Jeffrey Dwayne Ashby v. Debbie Lashean Ashby

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0969
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: AUGUST 22, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

NO. 2024-CA-0969-ME

JEFFREY DWAYNE ASHBY APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION HONORABLE DENISE DEBERRY BROWN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-D-502213-001

DEBBIE LASHEAN ASHBY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: LAMBERT, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Jeffrey Dwayne Ashby, pro se, brings this appeal from a July

8, 2024, Domestic Violence Order (DVO) entered by the Jefferson Family Court.

We affirm. BACKGROUND

The parties to this appeal are husband and wife. They separated on

April 27, 2024. On June 11, 2024, Debbie LaShean Ashby filed a petition for

dissolution of marriage in the Jefferson Family Court (Action No. 24-CI-501669).

Shortly thereafter, on June 21, 2024, Debbie filed a Petition for Order

of Protection in the family court against Jeffrey. In the petition, Debbie alleged the

following:

On June 16, 2024, I received a phone call from Jeffrey on a different phone number. I had hung up. Because I had told him to stop calling me or having other people call me. I had explained to Jeffrey that we would not be getting back together, but he refuses to listen to me. He had made numerous attempts to contact me through emails, phone calls, people that he knows, he had contacted my children, also sent letters to my address. Now I had told him he is harassing me, that he needs to stop bothering me. He refuses. Every since I filed for divorce, he had gotten worst by harassing me in any thing he can do, to try and get my attention. He had threatening my job, by contacting corporate by telling lies. He kept calling my phone again over and over and over on the 16th of June. I have 14 voice messages on my phone that I had kept. I also received a letter in the mail. He is constantly harassing me on a daily basis, were I have family and my managers as my witness. This past Monday, June 17th, 2024, I had a voicemail at 1:37 am that he had shot himself in the chest. I also received another voicemail on 6/17/24 at 2:03 am that he had been rushed to U of L hospital. His DR. had reached out to me to give me information about his condition because he had gave them my number. I spoke to Dr. Jolk today 6/20/24 and she explained to me that he shot himself in the chest, because he seen that I had filed for -2- divorce. Now hearing this made me scared of my safety, because if he can shoot himself, he can come and try to shoot me. He’s harassing me daily and I’m scared. His DR. asked me questions about his mental. [H]e is diagnosed, Bipolar, [S]chizophrenic, he hears voices in his head, sometimes he be talking to himself, he is depressed and he is suicidal. I need the protection to be safe, because I’m scared. He does not live with me, he has left the house since 4/27/24 and he has been deranged and crazy every since he knows I filed for divorce. I work everyday and he keeps calling my phone on my job everyday. [sic]

Record (R.) 1-2. On June 21, 2024, the family court issued an emergency

protective order (EPO). On the same day, the Jefferson County Sheriff’s

Department served Jeffrey at the hospital with notice of the DVO hearing and a

notice to surrender firearms.

On July 3, 2024, both parties, pro se, appeared before the court at the

DVO hearing. The family court placed both parties under oath and read the

Petition into the record, which Debbie adopted as her testimony. Video Record

(V.R.), July 3, 2024, Hearing – 11:41:32 – 11:43:52.

At the hearing, Jeffrey confirmed that he attempted to commit suicide

and testified that he had reached a breaking point due to a combination of factors,

including his cancer diagnosis, being estranged from family members, his pending

divorce with Debbie, and financial issues. Jeffrey testified that he was now in a

much better place and brought documentation to dispute Debbie’s allegations.

Jeffrey admitted to contacting Debbie on numerous occasions since their -3- separation, despite her requesting that he no longer contact her. He also testified

that he ceased all communication with Debbie after being served the EPO while in

the hospital. At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court announced it would

grant Debbie a DVO to be effective for three years. V.R., July 3, 2024, Hearing –

11:45:35.

During the hearing, Jeffrey requested the court to introduce his

documents related to the text messages between the parties. The family court

denied the request on the premise that the documents were unnecessary to its

decision-making because “if you would harm yourself, [Debbie] has a right to be

afraid you could possibly harm her.” V.R., July 3, 2024, Hearing – 11:45:39. The

family court elaborated:

It does not matter about those other things. You notice I haven’t even talked about them because they are not relevant. You’ve already acknowledged it, so I only have to prove it. You’ve already said, ‘I made calls to her knowing that she didn’t want me to call her.’ That’s your testimony, so the law provides that if a person tries to attempt suicide, then that is an act of domestic violence, in and of itself. So, it doesn’t matter what else happened that day. That is an act of domestic violence, even if you were nowhere near her.

V.R., July 3, 2024, Hearing – 11:50:50.

On July 8, 2024, the family court entered an Administrative Office of

the Courts (AOC) Form 275.3. In the DVO’s “additional findings” section, the

-4- family court checked one box, finding “[f]or Petitioner against Respondent in that

it was established, by a preponderance of evidence, that an act(s) of domestic

violence and abuse, has occurred and may again occur . . . .”

Neither party filed a motion for additional factual findings pursuant to

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the family court’s factual findings and entry of a

DVO under the clearly erroneous standard. CR 52.01; Caudill v. Caudill, 318

S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010). Findings are not clearly erroneous if they are

supported by substantial evidence, which is “evidence of substance and relevant

consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the mind[]” of a reasonable

person. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky.

1998) (citations omitted). “[I]n reviewing the decision of a trial court the test is

not whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the court’s findings

were clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion.” Gomez v. Gomez, 254

S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, we note that Debbie failed to file a brief in

compliance with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP). This Court

recognizes that both parties are proceeding pro se; however, this does not exempt

-5- either party from the requirement to follow our rules. Parties who represent

themselves in legal proceedings are expected to demonstrate a good faith effort to

comply with the appellate rules. Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Ky. App.

2010).

This Court may impose penalties under RAP 31(H). The decision

whether to impose any penalties is within our discretion. Roberts v. Bucci, 218

S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 2007). Considering the serious nature of domestic

violence actions, we decline to exercise any penalties in this case and proceed to

the merits of the appeal. See Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App.

2005).

We shall address Jeffrey’s arguments on appeal seriatim.

First, Jeffrey contends the family court violated his due process rights

by refusing to consider the documents he proffered at the hearing, claiming his

evidence would have directly refuted Debbie’s allegations. We disagree.

In appealing a family court’s decision to exclude evidence, a party

must show: 1) the substance of the excluded evidence; 2) that it was an abuse of

discretion to exclude the evidence; and 3) there was a substantial possibility the

court would have reached a different result if the evidence had not been improperly

-6- excluded. See Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 103;1 Lewis v. Fulkerson, 555

S.W.3d 432, 439 (Ky. App. 2017). The preservation of an alleged error at trial or

an evidentiary hearing regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is

governed by KRE 103, which provides, in relevant part:

(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected; and

...

(2) Offer of proof. If the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.

An “‘offer of proof must not be too vague, general, or conclusory.’

While KRE 103(a)(2) does not mandate a formal offer of proof, it does require an

indication of ‘the facts sought to be elicited or the specific facts the witness would

establish.’” Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 56 (Ky. 2017) (quoting

Henderson v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 335, 342 (Ky. 2014)) (citations

omitted). After reviewing the record, we do not believe Jeffrey has identified a

1 The Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) “shall apply to family law cases to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules.” Kentucky Family Court Rules of Procedure and Practice (FCRPP) 1(5). See also KRE 1101(a), which provides “[t]hese rules apply to all the courts of this Commonwealth in the actions, cases, and proceedings and to the extent hereinafter set forth.” -7- reversible error as to the family court’s denying his request to introduce the

substance of the texts between the parties.

Jeffrey claims that the evidence would demonstrate that the text

messages sent to Debbie did not contain threats and were not hostile. However,

excluding this evidence was not an abuse of discretion because there was no

factual issue regarding the content of the messages. See KRE 401 (relevant

evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.”); see also KRE 403 (relevant

evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of . . . confusion of the issues[.]”).

Jeffrey argues the family court abused its discretion in its excluding of

witnesses prepared to testify that his behavior was non-threatening. However, this

argument is not properly preserved, as Jeffrey never requested or implied that he

had witnesses prepared to testify. The record also does not reflect that Jeffrey

subpoenaed any witnesses to testify on his behalf pursuant to CR 45.05 or that they

appeared at the hearing.

Jeffrey also asserts he had documentation and receipts demonstrating

that the items he sent to Debbie were “benign and intended as gestures of goodwill,

not threats.” Brief at 6. However, Jeffrey never requested to introduce evidence of

-8- the nature of items sent to Debbie, nor implied the existence of such. Likewise, no

offer of proof was presented to the family court for consideration upon the court’s

exclusion of the evidence. KRE 103(a)(2).

As to each of the alleged evidentiary errors, having carefully reviewed

the record, we conclude that Jeffrey failed to demonstrate how the evidence, if

included, would create a substantial possibility that a different result could have

been reached or that the alleged evidentiary error affected a substantial right under

KRE 103(a). See Lewis, 555 S.W.3d at 439.

Next on appeal, Jeffrey argues the family court’s finding of domestic

violence was not supported by substantial evidence, and the entry of the DVO was

an abuse of discretion. Again, we disagree.

The family court may issue a DVO where it “finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and

may again occur[.]” Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.740(1); Hall v. Smith,

599 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. App. 2020). In the context of cases involving domestic

violence, a preponderance of the evidence is evidence that “establishes the alleged

victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Hall,

599 S.W.3d at 454. “Domestic violence and abuse” means “[p]hysical injury,

serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the

infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,

-9- strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried

couple[.]” KRS 403.720(2)(a). Further, it is well established that this Court may

affirm a lower court for any reason supported by the record. Kentucky Farm

Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1991).

The inquiry before us turns on whether substantial evidence supports a

finding that Jeffrey inflicted upon Debbie a fear of imminent physical injury

pursuant to KRS 403.720(2)(a). Debbie learned of Jeffrey’s suicide attempt from

hospital personnel and testified that “hearing this made me scared of my safety,

because if he can shoot himself, he can come and try to shoot me.” R., 1-2.

In Ashley v. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d 400 (Ky. App. 2017), petitioner

testified that her fear of imminent physical injury stemmed from an argument

which occurred in the presence of the parties’ minor children, where respondent

was yelling and throwing items at petitioner; smacked a tortilla chip off

petitioner’s arm; and called 911 before leaving the house and texting petitioner that

he was going to kill himself. Id. at 402. We affirmed the granting of a DVO,

holding the domestic violence findings were “based upon the escalation of [the

parties’] arguments, [respondent’s] alcohol use, and his suicide threat[.]” Id. at

405. This Court explained:

[W]e cannot hold that the incident where [respondent] smacked the chip off of [petitioner’s] arm constituted a physical injury within the definition of domestic violence or abuse. However, the definition also includes “the -10- infliction of fear of imminent physical injury,” which we hold [petitioner] established by a preponderance of the evidence. She testified under questioning by her attorney and the family court that she feared for her safety after [respondent], who was intoxicated, smacked the chip off of her arm and that she did not know what would have happened if 911 had not called back at that moment. [Respondent] admitted that he might have struck [petitioner] with more force because he had been drinking. But what pushed this into the realm of domestic violence was [respondent’s] text message to [petitioner] threatening to commit suicide. Therefore, we hold that the record supports the family court’s finding that domestic violence and abuse occurred.

Id. at 405 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

It is immaterial that a physical touching occurred in Ashley, despite

there being no alleged physical contact between the parties here, because the

Ashley Court specified that respondent’s smacking the chip off petitioner’s arm did

not constitute domestic violence, yet still upheld the DVO. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d at

405. Instead, the Court emphasized respondent’s escalating behavior and text

message threatening to commit suicide and noted that respondent possessed a

concealed carry firearms permit. Ashley, 520 S.W.3d at 405. Sub judice, Jeffrey

testified that the gun he used in his suicide attempt belonged to and is registered to

his adult son, who had previously given Jeffrey the gun for protection purposes. It

is undisputed that Jeffrey had possession of this gun in the parties’ home during

their marriage.

-11- Debbie’s fear for her physical safety was reasonable as the compact

timeline of events details Jeffrey’s rapidly escalating behavior after the parties’

marital separation, particularly on the day that culminated with his June 17, 2024,

suicide attempt. At minimum, this demonstrated Jeffrey’s inability to control his

emotions and actions as pertained to Debbie. In her Petition and testimony, Debbie

explained that on June 16, 2024, she received numerous phone calls, text

messages, letters, and emails from Jeffrey; that other individuals were contacting

her on Jeffrey’s behalf; that Jeffrey was attempting to communicate with her adult

children to ask about her; and that Jeffrey was calling her place of employment.

Immediately thereafter, in the early morning hours of June 17, 2024, Debbie

received a voicemail at 1:37 a.m., informing her that Jeffrey had shot himself in the

chest, and a second voicemail at 2:03 a.m., informing her that Jeffrey had been

rushed to the hospital. The inability of an individual to safely regulate his behavior

during periods of amplified stress, escalating so far as to attempting self-inflicted

serious harm, could easily terrorize family members who could become the object

of such behavior. See Hohman v. Dery, 371 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Ky. App. 2012)

(Evidence presented sufficient for court to reasonably infer that father’s conduct

caused mother to fear imminent physical injury where, in part, mother believed

father unable to control emotions, feared his conduct would escalate, and was

concerned about father’s frequent drive-bys and text messages); see also Crabtree

-12- v. Crabtree, 484 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Ky. App. 2016) (affirming DVO where it was

found that respondent’s threat to commit suicide in the presence of the children,

though “not directed at hurting any family members,” would have had the

“inevitable consequence of . . . terroriz[ing] the recipients of the information.”).

Standing alone, the mere threat of suicide may not constitute domestic

violence. However, Jeffrey was aware his actions were inflicting mental anguish

upon Debbie. Jeffrey admitted that he continued to contact Debbie against her

wishes, and only ceased this pattern of behavior when he was served with the EPO

at the hospital following his violent suicide attempt that took place while he was

operating a motor vehicle. The family court stands in the best position to weigh

the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses who testified. Hohman, 371

S.W.3d at 783. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we believe sufficient

evidence was presented to support the issuance of the DVO.

Accordingly, the family court’s finding of domestic violence was not

clearly erroneous and was supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the DVO issued by the Jefferson Family

Court on July 8, 2024, is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

-13- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Jeffrey Dwayne Ashby, Pro Se Louisville, Kentucky

-14-