Jefferson v. Larkin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Jefferson v. Larkin

40 A.D.2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d 673, 1972 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3942

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 7, 1972

StatusPublished

This text of 40 A.D.2d 604 (Jefferson v. Larkin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Jefferson v. Larkin, 40 A.D.2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d 673, 1972 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3942 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972).

Pincite

Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to sections 330 and 333 of the Election Law, petitioner appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated August 14, 1972, as granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that petitioner had failed timely to join an unsuccessful candidate. Judgment, insofar as appealed from, reversed on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to the Special Term for a hearing on the merits.' The questions of fact have not been considered. In our opinion, Special Term had plenary jurisdiction and should have conducted a hearing on the merits. Respondents’ motion to dismiss should have been denied and the motion for leave to intervene granted. Rabin, P. J., Hopkins, Munder, Shapiro and Christ, JJ., concur.

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In a proceeding pursuant to sections 330 and 333 of the Election Law, petitioner appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated August 14, 1972, as granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that petitioner had failed timely to join an unsuccessful candidate. Judgment, insofar as appealed from, reversed on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to the Special Term for a hearing on the merits.' The questions of fact have not been considered. In our opinion, Special Term had plenary jurisdiction and should have conducted a hearing on the merits. Respondents’ motion to dismiss should have been denied and the motion for leave to intervene granted. Rabin, P. J., Hopkins, Munder, Shapiro and Christ, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

40 A.D.2d 604, 335 N.Y.S.2d 673, 1972 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3942, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jefferson-v-larkin-nyappdiv-1972.