NUMBER 13-18-00378-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JEFF A. KAIGLER, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant Jeff A. Kaigler appeals his conviction for assault causing bodily injury to
a family member, a class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1).
The charging instrument alleges that Kaigler “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
[caused] bodily injury” to his aunt, Rebecca Kaigler, by pushing her to the floor. See id.
Kaigler appeals his conviction, contending there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the verdict.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At a bench trial, Rebecca testified that on October 9, 2017, she confronted Kaigler
at the bathroom door concerning rent payment. After the argument escalated, Kaigler
then pushed Rebecca out of the bathroom, using the door, and caused her to fall on the
floor. Rebecca testified that she suffered three bruised ribs and a broken collarbone.
She requested aid, and police officers were dispatched to the scene. Police officers
provided testimony and body-camera footage that demonstrated Rebecca holding her
arm and crying. The police officers arrested Kaigler for assault. See id. The trial court
found Kaigler guilty and sentenced him to twenty days confinement in the San Patricio
county jail and a $100 fine. This appeal followed.
II. EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT
By his sole issue, Kaigler contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the State did not sufficiently prove the manner and means of the
assault.
A. Standard of Review
“The standard for determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support
a conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim.
1 Because Texas courts no longer conduct factual sufficiency analyses in criminal cases, we
construe appellant’s contention as a legal sufficiency challenge. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). 2 App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We “determine
whether ‘the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant
committed the crime that was charged.’” Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (quoting Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
The legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal
offense. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008)).
The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and
the weight to be given their testimony. Id. Our role is to ensure only the rationality of
the trier of fact’s finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). When
the reviewing court is faced with a record supporting contradicting inferences, we must
presume that the jury resolved any such conflict in favor of the verdict, even if it is not
explicitly stated in the record. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(en banc)). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
3 which the defendant was tried. Id.
B. Applicable Law
To support a conviction for assault, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly [caused] bodily injury to
another.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1).
The State is not required to prove the manner and means of causing the injury
alleged in the information. See Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 298–99. The State, however,
must prove that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. See
Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App 2000); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739,
744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, assault is a result-
oriented offense and therefore the State must prove the appellant caused the bodily injury
with the requisite mental state. Fang v. State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 928–29 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Lastly, any physical pain is sufficient to establish
bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8); Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683,
688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
C. Discussion
Kaigler specifically argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction
because the State failed to prove the manner and means of the assault. However, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State is not required to prove the
manner and means of causing the injury. See Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 298–99.
Moreover, because assault is a result-oriented offense, the manner and means are
inconsequential for sufficiency review. Id. at 298. For these reasons, we need not
4 review whether the State failed to prove the manner and means of the assault.
The State provided legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for assault.
Rebecca confirmed that she was pushed by Kaigler and identified Kaigler as the sole
person who caused the injury. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. Kaigler’s own testimony
supports that he “pushed her really hard,” but he did not intend to hurt her. Because we
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NUMBER 13-18-00378-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JEFF A. KAIGLER, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant Jeff A. Kaigler appeals his conviction for assault causing bodily injury to
a family member, a class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1).
The charging instrument alleges that Kaigler “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
[caused] bodily injury” to his aunt, Rebecca Kaigler, by pushing her to the floor. See id.
Kaigler appeals his conviction, contending there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the verdict.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At a bench trial, Rebecca testified that on October 9, 2017, she confronted Kaigler
at the bathroom door concerning rent payment. After the argument escalated, Kaigler
then pushed Rebecca out of the bathroom, using the door, and caused her to fall on the
floor. Rebecca testified that she suffered three bruised ribs and a broken collarbone.
She requested aid, and police officers were dispatched to the scene. Police officers
provided testimony and body-camera footage that demonstrated Rebecca holding her
arm and crying. The police officers arrested Kaigler for assault. See id. The trial court
found Kaigler guilty and sentenced him to twenty days confinement in the San Patricio
county jail and a $100 fine. This appeal followed.
II. EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT
By his sole issue, Kaigler contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction because the State did not sufficiently prove the manner and means of the
assault.
A. Standard of Review
“The standard for determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support
a conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim.
1 Because Texas courts no longer conduct factual sufficiency analyses in criminal cases, we
construe appellant’s contention as a legal sufficiency challenge. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). 2 App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We “determine
whether ‘the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant
committed the crime that was charged.’” Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (quoting Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
The legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal
offense. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (citing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008)).
The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and
the weight to be given their testimony. Id. Our role is to ensure only the rationality of
the trier of fact’s finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). When
the reviewing court is faced with a record supporting contradicting inferences, we must
presume that the jury resolved any such conflict in favor of the verdict, even if it is not
explicitly stated in the record. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012).
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as
defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(en banc)). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
3 which the defendant was tried. Id.
B. Applicable Law
To support a conviction for assault, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly [caused] bodily injury to
another.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1).
The State is not required to prove the manner and means of causing the injury
alleged in the information. See Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 298–99. The State, however,
must prove that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. See
Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App 2000); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739,
744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, assault is a result-
oriented offense and therefore the State must prove the appellant caused the bodily injury
with the requisite mental state. Fang v. State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 928–29 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Lastly, any physical pain is sufficient to establish
bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8); Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683,
688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
C. Discussion
Kaigler specifically argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction
because the State failed to prove the manner and means of the assault. However, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the State is not required to prove the
manner and means of causing the injury. See Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 298–99.
Moreover, because assault is a result-oriented offense, the manner and means are
inconsequential for sufficiency review. Id. at 298. For these reasons, we need not
4 review whether the State failed to prove the manner and means of the assault.
The State provided legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for assault.
Rebecca confirmed that she was pushed by Kaigler and identified Kaigler as the sole
person who caused the injury. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. Kaigler’s own testimony
supports that he “pushed her really hard,” but he did not intend to hurt her. Because we
defer to the fact finder to weigh the facts and testimony of the case, we hold the finding
of the trial court that Kaigler pushed Rebecca is supported by sufficient evidence. See
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
The evidence also demonstrates that Kaigler had the required culpable mental
state. The circumstantial evidence from Kaigler’s pushing and injuring of Rebecca
suggests that he either knew the risk was reasonably certain to cause her injury or acted
recklessly and consciously disregarded it. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03. Either of
these two culpable mental states are sufficient for a conviction of assault. See id.
§ 22.01(a)(1).
Lastly, Rebecca also suffered bodily injury. As a result of Kaigler’s conduct,
Rebecca suffered three bruised ribs and a broken collarbone. See id. § 22.01(a)(1);
Garcia, 367 S.W.3d at 688. Moreover, footage from the officer’s bodycam showed
Rebecca crying and holding her arm. We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient
to support Kaigler’s conviction for assault. We overrule Kaigler’s sole issue.
5 III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
GINA M. BENAVIDES, Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed the 27th day of June, 2019.