UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 22-1420 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 25 : UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF : JUSTICE, et al., : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”); Merrick B. Garland in his official capacity as the Attorney
General of the United States; the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”); Christopher Wray in
his official capacity as the Director of the FBI; and the Civil Process Clerk for the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff raises a
variety of allegations, asserting that the FBI has been monitoring Plaintiff’s computer and phone
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, interfering with potential employment opportunities, and
attempting to get Plaintiff to violate federal law. Plaintiff claims that the DOJ and the FBI are
targeting Plaintiff based on his race and in violation of his civil and constitutional rights.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons detailed below, the Court grants Defendants’
motion to dismiss. II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 18, 2022. Compl., ECF No. 1. His original
complaint outlines various allegations against the FBI, claiming that the agency has harassed and
discriminated against Plaintiff in an “attempt[] to destroy [his] life.” Id. at 4–7. On May 24,
2022, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”). See FAC, ECF No. 3. On September
28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). See SAC, ECF No. 13. 1
Plaintiff first alleges that, after he submitted a bid for a government contract with the city
of Miami, the FBI contacted certain Miami government employees and asked them to select
Plaintiff for the bid in the hopes that he “would lie to try violate Federal Laws [sic] to win the
contract.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff next contends that the FBI monitored his computer and “sabotage[d]
plaintiff’s website . . . to prevent the plaintiff from have a [sic] commerce and generate revenue.”
Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff then includes a litany of allegations about the FBI interfering with various job
interviews by contacting his interviewers and telling them not to hire him. Id. ¶¶ 11–18.
According to Plaintiff, he has “suffered discrimination and harassment in whole by the FBI . . .
since August 1, 2020 [and has been] singled out for adverse treatment by FBI done under
‘National Security Letters’ . . . use to shield their violation of Federal Laws [sic].” Id. ¶ 1. In
short, Plaintiff claims that the FBI has violated multiple federal statutes and the Fourth and Ninth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 22–30. He seeks $100 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 13.
1 The Court considers the SAC to be the operative complaint. Although Defendants respond to the original complaint in their motion to dismiss, their arguments apply with equal force to the SAC, which does not differ substantially from the original complaint.
2 On February 28, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 5, 7, ECF No. 25. In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’
arguments are “just gobbledygook” and that his case should be allowed to proceed to discovery,
considering the public interest of full judicial review. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 2, 4, 7, ECF No. 29 (emphasis removed).
III. ANALYSIS
Because Plaintiff’s complaint is patently insubstantial, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are “construed liberally and [are]
held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Lemon v. Kramer,
270 F. Supp. 3d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam)). Nevertheless, “pro se plaintiffs retain the burden to establish that the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over their case.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Trump, No. 18-cv-2820, 2019 WL 11769175, at *1 (D.D.C. May 6, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Xiu
Jian Sun v. Trump, No. 19-5197, 2020 WL 873534 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2020). A complaint may
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the complaint is “patently insubstantial
and thus presents no federal question suitable for decision.” Id. (quoting Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts,
No. 18-cv-1233, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019)) (cleaned up). “Declining to
hear a claim because it is patently insubstantial is ‘reserved for complaints resting on truly
fanciful factual allegations,’ while ‘legally deficient complaints’ are still reserved for 12(b)(6)
dismissals.” Yi Tai Shao, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (quoting Vasaturo v. Peterka, 203 F. Supp.
3d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2016)) (emphasis in original). To meet this standard, “claims must be flimsier
than doubtful or questionable—they must be essentially fictitious.” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F.
3 Supp. 3d at 44) (cleaned up). “Essentially fictitious claims include ‘bizarre conspiracy theories,
any fantastic government manipulations of the will or mind, and any sort of supernatural
intervention.’” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 44) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s accusations rely solely on unsubstantiated theories about the FBI interfering
with his life. Plaintiff claims that he would be able to prove each of the assertions about the FBI
interfering with his various job interviews by deposing the interviewers. See SAC ¶¶ 12–18.
Yet he offers no evidence beyond his bare allegations—the sort of “bizarre conspiracy theories”
and “clearly fanciful claims” that are “‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid
of merit.’” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 536 (1974)).
Assertions “of surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins” like
Plaintiff’s have been dismissed by this Court and others in this District for patent
insubstantiality. Williams v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-cv-1084, 2023 WL 2139367
(D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2023); see also, e.g., Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1008 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2009); Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d
47, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2008). For example, in Williams, this Court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that
the FBI and other government agencies had planted listening devices in her home and stalked her
as part of a years-long investigation. See 2023 WL 2139367, at *7. Plaintiff's allegations
regarding the FBI blocking his various employment opportunities, interfering with his website,
and trying to set him up to commit fraud may be similarly characterized by the “common theme”
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 22-1420 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 25 : UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF : JUSTICE, et al., : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”); Merrick B. Garland in his official capacity as the Attorney
General of the United States; the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”); Christopher Wray in
his official capacity as the Director of the FBI; and the Civil Process Clerk for the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff raises a
variety of allegations, asserting that the FBI has been monitoring Plaintiff’s computer and phone
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, interfering with potential employment opportunities, and
attempting to get Plaintiff to violate federal law. Plaintiff claims that the DOJ and the FBI are
targeting Plaintiff based on his race and in violation of his civil and constitutional rights.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons detailed below, the Court grants Defendants’
motion to dismiss. II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 18, 2022. Compl., ECF No. 1. His original
complaint outlines various allegations against the FBI, claiming that the agency has harassed and
discriminated against Plaintiff in an “attempt[] to destroy [his] life.” Id. at 4–7. On May 24,
2022, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”). See FAC, ECF No. 3. On September
28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). See SAC, ECF No. 13. 1
Plaintiff first alleges that, after he submitted a bid for a government contract with the city
of Miami, the FBI contacted certain Miami government employees and asked them to select
Plaintiff for the bid in the hopes that he “would lie to try violate Federal Laws [sic] to win the
contract.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff next contends that the FBI monitored his computer and “sabotage[d]
plaintiff’s website . . . to prevent the plaintiff from have a [sic] commerce and generate revenue.”
Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff then includes a litany of allegations about the FBI interfering with various job
interviews by contacting his interviewers and telling them not to hire him. Id. ¶¶ 11–18.
According to Plaintiff, he has “suffered discrimination and harassment in whole by the FBI . . .
since August 1, 2020 [and has been] singled out for adverse treatment by FBI done under
‘National Security Letters’ . . . use to shield their violation of Federal Laws [sic].” Id. ¶ 1. In
short, Plaintiff claims that the FBI has violated multiple federal statutes and the Fourth and Ninth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 22–30. He seeks $100 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 13.
1 The Court considers the SAC to be the operative complaint. Although Defendants respond to the original complaint in their motion to dismiss, their arguments apply with equal force to the SAC, which does not differ substantially from the original complaint.
2 On February 28, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 5, 7, ECF No. 25. In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’
arguments are “just gobbledygook” and that his case should be allowed to proceed to discovery,
considering the public interest of full judicial review. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 2, 4, 7, ECF No. 29 (emphasis removed).
III. ANALYSIS
Because Plaintiff’s complaint is patently insubstantial, the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are “construed liberally and [are]
held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Lemon v. Kramer,
270 F. Supp. 3d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam)). Nevertheless, “pro se plaintiffs retain the burden to establish that the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over their case.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Trump, No. 18-cv-2820, 2019 WL 11769175, at *1 (D.D.C. May 6, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Xiu
Jian Sun v. Trump, No. 19-5197, 2020 WL 873534 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2020). A complaint may
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the complaint is “patently insubstantial
and thus presents no federal question suitable for decision.” Id. (quoting Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts,
No. 18-cv-1233, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019)) (cleaned up). “Declining to
hear a claim because it is patently insubstantial is ‘reserved for complaints resting on truly
fanciful factual allegations,’ while ‘legally deficient complaints’ are still reserved for 12(b)(6)
dismissals.” Yi Tai Shao, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (quoting Vasaturo v. Peterka, 203 F. Supp.
3d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2016)) (emphasis in original). To meet this standard, “claims must be flimsier
than doubtful or questionable—they must be essentially fictitious.” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F.
3 Supp. 3d at 44) (cleaned up). “Essentially fictitious claims include ‘bizarre conspiracy theories,
any fantastic government manipulations of the will or mind, and any sort of supernatural
intervention.’” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 44) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s accusations rely solely on unsubstantiated theories about the FBI interfering
with his life. Plaintiff claims that he would be able to prove each of the assertions about the FBI
interfering with his various job interviews by deposing the interviewers. See SAC ¶¶ 12–18.
Yet he offers no evidence beyond his bare allegations—the sort of “bizarre conspiracy theories”
and “clearly fanciful claims” that are “‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid
of merit.’” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528, 536 (1974)).
Assertions “of surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins” like
Plaintiff’s have been dismissed by this Court and others in this District for patent
insubstantiality. Williams v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-cv-1084, 2023 WL 2139367
(D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2023); see also, e.g., Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1008 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2009); Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d
47, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2008). For example, in Williams, this Court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that
the FBI and other government agencies had planted listening devices in her home and stalked her
as part of a years-long investigation. See 2023 WL 2139367, at *7. Plaintiff's allegations
regarding the FBI blocking his various employment opportunities, interfering with his website,
and trying to set him up to commit fraud may be similarly characterized by the “common theme”
underlying each of the cases listed above that were dismissed for patent insubstantiality: they are
“not merely factually unsubstantiated, but factually fanciful to the point that they [are]
‘essentially fictitious.’” Yi Tai Shao, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (quoting Best, 39 F. 3d at 330);
4 see also Jean-Baptiste v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-1054, 2023 WL 3736770, at *2
(D.D.C. May 31, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that the FBI had
blocked him from making securities trades on E*TRADE based on subject matter jurisdiction).
Moreover, and for the same reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)). When deciding a motion to dismiss, “the Court must . . .
‘treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. IRS, 261 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). “But a plaintiff must put forth factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2019 WL 11769175, at *2
(citation omitted and cleaned up).
Plaintiff does not provide factual support for his allegations in the SAC, providing
nothing beyond the mere allegations that the FBI set up the Plaintiff to commit fraud, interfered
with his website, and contacted any of his interviewers to prevent him from being hired. See
SAC ¶¶ 9–18. Simply put, Plaintiff has not put forth any factual content from which the Court
might draw the inference that Defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct. See Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2019 WL 11769175, at *2.
5 IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: September 7, 2023 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge