Jefferson v. State

• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: January 29, 2026
• Docket: 0509/24
• Status: Published

Opinion

Malik Dujuan Jefferson v. State of Maryland, Case No. 509, Sept. Term, 2024, Opinion filed on January 29, 2026, by Berger, J.

CRIMINAL LAW – DEFENSE OF OTHERS – AGGRESSION OR PROVOCATION BY PERSON CLAIMING DEFENSE A third party may intervene to defend an individual being attacked with the same level of force as the attacked individual could lawfully use in their own defense. Although one who initiates a fight is generally not entitled to claim self-defense, a non-deadly aggressor who is met with deadly force in defense may lawfully defend themselves against the deadly attack. A third party, therefore, is equally entitled to intervene to defend a non-deadly initial aggressor who is met with deadly force in response.

CRIMINAL LAW – STATEMENTS, CONFESSIONS, AND ADMISSIONS BY ACCUSED – WAIVER OF RIGHTS A criminal defendant’s waiver of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Pursuant to Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), a Miranda waiver may still be valid where a defendant is not informed of all information that may affect their decision to confess. Accordingly, law enforcement’s failure to inform a defendant of the charges lodged against them prior to obtaining a Miranda waiver does not render a waiver involuntary, provided that the defendant was aware that incriminating statements could be used against them. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. C-15-CR-22-000277

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 509

September Term, 2024 ______________________________________

MALIK DUJUAN JEFFERSON

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________

Wells, C.J., Berger, Lazerow, Alan C. (Specially Assigned),

JJ. ______________________________________

Opinion by Berger, J. ______________________________________

Filed: January 29, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.01.29 14:12:10 -05'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk On February 17, 2022, Appellant Malik Dujuan Jefferson (“Jefferson”)

accompanied Jackson Alexander Garcia (“Garcia”) to purchase marijuana from Jose

Osvaldo Genao Romero (“Genao”) in Rockville. After picking up Genao, who was

wearing a Louis Vuitton crossbody bag, from his residence, Garcia drove Jefferson and

Genao to a nearby neighborhood where an altercation ensued. As the altercation spilled

out of the vehicle and on to the street, Jefferson stood by as Garcia and Genao tussled. At

some point, Jefferson fired a single fatal shot that killed Genao. Thereafter, Jefferson and

Garcia fled the scene.

A few days later, Jefferson was arrested for first-degree murder. A Louis Vuitton

crossbody bag matching the one Genao was wearing on February 17 was recovered from

Jefferson’s bedroom. Detectives Eric Glass (“Detective Glass”) and Peter Marable

(“Detective Marable,” collectively “the Detectives”) questioned Jefferson shortly after his

arrest. The Detectives informed Jefferson that a warrant had been issued for his arrest and

indicated that they arrested Garcia the day before and wanted Jefferson’s side of the story.

During the hour-and-a-half long interview, Jefferson confessed to shooting Genao, but

stated he had only done so when it seemed like Genao was going to hurt or kill Garcia.

Jefferson also told the Detectives that he had given the firearm back to Garcia after the

shooting. It was not until after Jefferson confessed that the Detectives informed him that

he had been charged with first-degree murder.

Jefferson was tried for first-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon,

conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of

violence in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. At trial, the State urged the jury to find that Jefferson and Garcia had planned to steal marijuana from Genao and that the

subsequent homicide was both deliberate and pre-meditated. Among other things, the State

introduced into evidence, over objection, a redacted version of Jefferson’s custodial

interrogation. Additionally, over objection, the State’s firearm and toolmark examiner

testified that markings on cartridge casings and bullets test fired from the firearm recovered

from Garcia’s person upon his arrest were “consistent” with markings on the ballistics

evidence. Jefferson argued that he was acting in defense of Garcia when he shot Genao,

and requested that the trial court instruct the jury on both perfect and imperfect defense of

others. The trial court refused to give the requested instructions and the jury subsequently

returned a verdict convicting Jefferson of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in the

commission of a crime of violence, and robbery.

On appeal, Jefferson presents three questions for our review, which we have

rephrased as follows: 1 0F

I. Whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others.

1 Appellant phrased the questions as follows:

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the jury to hear Jefferson’s statements made to interrogators even though Jefferson’s waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary?

3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the State’s firearm expert to testify that firearms possess “unique” and “individual” markings, and that the 2 II. Whether the trial court erred by admitting statements made by Jefferson to police while in custody after he was read his Miranda rights, but before he was informed of the underlying charges.

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony from the State’s firearm and toolmark examiner opining that firearms possess “unique” and “individual” markings, and that the “individual marking” on evidentiary bullets and cartridge cases recovered from the crime scene were “consistent with” the “individual characteristics” of test fired bullets and cartridge cases.

For the following reasons, we shall vacate the judgments of conviction and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

The Arrest and Police Interview

On the evening of February 17, 2022, police and paramedics responded to a reported

shooting at the intersection of Bradley Avenue and Fletcher Place in Rockville. Upon

arrival, police and paramedics found Genao with gunshot wounds in his elbow and lower

abdomen. Genao was quickly transported to the hospital where he was later pronounced

dead. As police swept the scene they found, among other things, a large kitchen knife in

its sheath with Genao’s DNA on the handle, a shell casing, and blood.

“individual markings” on one bullet/casing from the test fire were consistent with the “individual characteristics” of the bullet/casing that was found at the crime scene, in violation of Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023)?

3 On February 21, 2022, the State charged Jefferson with first-degree murder for the

February 17 shooting of Genao. On February 22, 2022, Jefferson was arrested pursuant to

a warrant by Detective Rick Hillman (“Detective Hillman”). Detective Hillman informed

Jefferson that he was being arrested pursuant to a warrant, but did not inform him of the

specific charges for which he was being arrested. Jefferson asked Detective Hillman if the

warrant was “from what happened on the Metro” and Detective Hillman told him it was

not. Detective Hillman advised Jefferson that the Detectives who had obtained the warrant

would “speak with him about why he had the arrest warrant.” The rest of the ride to the

Montgomery County Police headquarters (“the station”) was silent.

Upon arriving at the station, Detective Hillman placed Jefferson in an interview

room alone. Approximately an hour-and-a-half later, Detective Glass and Detective

Marable arrived. Without advising Jefferson of the charges underlying the warrant, the

Detectives asked Jefferson biographical questions and advised him of his Miranda rights.

Jefferson stated that he understood the Miranda rights given to him and signed a form to

that effect. The Detectives then proceeded to question Jefferson about the events of

February 17, 2022. Jefferson ultimately confessed to shooting Genao after witnessing a

fight between Genao and Garcia that was getting “tragic.” Jefferson also confessed to

taking a Louis Vuitton crossbody bag that he thought may have been Garcia’s, but which

turned out to be Genao’s. It was not until after Jefferson confessed that the Detectives

informed him that he was being charged with first-degree murder.

4 Subsequently, Jefferson was indicted by the Grand Jury for Montgomery County

for first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, armed

robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

Pre-Trial Motions

Prior to trial, Jefferson moved to suppress the statements he made to the Detectives

on February 22, 2022, arguing that his Miranda waiver was not voluntary and knowing

because he had not been informed of the pending first-degree murder charge and that the

statements themselves were also involuntary. Detective Glass testified at the suppression

hearing. Jefferson elected not to testify at the hearing. The trial court summarily denied

Jefferson’s motion, finding that Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was voluntary and that “[n]one

of the Detective’s statements to [Jefferson], directly or indirectly, suggested or implied that

anything [Jefferson] might say would not be used against him.” Further, the trial court

announced that its review of the video-recorded interview led it to be satisfied that

Jefferson “fully understood the Miranda warnings and that his election to speak with

Detective Glass was a choice that he made freely, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.”

The trial court went on to note that it had also considered that Jefferson “was not yet served

with the arrest warrant or expressly advised of the serious charge that had already been

lodged against him,” but concluded that “the failure to advise [Jefferson] specifically of

the charge, while a consideration, does not, standing alone, render [Jefferson’s] statement

involuntary.”

Prior to trial, Jefferson also moved to limit the State’s firearm and toolmark

examiner’s (“the firearm examiner”) testimony. Specifically, Jefferson argued that “[t]he

5 opinion that a specific bullet or cartridge case can be ‘matched’ or ‘identified’ to a specific

gun” is “unreliable and inadmissible” under Abruquah v. State, 483 Md. 637 (2023). The

trial court granted the motion “as related to testimony that the fired ammunition matched a

particular firearm,” but denied the motion “as related to the specific use of the terms

‘unique’ or ‘individual’ when referring to particular markings.”

The Trial

At trial, precisely what happened on the evening of February 17, 2022, was subject

to dispute. Jefferson did not testify at trial. The State relied heavily on the statements that

Jefferson made during his custodial interview and footage obtained from a Ring doorbell

camera (“Ring footage”) that captured parts of the altercation. 21F

According to the State, on the evening of February 17, 2022, Garcia and Jefferson

acted on a plan to steal marijuana from Genao. Garcia picked up Jefferson near Aspen

Hill, then the two men drove to Genao’s apartment complex in Rockville. Genao came out

wearing a Louis Vuitton crossbody bag. The three men then drove a short distance to a

nearby neighborhood where, around the intersection of Fletcher Avenue and Bradley Place,

Garcia made a sharp U-turn and then stopped the vehicle. Thereafter, Garcia exited the

vehicle and Jefferson quickly followed. After briefly inspecting something near the back

license plate or bumper, Garcia and Jefferson opened the back door to the vehicle and

2 There was about a minute where there was insufficient activity to cause the motion detector of the Ring doorbell camera to work. As a result, the Ring video cut out when Jefferson and Garcia were interacting with Genao in the back seat of the vehicle and came back on to show Genao’s body on the ground in the street and Jefferson and Garcia standing over him. 6 began attacking Genao. During the tussle, either Garcia or Jefferson grabbed something

from Genao and tossed it into the front seat. The altercation eventually spilled onto the

street and Jefferson shot Genao in the elbow. After shooting Genao, Jefferson and Garcia

fled the scene and Jefferson gave the firearm to Garcia.

Defense counsel’s theory, on the other hand, was that Jefferson had acted in defense

of Garcia when he shot Genao. Defense counsel highlighted Jefferson’s custodial

statements, which were introduced into evidence. Specifically, Jefferson stated he was not

involved in the altercation between Garcia and Genao that spilled onto the street, but that

Genao shoved Jefferson when exiting the vehicle. Further, Jefferson described how the

altercation between Genao and Garcia escalated, noting that Genao “tried to slam

[Garcia’s] head on the ground” and it looked as if Genao was trying to kill Garcia.

Jefferson also indicated that Genao “had a knife on him” that he kept reaching for and that

Genao was “bigger than [Garcia].” According to Jefferson, it was only when the altercation

“was getting tragic” that he picked up Garcia’s gun, which Garcia had dropped by the

vehicle and shot Genao a single time in the elbow. Moreover, defense counsel argued that

the robbery occurred not when Jefferson and Garcia joined Genao in the back seat of the

vehicle, but after Genao had been shot when Garcia grabbed something from Genao’s

person.

The State also introduced evidence, through the testimony of its firearm examiner,

linking the firearm recovered from Garcia’s person upon his arrest to the homicide.

Specifically, the State’s firearm examiner testified, over objection, that “[a]ll firearms

possess individual markings that make it unique to that firearm” and that such “individual

7 characteristics” can “tell[] [the firearm examiner] if it’s John Doe’s gun.” The firearm

examiner went on to explain that she had fired test shots from the firearm that was

recovered from Garcia and compared the test fired cartridge cases and bullets with the

ballistics evidence. The firearm examiner then opined that the markings from the test firing

were “consistent” with the “class[] characteristics” and “individual characteristics” of the

evidence cartridge case and bullet.

Jury Instructions and the Resulting Verdict

At the close of evidence, Jefferson requested both a perfect and imperfect defense

of others instruction (collectively, “defense of others instruction”). Jefferson argued that

there was sufficient evidence to generate such instructions, including his custodial

statements that Genao tried to slam Garcia’s head on the pavement, that Genao was

reaching for his knife, that Genao was much larger than Garcia, and that Jefferson thought

Genao was going to hurt or kill Garcia.

The State opposed Jefferson’s request, arguing that, because there was insufficient

evidence for the jury to conclude that neither Garcia nor Jefferson was the initial aggressor

or that Jefferson subjectively believed Garcia was about to die, there was insufficient

evidence to generate the defense of others instruction. Jefferson countered that concluding

that a defense of others instruction was inapplicable to the facts of the case because Garcia

was the initial aggressor would require interpreting all of the evidence in the State’s favor.

Further, Jefferson argued that, even if Garcia was the initial aggressor, there was sufficient

evidence from which the jury could conclude that Genao escalated the altercation to the

deadly level.

8 The trial court agreed with the State and refused to give the defense of others

instruction. The trial court reasoned that, because Garcia and Genao were engaged in

mutual combat, which Garcia had initiated, neither defense of others instruction was

applicable to Jefferson.

Thereafter, the jury was instructed on, among other things, first-degree murder, first-

degree felony murder, and second-degree murder. While deliberating, the jury sent two

notes inquiring about the availability of lesser homicide charges. The first note asked: “Are

there any lesser homicide charges available?” The trial court responded that “[t]he

homicide charges available in case are those listed on the verdict sheet: First Degree

Murder[;] Second Degree Murder.” That same day, the jury sent a second note asking “is

homicide/killing someone in defense of another person’s life considered murder on its

own?” The trial court responded: “You must rely on the law as stated in the instructions

given.” The jury returned a verdict convicting Jefferson of second-degree murder, use of

a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and robbery. Jefferson noted a timely

appeal. We shall include additional details as necessary.

DISCUSSION

I. The trial court erred by not instructing the jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others because Jefferson adduced “some evidence” that he was acting in the defense of Garcia when he shot Genao.

On appeal, Jefferson contends that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the

jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others because his statements to the Detectives,

which were played for the jury, if believed, were sufficient to support the legal theory that

he acted in Garcia’s defense. Moreover, Jefferson asserts that the trial court’s conclusion

9 that Garcia was the initial aggressor and, as a result, a defense of others instruction was

unwarranted, improperly usurped the jury’s role as trier of fact. The State concedes that

the trial court was required to instruct the jury on perfect and imperfect defense of others

but argues that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As we shall explain,

we agree with Jefferson and the State that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on

defense of others. Further, based on our review of the record, we hold that the error was

not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A. Jefferson was entitled to a jury instruction on perfect and imperfect defense of others.

“The main purpose of jury instructions ‘is to aid the jury in clearly understanding

the case, to provide guidance for the jury’s deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a

correct verdict. Jury instructions direct the jury’s attention to the legal principles that apply

to the facts of the case.’” Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197 (2008) (quoting General v.

State, 367 Md. 475, 485 (2002)).

In criminal cases, Maryland Rule 4-325(c) (“Rule 4-325(c)) governs: “The court

may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to applicable law and the

extent to which instructions are binding. . . . The court need not grant a requested instruction

if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given.” Rule 4-325(c) has been

interpreted to require trial courts to give a requested instruction to the jury when: “(1) the

instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction is applicable to the facts of the

case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in instructions

actually given.” Dickey, 404 Md. at 197-98 (citing Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302-

10 03 (2006)). We review the trial court’s overall determination that a jury instruction is not

warranted “for an abuse of discretion, but the second requirement (whether the instruction

is applicable in that case) is akin to assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, which requires

a de novo review.” Danshin v. State, 491 Md. 520, 532 (2025) (quoting Jarvis v. State,

487 Md. 548, 564 (2024)).

Here, there is no dispute that the requested defense of others instruction was a

correct statement of law 3 that was not covered elsewhere in the instructions provided to the 2F

jury. Therefore, the only issue is whether the instruction was, in fact, applicable to the

facts adduced at trial. “In order for a jury instruction to be applicable under the facts of a

particular case, ‘[t]he requesting party must only produce “some evidence” to support the

requested instruction, and this Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the

requesting party.’” Id. at 533 (quoting Rainey v. State, 480 Md. 230, 255 (2022)). In other

3 The Supreme Court of Maryland recently recognized that there is a discrepancy between this Court’s recitation of the first element of perfect defense of others and the corresponding pattern jury instructions. Danshin, 491 Md. at 538-39. Specifically, this Court has repeatedly recited the first element as “the defendant actually believed that the person defended was in immediate and imminent danger of bodily harm” while the pattern jury instructions state “immediate or imminent.” Id. (comparing Joiner v. State, 265 Md. App. 546, 563 (2025), Dishman v. State, 118 Md. App. 360, 377 (1997), Choi v. State, 134 Md. App. 311, 326 (2000), Lee v. State, 193 Md. App. 45, 56-57 (2010), and Robinson v. State, 209 Md. App. 174, 206 (2012) with Crim. Pattern Jury Instructions 5:01 (Md. Bar. Ass’n 2024)). Because neither party in Danshin disputed that the jury instruction requested -- which was a verbatim recitation of the pattern jury instruction -- was a correct statement of the law, the Supreme Court of Maryland declined to opine on the discrepancy and instead assumed, without deciding, that the pattern jury instruction was a correct statement of law. Id. at 539 & n.13. The parties in this case do not dispute that “immediate or imminent” is a correct recitation of the first element of perfect defense of others. Therefore, we shall similarly assume, without deciding, that the pattern jury instruction requested is a correct statement of the law. 11 words, in the context of an instruction on perfect and imperfect defense of others, a

defendant need only produce “‘some evidence’ on the issue of mitigation or [defense of

others] . . . sufficient to give rise to a jury issue.” 4 Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 215 (1990) 3F

(quoting Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39-40 (1988)).

The so-called “some evidence” requirement is not a high bar. Hollins v. State, 489

Md. 296, 311 (2024) (quoting Arthur v. State, 420 Md. 512, 526 (2011)) (describing the

“some evidence” standard as a “fairly low hurdle” for a defendant). Rather, as the Supreme

Court of Maryland recently reiterated:

Some evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard. It calls for no more than what it says—“some,” as that word is understood in common, everyday usage. It need not rise to the level of “beyond a reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or “preponderance.” The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the defendant. It is of no matter that the [defense of others] claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support [the defendant’s] claim that [they] acted in [defense of others], the defendant has met [their] burden.

Danshin, 491 Md. at 533 (quoting Dykes, 319 Md. at 216-17) (emphasis in original).

“Some evidence” of each element of a defense is required “for a defendant to be entitled

to have the jury so instructed.” Id. (citing Jarvis, 487 Md. at 564). We, therefore, must

4 In assessing whether sufficient evidence has been adduced to generate a defense of others instruction, Maryland courts are guided by the same analysis employed in self- defense cases. See, e.g., Danshin, 491 Md. at 541-50 (analyzing whether some evidence as to each element of the defense of others defense was adduced using both self-defense and defense of others cases as guidance); Lee, 193 Md. App. at 59 (explaining that Maryland generally follows the common law rule, which allowed a third person to intervene and defend another using “the same degree and character of force that the one attacked could have used”). 12 determine whether “some evidence” of each element of the defense of others defense was

adduced at trial.

1. The elements of a defense of others defense

Defense of others can be either perfect or imperfect. Lee, 193 Md. App. at 59-60.

The former is a complete defense, which results in acquittal. Id. The latter, however, is

only a partial defense which mitigates murder to manslaughter. Id. To generate a perfect

defense of others instruction, the defendant must produce “some evidence” to support each

of the following:

(1) the defendant actually believed that the person defended was in immediate [or] imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm;

(2) the defendant’s belief was reasonable;

(3) the defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend the person defended in light of the threatened or actual force; and,

(4) the defendant’s purpose in using force was to aid the person defended.

Choi, 134 Md. App. at 326 (citation omitted). Conversely, where a defendant shows that

they “held an actual belief that [they] had to use force to defend another,” an imperfect

defense of others instruction is generated, even if the defendant’s “belief was not

objectively reasonable and/or the level of force [the defendant] used was not objectively

reasonable.” Lee, 193 Md. App. at 59 (citation omitted). We conclude that there was

“some evidence” of each element so as to generate a defense of others instruction.

13 First, there was sufficient evidence which, if believed, could have led the jury to

find that Jefferson, either reasonably or unreasonably, believed that Garcia was in

immediate or imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Indeed, the jury heard

Jefferson’s statements to the Detectives after his arrest in which he explained what had

happened. For example, Jefferson told the Detectives that Genao “shoved [Garcia] down,

like, tried to slam his head on the ground.” Further, Jefferson stated that the fight “didn’t

look like -- it wasn’t like a regular fight, it looked like [Genao] was trying to hurt [Garcia],”

or kill him. Jefferson also indicated that the fight seemed “like[] it was getting tragic” and

that it appeared to be “the fight of [Garcia’s] life.” Moreover, the jury heard that Genao

was much bigger than Garcia and that Genao had a large kitchen knife on him, which he

kept reaching for. Finally, the jury saw evidence that a kitchen knife in its sheath, which

had Genao’s DNA on the handle was recovered at the scene. Such evidence satisfies the

“some evidence” requirement.

Second, the jury could have concluded that Jefferson used either a reasonable or

unreasonable level of force against Genao. Indeed, the jury was presented with evidence

that Genao had a large kitchen knife on him, that Genao was trying to “slam [Garcia’s]

head on the ground,” and that Jefferson thought the fight between Genao and Garcia “was

getting tragic.” There was, therefore, sufficient evidence of the third element of defense

of others to generate the requested jury instruction.

Third, and finally, the jury heard Jefferson’s statement to the Detectives that he only

took Genao’s Louis Vuitton crossbody bag because he thought it belonged to Garcia and

that he never intended to rob Genao. This statement, along with those outlined above,

14 provided sufficient evidence to support Jefferson’s claim that his purpose for using force

against Genao was to aid Garcia, rather than to complete a robbery.

2. The innocent party requirement

In addition to the four elements outlined above, a defendant requesting either a

perfect or imperfect defense of others instruction must also adduce evidence that the person

on whose behalf they intervened was an innocent party; that is that the person defended

was “not the initial deadly aggressor or the person who escalated the [confrontation] to the

deadly level.” Lee, 193 Md. App. at 58 n.8 (citation omitted) (discussing this requirement

in the self-defense context). On appeal, Jefferson contends that whether Garcia was the

initial aggressor and whether Genao escalated the confrontation to the deadly force level

were questions for the jury, and that the trial court erred in resolving those factual issues in

the State’s favor. The State agrees with Jefferson that it was the jury’s role to resolve the

factual discrepancies. We agree with Jefferson and the State and conclude that the trial

court erroneously usurped the jury’s role as factfinder.

At trial, there was significant disagreement over whether Jefferson was legally

entitled to intervene to defend Garcia. The State argued that the requested defense of others

instruction was inapplicable because Garcia was the initial aggressor. The State’s theory

was that the Ring footage suggested that Garcia initiated the altercation by robbing Genao

in the back seat of the vehicle. The State, therefore, reasoned that Jefferson was not legally

entitled to a defense of others instruction. Jefferson countered that his statements to the

Detectives supported the theory that Genao escalated the confrontation from non-deadly to

deadly force by trying “to slam [Garcia’s] head on the ground” and “reaching for” his knife.

15 Because of this escalation, Jefferson reasoned that he was entitled to intervene. Moreover,

Jefferson argued that whether Garcia was the initial aggressor was an issue of fact for the

jury -- not the court -- to decide. The trial court was not persuaded that Jefferson regained

the defense when Genao escalated the fight to the deadly force level and instead agreed

with the State that Jefferson was not entitled to the requested defense of others instruction.

The trial court reasoned that, because Garcia was the initial aggressor and was engaged in

mutual combat, Jefferson was not entitled to choose a side and intervene. 5 4F

Maryland courts have frequently held that a third party may intervene to defend

persons being attacked “in such a manner that [they] could properly have defended

[themselves] by the use of force.” See, e.g., Tipton v. State, 1 Md. App. 556, 560 (1967).

That is, if a defendant intervenes on behalf of a person knowing that person would not be

5 As Jefferson correctly points out, the trial court initially relied on law that was not adopted by the Supreme Court when discussing whether Jefferson was entitled to the defense of others instruction. Indeed, the trial court extensively discussed Belton v. State for the proposition that:

if two are engaged unlawfully in a mutual fight (deadly or nondeadly) the law does not authorize anyone (close relative or stranger) to take sides in the contest and aid in the effort to overcome his adversary . . . [o]bviously, the law does not authorize anyone to join forces with the offender and aid in harming the innocent victim.

253 Md. App. 403, 426 (2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 483 Md. 523 (2023). After a brief recess, and prior to deciding whether to grant the defense of others instruction, counsel and the trial court realized their misguided reliance and noted the Supreme Court of Maryland’s express mandate that this Court’s discussion of defense of others in Belton “not be cited as authoritative in future cases.” Belton, 483 Md. at 557. Although, as we explain, the trial court erred by refusing to give the requested defense of others instruction, we note that the trial court did not, in fact, rely on Belton in so doing. 16 entitled to act in self-defense, then the defendant is not entitled to claim defense of others.

See, e.g., id. Although one who initiates a fight is generally not entitled to claim self-

defense, our Court has held that “[a] nondeadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an

encounter, using only his fists or some nondeadly weapon) who is met with deadly force

in defense may justifiably defend himself against the deadly attack. This is so because the

aggressor’s victim, by using deadly force against nondeadly aggression, uses unlawful

force.” Watkins v. State, 79 Md. App. 136, 139 (1989) (citation omitted); see also Tipton,

1 Md. App. at 560. As a result, even if Garcia was the initial aggressor at the non-deadly

level, if Genao escalated the fight to deadly force, Jefferson would have been entitled to

intervene.

Moreover, the questions of whether Garcia was the initial aggressor and whether

Genao escalated the fight to the level of deadly force were questions of fact squarely within

the jury’s role as factfinder to resolve. Indeed, “[f]rom time immemorial, the assessment

of testimonial credibility has always been the fundamental responsibility of the factfinder,

jury or trial judge, as a matter of fact.” Rothe v. State, 242 Md. App. 272, 283 (2019). As

discussed supra, there was “some evidence” which, if believed, could lead the jury to

conclude that Genao escalated the fight to the deadly force level.

Further, there was “some evidence” that it was Genao who was the initial aggressor.

To be sure, Jefferson told the Detectives that he and Garcia drove to purchase marijuana

from Genao and then the three men drove to another location. Jefferson did not explain

how or why he and Garcia joined Genao in the back seat of the vehicle but stated that

Genao “didn’t have what [Garcia] needed. I guess [Genao] thought [Garcia] was trying to

17 finesse him[.]” Jefferson then stated that Garcia and Genao were “fussing” and Genao’s

“telling [Garcia] this and that. And then I think [Genao] hit [Garcia] and [Garcia] hit him

back.”

Ultimately, it was for the jury -- not the trial court -- to determine whether to credit

Jefferson’s version of events. As explained supra, the “some evidence” requirement is a

low hurdle and the evidence can come solely from the defendant’s statements. Whether

Jefferson’s statements were contradicted by other evidence is irrelevant. If the jury

believed Jefferson’s version of events, it could have concluded that Genao, not Garcia, was

the initial aggressor. By refusing to give the defense of others instruction, the trial court

usurped the jury’s role as factfinder and instead resolved all factual inferences in favor of

the State. Because Jefferson satisfied the “some evidence” requirement, he was entitled to

a defense of others instruction that would allow the jury, not the court, to resolve the factual

discrepancies.

B. The trial court’s error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Having concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested defense

of others instruction, we now turn to whether such error was harmless. When, in a criminal

case, an appellant establishes error, we must reverse unless we are satisfied, “upon [our]

own independent review of the record,” that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Dionas v. State, 436 Md. 97, 108 (2013) (quoting Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638,

659 (1976)). An error is harmless if it “in no way influenced the verdict” and “there is no

reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of . . . contributed to the rendition of a

guilty verdict.” Id. (quoting Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659). Once an error has been established,

18 “the burden is on the State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and did not influence the outcome of the case.” Gonzalez v. State, 487 Md. 136, 184 (2024)

(quoting Perez v. State, 420 Md. 57, 66 (2011)).

The State asks us to make multiple inferences as to which version of facts the jury

credited in reaching its verdict. The State argues that, to reconcile the jury’s verdict with

the evidence, there can only be one factual scenario related to the robbery: that Jefferson

and Garcia instigated the confrontation by robbing Genao in the back seat of the vehicle

before the shooting. The jury acquitted Jefferson of first-degree murder, 6 robbery with a 5F

dangerous weapon (“armed robbery”), and conspiracy to commit armed robbery and

convicted him of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in a crime of violence, and

unarmed robbery. The State contends that, because robbery requires a finding that the

subject property was taken by force or threat, there are only two factual scenarios that

would support the robbery conviction.

The first scenario the State cites is the struggle in the back seat of the vehicle. The

jury saw a video at trial which the State characterized as showing Jefferson and Garcia

grabbing something from Genao and tossing it onto the front seat. The second possibility

that the State outlines arises from Jefferson’s statement to the Detectives that he saw the

Louis Vuitton crossbody bag in the vehicle after the shooting, thought it might belong to

Garcia, and took it. With the latter possibility, the State asserts that the only force possible

6 The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, and second-degree murder. The verdict sheet, however, listed only first-degree and second- degree murder. 19 would be the shooting. According to the State, had the jury credited the second factual

scenario when concluding that Jefferson was guilty of robbery, it would have convicted

him of armed robbery -- a charge to which Jefferson was acquitted. The State, therefore,

reasons that the only way to reconcile the evidence with the jury’s verdict is to conclude

that the jury must have credited the first scenario and found that Jefferson and Garcia

committed an unarmed robbery of Genao in the back seat of the vehicle before the

altercation spilled out onto the street. In such a case, the State asserts, the jury necessarily

concluded that Jefferson and Garcia were the initial aggressors. Because the jury

concluded that Garcia and Jefferson were the initial aggressors, the State contends, the

defense of others instruction would have been inapplicable to Jefferson. Accordingly, the

trial court’s erroneous refusal to give such instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

Jefferson counters that the State’s attempt to decipher the jury’s factual conclusions

related to the robbery conviction based on its verdicts on other counts is pure speculation

that should be rejected. Moreover, Jefferson argues that the State fails to exclude, beyond

a reasonable doubt, a third factual scenario, namely that the jury convicted Jefferson of

afterthought robbery. Jefferson reasons that the jury was presented with evidence from

which it could have determined that the robbery occurred when Garcia forcibly took

Genao’s bag from his person after Genao was shot. This scenario, unlike either of the

State’s purported scenarios, Jefferson argues, is consistent with the jury’s acquittal of first-

degree felony murder. Jefferson, therefore, asserts that the State has failed to carry its

20 burden of proving that the trial court’s erroneous refusal to give the requested defense of

others instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We decline the State’s invitation to speculate as to which factual conclusions the

jury accepted. Rather, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the jury could

have concluded that the robbery occurred after Genao was shot. 7 In such a case, the trial 6F

court’s error may well have affected the verdict because the jury could have found that

defense of others was applicable. Indeed, the jury’s notes during deliberation underscore

this conclusion. 8 The jury sent two notes relevant to our analysis here. First, the jury sent 7F

a note asking “[a]re there any lesser homicide charges available?” Next, the jury sent a

note asking, “is homicide/killing someone in defense of another person’s life considered

murder on its own?” Both notes indicate that the omission of the requested defense of

others instruction may well have affected the jury’s verdict. We, therefore, conclude that

the trial court’s refusal to give the requested defense of others instruction was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Because we conclude that there is a third possible robbery scenario to which defense

of others would undoubtedly apply, we decline to address the State’s attempt to establish a

7 The State argues that there is no evidence to support the possibility that the jury convicted Jefferson of afterthought robbery because it was Garcia -- not Jefferson -- who took Genao’s bag from his person after the shooting. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the jury was instructed on accomplice liability and under such a theory, the jury may well have concluded that Jefferson was guilty of afterthought robbery. 8 “[T]he jury’s behavior during deliberations,” including “jury notes sent over the course of the jury’s deliberations,” are “a relevant factor in the harmless error analysis.” Dionas, 436 Md. at 111 (citing Hunter v. State, 397 Md. 580, 596-97 (2007)). 21 per se rule that defense of others is unavailable to the instigator of a felony. Notably,

however, the cases on which the State relies for this proposition are readily distinguishable

from the present case.

Generally, “any act of the accused in violation of law and reasonably calculated to

produce the occasion amounts to bringing on the difficulty and bars [the accused’s] right

to assert self-defense [or defense of others] as a justification or excuse for a homicide.”

Street v. State, 26 Md. App. 336, 340 (1975) (quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law &

Procedure, 501 § 229 (12th ed. R. Anderson 1957)). We have stated, however, that “[a]

nondeadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an encounter, using only [their] fists or some

nondeadly weapon) who is met with deadly force in defense may justifiably defend

[themself] against the attack. This is so because the aggressor’s victim, by using deadly

force against nondeadly aggression, uses unlawful force.” Watkins, 79 Md. App. at 139.

The State argues that our cases have held that this exception does not apply to defendants

who instigated a felony.

The State first cites Street v. State for the proposition that “the claim of self-defense

[is] unavailable to [a defendant] as a matter of law [if the defendant] was an aggressor

engaged in the perpetration of a robbery.” 26 Md. App. at 339-40. In Street, we concluded

that self-defense was inapplicable to the defendant’s first-degree murder charge where the

defendant had robbed the victim at gunpoint prior to shooting the victim. Id. at 337-41.

The only evidence that the defendant had acted in self-defense was: (1) the defendant’s

statement that he shot the victim because the victim “had pulled out some scissors on him,”

and (2) “[a] pair of scissors [] found with the victim’s clothing.” Id. at 337-38. In Street,

22 therefore, the defendant was not a nondeadly aggressor because he initiated the altercation

with a gun. In the present case, however, there is some evidence that, if Garcia was the

initial aggressor, he was a nondeadly aggressor using only his fists. Street, therefore, does

not preclude the possibility that defense of others was available to Jefferson even if the jury

concluded that Garcia was the initial aggressor.

The State next cites Nicholson v. State, a case in which we held that the failure to

give a self-defense instruction was harmless error “[b]ecause the jury was not permitted to

acquit [the defendant] of second-degree felony murder on the basis of self-defense.” 239

Md. App. 228, 243-45 (2018). In so holding, we noted the well-established law “that self-

defense is not a defense to felony murder.” Id. at 245 (quoting Sutton v. State, 139 Md.

App. 412, 454 (2001)). Nicholson, however, is inapposite here because, as Jefferson

correctly points out, he was acquitted of first-degree felony murder.

Finally, the State cites Sutton v. State and Marquardt v. State for the proposition

that a robber is not permitted to use deadly force to protect himself (or, by extension, others)

from a victim who resists the robbery. In Sutton, we affirmed the trial court’s decision to

instruct the jury that self-defense was applicable to the charge of first-degree assault, but

not to felony murder. 139 Md. App. at 453. Although we rejected the argument that “the

use of any force by the victim[s] in a robbery to protect [themselves] would now make the

victim[s] the aggressor,” we did so within the context of a felony murder charge. Id. at

454. Indeed, we underscored that “[i]t has been established that self-defense is not a

defense to felony murder.” Id. at 454 (citing Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 429 (2000)).

Because Jefferson was acquitted of felony murder, Sutton is also inapposite.

23 Marquardt is also distinguishable, but for a different reason. In Marquardt, we

concluded that the defendant, who admitted to breaking into the victim’s apartment with a

baseball bat, was not entitled to a self-defense instruction related to his second-degree

assault charge. 164 Md. App. 95, 140 (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by,

Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1 (2020). In that case, the defendant claimed he hit the victim

with the baseball bat after the victim “ran at him, cursing,” with what appeared to be a

knife. Id. at 139. We explained that it was the victim -- not the defendant -- “who was

entitled to defend himself,” reasoning that, “even at the deadly force level . . . there is no

duty to retreat if one is attacked in [their] own home.” Id. at 140 (quoting Redcross v.

State, 121 Md. App. 320, 328 n.4 (1998)). In Marquardt, therefore, the victim was acting

with lawful force when he came running at the defendant with what appeared to be a knife.

In the present case, however, there was some evidence from which the jury could

infer that Genao escalated the altercation by using unlawful deadly force. Accordingly,

based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court’s error in refusing to give

the requested defenses of others instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. The trial court did not err by admitting statements Jefferson made during a custodial interrogation because Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was valid.

To provide guidance to the trial court on remand, we now turn to the issue of

whether the Detectives’ failure to inform Jefferson that he had been charged with first-

degree murder rendered his waiver of his Miranda rights invalid. Jefferson contends that,

because he was not advised that he had been charged with first-degree murder, his Miranda

waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Jefferson reasons that, without

24 knowing the charges lodged against him, his purported waiver was made without full

knowledge of the nature of his circumstances and the consequences of his waiver. Further,

Jefferson asserts that the officers violated Maryland Rule 4-212(e) 9 by failing to inform 8F

him of the charges against him, and that such a violation should be a weighty factor in the

voluntariness analysis. 10 The State counters that whether Jefferson knew of the nature of 9F

9 Maryland Rule 4-212(e) provides:

(e) Execution of Warrant -- Defendant Not in Custody. Unless the defendant is in custody, a warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendant. Unless the warrant and charging document are served at the time of the arrest, the officer shall inform the defendant of the nature of the offense charged and the fact that a warrant has been issued. A copy of the warrant and charging document shall be served on the defendant promptly after the arrest. The defendant shall be taken before a judicial officer of the District Court without unnecessary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest or, if the warrant so specifies, before a judicial officer of the circuit court without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the next session of court after the date of arrest. The court shall process the defendant pursuant to Rule 4-216, 4-216.1, or 4-216.2 and may make provision for the appearance or waiver of counsel pursuant to Rule 4-215. 10 In his reply brief, Jefferson urges us to adopt a per se rule excluding all custodial statements of defendants who have already been charged but who have not yet been informed of what those charges are. Jefferson reasons that such custodial statements are obtained in violation of Maryland Rule 4-212(e). Further, Jefferson contends that, though promptly superseded by statute, the reasoning employed in Johnson related to the prompt presentment requirement, now embodied in the latter half of Rule 4-212(e), warrants such a per se exclusionary rule. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314 (1978), superseded by statute, MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-912, as recognized in, Young v. State, 68 Md. App. 121 (1986). Because Jefferson raised this argument for the first time in his reply brief, we decline to consider it. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 713 (2004) (“[A]n appellate court ordinarily will not consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). Our conclusion, however, does not preclude Jefferson from timely raising this argument on remand. 25 the charges against him is irrelevant to the voluntariness of his Miranda waiver. Because

Jefferson does not allege that police engaged in any intimidation, coercion, or deception,

the State asserts Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary. We agree with

the State that Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was valid, and, therefore, conclude that the trial

court did not err in admitting Jefferson’s custodial statements.

Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is confined “to what

occurred at the suppression hearing. We view the evidence and inferences that may be

reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion,

here, the State.” Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 647 (2012) (quoting Lee v. State, 418

Md. 136, 148 (2011)). We uphold the motion court’s factual findings “unless they are

shown to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 148). “We, however, make

our own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the relevant law and applying

it to the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id. at 648 (quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 148-49).

A criminal defendant’s confession made during a custodial interrogation is

inadmissible “unless a law enforcement officer properly advised the defendant of the

defendant’s rights under Miranda and the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived those rights.” Madrid v. State, 474 Md. 273, 310 (2021) (citing

Gonzalez, 429 Md. at 637). The inquiry into whether a Miranda waiver is valid has “two

distinct dimensions”:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the

26 consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.

Gonzalez, 429 Md. at 651-52 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). The

totality of the circumstances approach

requires an examination of “all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including the individual’s “age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether [the individual] has the capacity to understand the warnings given [to them], the nature of [their] Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”

Id. at 652 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)).

Jefferson does not contend that his waiver was the product of intimidation, coercion,

or deception. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the second dimension of the Miranda

waiver analysis, namely whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”

Id. (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421).

“[A] valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information

‘useful’ in making [their] decision or all information that ‘might . . . affect[t] [their]

decision to confess.’” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987) (quoting Moran, 475

U.S. at 422) (third alteration in original). Indeed, in Spring, the United States Supreme

Court rejected the defendant’s claim that his Miranda waiver was invalid because law

enforcement failed to inform during an interview about firearms violations that they would

also question him about a homicide. Id. at 566-69.

27 The Court in Spring explained that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was “knowingly

and intelligently made” because he “understood that he had the right to remain silent and

that anything he said could be used as evidence against him.” Id. at 574. Knowledge of

the consequence of not remaining silent -- that is that any statements made could be used

against the defendant -- was sufficient to constitute a knowing waiver within the meaning

of Miranda. Id. To be sure, the Court went on to state: “The Constitution does not require

that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a [Miranda]

waiver[.]” Id. (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 422). Rather, “additional information could

affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing

nature.” Id. at 577. 11 10F

In Alston, we had occasion to apply the Supreme Court’s holding in Spring.

Alston v. State, 89 Md. App. 178, 182-85 (1991). There, officers initiated questioning

about robberies in Anne Arundel County after obtaining a Miranda waiver from the

defendant. Id. at 184. During the interrogation, however, the officers began questioning

the defendant about a robbery in Baltimore County. Id. The defendant admitted that he

11 The Supreme Court did note, however, that “[i]n certain circumstances, the Court has found affirmative misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. at 576 n.8 (citations omitted). Because the Court was “not confronted with an affirmative misrepresentation by law enforcement officials as to the scope of the interrogation,” the Court declined to “reach the question whether a waiver of Miranda rights would be valid in such a circumstance.” Id. Here, Jefferson does not contend that the Detectives’ failure to inform him of the first-degree murder charge lodged against him prior to securing his Miranda waiver was an affirmative misrepresentation as to the scope of the interrogation. Accordingly, we express no opinion regarding whether a Miranda waiver would be invalid in the face of such an affirmative misrepresentation by law enforcement. 28 was involved in the Baltimore County robbery “and signed a statement to that effect.” Id.

On appeal, the defendant argued that his Miranda waiver was invalid because the officers

failed to inform him of the “full scope of interrogation” at the outset. Id. at 182. Applying

the Supreme Court’s holding in Spring, we rejected the defendant’s argument, reasoning

that “the question whether [a defendant] knew of all of the subjects about which [they were]

to be questioned is irrelevant to the question of whether [their] Miranda waiver was made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. at 184.

Similarly, in Ratchford, we rejected the defendant’s argument that his Miranda

waiver was invalid because officers did not inform him, prior to obtaining the waiver, that

the subject of the questioning was a triple homicide. Ratchford v. State, 141 Md. App. 354,

365 (2001). Citing Spring, we reasoned that “[t]he law . . . does not compel such an

advisement.” Id.

Jefferson’s attempts to differentiate Spring, Ratchford, and Alston are unavailing.

Jefferson argues that, because he had already been charged with first-degree murder at the

time of the interrogation, the Detectives’ failure to inform him of the charges against him

is relevant to the voluntariness inquiry. Although, as a factual matter, Jefferson is correct

that the interrogations in Spring and Ratchford occurred prior to the respective defendants

being charged, the timing of the interrogation was not critical to the holding in either case.

Rather, the animating principle in Spring, which we were guided by in Ratchford and

Alston, was precisely which potential consequences for which a defendant must be aware

in order for their Miranda waiver to be valid. See Spring, 479 U.S. at 574. The Court in

Spring concluded that knowledge of the consequence that flows from making incriminating

29 statements, that is, that such statements may be used against the defendant, was sufficient.

Id.

Jefferson further argues that Alston is distinguishable because the issue here is not

whether Jefferson knew the “full scope” of the interrogation. Instead, Jefferson contends

that he was never told a critical fact underlying the interrogation -- that there was a pending

first-degree murder charge against him. In Alston, however, our conclusion that the

defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid was not dependent on the fact that he had been told

some, but not all, of the potential subjects of the interrogation. See Alston, 89 Md. App. at

182-85. Rather, we explained that:

Miranda specifically require[s] that the police inform a criminal suspect that [they] ha[ve] the right to remain silent and that anything [they] say[] may be used against [them]. There is no qualification of this broad and explicit warning. The warning, as formulated in Miranda, conveys to a suspect the nature of [their] constitutional privilege and the consequences of abandoning it.

Id. at 184 (quoting Spring, 479 U.S. at 577). Our conclusion in Alston, therefore, was again

premised on the defendant’s knowledge that making incriminating statements could lead

to those statements being used against him.

Here, Jefferson does not claim -- nor could he -- that he was not aware that his

incriminating statements could be used against him. The trial court denied Jefferson’s

motion to suppress, stating that “[n]one of the Detective’s statements to [Jefferson],

directly or indirectly, suggested or implied that anything [Jefferson] might say would not

be used against him.” In “[r]eviewing the totality of the warnings and the circumstances

30 of the interrogation,” to determine whether Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was valid, the trial

court explained:

In this case the court had the benefit of watching the video- recorded interview and observed the non-coercive and non- deceptive tactics employed by the experienced detective. The court also observed the level of comprehension and understanding exhibited by [Jefferson], who remained calm and collected throughout the interrogation. The court finds that [Jefferson] fully understood the Miranda warnings and that his election to speak with Detective Glass was a choice that he made freely, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.

The trial court went on to note that the failure to advise Jefferson, standing alone, did not

render his Miranda waiver involuntary.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the trial court’s factual findings

were not clearly erroneous. The time between Jefferson’s arrest and the subject interview

was less than two hours. After asking Jefferson a series of biographical questions, the

Detectives proceeded to secure Jefferson’s Miranda waiver. Jefferson was 23 years old at

the time of the interrogation and had obtained a GED. Detective Glass read Jefferson’s

Miranda rights from a form and confirmed after each right that Jefferson understood. At

the end of his recitation of the Miranda rights, Detective Glass again asked Jefferson if he

understood his rights and Jefferson responded in the affirmative. Jefferson then signed the

form confirming he understood his Miranda rights. Thereafter, Detective Glass began

questioning Jefferson about the events of February 17, 2022. During the interview, the

Detectives asked Jefferson multiple times if he needed any water. It was not until the end

of the hour-and-a-half interrogation -- and after Jefferson had confessed to shooting

31 Genao -- that Detective Glass informed Jefferson he had been charged with first-degree

murder.

The mere fact that Jefferson was unaware of the pending first-degree murder

charges is not dispositive in our analysis of whether Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was valid.

The record demonstrates that Jefferson was aware of the nature of his Miranda rights and

waived them knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily with an understanding of the

consequences of waiving those rights, namely that his incriminating statements could be

used against him. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting

Jefferson’s custodial statements to the detectives.

III. Any error in admitting testimony from the State’s firearm and toolmark examiner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, to provide guidance to the trial court on remand, we address whether it was

an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit certain portions of the State’s firearm

and toolmark examiner’s (“the firearm examiner”) expert testimony. Jefferson contends

that the firearm examiner’s testimony was the functional equivalent of “unqualified

testimony of a match between a particular firearm and a particular crime scene bullet,”

which the Supreme Court of Maryland expressly disavowed in Abruquah v. State, 483 Md.

637, 695 (2023).

Specifically, Jefferson takes issue with the firearm examiner’s testimony that “[a]ll

firearms possess individual markings that make it unique to that firearm” and that such

markings on the ballistics evidence were consistent with such markings on the test fired

cartridge cases and bullets. The State counters that the firearm examiner’s testimony was

32 precisely the type of testimony that the Supreme Court of Maryland held was permissible

in Arbuquah. Moreover, the State contends that, even if the trial court erred in admitting

the firearm examiner’s testimony, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the jury was informed of Jefferson’s admission that he shot Genao and gave the

gun to Garcia.

Assuming, without deciding, that the challenged expert testimony from the State’s

firearm examiner was the functional equivalent of the type of testimony rejected in

Abruquah, we conclude that such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed,

unlike the testimony in Abruquah -- which “was the only direct evidence before the jury

linking Abruquah’s gun to the crime” -- the jury in the present case was presented with

Jefferson’s admission that he shot Geano and subsequently gave the gun to Garcia. Id. at

697. In such circumstances, we are satisfied that any error in not limiting the firearm

examiner’s testimony did not affect the jury’s verdict and, therefore, was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. 12 11F

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct

the jury on both perfect and imperfect defense of others because there was “some evidence”

to generate such instructions. We further hold that the error in failing to instruct the jury

on both perfect and imperfect defense of others was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. In addition, we conclude that Jefferson’s Miranda waiver was valid and the trial

12 Of course, if the evidence at retrial is different than what is before us, the trial court can and should revisit this issue. 33 court did not err in admitting his custodial statements. Finally, we hold that any error in

admitting testimony from the State’s firearm and toolmark examiner regarding the

consistency between the “unique” and “individual” markings on the test fired cartridge

casings and bullets and the “unique” and “individual” markings on the ballistics evidence

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We, therefore, vacate the judgments of the trial

court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY VACATED. CASE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. COSTS TO BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.