RENDERED: AUGUST 14, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1365-ME
JEFFREY CASE MEEKS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN FAMILY COURT v. HONORABLE G. SID BRODERSON, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-D-00428-001
LESLEE ELIZABETH BANDY; O.F.M., A MINOR CHILD; AND W.J.M., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Jeffrey Case Meeks (“Meeks”), brings this expedited appeal from the Warren Family Court’s issuance of a domestic violence order (“DVO”). After careful review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellee, Leslee Elizabeth Bandy (“Bandy”), Meeks’s former wife, filed a petition for a DVO on July 25, 2025, seeking protection for herself and the two children she shares with Meeks, Appellees, O.F.M., A Minor Child (“Younger Son”), and W.J.M., A Minor Child (“Older Son”). Bandy alleged that Meeks had repeatedly telephoned and harassed her, following her and their two children. The petition also alleged that Meeks had continued to touch her in a sexual manner even after she told him to stop.
The Warren Family Court issued an emergency protective order on behalf of Bandy and both children. After some continuances, the Family Court held a hearing on Bandy’s DVO petition in October 2025, with a Special Judge presiding due to the retirement of the former Warren Family Court Judge.
Both Bandy and Meeks were represented by counsel at the hearing, which lasted roughly two hours. Three witnesses testified: Bandy, Meeks, and Meeks’s current wife, Stephanie Meeks (“Meeks’s Wife”).
Bandy testified first, stating that she and Meeks were divorced in 2022. Originally, both Meeks and Bandy possessed joint custody and equal time- sharing by agreement. However, in January of 2025, Bandy became sole custodian. Agreeing that the contents of her petition were true and correct, Bandy then described her memory of a July 25, 2025, incident at a bowling alley.
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According to Bandy, she knew that Older Son needed to see a doctor about his ear, and she had arranged for her mother to take him to an appointment later that day. Bandy averred that while she was dropping off Younger Son at a bowling camp, Meeks appeared in the parking lot, opened the passenger door, and angrily demanded to know about Older Son’s medical condition and appointment. Bandy did not want to provide those details to Meeks because he had been following her and making her feel unsafe, and she was Younger Son’s sole legal custodian. After the confrontation, Bandy proceeded to her workplace, whereupon her mother telephoned to inform her that Sheriff’s office personnel were present at Bandy’s home to perform a welfare check on Older Son. Bandy then decided to seek a DVO.
When asked by the Family Court whether Meeks had ever harmed her physically, Bandy stated that he had restrained her during their marriage. She also said that, beginning in March or April of 2025, Meeks had forced himself sexually upon her without her consent and had touched her in a sexual manner several times even though she had asked him to stop. She also recounted that Meeks had repeatedly telephoned or contacted her, including calling her roughly 120 times between July 4 and July 24 (the day before she filed the petition for a DVO). Bandy opined that the unwanted sexual acts, Meeks’s prior threats to kill her
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during the divorce proceedings if she kept their children away from him, and his habit of carrying a loaded weapon in his vehicle caused Bandy to feel unsafe.
Bandy further testified that the Family Court had restricted Meeks to one hour of supervised visitation per week since giving her full custody in January of 2025. Nonetheless, Bandy conceded that after Meeks pressured her, she agreed to let him have overnight visitation with the children on the night of June 14, 2025.
According to Bandy, on that date, Meeks left the children at his home with his wife and went to find Bandy. Eventually, Meeks saw Bandy’s vehicle at her boyfriend’s apartment and began to pound angrily on her boyfriend’s front door at approximately midnight. Bandy eventually came outside and drove away from her boyfriend’s apartment, claiming that Meeks chased her at high speeds. Bandy said that Meeks drove in the incorrect direction at a roundabout to block her car, exited his car, and yelled at her through her car window. Bandy did not exit her car because she did not feel safe. She stated her fear of Meeks, both for herself and their children’s safety.
On cross-examination, Bandy admitted that Meeks had not physically touched her during either the July 25 incident at the bowling alley or the June 14 incident at her boyfriend’s home and the roundabout. She stated that she had engaged in sexual relations with Meeks, at his insistence, around ten times in the months preceding her seeking of the DVO, including after the June 14 incident.
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Bandy acknowledged that she was pregnant, but she was not sure if Meeks or her boyfriend was the father. She also conceded that, despite fearing Meeks herself and concern for her children, and in violation of the Family Court’s order restricting Meeks’s supervised visitation, she had continued to allow him to have unsupervised visitation with their children after the June 14 incident. Bandy further admitted that Meeks had asked her to look for houses that they could buy together, as evidenced in the record by her correspondence with a realtor.
Bandy denied that her attitude towards Meeks had only changed after he told her on July 20, 2025, that he was going to stay with his (soon-to-be) wife instead of reuniting with Bandy. According to Bandy, Meeks only made that statement in response to Bandy’s earlier informing him that she did not want to reunite with him. When questioned by the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appointed for the children, Bandy admitted that she had allowed Meeks to have unsupervised visitation with the children even though the January 2025 order which gave her sole custody contained a finding that Meeks had subjected the children to abuse.
Meeks testified next, explaining that he drives a truck at night, and his children usually contact him during work hours. Older Son had called Meeks in the wee hours of July 25 and had mentioned needing to see a doctor about his ear. That conversation alarmed Meeks, and he contacted Bandy three times, but she did not respond. Thus, he went to the bowling alley because he knew that she would
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be dropping off Younger Son there for a camp. Meeks denied having behaved aggressively towards Bandy at the bowling alley, and he presented video footage of his interaction with her that morning.
According to Meeks, he had not forced Bandy to have sex with him.
Instead, Meeks and Bandy had consensual sex several times prior to July 25, including at her workplace and on June 14 (before she went to her boyfriend’s apartment later that same day).
As to the June 14 incident, Meeks said that the children wanted to talk to Bandy, so he tried to contact her and eventually found her at her boyfriend’s apartment (the address of which he intimated that he found via an internet search). When Bandy came to the door, Meeks told her it was not right for her to be with her boyfriend since she was pregnant with his (Meeks’s) child, and they (Meeks and Bandy) had planned to reunite. Bandy left, and Meeks followed her until she stopped near a roundabout. There were no other vehicles on the road. He stopped in front of her vehicle and told her to stop driving “crazy” because she was pregnant. He did not touch Bandy, and they were only stopped at the roundabout for 15-20 seconds. Bandy continued to allow him to have unsupervised visitation with children after the June 14 incident. He also helped coach the children’s football team(s).
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Meeks testified that on July 20 he had informed Bandy that he was going to remain with his soon-to-be wife instead of reuniting with Bandy. He claimed that conversation changed Bandy’s attitude towards him. Meeks denied ever having improperly touched or threatened Bandy.
During cross-examination by Bandy’s counsel and questioning by the GAL, Meeks denied that Bandy had told him numerous times between March and July 25 that she did not want to be with him. He did not deny the accuracy of telephone records submitted by Bandy showing that he had called her numerous times. Meeks maintained that he and Bandy had talked frequently, and he would call her back if she did not answer the first time.
Meeks’s Wife served as the final witness at the hearing. She testified that she had received a telephone call from Bandy on June 14, and during the ensuing dialogue, Bandy told her that she (Bandy) and Meeks had been engaged in a sexual relationship, and she (Bandy) was pregnant with Meeks’s child. Meeks’s Wife averred that during that conversation, and a subsequent one, Bandy did not mention being fearful of Meeks or having been pressured into having sex with him. Meeks’s Wife acknowledged at the hearing that she was also pregnant with Meeks’s child.
At the conclusion of proof and arguments by counsel, the Family Court made a few brief oral findings. First, it explicitly declined to find that an act
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of domestic violence occurred on July 25 at the bowling alley. However, it found that Bandy had testified “credibly” that there had been domestic violence in the past, and that Meeks had made threats to harm Bandy if she took their children away. The Family Court stated that it appeared as if Meeks and Bandy were attempting to reunite prior to July 20, when Bandy told Meeks there would be no reconciliation. Nonetheless, Meeks continued to try to contact Bandy until she sought a DVO. The Family Court found that Meeks’s conduct constituted stalking, and it issued a DVO to protect Bandy alone. It did not extend the DVO to the children. The Family Court also did not state with specificity the acts that amounted to stalking.
The Family Court soon thereafter issued its written decision, which consists entirely of a completed Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) Form 275.3. It did not craft a Judgment of its own. Instead, the Family Court merely checked a box indicating that it had jurisdiction and another box stating that “it was established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an act(s) of” stalking had occurred. Trial Court Record (“R.”) at 31. The Family Court neither incorporated its oral findings nor made any additional, written findings. The DVO prevents Meeks from coming within 500 feet of Bandy for three years. Meeks then filed this appeal.
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II. ANALYSIS
Although not explicitly enumerated as such in Meeks’s briefs, we perceive him to raise two, overarching issues: first, that the DVO is fatally flawed because the Family Court failed to make sufficient findings of fact; second, that there was insufficient evidence to conclude he stalked Bandy. Bandy asserts that both issues are unpreserved. Before we may address the merits, we must resolve competing motions filed by the parties.
A. Motions to Supplement and to Strike Parts of the Record Bandy has asked to supplement the certified record with two decisions issued by the Warren Family Court during the pendency of this appeal. Those rulings make some minor modifications to the January 2025 custody order but substantively deny Meeks’s request to vacate or amend that decision. Bandy included those orders as the first two exhibits in the appendix to her Appellee Brief. Relatedly, Meeks has asked us to strike those two exhibits to Bandy’s brief because they are not in the certified record. A motion panel of this Court passed both motions to this merits panel.
The January 2025 order granting Bandy sole custody of the children was discussed at the DVO hearing, as was Meeks’s then-pending motion to alter, amend, or vacate. However, the propriety of the DVO is the sole issue properly before us. Consequently, this appeal does not directly involve any issues
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pertaining to child custody or visitation, and the children are not protected parties under the DVO. As a result, the orders that Bandy attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 to her brief are not germane to the limited issues before us.
Because the orders at issue do not provide meaningful assistance with our analysis of the DVO, Bandy has not shown good cause to supplement the record with them. We decline to engage in an analysis of whether we may properly take judicial notice of Family Court decisions that are not directly relevant. Accordingly, we will deny Bandy’s motion to supplement the record and grant Meeks’s motion to strike exhibits 1 and 2 to Bandy’s brief. However, we will deny Meeks’s request to strike the entirety of Bandy’s brief; instead, we will disregard the stray references therein to exhibits 1 and 2, resulting in no prejudice to Meeks.
Standards of Review
Our standards for reviewing appeals are specific and oft-stated:
We review the entry of a DVO for whether the trial court’s finding of domestic violence was an abuse of discretion. McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Ky. App. 2008). Our review of the trial court’s factual findings is limited to whether they were clearly erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”)
52.01; Hall v. Smith, 599 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. App.
2020). A trial court’s factual determination is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence of sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Moore v.
Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
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“A trial court is authorized to issue a DVO if it ‘finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again occur[.]’” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky.
App. 2019) (quoting Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)
403.740(1)). “The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007)).
Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky. App. 2021).
B. Sufficiency of Findings of Fact Before we may address the merits of the DVO, we must first resolve Meeks’s argument that the DVO is inherently flawed because the Family Court failed to meet its duty to make sufficient findings of fact. We review de novo whether a Court has met its duty to make sufficient factual findings under CR 52.01. Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Ky. 2021). Smith is the seminal decision as to the findings that a Family Court must make when issuing a DVO.
In Smith, as here, the Family Court orally found at the conclusion of the hearing that an act of domestic violence had occurred. Id. at 813. Also in Smith, as here, the Family Court checked boxes on Form 275.3 to indicate that it had jurisdiction and that domestic violence had occurred and may occur again. Id. at 813-14. Further, in Smith, as here, the Family Court did not make additional written findings of fact. Id. at 814.
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But, unlike here, the Family Court in Smith also issued a separate form order incorporating its oral findings by reference. Id. Because the Warren Family Court here failed to incorporate its oral findings into its written decision, its oral findings are “beyond our consideration” since “[a] trial court speaks only through written orders entered upon the official record.” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 916 (Ky. App. 2019). Consequently, the issue becomes whether the Family Court here satisfied its fact-finding obligations by merely checking boxes on Form 275.3, or whether it must also make additional findings. The ambiguous language in Smith on that recurring issue has divided prior panels of this Court.
To determine the precise holding in Smith, we must quote from that opinion in more detail than we usually deem necessary:
As previously described, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law orally at the end of the hearing. It also fully and accurately completed AOC Form 275.3, finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that acts of sexual abuse had occurred and may occur again. Finally, it entered a written order “expressly and specifically incorporating” its oral findings and conclusions into the written order. We hold this was sufficient to meet the trial court’s duty to engage in at least a good faith effort at fact-finding and that the found facts be included in a written order.
First, we note that in issuing a protective order, the only essential facts, the trial court is required to find are (1) whether an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has occurred, and (2) whether it may occur again. The trial court made both of these findings in writing on AOC
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Form 275.3. Any additional factual findings the trial court makes in issuing a protective order are merely supporting those ultimate factual findings and are not “essential.”
This stands in contrast to the complex and multifaceted factual findings a trial court must make in the child custody context. In custody disputes, the trial court must specifically consider multiple factors to determine what is in the child’s best interest. See KRS 403.270(2).
In the child custody context, the mere written finding that something is or is not in a child’s best interest cannot be sufficient because it does not show how the trial court weighed each factor to determine what was in the child’s best interest. Written factual findings regarding each factor are an “essential” part of the trial court’s written order in child custody cases. Such is not the case in the protective order context. . . .
AOC Form 275.3 sufficiently apprises any third parties of the facts they must know to act on the order. Law enforcement, school officials, and medical providers are the third parties most likely to require this information. It is sufficient that they know an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has occurred and that it may occur again and what the object of the protective order is restrained from doing. All of this information is contained in a completely and accurately filled out AOC Form 275.3.
No additional information is required for third parties to fulfill any obligations they have in assisting in the enforcement of these orders.
Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817-18 (some internal quotation marks, citations, and paragraph breaks omitted).
The language that has divided prior panels of this Court stems from seemingly inconsistent language in two consecutive paragraphs in Smith. In the
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first paragraph, our Supreme Court said that the Family Court’s completion of Form 275.3 and its incorporation of its oral findings “was sufficient to meet the trial court’s duty to engage in at least a good faith effort at fact-finding and that the found facts be included in a written order.” Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). At least two prior panels of this Court have relied on that paragraph to conclude that a Family Court satisfies its fact-finding duty by completing Form 275.3 and making additional findings. See Hild v. Hild, No. 2024-CA-0363-ME, 2024 WL 4996639, at *3 (Ky. App. Dec. 6, 2024) (unpublished) (citing Smith and holding that “a completely and accurately completed AOC Form 275.3 order, along with some kind of additional findings, is sufficient to satisfy the circuit court’s good faith duty to record its findings.”); and Clan v. Streble, No. 2024-CA-0455-ME, 2025 WL 876392, at *2 (Ky. App. Mar. 21, 2025) (citing Smith and holding that “[i]n cases involving an order of protection, it is well established that the language set out in AOC Form 275.3 order, along with some level of additional findings, is sufficient to satisfy the family court’s duty to reduce its findings to writing.”).1 And in the very next paragraph of Smith, our Supreme Court held that the only “essential facts” that a Family Court must make to support a DVO may be
1 We cite to these unpublished opinions pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 41(A) as demonstrative, non-binding authority.
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made “in writing on AOC Form 275.3,” and “[a]ny additional factual findings the trial court makes in issuing a protective order are merely supporting those ultimate factual findings and are not ‘essential.’” Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817. At least four prior panels of this Court have relied on that essential/nonessential dichotomy in Smith to conclude that a Family Court satisfies its fact-finding duties by merely completing Form 275.3. See, e.g., Jones v. Heavner, No. 2022-CA-0483-ME, 2022 WL 17543040, at *6 (Ky. App. Dec. 9, 2022) (unpublished) (holding that a Family Court made sufficient findings by checking boxes on Form 275.3); Njere v. Jerry, No. 2022-CA-1005-ME, 2023 WL 5312193, at *2 (Ky. App. Aug. 18, 2023) (unpublished) (holding that “[u]nder our current precedent, an AOC Form 275.3 completely and accurately completed is sufficient” to satisfy the Family Court’s factfinding duty); Mills v. E.M., No. 2023-CA-1230-ME, 2024 WL 1589668, at *3 (Ky. App. Apr. 12, 2024) (unpublished) (“A properly completed AOC Form 275.3 constitutes sufficient findings to support the issuance of a DVO.”); McClusky v. Yount, No. 2022-CA-1300-ME, 2023 WL 4139876, at *3 (Ky. App. Jun. 23, 2023) (unpublished) (holding that “under our current precedent, an AOC Form 275.3 completely and accurately completed is sufficient.”).2
2 Again, we cite to these unpublished opinions pursuant to RAP 41(A). Some of our post-Smith decisions have also relied on our pre-Smith opinion in Williford v. Williford, 583 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky. App. 2019), wherein we held that “logically, completely and accurately filling out AOC Form 275.3 and checking the appropriate box under ‘Additional Findings’ on the form, in and of itself, must satisf[y] the court’s good faith duty to record fact-finding.” (Brackets in Williford; some internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) However, in Thurman v. Thurman,
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We conclude that Smith held that checking the boxes on AOC Form 275.3 alone is sufficient to satisfy a Family Court’s fact-finding duty. Indeed, there would be no reason for AOC to have taken the time and expense to create this form, approved by the Kentucky Supreme Court, if additional findings need to be made separately every time that it is used.
Our Supreme Court in Smith stressed that the Family Court made the “essential” factual findings “in writing on AOC Form 275.3.” Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817. That Court held that any additional findings made by the Family Court beyond what is contained in Form 275.3 “are merely supporting those ultimate factual findings and are not ‘essential.’” Id. We decline to make it mandatory for Family Courts to issue nonessential findings of fact. After all, our Supreme Court explicitly noted that any and all findings of fact not contained in Form 275.3 are merely “supporting” the “ultimate factual findings” made in the form and thus not ‘“essential.’” Id.
Therefore, the fact that the Family Court in Smith also incorporated its oral findings into its written decision does not mean that Family Courts must do so
560 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky. App. 2018), we noted, in dicta, that checking boxes on Form 275.3 does not satisfy a Court’s duty to make sufficient findings of fact. Any inconsistencies between Williford and Thurman are irrelevant going forward because each opinion predates our Supreme Court’s seminal decision on the subject in Smith (which does not cite to either Williford or Thurman). Because Smith is both more recent and a decision of our Commonwealth’s highest Court, we conclude that Smith governs our review of this issue. We thus decline to examine further the potential impact on this case of Williford or Thurman.
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in every case – even though it is always advisable. Incorporating oral findings is common, as well as prudent and helpful to the parties and reviewing Courts. But we decline to require invariably that busy Family Courts in essence issue two orders on the same subject and in the same matter because any findings beyond those found in Form 275.3 have been deemed inessential by our Supreme Court. Thus, we reject Meeks’s argument that the DVO here is fatally flawed due to insufficient findings of fact. However, we stress that “[a] party always has the authority under CR 52.02 to request additional findings if [he or] she believes the court’s fact-finding on AOC 275.3 alone is insufficient.” Williford, 583 S.W.3d at 430.
We also reject the argument that a Circuit/Family Court must supplement the already-executed AOC form by making additional findings of fact when issuing a DVO based upon stalking. The parties have not cited, and we did not independently locate, published, post-Smith precedent determining whether Courts must make additional findings of fact when issuing a DVO based upon stalking. As we shall soon discuss, stalking is somewhat different than other forms of domestic violence in that it requires at least two instances of misconduct by the perpetrator.
However, stalking is a type of domestic violence under KRS 403.720(2)(a), which defines domestic violence and abuse as “[p]hysical injury,
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serious physical injury, stalking . . . between family members . . . .” Former spouses are included within the definition of “family member” in KRS 403.720(3). We see no indication in Smith that a Court has additional duties when issuing a DVO based upon stalking. Certainly our Supreme Court in Smith explicitly mentioned stalking, even though Smith did not involve stalking:
we note that in issuing a protective order, the only essential facts, the trial court is required to find are (1)
whether an act of domestic violence and abuse, dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault has occurred, and (2) whether it may occur again. The trial court made both of these findings in writing on AOC Form 275.3.
Smith, 635 S.W.3d at 817 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, appropriately completing Form 275.3 sufficiently satisfies a Family Court’s fact-finding duties when issuing a DVO based on all forms of domestic violence and abuse, including stalking.3 That conclusion is not impacted by our decision in the distinguishable case of Taylor v. Fitzpatrick, 659 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. App. 2023). In Taylor, we concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support an order extending an
3 Though not cited by the parties, our research revealed that in one post-Smith opinion, we referenced additional factfinding for DVOs based on stalking. See Bowie v. Bowie, No. 2023- CA-1391-ME, 2024 WL 3380987, at *4 (Ky. App. Jul. 12, 2024) (unpublished). However, we did not directly analyze in Bowie that any requirement for additional factfinding for DVOs based upon stalking may not be harmonized with our Supreme Court’s holding in Smith. Additionally, Bowie is unpublished and thus not binding. See, e.g., Meier v. Jeff Wyler Alexandria, Inc., 685 S.W.3d 9, 14-15 (Ky. App. 2024).
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analogous interpersonal protective order (“IPO”). Id. at 749. We also criticized the Family Court’s failure to make findings of fact beyond checking a box on Form 275.3. Id. at 751. Here, however, there was evidence which, if believed, supported the issuance of a DVO. And, crucially, in Taylor we did not cite our Supreme Court’s holding in Smith regarding which findings of fact are essential and which are unessential. In sum, the DVO at hand contained sufficient findings of fact via the Family Court’s completion of Form 275.3.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the DVO Meeks and Bandy gave conflicting accounts of many events, such as whether Meeks forced Bandy to engage in sexual acts and whether he kept contacting her after she had asked him to stop doing so. Of course, we must stress that the Family Court alone had the ability to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354. Thus, Meeks’s reliance upon the testimony he gave, in which he denied most of Bandy’s allegations, does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of a DVO.
To determine whether there was substantial evidence that Meeks stalked Bandy, we must first analyze the term “stalking” and specify the conduct that constitutes it by defining its meaning. Bandy asks us to refer to the dictionary;
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Meeks seeks reference to statutes governing IPOs. Surprisingly, the parties have not cited a published opinion defining “stalking” as it is used in the DVO context.4 The defining issue presents itself because, for reasons to which we are not privy, the General Assembly has allowed for the issuance of a DVO based on stalking but has not defined that term. See KRS 403.720(2)(a) (including stalking within the definition of “domestic violence and abuse”). Yet the General Assembly did define “stalking” in the context of IPOs, describing it as “conduct prohibited as stalking under [KRS 508.140 or 508.150], or a criminal attempt, conspiracy, facilitation, or solicitation to commit the crime of stalking[.]” KRS 456.010(8). The cited statutes, KRS 508.140 and 508.150, “refer, respectively, to the criminal offenses of first- and second-degree stalking.” Taylor, 659 S.W.3d at 749.
Of course, terms in statutes are generally defined according to their everyday, common meaning under KRS 446.080(4). However, “technical words and phrases” which “have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.” Id. “Stalking” is a technical word
4 We have repeatedly used the definition of stalking found in the IPO statutes when reviewing a DVO based on stalking, albeit in unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Kiser v. Kiser, No. 2018-CA- 000812-ME, 2019 WL 169204, at *4 (Ky. App. Jan. 11, 2019) (unpublished); Kummer v. Valla, No. 2018-CA-001333-ME, 2019 WL 1578801, at *2 (Ky. App. Apr. 12, 2019) (unpublished); Parker v. Butler, No. 2025-CA-1368-ME, 2026 WL 1622937, at *4 n.2 (Ky. App. Jun. 5, 2026) (unpublished); Flintroy v. Gallegos-Esparza, No. 2021-CA-0928-ME, 2023 WL 324617, at *3 n.2 (Ky. App. Jan. 20, 2023) (unpublished).
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that has acquired a technical meaning in the law, as shown by the fact that it is specifically defined in both IPO and penal statutes.
IPOs and DVOs are closely related. As our Supreme Court has explained, “the heart of the difference” between them is “to whom the respective protective orders offer relief.” Smith v. Doe, 627 S.W.3d 903, 909 (Ky. 2021). However, “[a]part from who may file a petition for an IPO or DVO, the statutes governing the respective protective orders read and operate in much the same way.” Id. at 910. The Kentucky Supreme Court, and we, have remarked many times in other published opinions on the close parallels between DVOs and IPOs. For example, we have noted that “[a]lthough the statutes governing the issuance of DVOs are found under KRS Chapter 403, the legislative intent for enacting the IPO statutes is identical to that of the DVO statutes.” Jones v. Jones, 617 S.W.3d 418, 424 n.4 (Ky. App. 2021). Our Supreme Court has also noted that “though they are housed under different portions of KRS, the statutes governing IPOs and DVOs are nearly identical.” Doe, 627 S.W.3d at 908. We have held that “[i]t appears the purpose and intent behind, and the interpretation of, the DVO statutes are almost identical to that of the IPO statutes.” Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ky. App. 2017). The close relationship between a DVO and an IPO is perhaps best highlighted by the fact that “the same form [275.3] is utilized by the Courts for both IPOs and DVOs.” Taylor, 659 S.W.3d at 748.
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We perceive no logical, compelling reason to interpret the meaning of “stalking” differently in the DVO context than in the IPO context. Consequently, we will define “stalking” in the context of a DVO by using the definition of the term found in the context of an IPO. And we have summarized the IPO statutes to mean that:
for an individual to be granted an IPO for stalking, he or she must at a minimum prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, an individual intentionally engaged in two or more acts directed at the victim that seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed the victim, that served no legitimate purpose, and would have caused a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress, and that these acts may occur again. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.
Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Ky. App. 2017) (citations omitted).
Bandy alleged that Meeks forced her to engage in sexual acts against her will, followed her, and continued to contact her frequently after she had asked him not to do so. Indeed, it is undisputed that Meeks went to Bandy’s boyfriend’s apartment without an invitation on June 14, and followed Bandy from that apartment at a high rate of speed. It is also beyond question that Meeks called Bandy numerous times, as discussed in Bandy’s testimony and shown on call logs from her telephone that were entered into evidence. Bandy testified that Meeks called her roughly 120 times between July 4 and July 24, 2025. Meeks also visited
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Bandy’s place of employment and photographed her car in the parking lot. Bandy testified that she told Meeks on July 20 that she did not wish to reunite with him, but telephone logs show calls made to her from his phone between July 20 and July 25 (when she sought the DVO). Bandy testified that she feared Meeks, both for herself and for their children.
Meeks had a markedly different version of events, as he generally testified that Bandy had consented to the sexual acts and to his frequent communications. However, the Family Court alone had the ability to judge credibility, and it obviously found Bandy to be more credible than Meeks.
Accepting Bandy’s testimony as credible, there was sufficient evidence to show that Meeks had stalked her via frequently initiating unwanted contact (or the attempt at contact) with her, following her, and forcing her to engage in sexual acts without her consent. Bandy testified that Meeks was angry and unpredictable. She also testified that she feared Meeks; he had threatened to harm her in the past; and he had pushed her against a wall during their marriage. Bandy also testified that Meeks kept a loaded gun in his vehicle. The evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Meeks made explicit or implicit threats that placed Bandy in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death. In sum, the Family Court’s decision to issue a DVO against Meeks based on his having stalked Bandy is supported by substantial evidence.
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We have concluded that any further arguments in the parties’ briefs are without merit, irrelevant, or redundant. Schell v. Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29 n.1 (Ky. App. 2021). For the foregoing reasons, the Warren Family Court is affirmed.
III. ORDER
For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, the Court ORDERS that Appellee’s motion to supplement the record with the documents found in Exhibits 1 and 2 to Appellee’s brief be, and it is hereby, DENIED. The Court ORDERS Appellant’s motion to strike Appellee’s brief in its entirety be, and it is hereby, DENIED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: ____08/14/2026____ HON. AUDRA J. ECKERLE
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth A. Meredith II William D. Tingley Bowling Green, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky