driver’s license in the pocket and blood stains on both legs.
• The presence of Garcia’s bruises and head wound suggests additional violent
behavior by appellant that morning. The DNA evidence supports an inference
that at some point Garcia fought back and inflicted scratches on appellant’s
face. Jurors could have inferred that the large, wet blood stain close to the
living room wall was a result of conduct by appellant that either caused the
additional injuries or aggravated the knife-inflicted injuries.
• As noted above, the evidence shows that appellant had a motive to attack
appellant; in fact, after discussing that motive, he had attacked her earlier the
evening before her death. Only the presence of Fairchild calmed him down at
that time.
We conclude that a rational fact finder could have inferred from this evidence
that appellant stabbed Garcia either intending to cause her death or knowing that
such a forceful stab was reasonably certain to cause her death. We conclude that
the jurors could have reasonably drawn the inferences necessary to establish
appellant’s intent based upon the record as a whole, when considered in the light
most favorable to the verdict. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903.
–10– Conclusion
The evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that appellant
murdered Garcia by intentionally or knowingly causing her death. See PENAL
§ 19.02(b)(1).2 We overrule appellant’s single issue. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/Bill Pedersen, III// BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE
200302f.u05 Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47
2 Given this conclusion, we need not address the State’s alternate murder theory under section 19.02(b)(2). –11– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JEFFREY LEE PATTERSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Appellant Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1945392-J. No. 05-20-00302-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Pedersen, III. Justices Osborne and THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Reichek participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 10th day of May, 2022.
–12–