Jeffers v. Manetta Mills

3 S.E.2d 489, 190 S.C. 435, 1939 S.C. LEXIS 55
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJune 13, 1939
Docket14898
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 3 S.E.2d 489 (Jeffers v. Manetta Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jeffers v. Manetta Mills, 3 S.E.2d 489, 190 S.C. 435, 1939 S.C. LEXIS 55 (S.C. 1939).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Fishburne.

*437 This is an appeal from an order of the lower Court sustaining an award of the Industrial Commission, which in turn had approved the award made by the single Commissioner in favor of Mrs. Joe Jeffers and her four infant children, against Manetta Mills, employer, and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, carrier. The award was made on account of the death of J. J. Jeffers, husband and father of the claimants, alleged to have resulted from an accident while he was employed and engaged in the service of Manetta Mills, in the early part of June, 1936.

The deceased, Joe Jeffers, for eight or ten years immediately preceding the alleged accident, had been employed by Manetta Mills as a machinist in its welding room. The latter part of May or the first part of June, 1936, it is alleged, he suffered a burn on the top of his left hand from a spark while using an acetylene torch. On the afternoon of the day of the accident, or the next morning, he .came from the welding room and reported the accident to his foreman, Mr. Rush, and showed him the burn. The injury seemed trivial, and was not reported by foreman to the mill authorities, and it was not treated by a physician for seven or eight weeks. The deceased, however, upon going home, applied mercurochrome to the injury, and continued to so treat it, but the wound failed to permanently heal. It would heal superficially. He did not cease work, and while using the hand in the operation of an emery wheel, the skin would break loose, and grime and dirt would enter the open wound. After about seven weeks, when the injury had developed into an irritated sore, he consulted Dr. Gaston, his family physician, at Chester, who took him to Rock Hill, where Dr. Strait burned out the affected part with an electric needle. The doctors, however, were suspicious of malignancy, and sent a specimen of the tissue to Dr. Lynch in Charleston, who reported that the trouble was cancer. The affected spot was cauterized by Dr. Strait about August 10, 1936. After this operation the hand healed rapidly, and Jeffers returned to *438 his work at the mill, and continued working there for several months. However, before the end of the year the cancer had metastasized, affecting the upper arm, in consequence of which he died on the 11th day of December, 1937.

Appellants contend that the award of the Industrial Commission was based solely on hearsay evidence, uncorroborated by attending facts and circumstances. No claim is made that the alleged hearsay evidence should have been excluded. In fact, it was elicited by claimants and by appellants.

The burden rests upon the claimants to show by competent testimony, not only the fact of injury, but that it occurred in connection with the employment of the deceased; and to furnish evidence from which the inference can logically be drawn that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The award, of course, must be based upon something more than surmise or conjecture. Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co. et al., 189 S. C., 188, 200 S. E., 727.

It is also true that the proof of such facts may be established by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Commission et al., 352 Ill., 405, 415, 186 N. E., 140, 87 A. L. R., 770; Ohio Building Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill., 96, 115 N. E., 149; Demastes v. State Compensation Commissioner, 112 W. Va., 498, 165 S. E., 667, 71 C. J, 1085. And where the circumstances surrounding the injury sustained b}r the deceased are such as to lead an unprejudiced mind reasonably to infer that it was caused by accident, the evidence need not negative all other possible causes’ of death. Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, page 1013.

There were no witnesses to the alleged accidental injury to the hand of the deceased, so that the physical facts and the justified inferences to be drawn therefrom must be considered as a determining factor in deciding *439 the issue. We are also warranted in considering the hearsay testimony adduced, the probative value of which was for the Industrial Commission. Rice v. Brandon Corp. et al., 190 S. C., 229, 2 S. E. (2d), 740, opinion filed May 1, 1939.

The foreman, Rush, testified that the deceased came from the welding room and reported to him that he had suffered an accidental burn on his left hand from a blow torch spark; that he showed the red spot on his hand to him and to Tel-ford, another employee, and that the witness knew that it was a burn, and stated that he himself had been burned several times from a spark under similar circumstances. He described the injured place as being “a little blister” on top of deceased’s hand. Telford confirméd the statement that he was present when the deceased reported the alleged accident to the foreman and that he saw the hand. He said the spot was red, but that it did not look to him like a burn.

In addition to the testimony stated, it was proved that Jeffers was a strong, healthy man, 43 years of age, who had never missed a day’s work on account of illness. That no one, not even those in daily association with him in the welding room, had ever seen any blemish or injury on his hand before the time of the alleged accident; that several days after the accident the injured place assumed the appearance of a blue wart, similar to a blood blister; and that by the time Dr. Gaston made his examination — seven weeks later- — it had become an irritated sore, and proved to be malignant.

The medical testimony bearing upon the causal connection of the alleged burn with the cancerous condition is somewhat unsatisfactory, largely because of the fact that all of the doctors testified that they are practically helpless in the presence of cancer, and have no knowledge as to what might bring about the condition. They said that the cause of cancer is a matter of surmise and conjecture.

Dr. Gaston testified that in his opinion, from an examination of the sore on the hand of the deceased in August, 1936, *440 it evidently had its origin about June, 1936. He was asked this specific question: “Q. Say, he got burned in June, and after an interval until August, could this thing have occurred on there as a result of what he claimed got wrong with him in June? A. Evidently it started in June on his hand. He came to me in August for treatment.”

Dr. Gaston further testified that at the time of his examination there was a tumefaction that was discharging, and that there was a sort of hollow, ulcerous condition in the skin. There was a growth more than an ulcer. And he further said that sometimes following a burn “you would have a granulation and some sort of growth, but this would be exceptional.” He testified that some of the medical profession held to the view that a constant irritation of a wound would develop into cancer, but whether that view is correct or not he did not know.

Dr. Strait, who cauterized the sore, testified: “We see plenty of burns and bruises, and no- cancer, but there is always a possibility it causes them. The cause of them is unknown, so one man’s guess is as good as another’s.”

Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
3 S.E.2d 489, 190 S.C. 435, 1939 S.C. LEXIS 55, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jeffers-v-manetta-mills-sc-1939.