Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC2025-0517 ____________
JEFFREY G. HUTCHINSON, Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
___________
No. SC2025-0518 ___________
JEFFREY G. HUTCHINSON, Petitioner,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
April 25, 2025
PER CURIAM.
More than two decades have passed since Jeffrey Glenn
Hutchinson murdered three children under the age of ten. For
these crimes, the trial court imposed sentences of death. Governor Ron DeSantis has signed a warrant calling for the execution of
those three sentences. Following issuance of the warrant,
Hutchinson filed his fourth successive motion for postconviction
relief. The circuit court denied the motion in its entirety, giving rise
to this consolidated proceeding. Carrying out our mandatory-
review function, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., we affirm. In
addition, we deny Hutchinson’s requests for habeas relief, 1 a stay,
and oral argument.
I
In 1998, Hutchinson lived with his girlfriend, Renee Flaherty,
and her three children: Geoffrey (nine years old), Amanda (seven
years old), and Logan (four years old). On the day of the murders,
Hutchinson drank several beers and argued with Renee. As a
result of that argument, Hutchinson packed up his belongings,
including a shotgun, and went to a nearby bar where he consumed
more beer. At one point, he told a patron that Renee was angry at
him.
1. Article V, section 3(b)(9) of the Florida Constitution gives us discretionary authority to issue writs of habeas corpus.
-2- Hutchinson left the bar and drove back to Renee’s home.
Armed with a shotgun, he broke down the front door. He proceeded
to the bedroom where he shot Renee, Amanda, and Logan, killing
each of them with a single shot to the head.
Hutchinson then turned his attention to Geoffrey, who was
standing at the bedroom doorway. Perceiving the imminent danger
posed by Hutchinson, Geoffrey attempted to block the first shot
directed at him. Predictably, Geoffrey’s defensive efforts were
ineffective. The shot grazed Geoffrey’s arm and struck him in the
chest. Geoffrey spun around, stumbled into the living room, and
fell to the floor. However, he remained conscious. Meanwhile, as
Hutchinson had done after taking each shot, he pumped the
shotgun to reload the chamber. Hutchinson then fired a second
shot at the kneeling child. This shot hit Geoffrey in the head,
killing him.
In the aftermath of the shootings, a male who did not identify
himself called 911 from Renee’s house. The caller began by stating,
“I just shot my family.” Later, the caller indicated that “some guys”
had been present, though he was unsure of the exact number. At
some point, the caller stopped speaking with the operator.
-3- Within minutes of the 911 call, law enforcement arrived at
Renee’s home where they found Hutchinson on the floor of the
garage. A phone was near Hutchinson’s head and still connected to
the 911 dispatcher. Body tissue from Geoffrey was on one of
Hutchinson’s legs, and there was gunshot residue on Hutchinson’s
hands.
After assessing the situation in the garage, law enforcement
entered the home. Inside, officers found Renee’s and Logan’s bodies
on the bed, Amanda’s body on the bedroom floor, and Geoffrey’s
body in the living room. They also located a twelve-gauge pistol-
grip shotgun on the kitchen counter—a shotgun later determined to
be Hutchinson’s.
That night, Hutchinson was taken to a nearby police station
where he spoke with two officers. Among other things, Hutchinson
claimed that two mask-wearing individuals were responsible for the
deaths of Renee and the children.
After additional evidence was obtained, the State charged
Hutchinson with four counts of first-degree murder and sought the
death penalty. At trial, the State presented overwhelming evidence
of Hutchinson’s guilt, including the testimony of multiple witnesses
-4- identifying Hutchinson as the 911 caller. The State also presented
testimony from officers who responded to Renee’s home and
detained Hutchinson. Several experts opined on the significance of
physical evidence recovered from the scene.
For one of his defenses, Hutchinson argued that two men
barged into the house and shot Renee and the children, despite
Hutchinson’s best efforts to disarm them. The State, however,
presented evidence that Hutchinson lacked any injuries one would
expect from an intense physical altercation.
Ultimately, the jury rejected Hutchinson’s defenses (including
voluntary intoxication) and found him guilty as charged on all four
murder counts. With the advice of his family and counsel,
Hutchinson waived a penalty-phase jury.
At the ensuing penalty phase, the trial court received evidence
on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. As for mitigation, the
court heard that Hutchinson had served in the Gulf War and
suffered effects (including nonphysical issues) from that service—
what witnesses described as Gulf War Syndrome or Illness. In
addition, the court heard that Hutchinson had earned multiple
awards for his military service.
-5- Following the penalty phase, the parties submitted competing
sentencing memoranda. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced
Hutchinson to death for the murder of each child, finding that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. 2
Hutchinson appealed his convictions and death sentences, but
we affirmed. Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 961 (Fla. 2004).
In the twenty-plus years since our affirmance, Hutchinson has
challenged his convictions and death sentences in both state and
federal court to no avail. We affirmed the denial of his initial
motion for postconviction relief and likewise affirmed the denial of
his successive motions, including one pending when the Governor
signed the death warrant. Hutchinson v. State, 17 So. 3d 696 (Fla.
2009) (initial state postconviction proceeding); Hutchinson v. State,
243 So. 3d 880 (Fla. 2018) (successive state proceeding);
Hutchinson v. State, 343 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 2022) (successive state
proceeding); Hutchinson v. State, No. SC2025-0497, 2025 WL
2. For all three children, the court found that the youth and prior-violent-felony aggravators applied. And as for Geoffrey, the court ruled that his murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
-6- 1155717 (Fla. Apr. 21, 2025) (successive state proceeding).
Hutchinson fared no better in federal court. His first habeas
petition was rejected on timeliness grounds. Hutchinson v. Florida,
No. 5:09-cv-261-RS, 2010 WL 3833921 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2010),
aff’d, 677 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2012).3 And his second petition was
dismissed as an unauthorized second or successive petition.
Hutchinson v. Crews, No. 3:13-cv-128-MW, 2013 WL 1765201 (N.D.
Fla. Apr. 24, 2013).
This brings us to the claims Hutchinson raised in his fourth
successive postconviction motion—the motion at issue in this
appeal. As part of these claims, Hutchinson asserted that the
limited warrant-litigation period violated his constitutional rights,
especially in light of the claims he raised in his third successive
3. Hutchinson later sought relief from the judgment dismissing his first federal habeas petition, but the federal district court declined to grant relief. Hutchinson v. Inch, No. 3:13-cv-128- MW, 2021 WL 6335753, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2021), certificate of appealability denied, No. 21-10508-P, 2021 WL 6340256, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021); Hutchinson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:13-cv-128-MW, slip op. at 15-18 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2025), certificate of appealability denied, No. 25-11271, slip op. at 10-11 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025).
-7- motion.4 He accordingly asked for a stay. Apart from requesting
additional time to investigate and litigate his claims, Hutchinson
asserted entitlement to the vacatur of his death sentences on
constitutional grounds. The court denied relief in all respects
without holding an evidentiary hearing. Having denied the claims,
the court declined to issue a stay.
Hutchinson appealed, arguing various grounds for reversal.
He also asks us to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Asserting that
our review would be facilitated by additional deliberation,
Hutchinson requests a stay and oral argument.
II
We begin with Hutchinson’s appeal. He challenges the court’s
ruling on his numerous records requests, its summary denial of his
fourth successive postconviction motion, and its refusal to enter a
stay while his postconviction claims were pending.
A
For his first issue, Hutchinson argues that the circuit court
erred in denying his records requests. We disagree.
4. As suggested above, we have affirmed the denial of this motion.
-8- Hutchinson sought records under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.852(h) and (i). The circuit court ruled that
subdivision (h) did not apply since the mandate in Hutchinson’s
direct appeal issued in 2004. As for subdivision (i), the court found
that the requests did not meet the standards established in the rule
or in case law interpreting it. Indeed, the court determined that
many of the requests did not relate to a colorable claim for relief
and, thus, amounted to a prohibited fishing expedition.
We have held that a circuit court has broad discretion in
handling post-warrant records requests. See Cole v. State, 392 So.
3d 1054, 1065 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024); Tanzi v.
State, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S59, S60 (Fla. Apr. 1, 2025), cert denied,
Nos. 24-6932, 24A948, 2025 WL 1037494 (U.S. Apr. 8, 2025). In
this case, the rationale provided by the circuit court comports with
our warrant-related precedent and was reasonable based on the
facts and circumstances of this case. 5 Accordingly, we find no
abuse in the court’s discretionary ruling.
5. Though Hutchinson claims that his requests met the appropriate legal standards, his assertions are conclusory.
-9- As an alternative, Hutchinson now claims that the operation of
rule 3.852 violates due process and equal protection, at least in his
case. We reject this challenge.
To the extent Hutchinson is presenting an as-applied
constitutional challenge, that challenge is not preserved. Davis v.
Gilchrist Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 280 So. 3d 524, 531 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019) (preservation requirement). However, on the merits, the
claim still fails. We have consistently rejected constitutional
challenges to rule 3.852’s restrictions on the availability of public
records. Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782, 793 (Fla. 2019); Lambrix v.
State, 124 So. 3d 890, 895 n.2 (Fla. 2013). And we see nothing
novel in Hutchinson’s challenge. We further note that, even at this
stage, Hutchinson does not say how some record believed to exist
would support a colorable claim, i.e., the type of claim that could
support relief.
B
Next, we consider the circuit court’s rulings on the fourth
successive postconviction motion. Under our de novo standard of
review, we affirm the summary denial of successive claims where
- 10 - those claims are untimely, procedurally barred, legally insufficient,
or refuted by the record. See Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1060-61.
Hutchinson asserts error in the court’s rejection of his claim
that he was denied due process based on (1) the shortness of the
warrant period, (2) the pendency of claims at the time the warrant
was signed, (3) the reassignment of his third successive motion to
another judge who lacked familiarity with this case, and (4) a
“myriad of additional issues” frustrating counsel’s ability to
research and present post-warrant claims. This claim is meritless.
We have recently rejected due process arguments comparable
to Hutchinson’s. Tanzi, 50 Fla. L. Weekly at S60; Barwick v. State,
361 So. 3d 785, 789-90 (Fla.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2452 (2023).
Though Hutchinson relies on different facts than those in Tanzi and
Barwick, such distinctions do not justify a different outcome here.
In sum, although the warrant period in this case was
admittedly short and the record lengthy, Hutchinson has been able
to raise numerous postconviction claims and advance arguments to
- 11 - support them. 6 Moreover, as represented in the primary order
challenged here, the newly assigned judge offered record- and rules-
based reasons for rejecting Hutchinson’s claims. We also note that
Hutchinson, though concerned about the judge’s lack of prior
familiarity with his case, has not claimed that the judge was biased
in any respect.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we agree with
the denial of this claim. 7
6. Based on our own independent assessment of the record, we reject Hutchinson’s premise that he “was not afforded any opportunity to address the specific concerns or issues raised by the judge who ultimately issued the order denying him relief.”
7. The dissent takes issue with our resolution of this claim, implying that the facts in this case set it apart from our recent unanimous decisions rejecting claims based on the shortness of the warrant period. See Tanzi, 50 Fla. L. Weekly at S60; Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 789. To this end, the dissent notes that we did not receive notification from anyone—including Hutchinson’s attorneys and the Office of the Attorney General—that Hutchinson had asked Governor DeSantis to find him insane under section 922.07, Florida Statutes (2024) (giving the Governor authority to declare a death- row inmate “insane” for purposes of execution). Nor were we told about the mandatory stay until its dissolution (which happened after the Governor denied relief). See § 922.07(1). Nevertheless, despite being surprised by the lack of notice, we do not see how the events occurring in a purely executive proceeding frustrated or impeded our review of Hutchinson’s distinct requests and claims here. We similarly find misplaced the dissent’s reliance on the pendency of Hutchinson’s third successive motion at the time the
- 12 - 2
Hutchinson also argues that the circuit court erred in denying
his claim challenging the warrant selection process as “arbitrary
and truncated.” As he sees it, “Florida’s utter lack of any method,
criteria, or procedure in determining whom to execute is arbitrary
and capricious leading to an absurd result that violates the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the Florida
Constitution.” We again disagree.
Our precedent contradicts Hutchinson’s arguments. We have
repeatedly held that the Governor’s broad discretion does not
contravene constitutional norms. In doing so, we have emphasized
not only the executive’s authority to exercise discretion, but also the
breadth of that discretion. For instance, in Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d
769, 780 (Fla. 2012), we said that the “absolute discretion” reposed
in the Governor did not violate the constitution.
warrant issued. Our rules of procedure specifically contemplate that such situations could occur and provide for expedited proceedings in order to timely resolve the pending claims. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).
- 13 - Notwithstanding this authority, Hutchinson tells us that other
states have a more structured, less-discretionary process. That
may be true. But we are aware of no constitutional principle that
demands a fixed formula, thereby limiting the decisionmaker in
determining the order of execution. At the very least, Hutchinson
has failed to show that a discretionary standard in warrant
selection (regardless of the decisionmaker) offends a discrete
provision of the state or federal constitution.
As another component of this claim, Hutchinson asserts that
his execution would be arbitrary because of his mitigation and
severe brain damage. It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence forbids statutes that allow
imposition of arbitrary death sentences. But that aspect of the
Eighth Amendment is satisfied when the challenged statute
sufficiently narrows the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty. Johnson v. Norris, 537 F.3d 840, 850 (8th Cir. 2008). We
have repeatedly held that Florida’s death-penalty statute
accomplishes this. Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1015 (Fla.
2023) (collecting cases). We have also upheld the validity of specific
aggravators, including the prior-violent-felony (PVF) and the
- 14 - “especially” heinous-attrocious-or-cruel (HAC) aggravators. 8
Davidson v. State, 323 So. 3d 1241, 1250 (Fla. 2021) (upholding
PVF aggravator); Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 104 (Fla. 2009)
(upholding HAC aggravator).
The Eighth Amendment also requires individualized
sentencing, which gives the capital defendant the right to present
mitigating evidence to his sentencer. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S.
163, 175 (2006) (“In aggregate, our precedents confer upon
defendants the right to present sentencers with information
relevant to the sentencing decision and oblige sentencers to
consider that information in determining the appropriate sentence.
The thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends here.”); cf. Jackson
v. Cool, 111 F.4th 689, 702 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[C]apital defendants
have a right to present during their sentencing proceedings ‘any and
all relevant mitigating evidence that is available.’ ” (emphasis added)
(quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))).
Hutchinson vindicated this right by presenting mitigating evidence
at his penalty phase. And despite his invocation of vague
8. In their current form, these aggravators are listed in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2024).
- 15 - constitutional principles, Hutchinson has not cited any authority
holding that the Eighth Amendment provides an absolute right to
present mitigating evidence at any time, regardless of its
availability, regardless of the defendant’s diligence in locating and
presenting it, and regardless of its strength or force. 9
Consequently, Hutchinson seeks an unjustified extension of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
his claim is inconsistent with our precedent.10
Relying on the Eighth Amendment, Hutchinson also claims
that his execution would be cruel and unusual punishment in light
of his time on death row, his conditions of confinement, and his
9. If anything, our recent case law would be inconsistent with such a right. See Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 977-78 (Fla.) (rejecting constitutional challenge to rule 3.851’s one-year time limitation), cert. denied, No. 24-6510, 2025 WL 467243 (U.S. Feb. 12, 2025); Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795 (enforcing procedural bar in context of Eighth Amendment claim); James v. State, No. SC2025- 0280, 2025 WL 798376, at *9 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2025) (refusing to reconsider prior rulings that barred merits review of certain constitutional claims), cert. denied, No. 24-6775, 2025 WL 864460 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2025).
10. Moreover, to the extent that Hutchinson is arguing that his brain damage categorically exempts him from the death penalty, he is wrong for the reasons we identify below.
- 16 - combat-related issues. We agree with the circuit court’s rejection of
this claim.
Our precedent again undermines Hutchinson’s arguments.
Indeed, we have consistently rejected arguments that a lengthy time
on death row requires setting aside a death sentence. Orme v.
State, 361 So. 3d 842, 845 (Fla. 2023) (citing 2003 precedent). And
in the warrant context, we recently rejected an argument that a
lengthy amount of time on death row, coupled with substandard
conditions of confinement, could be a basis for vacating a death
sentence. See Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1064. We are not persuaded that
Hutchinson’s combat-related issues make a difference for purposes
of this claim.
Hutchinson also asserts that the circuit court erred in denying
his access-to-court claim. In that claim, Hutchinson argued that
the Florida Constitution’s access-to-court provision entitles him to
the presence of two legal witnesses and related accommodations.
We disagree.
We have rejected similar requests, finding the legal grounds
advanced to be without merit. See Dailey, 283 So. 3d at 791; Long
- 17 - v. State, 271 So. 3d 938, 946 (Fla. 2019). And we see no reason to
depart from that precedent.
III
Aside from challenging the denial of his fourth successive
motion, Hutchinson has filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. In
his petition, Hutchinson raises three claims. We deny them all.
For his first habeas claim, Hutchinson argues that Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), should extend to individuals, like
Hutchinson, with certain neurocognitive disorders. This claim fails
for multiple reasons.
First, this argument could have been raised earlier and is thus
untimely and procedurally barred. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)-(e);
Sparre v. State, 391 So. 3d 404, 406 n.5 (Fla. 2024). 11 Second, on
the merits, our precedent squarely forecloses Hutchinson’s
argument. We have repeatedly refused to extend Atkins beyond the
intellectual-disability context. See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94,
11. Hutchinson argues that procedural bars do not apply to categorical-exemption claims, but he is mistaken. See Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94, 100 (Fla. 2023); Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795.
- 18 - 98 (Fla. 2023) (warrant); Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 795 (warrant);
Wells, 364 So. 3d at 1016 (direct appeal). We decline to revisit this
precedent.
Hutchinson’s second habeas claim seeks relief from
procedural barriers, relying on the alleged ineffectiveness of state
postconviction counsel as a gateway to seek merits review of
otherwise barred claims. Hutchinson focuses primarily on
counsel’s failure to file the initial postconviction motion in state
court within the time frame that would have tolled the federal
habeas statute of limitations. In light of that claimed
ineffectiveness, he urges us to adopt a rule similar to the one the
U.S. Supreme Court adopted in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-17
(2012) (ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel can
provide cause to forgive a procedural default for claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel where the state requires such claims to
be raised in the initial-postconviction-review proceeding). This
claim lacks merit.
First, we have held that there is no right to the effective
assistance of postconviction counsel. Barwick, 361 So. 3d at 791.
- 19 - We have also consistently recognized that Martinez applies solely in
federal courts. See Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1215 (Fla.
2019); Howell v. State, 109 So. 3d 763, 774 (Fla. 2013). What’s
more, Martinez only applied to a certain type of defaulted claim—
one that asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Davila v.
Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 530 (2017). That type of claim is not at issue
in this warrant proceeding.
C
In his third and final habeas claim, Hutchinson challenges the
HAC aggravator, arguing that it fails to perform the narrowing
function demanded by the Eighth Amendment. This claim is
untimely and procedurally barred as it could have been raised on
direct appeal. Sparre, 391 So. 3d at 406 n.5. Moreover, we have
rejected similar challenges. Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 105 (collecting
cases). And last, the HAC aggravator applied only to Geoffrey’s
murder. Thus, even if we found it invalid, it would have no bearing
on the death sentences for the murders of Amanda and Logan.
IV
For the reasons given above, we affirm the summary denial of
Hutchinson’s fourth successive motion and deny habeas relief. In
- 20 - light of these rulings, we also deny Hutchinson’s request for oral
argument and a stay. No motion for rehearing will be considered.
The mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
LABARGA, J., dissenting.
I fully acknowledge the horrific facts of this death warrant
case. Yet, as acknowledged by the majority, “the warrant period in
this case was admittedly short and the record lengthy.” Majority op.
at 11 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the recent procedural history of this case has
been affected by the following: (1) Hutchinson’s third successive
postconviction motion was still pending in the circuit court at the
time that the death warrant was signed on March 31, 2025, and
(2) on April 17, 2025, the Governor temporarily stayed Hutchinson’s
execution so that Hutchinson could be evaluated for competency.
At the time that the stay was entered, this Court was actively
considering the merits of Hutchinson’s current postconviction
appeal, habeas petition, and other motions. However, this Court
- 21 - was only notified of the stay days later, after the competency
evaluation was completed and the stay lifted.
Given these circumstances, I cannot concur in the majority’s
decision to permit this execution to proceed at this time, without
ensuring a reasonable period for this Court to conduct a full review.
Because due process requires more, I dissent.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County, Lacey Powell Clark, Judge Case No. 461998CF001382XXXACX And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Chelsea Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M. Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Alicia Hampton, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
- 22 -