Jefferson v. Douglas

493 F. Supp. 13, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11086
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedJuly 12, 1979
DocketCIV-79-303-D
StatusPublished

This text of 493 F. Supp. 13 (Jefferson v. Douglas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jefferson v. Douglas, 493 F. Supp. 13, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11086 (W.D. Okla. 1979).

Opinion

ORDER

DAUGHERTY, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Lexington Assessment and Reception Center (LARC) in Lexington, Oklahoma, brings this pro se action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that the above-named Defendants while acting under color of state law deprived him of certain of his civil rights while he was incarcerated in LARC.

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth three counts:

I. “Defendant Smith violated my Constitutional rights by cancelling my limited canteen order, apparently using her authority arbitrarily without any real concern for my health, causing me cruel unsual [sic] punishment.” (Emphasis in original.)

Plaintiff alleges that he is a diabetic and needs some kind of sugar substance within reach or on his person at all times to prevent a possible diabetic coma when his blood sugar is low; that on February 23, 1979 Defendant Rita Smith, the correctional officer responsible for security over the food services at LARC, arbitrarily cancelled his canteen order of limited items without concern for his health needs; that by cancelling his orders, Defendant Smith is preventing him from getting a product that could possibly save his life; that as the institutional rules do not permit an inmate to have sugar in his cell or on his person, the only way he can be sure of having a sugar substance on hand is to buy it from the canteen; and that Defendant Smith overstepped her bounds as she is neither a medical doctor nor is she working at the LARC canteen.

II. “Defendant Smith further violated my Constitutional rights by restricting my purchase of limited food items, preventing me from getting a needed sugar substance, creating a situation of cruel and unsual [sic] punishment. Also she showed discrimination against me by singling me out for punishment.”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Smith has created a situation where if he tries to buy a sugar substance he is subject to being charged with an institutional violation of “disobeying a direct order” and that on February 6, 1979 Defendant Smith singled him out and cursed him. Plaintiff claims that this situation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because of the severe mental anguish he is suffering and that his faith in Defendant Smith has been clearly shaken.

*15 III. “Defendant Stites violated my Constitutional rights by denying me medical attention when I consulted him about my sugar intake, causing me mental anguish.”

Plaintiff alleges that he went to Defendant Ronald Stites, a physician at LARC, to ask his direction with regard to what items he would be allowed to purchase; that Defendant Stites refused to exercise his authority as a medical doctor and give him a list of items he could buy; and that the only way he could purchase an item was with a list from the doctor. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Stites’ refusal to give him this information participated in causing him cruel and unusual punishment and increased his mental anguish.

Plaintiff seeks relief herein in the nature of injunctive relief and damages.

After allowing Plaintiff to file his Complaint in this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court entered an Order directing the prison authorities responsible for the Lexington institution to undertake a review of the subject matter of Plaintiff’s Complaint and to file with the Court a written report of their review. The purpose of this procedure was to develop an administrative record by which the Court could determine preliminary issues, including those of jurisdiction and frivolity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (Tenth Cir. 1978); also Robinson v. Benton, 579 F.2d 70 (Tenth Cir. 1978); Martinez v. Chavez, 574 F.2d 1043 (Tenth Cir. 1978).

The Court now has before it Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants’ Answer thereto, Plaintiff’s Traverse to Answer, a written report of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’ review into the subject matter of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and Plaintiff’s Response In Answer to Special Report Review.

In their Answer, Defendants admit that the Plaintiff has a diagnosed diabetic condition; that he is under the supervision and care of the LARC medical staff and is on a controlled diet prescribed by LARC medical personnel; that his canteen privileges have been cancelled; that Defendant Smith has on occasion advised the Plaintiff that he will be subject to disciplinary action and possible punishment for continuing to use or attempt to use canteen privileges or purchase items containing a sugar substance; and that Defendant Stites consulted with the Plaintiff concerning the purchase of items from the canteen. Defendants deny that the cancellation of Plaintiff’s canteen privileges was arbitrary and without regard to Plaintiff’s health needs; deny that Plaintiff is in need of a sugar substance to prevent a possible diabetic coma; deny that Defendant Smith acted without authority in denying Plaintiff’s canteen privileges; deny that Defendant Smith verbally abused Plaintiff, using foul language; deny that Defendant Smith has singled Plaintiff out for any arbitrary action resulting in cruel and unusual punishment; deny that Defendant Stites denied Plaintiff medical attention when he consulted with him concerning the purchase of items from the canteen; and deny that Defendant Stites refused to provide Plaintiff with a list of items that he could purchase at the LARC canteen.

In his Traverse to Answer, Plaintiff addresses several of the allegations made in the Defendants’ Answer. With regard to Defendant Smith’s assertion that the cancellation of Plaintiff’s canteen privileges was not done arbitrarily but was done with concern for Plaintiff’s health, Plaintiff contends that said Defendant’s action was arbitrary as she allows him to purchase tobacco, which, according to a medical encyclopedia cited by Plaintiff, is harmful to Plaintiff’s diabetic condition. Plaintiff also disputes the Defendants’ denial that Plaintiff is in need of a sugar substance to prevent a possible diabetic coma. In support of his contention, Plaintiff again refers to the medical encyclopedia; he adds that two of the Defendants are not medical doctors and that Defendant Stites, who is a medical doctor, did not examine Plaintiff’s blood and thus could not tell whether he needed sugar or not. Plaintiff further disputes Defendant Smith’s denial that she has singled out the Plaintiff for any arbitrary acts *16 resulting in cruel and unusual punishment and Defendant Stites’ denial that he refused to provide Plaintiff with a list of items he could purchase at the LARC canteen.

In its report the Department of Corrections indicates:

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Related

Procunier v. Martinez
416 U.S. 396 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Lonnie A. Massey v. Terrell Don Hutto
545 F.2d 45 (Eighth Circuit, 1976)
Martinez v. Aaron
570 F.2d 317 (Tenth Circuit, 1978)
Steward v. Henderson
364 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Georgia, 1973)
Tuggle v. Evans
457 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Colorado, 1978)
Robinson v. Benton
579 F.2d 70 (Tenth Circuit, 1978)
Munoz v. Civil Service Commission
429 U.S. 845 (Supreme Court, 1976)

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Bluebook (online)
493 F. Supp. 13, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11086, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jefferson-v-douglas-okwd-1979.