FILED Apr 10 2026, 9:02 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Jeffrey Gray, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Rodney Scott Benham, Lumberjack’s Bar & Grill, and Jeremy Shadday, Appellees-Defendants
April 10, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CT-2588 Appeal from the Jennings Superior Court The Honorable Gary L. Smith, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 40D01-2309-CT-000024
Opinion by Judge Felix
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Judge Mathias concurs. Judge May concurs in result without opinion.
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Exactly two years after Jeffrey Gray was physically attacked at Lumberjack’s
Bar & Grill (“Lumberjack’s”), Gray sued his attacker and others. Gray did not
tender the summonses related to his complaint until several days later. The
defendants subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing
that Gray did not commence his civil action within the applicable two-year
statute of limitations. The trial court granted that motion and dismissed Gray’s
claims with prejudice. Gray now appeals and raises one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred by granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] The facts, as presented in Gray’s complaint, are as follows. On September 18,
2021, Gray and Jeremy Shadday were at Lumberjack’s, which is located in
Jennings County, Indiana. Shadday “physically attacked” Gray. Appellant’s
App. Vol. II at 30. Shadday “struck [Gray] with his hands, fists, elbows, feet,
and/or knees.” Id. at 37. At some point during the attack, Gray fell, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 2 of 10 Shadday “continued to strike” him. Id. Gray “lost consciousness” because of
the attack. Id.
[4] On September 18, 2023, Gray sued Shadday, Lumberjack’s, and Lumberjack’s
owner Rodney Benham (collectively, “Defendants”). 1 On September 26, Gray
tendered the summonses for his complaint. After Defendants filed their
answers, Gray was granted leave to amend his complaint. In the amended
complaint, Gray sued Lumberjack’s and Benham for negligence and violating
Indiana Code chapter 7.1-5-10; he sued Shadday for civil battery. The
Defendants answered the amended complaint, and Shadday filed an Indiana
Trial Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings (the “Motion”), in
which Lumberjack’s and Benham later joined.
[5] In the Motion, Defendants argued that Gray failed to timely commence this
action because he did not tender the summonses on or before the two-year
deadline. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the Motion and
dismissed all of Gray’s claims with prejudice. This appeal ensued. 2
1 Gray also named David Siefker Sr. as a defendant, but Gray “has since abandoned” his claims against Siefker. Appellant’s Br. at 4 n.1. 2 Gray fails to include in his Appendix the Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) for the trial court cause underlying this appeal. We remind Gray that the CCS must be included in the Appendix, Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(a), as the first document in volume two thereof, id. 51(B). Gray also fails to include in his Appendix the summonses he tendered to the clerk, Lumberjack’s and Benham’s motion to join Shadday’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(C) motion, and the trial court’s order allowing them to do so. See App. R. 50(A)(2)(f)– (h). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of these documents. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 3 of 10 Discussion and Decision The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting the Motion
[6] Gray challenges the trial court’s decision to grant the Motion. 3 We review a
trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule 12(C) motion de novo. KS & E Sports v.
Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. 2017) (Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l
Trust Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). To the extent the trial court’s decision
presents a question of law, we review such a question de novo, as well. Brooks
v. USA Track & Field, Inc., 272 N.E.3d 490, 494 (Ind. 2025) (citing Horton v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016)), reh’g denied (Feb. 13, 2026).
[7] A Trial Rule 12(C) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Bayer
Corp. v. Leach, 147 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam) (citing KS & E
Sports, 72 N.E.3d at 898). We will affirm a trial court’s decision to grant a Trial
Rule 12(C) motion “only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that
under no circumstances could relief be granted.” KS & E Sports, 72 N.E.3d at
898 (quoting Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 5). Like the trial court, we “base our
3 In response to the Motion, Gray designated evidence to the trial court. Trial Rule 12(C) provides that “[i]f, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” See also Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Milestone Contractors, L.P. v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 739 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. dismissed) (“A trial court converts a Rule 12 motion to a motion for summary judgment ‘by its consideration of extraneous matters’ regardless of whether the court converts the motion to one for summary judgment expressly”). The trial court here did not consider Gray’s designated evidence, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 108, so the motion remained under Trial Rule 12(C).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 4 of 10 ruling solely on the pleadings,” and “we accept as true the material facts alleged
in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 5).
[8] The Motion was based on Gray’s failure to commence this civil action within
the applicable statute of limitations period. Judgment on the pleadings is
particularly appropriate “[w]hen a complaint shows on its face that it has been
filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations.” Residential
Warranty Servs., Inc. v. L.M. Henderson & Co., LLP, 196 N.E.3d 711, 715 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2022) (quoting Richards-Wilcox, Inc. v. Cummins, 700 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998)). That is, if the complaint states facts facially indicating the
complaint was filed after the statute of limitations period expired, then the
complaint should be dismissed at the pleading stage as barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. (citing State v. Alvarez ex rel. Alvarez, 150 N.E.3d 206, 216 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2020)).
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FILED Apr 10 2026, 9:02 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Jeffrey Gray, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Rodney Scott Benham, Lumberjack’s Bar & Grill, and Jeremy Shadday, Appellees-Defendants
April 10, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CT-2588 Appeal from the Jennings Superior Court The Honorable Gary L. Smith, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 40D01-2309-CT-000024
Opinion by Judge Felix
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Judge Mathias concurs. Judge May concurs in result without opinion.
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] Exactly two years after Jeffrey Gray was physically attacked at Lumberjack’s
Bar & Grill (“Lumberjack’s”), Gray sued his attacker and others. Gray did not
tender the summonses related to his complaint until several days later. The
defendants subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing
that Gray did not commence his civil action within the applicable two-year
statute of limitations. The trial court granted that motion and dismissed Gray’s
claims with prejudice. Gray now appeals and raises one issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred by granting the motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] The facts, as presented in Gray’s complaint, are as follows. On September 18,
2021, Gray and Jeremy Shadday were at Lumberjack’s, which is located in
Jennings County, Indiana. Shadday “physically attacked” Gray. Appellant’s
App. Vol. II at 30. Shadday “struck [Gray] with his hands, fists, elbows, feet,
and/or knees.” Id. at 37. At some point during the attack, Gray fell, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 2 of 10 Shadday “continued to strike” him. Id. Gray “lost consciousness” because of
the attack. Id.
[4] On September 18, 2023, Gray sued Shadday, Lumberjack’s, and Lumberjack’s
owner Rodney Benham (collectively, “Defendants”). 1 On September 26, Gray
tendered the summonses for his complaint. After Defendants filed their
answers, Gray was granted leave to amend his complaint. In the amended
complaint, Gray sued Lumberjack’s and Benham for negligence and violating
Indiana Code chapter 7.1-5-10; he sued Shadday for civil battery. The
Defendants answered the amended complaint, and Shadday filed an Indiana
Trial Rule 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings (the “Motion”), in
which Lumberjack’s and Benham later joined.
[5] In the Motion, Defendants argued that Gray failed to timely commence this
action because he did not tender the summonses on or before the two-year
deadline. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the Motion and
dismissed all of Gray’s claims with prejudice. This appeal ensued. 2
1 Gray also named David Siefker Sr. as a defendant, but Gray “has since abandoned” his claims against Siefker. Appellant’s Br. at 4 n.1. 2 Gray fails to include in his Appendix the Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) for the trial court cause underlying this appeal. We remind Gray that the CCS must be included in the Appendix, Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(a), as the first document in volume two thereof, id. 51(B). Gray also fails to include in his Appendix the summonses he tendered to the clerk, Lumberjack’s and Benham’s motion to join Shadday’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(C) motion, and the trial court’s order allowing them to do so. See App. R. 50(A)(2)(f)– (h). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27 and Indiana Evidence Rule 201, we have taken judicial notice of these documents. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 3 of 10 Discussion and Decision The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting the Motion
[6] Gray challenges the trial court’s decision to grant the Motion. 3 We review a
trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule 12(C) motion de novo. KS & E Sports v.
Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. 2017) (Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l
Trust Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). To the extent the trial court’s decision
presents a question of law, we review such a question de novo, as well. Brooks
v. USA Track & Field, Inc., 272 N.E.3d 490, 494 (Ind. 2025) (citing Horton v.
State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016)), reh’g denied (Feb. 13, 2026).
[7] A Trial Rule 12(C) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Bayer
Corp. v. Leach, 147 N.E.3d 313, 315 (Ind. 2020) (per curiam) (citing KS & E
Sports, 72 N.E.3d at 898). We will affirm a trial court’s decision to grant a Trial
Rule 12(C) motion “only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that
under no circumstances could relief be granted.” KS & E Sports, 72 N.E.3d at
898 (quoting Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 5). Like the trial court, we “base our
3 In response to the Motion, Gray designated evidence to the trial court. Trial Rule 12(C) provides that “[i]f, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” See also Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Milestone Contractors, L.P. v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 739 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. dismissed) (“A trial court converts a Rule 12 motion to a motion for summary judgment ‘by its consideration of extraneous matters’ regardless of whether the court converts the motion to one for summary judgment expressly”). The trial court here did not consider Gray’s designated evidence, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 108, so the motion remained under Trial Rule 12(C).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 4 of 10 ruling solely on the pleadings,” and “we accept as true the material facts alleged
in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Veolia Water, 3 N.E.3d at 5).
[8] The Motion was based on Gray’s failure to commence this civil action within
the applicable statute of limitations period. Judgment on the pleadings is
particularly appropriate “[w]hen a complaint shows on its face that it has been
filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations.” Residential
Warranty Servs., Inc. v. L.M. Henderson & Co., LLP, 196 N.E.3d 711, 715 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2022) (quoting Richards-Wilcox, Inc. v. Cummins, 700 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998)). That is, if the complaint states facts facially indicating the
complaint was filed after the statute of limitations period expired, then the
complaint should be dismissed at the pleading stage as barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. (citing State v. Alvarez ex rel. Alvarez, 150 N.E.3d 206, 216 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2020)).
[9] Gray’s civil action is for personal injury, so he had to “commence[]” it “within
two (2) years after the cause of action accrue[d].” Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a).
Pursuant to Trial Rule 3, a “civil action is commenced by” (1) “filing with the
court a complaint or such equivalent pleading or document as may be specified
by statute,” (2) “payment of the prescribed filing fee or filing an order waiving
the filing fee,” and (3) “furnishing to the clerk as many copies of the complaint
and summons as are necessary” if “service of process is required.” For a civil
action to be timely commenced, all three Trial Rule 3 requirements must be
fulfilled within the applicable statute of limitations period. Smith v. Haggard, 22
N.E.3d 801, 803–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Even if a plaintiff files his complaint
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 5 of 10 within the statutory period, his failure to pay the correct fee or to tender the
summons within that period renders his civil action untimely commenced. Id.
Requiring a plaintiff to tender the summons within the statute of limitations
“promotes prompt, formal notice to defendants that a lawsuit has been filed,”
which “helps to prevent surprise to defendants” and “helps to reduce stagnation
that might otherwise occur if claims could be filed only to remain pending on
court dockets without notified defendants.” Id. at 803 (quoting Ray-Hayes v.
Heinamann, 760 N.E.2d 172, 173 (Ind.), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on reh’g, 768
N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2002)).
[10] Here, it is undisputed that on September 18, 2021, the fight occurred. It is
further undisputed that unless the discovery rule applies, Gray had to commence
his civil action on or before September 18, 2023. Gray argues that the discovery
rule does apply; 4 Lumberjack’s and Benham argue that it does not.
[11] The discovery rule provides that the applicable “statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence
could have discovered, that it has been injured from tortious [or negligent]
conduct.” City of Marion v. London Witte Group, LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind.
2021) (citing Wehling v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992)).
“When a cause of action accrues is generally a question of law.” Id. (alteration
4 In particular, Gray asserts that his complaint “allows on its face that [his] cause of action may have accrued on September 18, 2021 and just as equally allows that accrual may not have occurred until September 19 or September 26 of 2021 or perhaps Christmas of 2022 or July 4th of 2023.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 6 of 10 omitted) (quoting Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of South Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274,
1280 (Ind. 2009)). “In a typical personal injury claim, . . . the injury occurs at
the time the [tortious or] negligent act is done, and the claimant is either aware
of the injury or the cause of the injury.” Rieth-Riley Const. Co., Inc. v. Gibson, 923
N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[12] Nothing in Gray’s complaint suggests his claim is any different from the typical
personal injury claim:
7. On or about September 17-18, 2021, Plaintiff was present at the Property as a patron/invitee of Defendants Siefker, Benham, and/or Lumberjack’s[.]
8. On or about September 17-18, 2021, Defendant Shadday was present at the Property as a patron/invitee of Defendants Siefker, Benham, and/or Lumberjack’s.
9. While Plaintiff was at the Property on or about September 17- 18, 2021, he was physically attacked by Defendant Shadday.
10. During and in the course of Defendant Shadday’s attack on Plaintiff, Defendant Shadday knowingly and intentionally battered Plaintiff.
11. Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries during, in the course of, and as a result of Defendant Shadday’s attack.
12. Subsequent to Defendant Shadday’s attack, Plaintiff required and received medical care in treatment of said injuries.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 30.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 7 of 10 15. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of Defendant Shadday’s attack including but not limited to physical injuries, pain and suffering, mental anguish, anxiety, and economic losses.
Id. at 31.
44. Defendant Shadday knowingly or intentionally touched Plaintiff in a rude, insolent, or angry manner without his consent on or about September 18, 2021 at the Property.
45. Defendant Shadday knowingly or intentionally struck Plaintiff with his hands, fists, elbows, feet, and/or knees on or about September 18, 2021 at the Property.
***
47. In striking Plaintiff, Defendant Shadday caused Plaintiff to fall to the ground.
48. After Plaintiff fell to the ground, Defendant Shadday continued to strike Plaintiff.
49. As a direct, proximate result of Defendant Shadday’s battery of him, Plaintiff lost consciousness.
Id. at 37.
[13] Accepting these allegations as true leads to only one conclusion: On September
18, 2021, Gray knew or should have known that he had been injured due to
tortious conduct. Nothing in the complaint suggests that Gray did not know or
could not have discovered until after September 18, 2021, that he had been
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 8 of 10 injured from tortious conduct. To the extent Gray relies on his allegation
regarding his loss of consciousness, there are no other allegations in the
complaint that lead us to believe his unconsciousness lasted for any significant
period of time such that he would be precluded from knowing or discovering
that on September 18, 2021, he had been injured due to tortious conduct. And
this lone, unspecific allegation of unconsciousness does not create a factual
dispute that bars judgment on the pleadings.
[14] Gray had to commence his civil action based on the tortious conduct alleged in
his complaint on or before September 18, 2023. It is undisputed that on
September 18, 2023, Gray filed his complaint in this case and paid the
appropriate filing fee. Gray completed the complaint and filing fee
requirements within the statutory period. It is also undisputed that on
September 26, 2023, Gray tendered the summonses to the clerk. Gray did not
complete the summonses requirement within the statutory period.
Consequently, Gray failed to commence this civil action within the applicable
two-year statute of limitations. The trial court therefore did not err by granting
the Motion and dismissing Gray’s claims with prejudice, and we affirm that
decision.
[15] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., concurs. May, J., concurs in result without opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 9 of 10 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Bryce A. Wagner The Wagner Law Firm, PLLC Tallahassee, Florida
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES – RODNEY SCOTT BENHAM AND LUMBERJACK’S BAR & GRILL Jeremy M. Dilts Carson LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE – JEREMY SHADDAY Jefferson C.M. Kisor Bascom & Kisor Lawrenceburg, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CT-2588 | April 10, 2026 Page 10 of 10