Jean Gagnon v. P Constance Gagnon, et al.

2022 DNH 094
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedAugust 10, 2022
Docket21-cv-800-LM
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2022 DNH 094 (Jean Gagnon v. P Constance Gagnon, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Jean Gagnon v. P Constance Gagnon, et al., 2022 DNH 094 (D.N.H. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Jean Gagnon

v. Civil No. 21-cv-800-LM Opinion No. 2022 DNH 094 P Constance Gagnon, et al.

ORDER

Plaintiff Jean Gagnon1 brings this interpleader action to resolve claims to

certain funds within his possession (the “interpleaded funds”). Jean named several

defendants as potential claimants to the interpleaded funds, including Theresa

Pare, Constance Gagnon, Kathleen Sands, Pantipa Taylor, Steven Taylor, Jessica

Gile, Richard Taylor III, the unknown heirs of Richard Taylor Sr. and Richard

Taylor Jr.,2 and the United States. Of these defendants, only three—Constance

Gagnon, Kathleen Sands, and the United States (the “claimants”)—filed an answer.

The remaining defendants failed to answer, and the court entered default against

them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Jean and the claimants have

stipulated to a settlement that divides the interpleaded funds among the claimants

1 Because there are two parties in this case with the last name Gagnon, the

court refers to plaintiff Jean Gagnon as “Jean” in this order.

2 On February 8, 2022, Attorney Daniel J. Kalinski, as guardian ad litem for

the unknown heirs of both Richard Taylor Sr. and Richard Taylor Jr., informed the court that he has investigated and determined that all heirs of both men are included in the complaint and that there are no unknown heirs. and awards Jean his attorney fees and costs. Jean, the claimants, and Attorney

Daniel J. Kalinski, as guardian ad litem for the unknown heirs, jointly move for

entry of default judgment against the defendants in default (“defaulting

defendants”) and entry of final judgment consistent with the settlement. Doc. no.

29. For the following reasons, the court grants the parties’ joint motion.

DISCUSSION

To enter final judgment per Jean and the claimants’ stipulation, the court

must first consider whether they are entitled to default judgment against the

defaulting defendants. If they are so entitled, the court can enter final judgment in

their favor.

I. Default Judgment

“[W]hen judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or

otherwise defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to assure itself that it has

jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.” Sun Life Assur. Co. of

Canada, (U.S.) v. Conroy, 431 F. Supp. 2d 220, 224 (D.R.I. 2006). Accordingly, to

grant default judgment, the court must first consider whether it has both subject

matter jurisdiction over this case and personal jurisdiction over defendants. Id. If

so, then the court next considers whether Jean and the claimants are entitled to

default judgment.

2 The court initially looks to subject matter jurisdiction. Jean brought this

interpleader action in New Hampshire state court pursuant to New Hampshire law.

The United States removed the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1444,

which authorizes the United States to remove any interpleader action in which it is

a defendant from state court to the appropriate federal district court. Accordingly,

this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Thomas Indus., Inc. v.

City of Bristol, 336 F. Supp. 3d 28, 32 (D. Conn. 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1444,

2410(a)(5)).

The court next looks to personal jurisdiction. This court’s personal

jurisdiction in state-law claims is generally coextensive with New Hampshire state

courts’ personal jurisdiction. See Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson &

Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2002). “Personal jurisdiction usually is

obtained over a defendant by service of process.” Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v.

Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2003). Unlike subject matter jurisdiction,

defendants may waive personal jurisdiction by either failing to raise it or through

actions indicating that they acquiesce to the court’s jurisdiction. Vazquez-Robles v.

CommoLoCo, Inc., 757 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2014). Here, Jean properly served all

defendants. No party has raised an objection to this court’s personal jurisdiction

over any defendants. Accordingly, the court concludes it has personal jurisdiction

over all defendants.

Having determined that the court has jurisdiction over this case and the

parties, the court next considers whether Jean and the claimants are entitled to

3 default judgment against the defaulting defendants. After default has been entered

against a defendant under Rule 55(a), the court may enter default judgment against

them under Rule 55(b). “In an interpleader action, the failure of a named and

properly served defendant to appear or defend in the action is deemed to be a

forfeiture of that defendant’s right or claim to the interpleaded fund.” Metro. Life

Ins. Co. v. Rathe, No. 20-CV-858-JD, 2021 WL 7082831, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 31,

2021). Here, the defaulting defendants have failed to appear in this case. They

have thus forfeited their right to the interpleaded funds, and the court enters

default judgment against them. See id.

Specifically, the Clerk of Court shall enter default judgment against Teresa

Pare, Pantipa Taylor, Steven Taylor, Jessica Gile, Richard Taylor III, and the

unknown heirs of both Richard Taylor Sr. and Richard Taylor Jr.

II. Entry of Final Judgment

Jean and the claimants have reached a settlement regarding the disposition

of the interpleaded funds and move the court to enter final judgment. Pursuant to

their agreement, the Clerk of Court shall distribute the interpleaded funds as

follows:

(1) $103,185.89 shall be paid to the United States;

(2) $100,541.72 shall be paid to Constance Gagnon;

(3) $100,541.72 shall be paid to Kathleen Sands;

4 (4) $5,288.34 shall be paid to Jean Gagnon for fees and costs he incurred in

this action; and

(5) Any remaining funds shall be split evenly between the United States,

Constance Gagnon, and Kathleen Sands.

The execution of this judgment shall be stayed until 30 days from the date of entry

of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a). After the stay ends, the Clerk of Court shall

distribute the interpleaded funds in accordance with this order by September 23,

2022.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the motion for default judgment

and entry of final judgment. Doc. no. 29. In addition, because the parties’

stipulation resolves Jean’s request for attorney fees and costs, the court denies his

prior motions requesting the same as moot. Doc. nos. 10, 27. The Clerk of Court

shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

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Related

Gagnon v. Gagnon
D. New Hampshire, 2022

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