Jeffrey Aaron Brinson v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 7, 2024
• Docket: 07-24-00015-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00014-CR No. 07-24-00015-CR

JEFFREY AARON BRINSON, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 100th District Court Childress County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 6575 & 6764, Honorable Dale A. Rabe, Presiding

October 7, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Jeffrey Aaron Brinson appeals from the trial court’s two judgments. Through that

entered in Cause No. 6575, the trial court revoked his community supervision, adjudicated

him guilty of assault by impeding breathing, and sentenced him to 50 years imprisonment.

Through Cause No. 6764, it adjudicated his guilt for assault family violence and imposed

a 15-year prison term. He attacks each conviction via two issues, namely the sufficiency

of the evidence illustrating conditions of probation were violated and the propriety of

ordering the sentences to run consecutively. We affirm. Background

In April 2022, appellant pleaded guilty to both crimes for which he was ultimately

convicted. However, the trial court deferred the adjudication of his guilt in each cause

and placed him on community supervision. The State subsequently moved to adjudicate

guilt in each cause, averring multiple ways in which he violated the terms of his probation.

Upon convening separate evidentiary hearings in each case, the court found appellant

had violated several conditions of probation, granted the motions to revoke, adjudicated

appellant guilty of the respective crimes, and ultimately sentenced him as mentioned

earlier. So too did it stack appellant’s ensuing sentences.

Issues One, Two, and Three—Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his first three issues, appellant argues the trial court erred in adjudicating his

guilt since the State failed to prove he violated any condition of probation. We overrule

the issues.

When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question

before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hacker v. State, 389

S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Next, a single violation of community

supervision is sufficient to support revocation. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). So, to prevail on appeal, the appellant must successfully challenge all

findings that support the revocation order. Sharp v. State, No. 07-19-00409-CR, 2020

Tex. App. LEXIS 7124, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sep. 2, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). Garcia v. State, No. 02-15-00138-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS

716, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 26, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

2 publication); Black v. State, 411 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no

pet.).

Appellant did not challenge on appeal the trial court’s finding in Cause No. 6575

that he failed to complete his community service hours. Nor did he here contest the

finding in Cause No. 6764 that he failed to complete drug evaluations as ordered. Having

failed to challenge every finding underlying each decision to revoke community

supervision, appellant fell short of carrying his appellate burden described in Sharp.

Issue Four—Consecutive Sentences

Through his last issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in ordering his

sentences to run consecutively. That resulted in a grossly disproportionate sentence,

allegedly. We overrule the issue.

Though appellant originally moved for the sentences to run concurrently, he

eventually uttered, though legal counsel: “I would ask the Court to run these sentences

consecutively.” (Emphasis added). This came during his argument at the sentencing

hearing in Cause No. 6764. The trial court apparently acquiesced by ordering the

sentence in 6764 begin after that levied in 6575 ended. Because appellant invited the

sentence received, he cannot now complain of it. Sharp v. State, 210 S.W.3d 835, 838

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.).

Moreover, an analysis of the circumstances at bar under the standard we

described in Chappell v. State, Nos. 07-17-00151-CR, 07-17-00299-CR, 2018 Tex. App.

LEXIS 882, at *16 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 31, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) leads us to conclude that stacking the sentences did not

render the sentence grossly disproportionate. The criminal acts involved two different

3 instances of assault. So too had he previously been convicted of aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon. Stacked sentences obligating appellant to serve 65 years in prison

after committing three independent violent felonies does not evince that rare instance of

gross disproportionality. See Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Crim. App.

1984) (observing that the cumulation of sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment).

Having overruled each of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgments of the trial

court.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Do not publish.