IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JEANNENE MITCHELL, No. 87860-3-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION YWCA KING SNOHOMISH COUNTY OFFICERS,
Respondent.
MARIA CHAVEZ-WILCOX, KRIS LAMBRIGHT, and 1-10 DOE DEFENDANTS,
Defendants.
COBURN, J. — Jeannene Mitchell entered into a settlement agreement with the
YWCA to resolve her small claims court action concerning her housing conditions in a
YWCA rental property. She later filed a lawsuit in superior court alleging similar claims
as well as claims of financial mismanagement. The trial court granted the YWCA’s
motion to dismiss. We review the court’s decision as an order on summary judgment
and affirm. Many of Mitchell’s claims are precluded by the settlement agreement and
she fails to meet her burden on summary judgment on the remaining claims.
FACTS
On October 3, 2023, Jeannene Mitchell entered a lease agreement for a unit in
the Lexington-Concord building owned by the YWCA. After allegedly suffering exposure No. 87860-3-I/2
to mold in her apartment, Mitchell moved to a second unit within the Lexington-Concord
building. She eventually moved to a different YWCA-owned property, Opportunity Place,
on March 20, 2024.
In March 2024, Mitchell filed a lawsuit in King County District Court seeking
$2,423 in personal damages for the YWCA’s failure to perform its duties as a landlord.
Mitchell claimed she was exposed to mold, building maintenance failed to repair a leak
in the bathroom for four months, and maintenance did not address a mouse infestation.
Mitchell and the YWCA settled the claim by settlement agreement on July 31, 2024. The
YWCA agreed to pay Mitchell the requested $2,423 and Mitchell agreed to file a
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice with the district court. The settlement agreement
included a release of additional claims related to events occurring before the date of the
agreement:
Mitchell, of her own free will, voluntarily, for herself: her spouse, her heirs, legatees, representatives, successors, transferees and assigns, hereby forever releases, discharges and acquits the YWCA, and the YWCA’s present and former divisions, officers, directors, employees, agents, insurers and attorneys (“Released Parties”) of and from any and all claims, demands, sums of money, actions, rights, causes of action, obligations and liabilities of any kind whatsoever, at law or in equity, known or unknown, that Mitchell has or may have in the future, which are or may be based upon any facts, acts, conduct, representations, omissions, contracts, claims, events, causes, matters or other things occurring at any time on or before the date of this Agreement. Said release includes without limitation the matters alleged in Jeannene Ann Mitchell v. YWCA of Seattle-King County, filed with King County District Court (Case No. 24CIV05325KCX) and any and all matters arising out of Mitchells tenancy and relationship with the YWCA; any grievances, claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, physical or emotional injury; any alleged violation of Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (RCW 49.60); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Americans With Disabilities Act, any comparable state laws including the or any other federal, state or local law, regulation or ordinance, or public policy, contract or tort law, having any bearing whatsoever on the terms and conditions of Mitchell’s relationship with the YWCA.
2 No. 87860-3-I/3
Mitchell received a check for the full amount of the settlement agreement from
the YWCA on August 5, 2024. The same day, Mitchell sent a letter to the district court
“to propose a settlement” agreement, detailed the salient terms, and included a copy of
the agreement. The court responded:
Plaintiff has filed what the Court construes as a proposed settlement agreement. The Court does not deem this to be a motion to dismiss the case at this time. It is unclear whether Plaintiff has delivered to Defendant a copy of the proposed settlement agreement. The Court will not forward a copy of Plaintiff’s letter to Defendant, as that is the Plaintiff’s responsibility. In the future, any settlement communications between the Parties do not need to be filed with the Court.
Mitchell attempted to file a settlement letter with the district court on August 14, 2024,
but the court rejected the filing stating: “[d]ocuments are excluded from electronic filing
pursuant to LGR 30, court is unable to process. Please file by mail or in person. This
document is marked to be confidential.”
Instead of filing a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, Mitchell then moved to
dismiss the district court case without prejudice, which the court granted on September
5, 2024. The order entered states, “Plaintiff appeared and moved for dismissal without
prejudice so that she could file in a higher court. Proof of service was not filed and
Defendant did not appear.”
On November 1, 2024, Mitchell, acting pro se, filed a complaint against the
YWCA and its Chief Executive Officer Maria Chavez-Wilcox and former Chief Financial
Officer Kris Lambright in King County Superior Court. Counsel for the YWCA timely
appeared in the action. Mitchell later filed an amended complaint that asserted 21
claims: failure of duty to tenants (count 1); “warranty of habitability failure” (count 2);
embezzlement (count 3); “laundering money through real estate” (count 4);
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“misrepresenting revenues and expenses” (count 5); retaliation (count 6); “life
endangerment” (count 7); negligence (count 8); violation of freedom of speech (count
9a) 1; “no legal protocol for tenants” (count 9b); “planned obsolescence” (count 10);
breach of fiduciary duty (count 11); “no security for tenants” (count 12); fraud in
discrepancy between actual building conditions and reported improvement costs for
2023 (count 13); “Math is wrong” meaning fraud in increasing expenses from 2022 to
2023 without significant property improvement or operational changes (count 14); “credit
utilization” by opening 48 lease accounts not listed in the YWCA’s IRS 990 form 2 (count
15); identity theft by opening unauthorized lease accounts3 (count 16); securities fraud
because the 2022-23 cash sales do not equal amount invested (count 17); “Reduced
Income and Cash Reduction from Financing Activities” (count 18); “‘Other’ Categories
2022 (only)” which appears to dispute financial expenditures (count 19); money
laundering embezzled funds based on selling and reselling the same property (count
20); “Whistleblower Compensation Claim” (count 21) in which Mitchell requests that the
court award compensation for her discoveries.
The facts section of Mitchell’s complaint stated that she entered into a rental
agreement with the YWCA from October 3, 2023 to January 1, 2024, and had to move
to a different YWCA property after having been exposed to mold. As to Mitchell’s other
claims, she summarily asserts: “Defendants engaged in systemic fraud, embezzlement,
money laundering, and identity theft, using unauthorized guardian accounts and other
1 The complaint includes two claims named “count 9.” We refer to them as “count 9a” and “count 9b” so as to maintain the numbers Mitchell assigns to her claims. 2 Mitchell does not allege that the YWCA unlawfully obtained credit based on her lease account. 3 Mitchell does not allege that the YWCA stole her identity. 4 No. 87860-3-I/5
fraudulent practices to conceal their actions.” Mitchell also submitted a notarized
document she filed as her supporting affidavit. This document summarizes Mitchell’s
complaint which can best be categorized into three issues: (1) habitability of her rented
YWCA property, (2) YWCA financial and operational mismanagement; and (3) YWCA
retaliatory actions and free speech violations. As to her rental unit, Mitchell avers she
suffered health impacts and medical bills because of “mold infestations, rodent activity,
persistent leaks, and non-functioning electrical outlets,” and that the YWCA did not
timely address the known hazards. Regarding complaints of “Financial and Operational
Mismanagement,” Mitchell asserts:
7. Based on inspection reports and discrepancies in YWCA’s financial records, the funds allocated for property maintenance were misappropriated. Records indicate IRS Form 990 reporting funds for “leasehold improvements,” yet the Lexington-Concord building deteriated [sic] without any leasehold improvements performed, rendering the buildings obsolete.
8. YWCA’s mismanagement is further evidenced by unexplained financial figures in the “Other” categories of their filings, totaling over $97 million in 2022 exclusively, with no clear allocation to necessary property repairs, and incorrect mathematical calculations.
As to Mitchell’s “Retaliatory Actions and Freedom of Speech Violations,” Mitchell also
alleges
9. After I reported the unsafe conditions, YWCA officers took retaliatory actions against me, including blocking communication and imposing settlement clauses that restricted my rights to report future issues.
10. These actions violate my rights under RCW 59.18.240 and 59.18.250 of the Washington State Landlord-Tenant Act, which protect tenants from retaliation and ensure the freedom to report unsafe living conditions.
The YWCA filed a motion for relief from deadline, requesting extension of the
deadline for responsive pleading, contemporaneously with a CR 12(b)(6) motion to
5 No. 87860-3-I/6
dismiss. Mitchell filed an ex parte motion for entry of default against the YWCA. The trial
court denied Mitchell’s motion, noting that the YWCA had appeared through counsel
and noted a motion to dismiss for hearing. The court granted the YWCA’s motion for
relief from deadline.
The trial court heard oral argument on the YWCA’s motion to dismiss and
subsequently entered an order granting the motion and dismissing Mitchell’s claims with
prejudice.
Mitchell appeals.
DISCUSSION
Mitchell argues that the trial court improperly dismissed her case because the
YWCA was in default, the settlement agreement is void and unenforceable under Cr 2A,
she has standing to bring the various claims, and the court did not allow her adequate
time to state her claims.
Order on Review
The YWCA moved to dismiss the case for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted” under CR 12(b)(6), and the trial court granted dismissal on that
ground. A CR 12(b)(6) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint and
should be granted only if the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would justify
recovery. Singh v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 4 Wn App. 2d 1, 4, 428 P.3d 373 (2018).
“When a party submits documents that were not contained in the original complaint for
consideration by the court in assessing a CR 12(b)(6) motion, those submissions
generally convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under CR
56.” Singh, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 4-5; CR 12(b).
6 No. 87860-3-I/7
In support of its motion to dismiss, the YWCA submitted several documents
outside the pleadings including Mitchell’s lease agreement, the letter notifying the
district court of the proposed settlement agreement, the court’s response, and the
district court order dismissing the case without prejudice. The court considered these
documents when ruling on the motion to dismiss. Because this evidence was not
contained in Mitchell’s amended complaint, the submissions converted the motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. We therefore review the trial court’s order
as a decision on motion for summary judgment.
We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Ranger Ins. Co. v.
Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). Summary judgment is
appropriate “only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d
439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014); see also CR 56(c). “The party moving for summary
judgment bears the initial burden of showing that there is no disputed issue of material
fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that an issue of
material fact remains.” Haley v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 216,
522 P.3d 80 (2022) (citation omitted). The nonmoving party avoids summary judgment
when it sets forth specific facts which sufficiently rebut the moving party’s contentions
and disclose the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact. Ranger Ins. Co., 164
Wn.2d at 552. “[W]e consider all facts and make all reasonable factual inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 444. Additionally,
we may affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis supported by the record. Huff v.
Wyman, 184 Wn.2d 643, 648, 361 P.3d 727 (2015).
7 No. 87860-3-I/8
Default
Mitchell claims the trial court erred by denying her motion to enter an order of
default against the YWCA. We disagree.
A party may move for default when “a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend as provided
by these rules and that fact is made to appear by motion and affidavit.” CR 55(a)(1).
Appearance by a party is not enough to prevent entry of an order of default. “Even if a
party has appeared in an action, if the party then fails to answer a pleading . . . or to file
a responsive pleading . . . the party may still enter default.” Duryea v. Wilson, 135 Wn.
App. 233, 238, 144 P.3d 318 (2006). However, a party that has filed such pleadings is
not in default. Duryea, 135 Wn. App. at 239.
Here, counsel for YWCA acknowledged that she had miscalculated the deadline
for responsive pleading after Mitchell filed her amended complaint. To remedy the error,
the YWCA filed a motion for relief from deadline under CR 6(b)(2) 4 contemporaneously
with its untimely motion to dismiss the case. Pursuant to CR 6(b)(2), “for cause shown”
and “upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period,” the court has the
discretion to “permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect.”
Counsel for the YWCA made a motion and a showing of excusable neglect for
4 CR 6(b) states: When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion, (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. 8 No. 87860-3-I/9
failing to file timely pleadings. The trial court granted the motion which extended the
deadline to December 23, 2025, the date YWCA filed the motion to dismiss. Mitchell
has not assigned error to the court’s order granting relief from deadline and makes no
argument that the court abused its discretion in granting the requested relief.
The trial court exercised its discretion to extend the deadline for the YWCA to
submit its pleadings such that the YWCA’s motion to dismiss was timely. The YWCA
was not in default, therefore the trial court properly denied Mitchell’s motion for an order
of default.
Application of the Settlement Agreement
Settlement agreements are governed by the principles of contract law. Morris v.
Maks, 69 Wn. App. 865, 868, 850 P.2d 1357 (1993). Such agreements between private
parties “are viewed with finality.” Paopao v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 145 Wn. App.
40, 48, 185 P.3d 640 (2008). “The courts will enforce a settlement agreement so long as
it was fairly and knowingly made.” Oregon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barton, 109 Wn. App. 405,
414, 36 P.3d 1065 (2001). Additionally, “a strong presumption attaches that the parties
have considered and settled every existing difference.” Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 109 Wn.
App. at 414.
A. Validity of the Settlement Agreement
Mitchell claims that the settlement agreement cannot preclude her claims
because it “was not executed as a matter of law, contains seven illegal phrases, and
was dismissed without prejudice by [the district court], rendering it void.”
Mitchell first asserts that the settlement agreement was not executed as a matter
of law. According to Mitchell, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice,
9 No. 87860-3-I/10
thereby preserving her ability to bring the claims anew. Additionally, she argues, the
YWCA did not appear at the proceedings in district court or make a motion to enforce
the settlement agreement under CR 2A.
Contrary to Mitchell’s assertion, the district court did not “reject” the settlement
agreement. The proposed settlement agreement document submitted by Mitchell was
“returned to the filer or are rejected for filing” for procedural reasons rather than any
issues with its contents. Moreover, Mitchell obtained the dismissal without providing
evidence that she had served the YWCA with notice of the motion and proceedings, and
the YWCA did not appear, presumably due to lack of notice. The YWCA did not have
the opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss without prejudice or move to enforce
the settlement agreement.
Mitchell’s characterizations of the district court’s actions are erroneous and
misleading. She provides no legal support for her contention that an order granting a
motion to dismiss without prejudice prevents the enforcement of a valid contract. 5 The
actions of the district court did not invalidate the settlement agreement.
Next, Mitchell contends that she was forced to sign the agreement under
economic duress and the agreement contains illegal clauses “including an overbroad
waiver of future claims and clauses barring Appellant from reporting future maintenance
issues.” Her claims of illegality arise from a misunderstanding of the language of the
settlement agreement.
The settlement agreement releases defendants from claims “known or unknown,
5 In support Mitchell quotes, “A dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if no action had been brought at all,” and attributes the quotation to Allan v. Univ. of Wash., 140 Wn.2d 323, 997 P.2d 360 (2000). Allan does not include this statement, nor does the case discuss dismissal of a claim without prejudice. 10 No. 87860-3-I/11
that Mitchell has or may have in the future, which are or may be based upon any facts,
acts, conduct, representations, omissions, contracts, claims, events, causes, matters or
other things occurring at any time on or before the date of this Agreement.” Mitchell may
not bring any future claims based on actions that occurred before the date of the
settlement agreement. However, the agreement does not prevent Mitchell from bringing
claims based on actions or issues occurring after July 31, 2024. As explained by the
YWCA during oral argument, “the settlement agreement does not preclude Ms. Mitchell
from reporting future repair concerns. It simply settled all claims related to existing
repair concerns, whether known or unknown at the time of her signature.” The court
further clarified, “That’s the future part. . . . you can’t come back later on and try to
litigate or claim more damages arising out of the original subject matter of the
settlement, as opposed to . . . something totally different.” The language does not
illegally curtail her ability to report future issues or bring future claims. Therefore,
Mitchell’s argument that the settlement agreement cannot bar her claims because it is
void or voidable is without merit.
As to her claim of duress, Mitchell asserts she “was forced to sign under
economic duress after medical bills went into collections and housing was unstable.”
However, “[t]he assertion of duress must be proven by evidence that the duress
resulted from the other’s wrongful or oppressive conduct. The mere fact that a contract
is entered into under stress or pecuniary necessity is insufficient.” Retail Clerks Health &
Welfare Tr. Funds v. Shopland Supermarket, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 939, 944, 640 P.2d 1051
(1982). Because Mitchell does not provide any evidence that the YWCA engaged in
wrongful or oppressive conduct to coerce her agreement to the settlement, she cannot
11 No. 87860-3-I/12
negate the contract with her claim of duress. Mitchell’s arguments that the settlement
agreement is unenforceable due to duress and illegal terms have no merit.
Mitchell also contends that the settlement agreement is not enforceable under
CR 2A because the YWCA did not move to enforce the agreement and the agreement
included illegal terms. CR 2A provides that the court will not enforce a disputed
agreement between the parties “unless the same shall have been made and assented
to in open court on the record, or entered in the minutes, or unless the evidence thereof
shall be in writing and subscribed by the attorneys denying the same.” However, “CR 2A
applies only when (1) the agreement was made by the parties or attorneys ‘in respect to
the proceedings in a cause,’ and (2) the purport of the agreement is disputed. Lavigne
v. Green, 106 Wn. App. 12, 17, 23 P.3d 515 (2001) (quoting In re Marriage of Ferree,
71 Wn. App. 35, 39, 856 P.2d 706 (1993)). “[T]he ‘purport’ of an agreement is disputed
only when its existence or material terms are disputed,” and the dispute must be
genuine. Ferree, 71 Wn. App. at 40. The burden is on the party asserting the settlement
agreement to prove there is no genuine dispute as to the existence and material terms
of a settlement agreement. Id. at 41.
Counsel for defendants filed a declaration and attached multiple exhibits,
including a copy of the settlement agreement signed by Mitchell on July 29, 2024 and a
representative of the YWCA on July 31, 2024. Counsel also filed a copy of the
settlement check written on August 2, 2024 and a declaration of the Housing Services
Director stating that she had “handed” the settlement check to Mitchell on Monday
August 5, 2024. Mitchell disputes the existence of the settlement agreement based on
(1) the district court’s “rejection” of the document and the entry of the order of dismissal
12 No. 87860-3-I/13
without prejudice and (2) the allegedly illegal terms. As shown above, these claims are
without merit and, therefore, do not support a genuine dispute as to the existence and
material terms of the agreement. Without a genuine dispute, CR 2A does not bar
enforcement of the settlement agreement and Mitchell is bound by the terms of that
contract.
B. Claims that Are Barred by the Settlement Agreement
Based on the settlement agreement, Mitchell cannot raise new claims arising
from actions or events that occurred prior to signing the document on July 31, 2024.
Therefore, the settlement agreement bars any claims in the amended complaint related
to the maintenance issues at the Lexington-Concord building during that time. Mitchell
does not assert that the claims arise from a different time frame. Therefore, she fails to
raise a genuine issue of fact to dispute enforcement of the contract and the trial court
properly granted summary judgment on those claims barred by the settlement
agreement. See Allen v. State, 19 Wn. App. 2d 895, 912, 498 P.3d 552 (2021)
(summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiff established no genuine dispute of
material fact as to the validity of the settlement agreement). The trial court did not err in
dismissing Mitchell’s claims of: failure of duty to tenants (count 1); “warranty of
habitability failure” (count 2); “life endangerment” (count 7); negligence (count 8); and
“no legal protocol for tenants” (count 9b); and “no security for tenants” (count 12).
Claims Not Barred by the Settlement Agreement
Mitchell’s complaint includes many claims pertaining to the YWCA’s “Financial
and Operational Mismanagement” that are not necessarily barred by the settlement
agreement. In its motion to dismiss, the YWCA provided legal argument and evidence
13 No. 87860-3-I/14
that Mitchell’s claims have no basis in law or fact. We agree.
A. Allegations Rather than Causes of Action
In the motion to dismiss, the YWCA provided legal arguments to establish that
several of Mitchell’s counts do not raise actual causes of action. These claims include:
“planned obsolescence” (count 10) pled as “Defendants have ample money for long and
short-term maintenance. Tax Returns IRS 990 show continuing grant increases for
maintenance. Yet there is no maintenance”; “Math is wrong” (count 14) alleging fraud
based on an increase in expenditures without an increase in services; “Reduced Income
and Cash Reduction from Financing Activities” (count 18) which merely claims “2021-
2022 990s show losses from fundraising activities. The purpose of fundraising is to raise
funds—not lose money”; “‘Other’ Categories 2022 (only)” (count 19) which appears to
dispute financial expenditures; and a “Whistleblower Compensation Claim” (count 21) in
which she requests that the court award compensation for her discoveries.
Mitchell’s response to the motion to dismiss fails to rebut the YWCA’s legal
arguments. She has not met her burden to counter the YWCA’s motion with evidence
and legal argument in support of these claims. The counts were properly dismissed on
summary judgment.
B. Financial Misconduct
Many of the counts pleaded in the amended complaint are based on claims of
financial misconduct: embezzlement (count 3); “laundering money through real estate”
(count 4); “misrepresenting revenues and expenses” (count 5); breach of fiduciary duty
(count 11); fraud (count 13); “credit utilization” (count 15); identity theft (count 16);
securities fraud (count 17); and money laundering embezzled funds (count 20). Again,
14 No. 87860-3-I/15
in the motion to dismiss, the YWCA provided extensive legal argument as to why these
claims are not properly asserted and should fail. Mitchell responds, “[t]he complaint
addresses embezzlement, unauthorized credit accounts, fake securities sales,
Unauthorized Accounts and Fraud. Defendants lack of response delays and defrauds
the court.” Additionally, Mitchell alleges that she has standing to bring the lawsuit under
“under federal state, municipal laws, including the Internal Revenue Code, Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Pension Protection Act, Washington Nonprofit Corporation Act, Charitable
Solicitation Act, and Landlord Tenant Law.”
Merely alleging financial misconduct without admissible evidence of facts cannot
defeat summary judgment. See Overton v. Consol. Ins. Co., 145 Wn.2d 417, 430, 38
P.3d 322 (2002) (“conclusions of fact are insufficient. . . conclusory statements of fact
will not suffice”). The YWCA has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these financial claims.
Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted.
C. Retaliation and Freedom of Speech
In count 9a, Mitchell alleges that the YWCA violated her freedom of speech by
prohibiting her from “reporting any past, present, or future repair issues,” and “prevents
the tenant from reporting any unknown claims in the future.” In the motion to dismiss,
the YWCA points out that it is not a state actor, as required for a First Amendment
claim. Indeed, the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the freedom of speech
only with respect to state actions. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic
Policy Comm., 113 Wn.2d 413, 420, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989). Mitchell has not provided
any evidence or legal argument to establish that the YWCA is a public entity and subject
15 No. 87860-3-I/16
to claims for freedom of speech violations.
Mitchell also claims that the YWCA retaliated against her after she complained
about the housing conditions, citing RCW 59.18 in count 6 of the amended complaint.
Her affidavit further explains the alleged retaliatory actions: “After I reported the unsafe
conditions, YWCA officers took retaliatory actions against me, including blocking
communication and imposing settlement clauses that restricted my rights to report
future issues.” She asserts that the actions violate her rights under RCW 59.18.240 and
RCW 59.18.250 of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA).
Under the RLTA,
So long as the tenant is in compliance with this chapter, the landlord shall not take or threaten to take reprisals or retaliatory action against the tenant because of any good faith and lawful:
(1) Complaints or reports by the tenant to a governmental authority concerning the failure of the landlord to substantially comply with any code, statute, ordinance, or regulation governing the maintenance or operation of the premises, if such condition may endanger or impair the health or safety of the tenant; or
(2) Assertions or enforcement by the tenant of his or her rights and remedies under this chapter.
RCW 59.18.240. For the purposes of this provision, “reprisal or retaliatory action”
includes, but is not limited to, eviction, increasing rent, reduction in services, and
increasing the obligations of the tenant, “when such actions are intended primarily to
retaliate against a tenant because of the tenant’s good faith and lawful act.” RCW
59.18.240(2). If a landlord initiates any of these actions within 90 days of “a good faith
and lawful act by the tenant as enumerated in RCW 59.18.240,” there is a rebuttable
presumption that the action was a reprisal or retaliatory action. RCW 59.18.250.
Mitchell does not contend that the YWCA engaged in any of the reprisal or
16 No. 87860-3-I/17
retaliatory services named in RCW 59.18.240. Rather, she claims retaliation through the
terms of the settlement agreement that restricted her ability to report future issues.
However, as discussed above, the settlement agreement prohibits Mitchell from future
claims based on actions that occurred before the date of the settlement agreement. The
provisions of the settlement agreement do not restrict Mitchell from reporting future
issues. As a result, Mitchell does not establish a claim for retaliation under the RLTA.
Because Mitchell did not respond to the YWCA’s motion to dismiss with
admissible evidence and legal argument to support her claims, dismissal with prejudice
was proper. Time to Argue Claim
Finally, Mitchell asserts “Court’s imposition of severe and arbitrary time limits,
especially on a complex motion, denied Appellant a meaningful opportunity to present
her case, thus violating the fundamental right to be heard and denying due process.”
She alleges that she was “cut off, silenced, evidence refused, and rebuttal barred in a
22-minute hearing.”
King County LCR 56(c)(1) requires oral arguments for all summary judgment 6
motions unless waived by the party or struck by the court. “The assigned judge shall
determine the length of oral argument.” KCLCR 56(c)(1). Additionally, “[a] trial court has
discretion to reasonably control the presentation of a party’s argument to secure fair,
effective, and efficient proceedings.” Baldwin v. Silver, 165 Wn. App. 463, 470, 269 P.3d
284 (2011).
The King County local rules do not have a similar requirement for CR 12(b)(6) motions. 6
See KCLCR 12. The YWCA originally brought this motion as a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 17 No. 87860-3-I/18
Mitchell claims “bias and denial of right to be heard” by the trial court. In support
of this claim, she specifically cites to the trial court’s statement, “I don’t even know what
you’re talking about,” in the context of her discussion about her claim of identity theft.
The court further stated, “I’m not understanding the connection to identity theft.” The
court then allowed Mitchell to provide a lengthy explanation of the claims. Additionally,
before ending the proceedings and taking the matter under advisement, the court
inquired, “[i]s there something, one more thing you need me to know related only to
what counsel has said and nothing more?” This allowed Mitchell further opportunity to
respond to the YWCA’s arguments.
Mitchell was not “cut off” and her rebuttal was not barred by the court. While she
may have preferred more time, the court was allowed to exercise its discretion as to the
length of oral argument. She was not denied her right to be heard.
CONCLUSION
Mitchell is bound by the settlement agreement and the court properly dismissed
those claims precluded by its terms. For the remaining claims, Mitchell failed to rebut
the YWCA’s evidence and argument on summary judgment. The trial court properly
granted summary judgment and dismissed her claims with prejudice.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: