Jeffrey Johnson v. Kyle Feigley, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedOctober 24, 2025
Docket3:20-cv-20358
StatusUnknown

This text of Jeffrey Johnson v. Kyle Feigley, et al. (Jeffrey Johnson v. Kyle Feigley, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeffrey Johnson v. Kyle Feigley, et al., (D.N.J. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JEFFREY JOHNSON, Civ. No. 20-20358 (MAS)(JBD)

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM ORDER

v.

KYLE FEIGLEY, et al.,

Defendants.

Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Jeffrey Johnson’s motion to compel the production of five audio/video recordings and a handgun. [Dkt. 82.] Defendants Blair Astbury, Juanita Cherry, Eric Daab, Kyle Feigley, Timothy Gibson, Lisa King, Thomas Ryan, James Sansone, Glenn Sefick, Chris Talar, and Anthony Zoppina (the “NJOAG Defendants”) oppose the motion. [Dkt. 83.] For the reasons set forth below, Johnson’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. * The Court writes for the parties and accordingly assumes familiarity with the case. On April 3, 2025, fact discovery closed. [Dkt. 77.] Thereafter, on May 30, 2025, the NJOAG Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. 80.] Instead of filing an opposition to that motion, on June 13, 2025, Johnson filed the motion to compel now before the Court. [Dkt. 82.] In his motion, Johnson seeks to compel the NJOAG Defendants to (i) “produce for inspection and copying” the audio/video recordings referenced in the New Jersey State Police’s Supplemental Investigation Report dated August 7, 2019; and (ii) “produce to the 1 Court for inspection” the Spesco .25 caliber handgun with serial number 17236 allegedly seized from Johnson’s home during the execution of a search warrant. [Dkt. 82] at 1-2, 7-9; [Dkt. 82-2] at 23. Johnson also seeks an extension of the

deadline to resolve discovery disputes, which expired at the close of fact discovery. [Dkt. 84.] The NJOAG Defendants oppose the motion on the grounds that it is time-barred and that reopening discovery at this stage would be prejudicial, and because Johnson did not properly serve the NJOAG Defendants with the discovery requests in the first instance. [Dkt. 83] at 3-6. *

In assessing a motion to compel, the Court must determine whether the discovery sought by the motion falls within the scope of proper discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 270 F.R.D. 186, 196 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d, Civ. No. 08-6292 (RBK), 2010 WL 3724271 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2010) (“In deciding a discovery motion, the Court must focus on whether the information, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, is relevant to the claims or defenses of the parties.”). “When addressing the scope of discovery under [Rule 26] the court must

consider a number of factors” including: “(1) the importance of the issues at stake in th[e] action; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ relative access to relevant information; (4) the parties’ resources; (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues; and (6) whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” United States v. Morales, Civ. No. 17-7447 (LHG), 2019 WL 13251180, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2019) (citations omitted). 2 Where, as here, a motion to compel is filed after the fact discovery deadline, the Court must also analyze whether to permit an amendment to the scheduling order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Zimmerman v. Edwin A.

Abrahamsen & Assocs., P.C., Civ. No. 15-1174, 2017 WL 3701827, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2017) (collecting cases). Under Rule 16, the Court may modify a pretrial schedule “only for good cause,” which exists when the deadlines set forth in the scheduling order cannot be met “despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension,” or “due to any mistake, excusable neglect or any other factor which might understandably account for failure . . . to undertake to comply with the

Scheduling Order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469 (D.N.J. 1990); Piano Wellness, LLC v. Williams, Civ. No. 11-1601 (AMD), 2013 WL 12303219, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2013) (quotation omitted). Ultimately, however, “‘Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor . . . and [ ] dictate the sequence of discovery.’” Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. List Servs. Direct, Inc., Civ. No. 15-3271 (JMV), 2018 WL 3993449, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2018) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)).

Exercising its broad discretion, the Court grants Johnson’s motion in part and denies it in part. As an initial matter, Johnson filed his motion to compel after the fact discovery deadline and therefore it is, as NJOAG Defendants correctly note, untimely. Zimmerman, 2017 WL 3701827, at *4. The scheduling order in this case explicitly states that “[o]utstanding discovery disputes must be resolved by appropriate motion returnable before [the fact discovery deadline],” which was 3 April 3, 2025. [Dkts. 68, 77.] Johnson, however, did not file his motion until June 13, 2025—two months after the close of fact discovery. [Dkt. 82.] Nonetheless, on balance, the Court finds good cause to reopen discovery for the

limited purpose of resolving Johnson’s motion and compelling NJOAG’s production of the requested audio/video recordings. Although Johnson failed to pursue his requested discovery within the designated fact discovery period, it appears that his delay in filing his motion may be attributable to the fact that he received a new production of documents from defendants on May 16, 2025, and his unawareness that the close of fact discovery

limited his ability to obtain additional evidence thereafter. See [Dkt. 82-1] at 1; [Dkt. 84] at 1. Johnson’s motion was also filed only two months after the close of fact discovery. [Dkt. 82.] And while the NJOAG Defendants argue that “reopening discovery would severely prejudice [them]” as they “timely filed a motion [for] summary judgment,” the Court administratively terminated that motion pending the resolution of Johnson’s motion to compel. [Dkt. 83] at 6 (citing [Dkt. 80]); [Dkt. 86]. The Court will permit the NJOAG Defendants to promptly refile their

motion, thus alleviating any possible prejudice. Additionally, the audio/video recordings Johnson requests appear directly relevant to his allegations that he was improperly surveilled without warrants and that the controlled firearm purchases underlying the execution of the warrants leading to the search of his home and ultimate arrest were fabricated. Accordingly, the recordings bear directly on his core claim that defendants violated his Fourth 4 Amendment rights through an illegal search and seizure. [Dkt. 82-2] at 1-2. Johnson also only seeks to compel five recordings, and the NJOAG Defendants have neither presented any burden argument nor disputed the relevance of those

materials.1 Accordingly, while the Court appreciates Johnson’s delay in filing his motion, considering the relevant nature of the requested recordings, the slight burden of production and lack of prejudice to the NJOAG Defendants, and Johnson’s pro se status, the Court finds good cause to reopen discovery and to compel the production of the requested audio/video recordings. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Macy’s Retail

Holdings, Civ. No. 06-3020 (JBS), 2009 WL 2488194, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug.

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Related

Crawford-El v. Britton
523 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
270 F.R.D. 186 (D. New Jersey, 2010)
Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Importers, Inc.
133 F.R.D. 463 (D. New Jersey, 1990)

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