Jean Clau S. Wright v. New Jersey State Parole Board

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: A-2328-24
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2328-24

JEAN CLAU S. WRIGHT, a/k/a JEAN CLAUDE S. WRIGHT, JEAN-CLAUDE WRIGHT, JEANCLAUDE S. WRIGHT, JEAN WRIGHT, and JEAN C. WRIGHT, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION Appellant, January 14, 2026

v. APPELLATE DIVISION

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent. ________________________

Argued October 9, 2025 – Decided October 29, 2025 Resubmitted December 4, 2025 – Decided January 14, 2026

Before Judges Marczyk, Bishop-Thompson and Puglisi.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Cody T. Mason, Deputy Public Defender II, of counsel and on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by

PUGLISI, J.A.D.

At issue in this appeal is whether the commencement of an offender's

mandatory parole supervision (MPS) term is tolled when the offender is

released from incarceration in the Department of Corrections (DOC) to the

custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Because the answer

to that question is yes, we affirm the New Jersey State Parole Board's (Board)

November 26, 2025 final agency decision determining the commencement date

of Jean-Claude Wright's MPS term. 1

I.

A jury convicted Wright of two counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A.

2C:15-1(a); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); and

two counts of fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4). For

each robbery conviction, Wright was sentenced to eleven years in prison with

an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility term and a five-year MPS term,

pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The

1 Wright appealed from the Board's April 2, 2025 decision declining to consider his administrative appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and both parties' appellate briefs addressed the jurisdictional issue and the merits of the appeal. On October 29, 2025, we reversed the Board's decision and remanded to the Board for the issuance of a final agency decision, which we now consider.

A-2328-24 2 sentences were imposed concurrently, and the remainder of the convictions

merged into the robbery convictions.

On November 20, 2018, Wright completed his maximum term of

incarceration and was released from the DOC to the custody of ICE. He

remained in ICE custody until December 1, 2021, when he was released into

the community and, according to the Board, began serving his five-year MPS

term.

Wright's February 21, 2025 administrative appeal to the Board

contended: MPS commences upon the completion of a custodial sentence;

because Wright was released from DOC custody on November 20, 2023, his

MPS term should not have been tolled during civil detention by ICE; and his

MPS term therefore exceeded the imposed sentence, which violated his

constitutional rights and warranted immediate remediation under State v.

Njango, 247 N.J. 533 (2021). He requested the Board correct the

commencement date of his MPS term and communicate the date to the DOC,

which would result in immediate termination of his MPS. Pursuant to our

remand, the Board issued a final agency decision in which it denied his

administrative appeal.

A-2328-24 3 II.

We "ordinarily employ a deferential standard when reviewing a Parole

Board administrative determination in the specialized area of parole

supervision." Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36, 46 (2023).

However, we "review decisions construing a statute de novo, owing no

deference to the analysis" of lower courts or agencies. State v. Cromedy, 261

N.J. 421, 430 (2025).

"Discerning 'the Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when

interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the

statutory language.'" Williams, 255 N.J. at 46 (quoting DiProspero v. Penn,

183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "[L]egislative intent controls because 'statutes are

to be read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative intent is

to be presumed as consonant to reason and good discretion.'" Haines v. Taft,

237 N.J. 271, 283 (2019) (quoting Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994)).

"We must presume that the Legislature intended the words that it chose

and the plain and ordinary meaning ascribed to those words." Paff v.

Galloway Twp., 229 N.J. 340, 353 (2017). "[I]f there is ambiguity in the

statutory language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation, we may

turn to extrinsic evidence, 'including legislative history, committee reports,

A-2328-24 4 and contemporaneous construction.'" DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93 (quoting

Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)).

"A statute's words and phrases should 'be read and [interpreted] with

their context.'" Williams, 255 N.J. at 46 (alteration in original) (quoting State

v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596, 613 (2021)). Judges do not read terms in

isolation; instead, they should "consider 'them in context with related

provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'" Lopez-Carrera,

245 N.J. at 613 (quoting DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492).

With these standards in mind, we begin our analysis with the text of the

statute. "[NERA] provides that a court sentencing a defendant to a term of

incarceration for a first- or second-degree crime enumerated in subsection (d)

'shall fix a minimum term of [eighty-five percent] of the sentence imposed,

during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.'" Njango, 247 N.J.

at 546 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a)). "[A] court meting out a NERA

sentence 'shall also impose a five-year term of [MPS] if the defendant is being

sentenced for a crime of the first degree, or a three-year term of [MPS] if the

defendant is being sentenced for a crime of the second degree.'" Ibid. (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c)). At issue here is the application of the next section of

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c), which reads as follows:

The term of [MPS] shall commence upon the completion of the sentence of incarceration imposed

A-2328-24 5 by the court pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a)] unless the defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for another crime at the time the defendant completes the sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to subsection [(a)], in which case the term of [MPS] shall commence immediately upon the defendant's release from incarceration. During the term of [MPS,] the defendant shall remain in release status in the community in the legal custody of the Commissioner of the [DOC] and shall be supervised by the . . . Board as if on parole and shall be subject to the provisions and conditions of section 3 of P.L.1997, c.117 (C.30:4-123.51b).

The tension here arises in reconciling NERA's requirement MPS

commence "immediately upon the defendant's release from incarceration" with

its mandate that "[d]uring the term of [MPS,] the defendant shall remain in

release status in the community." While these two provisions are typically

harmonious, this case creates an ambiguity because, during Wright's detention,

he was released from incarceration but was not in the community. We

therefore may look to extrinsic evidence to discern whether the legislative

intent supports the tolling of MPS during civil detention. 2

The Legislature enacted NERA "primarily because of New Jersey's

alarmingly high rate of parolee recidivism." State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560,

2 Immigration proceedings are "civil, not criminal" matters, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012). NERA's tolling provision applies where "the defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for another crime at the time the defendant completes the [NERA] sentence of incarceration imposed." There is no dispute this tolling provision is inapplicable here.

A-2328-24 6 569 (2001) (citing Stacey L. Pilato, Note, New Jersey's No Early Release Act:

A Band-Aid Approach to Victims' Pain and Recidivism?, 22 Seton Hall Legis.

J. 357, 364 (1997)), superseded by statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d) (2001), as

stated in State v. Parolin, 171 N.J. 223, 232 (2002). "[T]he purpose of

[NERA] was to 'increase prison time for offenders committing the most serious

crimes in society.'" Ibid. (quoting S. L. & Pub. Safety Comm. Statement to S.

855 (Apr. 24, 1996)).

NERA's MPS "provision . . . is 'unique and radically different' from the

general parole statute, N.J.S.A 30:4-123.45 to .95." State v. Friedman, 209

N.J. 102, 116 (2012) (internal citation omitted). Governor Christie Whitman's

signing statement emphasized:

[T]o ensure that violent criminals who complete their sentence are not released into the community without supervision, the bill provides that such criminals receive post-release parole supervision from the [Board]. The supervision would last five years for first-degree offenders and three years for second- degree offenders. Under previous law, convicted criminals who served [eighty-five] percent of their sentence could have been released without a parole requirement.

[Press Release, Off. of the Governor, Gov. Whitman Signs "No Early Release Act" to Keep Violent Criminals Behind Bars, at 2 (June 9, 1997).]

Thus, the Legislature determined the imposition of MPS in NERA cases

was critical for two reasons: 1) the offender has been convicted of a serious,

A-2328-24 7 violent offense, often carrying a substantial prison term; and 2) because of the

imposition of an eighty-five percent mandatory minimum term, the offender

will likely serve the maximum sentence without becoming eligible for

discretionary parole release. See Friedman, 209 N.J. at 116-17 (quoting

Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2

(2011)) (explaining NERA requires the imposition of MPS because the

offender will likely serve the maximum sentence imposed). We previously

held "the Legislature has spoken in clear and unambiguous terms that a person

convicted of a NERA offense must serve" the entire MPS term imposed, which

may not be reduced by credits. Salvador v. Dep't of Corr., 378 N.J. Super.

467, 469 (App. Div. 2005).

Our Supreme Court has recognized "the ultimate purpose of parole 'is to

help [offenders] reintegrate into society as constructive individuals.'" J.I. v.

N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 221 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972)). An offender in ICE

custody is neither "in release status in the community," nor being "supervised

by the [Board] as if on parole," subject to conditions set by the Board.

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). Thus, not only does Wright's interpretation of NERA

frustrate the important goals of the statute, it renders these provisions

meaningless. See M.R. v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J. 322, 338 (2025)

A-2328-24 8 (quoting DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296,

307 (2005)) ("[W]e endeavor to give meaning to all words and to avoid an

interpretation that reduces specific language to mere surplusage.").

We are satisfied the outcome here does not offend the notions of

fundamental fairness articulated by our Supreme Court in Njango. In that

case, years after his NERA sentence was imposed, we held Njango was

entitled to 2,692 days of service credit, which the sentencing court had denied.

Njango, 247 N.J. at 541. The application of credits resulted in Njango's

immediate release from incarceration one year and seven months past his

maximum incarceration date. Ibid. He filed a petition for post-conviction

relief (PCR), seeking either a reduction of his MPS term or to withdraw his

guilty plea. Ibid.

In reversing our affirmance of the PCR court's determination, the

Supreme Court held Njango was entitled to relief under the fundamental

fairness doctrine. Id. at 548. Because "arbitrary government

decisionmaking. . . denied Njango a remedy for a wrong," the Court found he

was entitled to credit for the time he spent incarcerated when he should have

been released to MPS. Ibid. This outcome did not run afoul of the legislative

intent because, in that case, "[t]he objective of parole supervision —to protect

the public from the risk from violent offenders—was certainly satisfied when

A-2328-24 9 [Njango] was mistakenly or erroneously incarcerated beyond the prescribed

time for his release." Id. at 550.

Here, as the Board noted, Wright was not subject to incarceration

beyond his maximum term because of arbitrary state government

decisionmaking. Rather, he was detained and eventually released by federal

immigration authorities. Because the fundamental fairness concerns

implicated in Njango are not present here, its holding does not control the

outcome.

We note, as a corollary to MPS, parole supervision for life (PSL)

contains a similar provision requiring PSL to "commence immediately upon

the defendant's release from incarceration" unless "the defendant is serving a

sentence of incarceration for another offense at the time the defendant

completes the custodial portion of the sentence imposed" under PSL, in which

case PSL "shall not commence until the defendant is actually released from

incarceration for the other offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b). As with NERA,

an offender subject to PSL remains in the custody of the Commissioner of the

DOC and is supervised by the Board, subject to parole conditions. Compare

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c), with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(b). While not explicitly

provided in the statute, an offender's PSL term is tolled during civil

A-2328-24 10 commitment as a sexually violent predator. 3 See In re Civ. Commitment of

R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 179 (2014) (discussing the PSL conditions imposed after

the release of an offender civilly committed under the Sexually Violent

Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to .38).

A sensible reading of the statute leads us to conclude the Legislature

intended a NERA offender to serve the mandatory three- or five-year MPS

term while in the community, not in federal detention. We therefore discern

no basis to disturb the Board's determination Wright's MPS term was tolled

while he was detained in ICE custody and commenced upon his release to the

community.

Affirmed.

3 A defendant convicted of a sex offense subject to PSL may also be subject to NERA. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(7) and (8); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a).

A-2328-24 11