IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Jeffrey Haskins, FILED Appellant-Plaintiff Apr 20 2026, 8:45 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court
Financial Builders Federal Credit Union, Appellee-Defendant
April 20, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1810 Appeal from the Howard Superior Court The Honorable Ryan D. Washburn, Judge Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No. 34D02-2412-PL-4336
Opinion by Judge Scheele Judges Brown and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 1 of 8 Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Jeffrey Haskins appeals the trial court’s grant of Financial Builders Federal
Credit Union’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Haskins raises
one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in
dismissing his overdraft-fees claim as time-barred under Indiana Code section
34-11-2-9(c). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Haskins was a member of Financial Builders Federal Credit Union (Financial
Builders) where he held a checking account pursuant to a “Membership and
Account Agreement[.]” App. Vol. II p. 142. On December 30, 2024, Haskins
filed a class action complaint against Financial Builders. On March 7, 2025,
Haskins amended his complaint asserting, in relevant part, a breach of contract
claim based on Financial Builders’ assessment of overdraft fees. Specifically,
Haskins challenged overdraft fees charged to his account on three dates—
February 2, 2022, August 8, 2022, and September 1, 2022—alleging they were
assessed while his account held sufficient funds to cover his transactions. Id. at
36.
[3] Financial Builders filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule
12(B)(6) on March 27, 2025, alleging Haskins’ claim was time-barred under
Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9(c)’s two-year limitations period. On June 26,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 2 of 8 the trial court granted Financial Builders’ motion and dismissed Haskins’
claim. 1 Haskins now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [4] We review a ruling on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo. City of Fishers v.
Netflix, Inc., 264 N.E.3d 69, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “A motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is,
whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances
under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of
Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024), reh’g.
denied). “An order to dismiss is affirmed when it is apparent that the facts
alleged in the challenged pleading are incapable of supporting relief under any
set of circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Here, it is
undisputed that Haskins held a checking account with Financial Builders and
the overdraft fees were charged more than two years prior to the date Haskins
filed his complaint.
[5] However, Haskins contends he contracted with Financial Builders “to provide
the service of paying for transactions in circumstances where his account did
not contain sufficient funds to cover a transaction, and the overdraft fee that
1 Haskins brought a second breach of contract claim based on Financial Builders’ assessment of a non- sufficient funds fee on each of a merchant’s representments of the same item for payment and alleged unjust enrichment and violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act based on Financial Builders’ practices. The trial court also dismissed Haskins’ second claim pursuant to Financial Builders’ Rule 12(B)(6) motion, and Haskins does not challenge that dismissal on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 3 of 8 gave rise to Haskins’ claim originated from such services rather than a
transaction ‘strictly’ concerned with the payment of money.” Appellant’s Br. p.
13. Haskins essentially asserts the Agreement governing his deposit account is a
contract for payment of money in some circumstances and for services in
others. Because Haskins contends his overdraft-fees claim is based on a service
under his written contract, he argues Indiana Code section 34-11-2-11’s ten-year
limitations period should apply. We disagree.
[6] This issue raises a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a pure question of
law that we review de novo. Folkening v. Van Petten, 22 N.E.3d 818, 821 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
We first look to the plain language of the statutes and, if unambiguous, give effect to their plain meaning. We examine the statutes as a whole and avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of words. The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus, we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction.
Id. at 821-22 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, “we may not
add new words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the
legislature.” McNeil v. Anonymous Hosp., 219 N.E.3d 789, 796 (Ind. Ct. App.
2023), trans. denied. And “[s]tatutory provisions cannot be read standing alone;
instead, they must be construed in light of the entire act of which they are a
part.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 4 of 8 [7] Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9(c), as amended on July 1, 2024, provides:
(c) An action upon a deposit account must be commenced not later than two (2) years after the cause of action accrues, regardless of whether the action is brought by:
(1) a depositor (as defined in IC 28-9-2-4); or
(2) a depository financial institution (as defined in IC 28-9-2-6). 2
“Deposit account” is defined as “an account made by a depositor, either
individually or jointly with another person, with a depository financial
institution” and expressly includes checking accounts. Ind. Code § 28-9-2-5
(1989).
[8] The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “upon” as “on the surface,” “on it,”
“thereafter,” or “thereon[.]” Merriam-Webster, UPON Definition & Meaning -
Merriam-Webster [https://perma.cc/HPT2-57MT] (last visited April 9, 2026).
“Thereon” is defined as “on that” and is synonymous with “thereupon,” which
means “on that matter.” Merriam-Webster, THEREON Definition & Meaning
- Merriam-Webster [https://perma.cc/TT28-G3YM] (last visited April 9,
2026); Merriam-Webster, THEREUPON Definition & Meaning - Merriam-
Webster [https://perma.cc/KD4M-6R5K] (last visited April 9, 2026). Thus, it
is clear that “an action upon” refers to any cause of action taken
2 This section formerly provided “[a]n action upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, deposit accounts, or other written contracts for the payment of money . . . must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-9(b) (2021).
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IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Jeffrey Haskins, FILED Appellant-Plaintiff Apr 20 2026, 8:45 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court
Financial Builders Federal Credit Union, Appellee-Defendant
April 20, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1810 Appeal from the Howard Superior Court The Honorable Ryan D. Washburn, Judge Pro Tempore Trial Court Cause No. 34D02-2412-PL-4336
Opinion by Judge Scheele Judges Brown and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 1 of 8 Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Jeffrey Haskins appeals the trial court’s grant of Financial Builders Federal
Credit Union’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Haskins raises
one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred in
dismissing his overdraft-fees claim as time-barred under Indiana Code section
34-11-2-9(c). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Haskins was a member of Financial Builders Federal Credit Union (Financial
Builders) where he held a checking account pursuant to a “Membership and
Account Agreement[.]” App. Vol. II p. 142. On December 30, 2024, Haskins
filed a class action complaint against Financial Builders. On March 7, 2025,
Haskins amended his complaint asserting, in relevant part, a breach of contract
claim based on Financial Builders’ assessment of overdraft fees. Specifically,
Haskins challenged overdraft fees charged to his account on three dates—
February 2, 2022, August 8, 2022, and September 1, 2022—alleging they were
assessed while his account held sufficient funds to cover his transactions. Id. at
36.
[3] Financial Builders filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule
12(B)(6) on March 27, 2025, alleging Haskins’ claim was time-barred under
Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9(c)’s two-year limitations period. On June 26,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 2 of 8 the trial court granted Financial Builders’ motion and dismissed Haskins’
claim. 1 Haskins now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [4] We review a ruling on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo. City of Fishers v.
Netflix, Inc., 264 N.E.3d 69, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “A motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is,
whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances
under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of
Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024), reh’g.
denied). “An order to dismiss is affirmed when it is apparent that the facts
alleged in the challenged pleading are incapable of supporting relief under any
set of circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Here, it is
undisputed that Haskins held a checking account with Financial Builders and
the overdraft fees were charged more than two years prior to the date Haskins
filed his complaint.
[5] However, Haskins contends he contracted with Financial Builders “to provide
the service of paying for transactions in circumstances where his account did
not contain sufficient funds to cover a transaction, and the overdraft fee that
1 Haskins brought a second breach of contract claim based on Financial Builders’ assessment of a non- sufficient funds fee on each of a merchant’s representments of the same item for payment and alleged unjust enrichment and violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act based on Financial Builders’ practices. The trial court also dismissed Haskins’ second claim pursuant to Financial Builders’ Rule 12(B)(6) motion, and Haskins does not challenge that dismissal on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 3 of 8 gave rise to Haskins’ claim originated from such services rather than a
transaction ‘strictly’ concerned with the payment of money.” Appellant’s Br. p.
13. Haskins essentially asserts the Agreement governing his deposit account is a
contract for payment of money in some circumstances and for services in
others. Because Haskins contends his overdraft-fees claim is based on a service
under his written contract, he argues Indiana Code section 34-11-2-11’s ten-year
limitations period should apply. We disagree.
[6] This issue raises a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a pure question of
law that we review de novo. Folkening v. Van Petten, 22 N.E.3d 818, 821 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
We first look to the plain language of the statutes and, if unambiguous, give effect to their plain meaning. We examine the statutes as a whole and avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of words. The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus, we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction.
Id. at 821-22 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, “we may not
add new words to a statute which are not the expressed intent of the
legislature.” McNeil v. Anonymous Hosp., 219 N.E.3d 789, 796 (Ind. Ct. App.
2023), trans. denied. And “[s]tatutory provisions cannot be read standing alone;
instead, they must be construed in light of the entire act of which they are a
part.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 4 of 8 [7] Indiana Code section 34-11-2-9(c), as amended on July 1, 2024, provides:
(c) An action upon a deposit account must be commenced not later than two (2) years after the cause of action accrues, regardless of whether the action is brought by:
(1) a depositor (as defined in IC 28-9-2-4); or
(2) a depository financial institution (as defined in IC 28-9-2-6). 2
“Deposit account” is defined as “an account made by a depositor, either
individually or jointly with another person, with a depository financial
institution” and expressly includes checking accounts. Ind. Code § 28-9-2-5
(1989).
[8] The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “upon” as “on the surface,” “on it,”
“thereafter,” or “thereon[.]” Merriam-Webster, UPON Definition & Meaning -
Merriam-Webster [https://perma.cc/HPT2-57MT] (last visited April 9, 2026).
“Thereon” is defined as “on that” and is synonymous with “thereupon,” which
means “on that matter.” Merriam-Webster, THEREON Definition & Meaning
- Merriam-Webster [https://perma.cc/TT28-G3YM] (last visited April 9,
2026); Merriam-Webster, THEREUPON Definition & Meaning - Merriam-
Webster [https://perma.cc/KD4M-6R5K] (last visited April 9, 2026). Thus, it
is clear that “an action upon” refers to any cause of action taken
2 This section formerly provided “[a]n action upon promissory notes, bills of exchange, deposit accounts, or other written contracts for the payment of money . . . must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action accrues.” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-9(b) (2021).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 5 of 8 on/thereupon/or on the matter of the deposit account. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-9(c)
(2024).
[9] In addition, the plain language of this section does not carve out causes of
action arising from certain types of transactions on a deposit account; indeed,
the statute makes no distinction between debits, credits, or fees charged to the
account. Haskins argues that “actions upon a deposit account” are limited to
“circumstances where a bank is required to return a customer’s deposit on
demand, actions to quiet title to an account, actions to freeze an account, or
actions to transfer ownership of an account and does not subsume the service
aspects of a bank’s contract with a depositor.” Appellant’s Br. p 15. But we
may not add language to the statute to limit its application to only these causes
of action. McNeil, 219 N.E.3d at 796. Haskins’ argument that certain charges
against the account should be treated differently than others would lead to the
sort of illogical result that our standard of review avoids. See Folkening, 22
N.E.3d at 821.
[10] Haskins further relies on Folkening for the proposition that Indiana Code section
34-11-2-9 applies strictly to written contracts for the payment of money and
actions on contracts for services are governed by Indiana Code section 34-11-2-
11. But Folkening is inapposite. That case involved a settlement agreement
requiring payment of money and completion of other actions regarding disposal
of a property. We noted that the settlement agreement was “not a promissory
note or a bill of exchange,” Folkening, 22 N.E.3d at 822, which were the two
specifically enumerated types of contracts for the payment of money mentioned
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 6 of 8 in section 34–11–2–9 when that case was decided in 2014. If the contract in
Folkening had been strictly one of those enumerated contracts, it would have
been subject to section 34-11-2-9. Here, the contract in question is indisputably
a deposit account, which the legislature has since added to the limitations
period under section 34-11-2-9(c).
[11] We also note that, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
“[w]hen certain items or words are specified or enumerated in a statute then, by
implication, other items or words not so specified or enumerated are excluded.”
A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 614 (Ind. 2018). The
legislature specifically enumerated a two-year statute of limitations on actions
on a deposit account. Invocation of the ten-year statute of limitations for certain
actions on a deposit account is not so specified and, by implication, is excluded.
Moreover, given that “deposit account” is specified under section 34-11-2-9, its
absence from section 34-11-2-11 implies its exclusion there. See also McNeil, 219
N.E.3d 796 (statutory provisions must be construed in light of the entire act).
[12] The gravamen of Haskins’ complaint is a dispute regarding overdraft fees
charged to his account. If a party disputes the credits, debits, or fees on that
account, then the action is a dispute over the accounting itself. Thus, a
challenge to the fee—whether that fee stems from the bank’s services to the
depositor or from the depositor’s credit to the account—is still a cause of action
upon the deposit account. In other words, without the existence of Haskins’
deposit account, there would be no cause of action. Because Haskins’ action
upon the account concerns overdraft fees charged more than two years prior to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 7 of 8 the date he filed his cause of action, his claim is time-barred. We thus affirm the
trial court’s dismissal of Haskins’ action under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).
[13] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Lynn A. Toops Gabriel A. Hawkins Lisa M. LaFornara Cohen & Malad, LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Finis Tatum IV Janet L. Thompson Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS AMICI CURIAE INDIANA BANKERS ASSOCIATION AND INDIANA CREDIT UNION LEAGUE Libby Y. Goodknight Brett J. Ashton Krieg DeVault LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1810 | April 20, 2026 Page 8 of 8