1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JEFFERY BEADLE, Case No. 25-cv-08366-TLT
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE, PARTIALLY 9 v. GRANTING AND PARTIALLY DENYING MOTION TO AMEND 10 EDWARD BORLA, et al., COMPLAINT 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 9
12 13 Plaintiff, a prisoner at Correctional Training Facility (CTF), filed a pro se civil rights 14 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was related to 25-cv-02820-TLT, McKenzie v. Borla, 15 which raises similar or identical allegations. The complaint (Dkt. No. 8) is before the Court for 16 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the complaint is ordered 17 served on defendants Borla and Macomber. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. No. 9) 18 is partially granted and partially denied. 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Standard of Review 21 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 22 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 24 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 26 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 27 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 1 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 2 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 3 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 4 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 5 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 6 do. . .. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 7 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 8 proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. All or part 9 of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an 10 arguable basis in either law or in fact. 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 12 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 13 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 14 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give 16 leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court has discretion to 17 deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 18 repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed undue prejudice to the 19 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” 20 Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 22 The complaint names CTF Warden Edward Borla and the Secretary of the California 23 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Jefferey Macomber as defendants and 24 alleges that defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment rights by housing him in an 25 unconstitutionally small double cell with another prisoner since May 2025. 26 Plaintiff seeks damages and permanent single cell status. 27 C. Analysis 1 have the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 2 (1981). “[T]he Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 3 that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Liberally construed, plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Borla and 5 Macomber for inadequate living space. 6 D. Motion to Amend Complaint 7 Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add a retaliation claim against Officer A. Pelayo. 8 He alleges that he engaged in protected activity by refusing to be double-celled, and that Pelayo 9 retaliated against him for that activity by writing him up. Dkt. Nos. 9, 19. He was found guilty and 10 lost 60 days of credit as well as his job. He also alleges he has bilateral tinnitus and that high- 11 density housing has exacerbated this condition. 12 Plaintiff may amend his complaint to add allegations about his tinnitus as it relates to his 13 complaint about being unconstitutionally double-celled at CTF. He may not amend his complaint 14 to add a retaliation claim because he has not met the requirements for a retaliation claim. “Within 15 the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) 16 An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 17 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 18 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 19 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim because he has not adequately alleged that he 21 was engaged in protected conduct. While plaintiff alleges that being double-celled violates his 22 Constitutional rights, no court has so ruled. He does not have the legal right to refuse to follow 23 prison rules because of his untested legal theory. His conduct of refusing a housing assignment 24 was not protected conduct. See, e.g., Banks v. Pelayo, No. 120CV0117JLTPC, 2021 WL 675310, 25 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 26 120CV00117DADJLTPC, 2021 WL 1238232 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-15688, 2022 27 WL 874640 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (“While the decision to double-cell an inmate for engaging in 1 1995), a plaintiff’s refusal to accept a cellmate is not itself protected conduct within the meaning 2 of the First Amendment.”). While plaintiff’s act of filing a lawsuit or discussing his lawsuit is 3 protected conduct, plaintiff has not alleged that he was double-celled in retaliation for filing or 4 speaking about his lawsuit, rather, he has alleged that he was disciplined in retaliation for refusing 5 to double-cell.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JEFFERY BEADLE, Case No. 25-cv-08366-TLT
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE, PARTIALLY 9 v. GRANTING AND PARTIALLY DENYING MOTION TO AMEND 10 EDWARD BORLA, et al., COMPLAINT 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 9
12 13 Plaintiff, a prisoner at Correctional Training Facility (CTF), filed a pro se civil rights 14 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was related to 25-cv-02820-TLT, McKenzie v. Borla, 15 which raises similar or identical allegations. The complaint (Dkt. No. 8) is before the Court for 16 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the complaint is ordered 17 served on defendants Borla and Macomber. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. No. 9) 18 is partially granted and partially denied. 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Standard of Review 21 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 22 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 24 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 25 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 26 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 27 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 1 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are not 2 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 3 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 4 “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 5 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 6 do. . .. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 7 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 8 proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. All or part 9 of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the prisoner’s claims lack an 10 arguable basis in either law or in fact. 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 12 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 13 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 14 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 If a court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it should “freely give 16 leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A court has discretion to 17 deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 18 repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed undue prejudice to the 19 opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” 20 Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 22 The complaint names CTF Warden Edward Borla and the Secretary of the California 23 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Jefferey Macomber as defendants and 24 alleges that defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment rights by housing him in an 25 unconstitutionally small double cell with another prisoner since May 2025. 26 Plaintiff seeks damages and permanent single cell status. 27 C. Analysis 1 have the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 2 (1981). “[T]he Eighth Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 3 that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Liberally construed, plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Borla and 5 Macomber for inadequate living space. 6 D. Motion to Amend Complaint 7 Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add a retaliation claim against Officer A. Pelayo. 8 He alleges that he engaged in protected activity by refusing to be double-celled, and that Pelayo 9 retaliated against him for that activity by writing him up. Dkt. Nos. 9, 19. He was found guilty and 10 lost 60 days of credit as well as his job. He also alleges he has bilateral tinnitus and that high- 11 density housing has exacerbated this condition. 12 Plaintiff may amend his complaint to add allegations about his tinnitus as it relates to his 13 complaint about being unconstitutionally double-celled at CTF. He may not amend his complaint 14 to add a retaliation claim because he has not met the requirements for a retaliation claim. “Within 15 the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) 16 An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 17 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 18 Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 19 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 20 Plaintiff has not stated a retaliation claim because he has not adequately alleged that he 21 was engaged in protected conduct. While plaintiff alleges that being double-celled violates his 22 Constitutional rights, no court has so ruled. He does not have the legal right to refuse to follow 23 prison rules because of his untested legal theory. His conduct of refusing a housing assignment 24 was not protected conduct. See, e.g., Banks v. Pelayo, No. 120CV0117JLTPC, 2021 WL 675310, 25 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 26 120CV00117DADJLTPC, 2021 WL 1238232 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-15688, 2022 27 WL 874640 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2022) (“While the decision to double-cell an inmate for engaging in 1 1995), a plaintiff’s refusal to accept a cellmate is not itself protected conduct within the meaning 2 of the First Amendment.”). While plaintiff’s act of filing a lawsuit or discussing his lawsuit is 3 protected conduct, plaintiff has not alleged that he was double-celled in retaliation for filing or 4 speaking about his lawsuit, rather, he has alleged that he was disciplined in retaliation for refusing 5 to double-cell. He alleges that Pelayo arrived at his cell with the proposed cellmate, at which time 6 plaintiff informed Pelayo about his lawsuit, and was subsequently written up. That order of events 7 shows that Pelayo did not decide plaintiff would be assigned a cellmate in retaliation for being 8 informed of his lawsuit. Because this is not a colorable claim, plaintiff may not add it to his 9 complaint because such amendment would be futile. 10 Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to include his tinnitus allegations within 28 days 11 of the date of this order. 12 CONCLUSION 13 1. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Borla 14 and Macomber. 15 2. Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint (FAC) within 28 days of the date of 16 this order to add allegations regarding his tinnitus as it relates to his claim about being housed in 17 an unconstitutionally small cell. The FAC must include the caption and civil case number used in 18 this Order and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an 19 amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the 20 allegations he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He 21 may not incorporate material from his original complaint or petition by reference. If plaintiff does 22 not file a FAC within the designated time, his case will move forward only on the claims 23 identified in the section above titled “Plaintiff’s Claims.” 24 3. The Court ORDERS that service on the following defendants shall proceed under 25 the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) e-service program for 26 civil rights cases from prisoners in the CDCR’s custody: 27 a. Edward Borla, Warden of CTF 1 In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on the CDCR via email the 2 following documents: the operative complaint (Dkt. No. 8), this Order of Service, a CDCR Report 3 of E-Service Waiver form, and a summons. The Clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the 4 plaintiff. 5 No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on the CDCR, the CDCR shall 6 provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which 7 defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by 8 the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) and which defendant(s) decline to waive service or 9 could not be reached. The CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service 10 Waiver to the California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 days, shall file with the Court 11 a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are waiving service. 12 Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk shall prepare for each 13 defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a 14 USM-285 Form. The Clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 forms and copies 15 of this order, the summons, and the operative complaint for service upon each defendant who has 16 not waived service. The Clerk also shall provide the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E- 17 Service Waiver. 18 4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 requires defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and 20 complaint. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if defendants had been served on the 21 date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii), defendants will not be 22 required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the CDCR 23 provides a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver to the California Attorney General’s 24 Office. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 25 summons is necessary.) If defendants have not waived service and have instead been served by 26 the USMS, then defendants shall serve and file an answer within twenty-one (21) days after being 27 served with the summons and complaint. ] Civil Procedure. 2 6. Briefing is currently stayed while the Court decides whether to set a bellwether 3 case. After the Court resolves the motion to set a bellwether case, the Court will either stay the 4 || non-bellwether cases (if it grants the motion) or set a briefing schedule in each of the related cases 5 (if it denies the motion). 6 7. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants or 7 || their counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to them. 8 8. It is plaintiffs responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 9 || informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 10 || Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11, a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 11 while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 12 || address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 13 directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and (2) 14 || the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro se 3 15 || party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). a 16 10. Upona showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be 17 || granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: January 27, 2026 20 Seek A ON 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28