Jean Pierre Iventrick v. Warden, North Florida Detention Center, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JEAN PIERRE IVENTRICK,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-1172-JEP-MCR

WARDEN, NORTH FLORIDA DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

Respondents. ___________________________________/

ORDER Petitioner, a detainee of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking, among other relief, an order directing Respondents to release him. (Doc. 1 at 8). Petitioner, a citizen of Haiti, entered the United States on June 26, 2023, and was granted parole. (Id. at 1; Doc. 5-2 at 3). ICE re-encountered Petitioner on February 12, 2026, following his arrest during a traffic stop. (Doc. 1 at 2, 5; Doc. 5-2 at 3). At the heart of this case is Petitioner’s contention that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)—not § 1225(b)(2)(A). (See generally Doc. 1).1

1 The Federal Respondents understand the petition to assert a claim under § 1226(a). (See Doc. 5 at 1). Accordingly, this Court construes the petition to assert a This Court previously addressed claims and arguments similar to those raised in this case, concluding that the Court has jurisdiction, but the relevant

statutory language and context support the Federal Respondents’ position that an alien without lawful admission who has resided in the United States for some appreciable period of time is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Diaz Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t of Removal Operations,

817 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2026); see also Lozano Sousa v. Ripa, No. 3:25- cv-1617-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 958794 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2026). However, on May 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite approach on the substantive issue under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

concluding that “§ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1276 (11th Cir. 2026).2 While

claim under that statute. See United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[Courts] liberally construe pro se filings.”). 2 Although the mandate has not yet issued, the Eleventh Circuit’s published opinion has immediate precedential effect. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does not affect this result.”). the opinion did not specifically address the circumstance of an individual, like Petitioner, who had been initially paroled into the country, the reasoning of

the opinion is equally applicable to Petitioner. Petitioner was detained within the interior of the United States—not at the border. See id. at 1286. (recognizing “the longstanding border-interior distinction for purposes of [immigration] detention”). And he was not “seeking lawful entry after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer”—indeed, he was “not applying for entry in any literal sense when [he was] detained” following his arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a valid license. Id. at 1269 (some internal quotation marks omitted). The Federal Respondents concede that this

Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case. (Doc. 5 at 2–3). Therefore, it is ORDERED: 1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim that his detention

without an individualized bond hearing violates the INA.3 Within seven days of this Order, Respondents shall either afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C.

3 Because the Court grants relief on Petitioner’s claim under the INA, the Court need not address Petitioner’s other claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would be cumulative”). § 1226(a) or release Petitioner. If Respondents release Petitioner, they shall provide Petitioner with access to a telephone to arrange transportation from the detention facility. 2. The Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) is DENIED for the same

reasons stated in Lanvin-Valdez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, No. 3:26-CV-180-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 1004569, at *2—-3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2026). 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment granting the petition, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on June 26, 2026.

£ JORDAN E. PRATT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jean Pierre Iventrick Counsel of Record