Jeffrey Hines v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: August 30, 2012
• Docket: A12A1058
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., ANDREWS and BOGGS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. (Court of Appeals Rule 4 (b) and Rule 37 (b), February 21, 2008) http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

August 30, 2012

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A12A1058. HINES v. THE STATE.

ANDREWS, Judge.

At a bench trial on facts stipulated to by the prosecution and the defense,

Jeffrey Kyle Hines was found guilty of five counts of sexual exploitation of children

in violation of OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8). Evidence showed that Hines possessed

five video files located on a computer at his residence depicting minors engaging in

sexually explicit conduct. Police found the video files during a search of Hines’s

residence pursuant to a warrant. Hines contends that the trial court erred by denying

his motion to suppress evidence of the video files because the warrant was

insufficient to justify the search. We find no error and affirm.

An investigator with the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Office conducted an

investigation over the internet which revealed that a computer attached to a Comcast- owned internet protocol (IP) address located in Cherokee County was using a specific

software program to share known and suspected child pornography files. After being

served with a search warrant, Comcast informed the investigator that the IP address

was assigned to a customer located at 547 Toonigh Road in Woodstock, Georgia.

Based on a finding that there was probable cause to believe that a crime in violation

of OCGA § 16-12-100 was being committed at that location, the investigator obtained

a warrant to search the property. The property was described in the warrant as a house

located at 547 Toonigh Road with attached garages and a single mailbox, and the

warrant authorized the investigator to search the house and any vehicles and buildings

located on the property for computer hardware or software containing images of

children depicting sexually explicit conduct as defined in OCGA § 16-12-100,

together with indicia of use, ownership, possession, or control of those items.

When the investigator executed the search warrant at the property, the wife of

the Comcast customer appeared at the door of the house. The investigator told her

that an investigation led him to believe that a computer connected to the internet at

her address contained child pornography, and that he had a search warrant. She told

the investigator that she and her husband and their daughter lived in the house, and

that Hines, her husband’s nephew, lived in a recreational vehicle owned by them and

2 parked on the property behind the house. She also told the investigator that she and

her husband had computers in the house connected to the internet by a wireless

router, and that Hines had a computer in the recreational vehicle and had their

permission to use the signal from their wireless router to connect to the internet. The

investigator searched the recreational vehicle pursuant to the warrant and found

Hines’s computer. Evidence showed that Hines’s computer was the same computer

which the investigator’s internet investigation showed was sharing child pornography

files, and the computer contained the five video files used as evidence to convict

Hines of five counts of violating OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8).

Hines contends that, when the investigator learned for the first time prior to the

search of the recreational vehicle that the vehicle was his separate residence, the

investigator was required to obtain a separate warrant to search that vehicle. To the

contrary, the warrant to search the property at 547 Toonigh Road provided that there

was probable cause to search the house and any other buildings and vehicles located

on the property. Hines does not dispute that there was probable cause for issuance of

the warrant to search the property located at 547 Toonigh Road, including the house,

other buildings, and vehicles on the property, nor does he dispute that the recreational

vehicle in which he was living was located on the described property. This is not a

3 case where a warrant was issued based on probable cause to search only one

residence at a described street address, but other residences were also located at the

address. In that case an issue may arise as to whether more than the street address is

needed in the warrant to sufficiently describe the property to be searched. See State

v. Capps, 256 Ga. 14, 15-16 (342 SE2d 676) (1986). Here, the search warrant

provided that there was probable cause to search the house and any other buildings

and vehicles located at the described street address. See Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga.

653, 655-656 (670 SE2d 411) (2008) (warrant found probable cause to search two

residences located in a multiple-occupancy building at a single street address). We

find that the search warrant sufficiently identified the recreational vehicle located at

the street address as property to be searched such that “it enable[d] a prudent officer

executing the warrant to locate the . . . place definitively and with reasonable

certainty,” and sufficiently limited the searching officer’s discretion. Day v. State, 304

Ga. App. 195, 197 (695 SE2d 719) (2010) (punctuation and citation omitted); Reaves

v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 187-188 (664 SE2d 211) (2008); Price v. State, 303 Ga. App.

859, 862 (694 SE2d 712) (2010); Felix v. State, 234 Ga. App. 509, 511 (507 SE2d

172) (1998), vacated on other grounds, 271 Ga. 534 (1999). The warrant described

the place to be searched with sufficient particularity; the search did not exceed the

4 scope of the warrant; and the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. The

evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Hines guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979).

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.