J.D. v. C.N.D.

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3827-24

J.D.1,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.N.D.,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted June 4, 2026 – Decided June 29, 2026

Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FV-04-0185-26.

Kahn & Lehrfeld, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Cori H. Lehrfeld, on the brief).

Donelson, D'Alessandro & Peterson, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Linwood H. Donelson III, on the brief).

1 We use the parties' initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(c)(12). Defendant C.N.D. appeals from a July 24, 2025 final restraining order

(FRO) entered against him in favor of plaintiff J.D. pursuant to the Prevention

of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm.

Each party testified at the FRO trial, and the court considered electronic

evidence in the form of emails, texts, and a recording. The parties have been in

a long-term marriage and have five children, all but one of whom are minors.

The minor children ranged in age from five to fourteen years old and all resided

with the parties. The predicate acts of domestic violence happened within one

month of plaintiff filing a complaint for divorce.

Plaintiff testified the relationship became tense after she filed the divorce

complaint, and there was very little communication between the parties. On

July 9, 2025, plaintiff told defendant she was going to stay with her sister and

he "exploded."

Plaintiff recorded the exchange because she "knew he wasn't going to take

it well that [she] was leaving." On the recording, defendant is heard saying:

"F**k all of you guys," to plaintiff and the children. The children are heard

imploring defendant to stop and attempting to calm him. After cursing at the

family, defendant then said: "Don't worry. I won't be around much longer. I

won't. You can have everything." Defendant insisted on wanting to "sit down

A-3827-24 2 and talk" to plaintiff. She refused and remarked the parties' living conditions

were "unbearable" because defendant had placed cameras throughout the

residence and had a private investigator follow her for more than six months.

Defendant responded this was because plaintiff would not talk to him.

When it was clear plaintiff did not want to discuss things with defendant,

he resumed cursing at her and attempted to enlist the children in his tirade by

instructing one of them to tell plaintiff what she thought of plaintiff. When this

did not work, defendant became angry and slammed his head into the

refrigerator, which caused him to fall to the ground. After defendant struck the

refrigerator, plaintiff stopped recording and called 9-1-1.

Defendant left before the police arrived, but they caught up with him.

They took him to a hospital for evaluation, and he was released the next day.

Plaintiff tried to calm the children, and they remained in the marital

residence until the next day. Given defendant's impending return, plaintiff

panicked and left with the children for her aunt's home in Maryland. They left

in such a rush, the children packed their belongings in trash bags. Plaintiff

feared the consequences of calling 9-1-1 on defendant and speaking with the

police. Even so, before leaving for Maryland, she emailed defendant to let him

know where she and the children were.

A-3827-24 3 Plaintiff's domestic violence complaint laid out a history of harassment,

explaining that in the six months preceding the complaint, defendant placed her

and the children under "constant surveillance" by installing cameras in the

marital residence, having plaintiff followed, and sending her pictures of the

places she visited as proof of the surveillance. At trial, plaintiff testified that

during an argument defendant told her she was not allowed to leave him and he

read off the dates and times she visited certain places. As an example of the

surveillance, plaintiff told defendant she made an appointment to get new tires

at a local tire center. However, plaintiff changed her appointment to a different

branch. Defendant then confronted her for lying to him by sending her a text

from the location where the original appointment had been made, showing she

was not there. Plaintiff felt as if she was under constant surveillance and became

"anxious all the time."

On July 10, 2025, police contacted plaintiff while she and the children

were en route to her aunt's home in Maryland. They explained defendant had

called them, even though plaintiff previously told defendant where she and the

children were. On July 13, 2025, Maryland police visited her aunt's residence

twice because of defendant. Plaintiff testified defendant had done this before

when she and the children visited Maryland on June 27, 2025.

A-3827-24 4 Plaintiff and the children returned to New Jersey on July 14, 2025. She

discovered defendant had cut the cable television line in the marital residence

and changed the password on the family Netflix account.

Plaintiff testified defendant's conduct scared her because it was escalating.

When the parties were dating, defendant accused plaintiff of cheating on him.

During the marriage he displayed a distrust of plaintiff because he believed she

had a relationship with another person five years before the parties were married.

Plaintiff denied having such a relationship.

Plaintiff changed her telephone number due to defendant's behavior. She

testified she needed an FRO since she was scared and could not live with

defendant because of the harassment.

Defendant testified his actions were a result of plaintiff's physical and

emotional abuse of the children. On July 9, he involved the children in the

discussion because he was attempting to get the family into counseling. He

claimed he was mediating between plaintiff and the children.

Defendant denied deliberately striking his head against the refrigerator,

and instead, claimed he fainted because he had low blood oxygen levels and a

low red blood cell count. He denied being suicidal. Rather, on July 9, his

A-3827-24 5 comments were borne of a desire to talk and avoid a divorce. Defendant

conceded he was held in the hospital overnight.

On July 10, defendant claimed he called the police because he observed

the children on camera leaving the marital residence with garbage bags. He

heard one of the children say they were being forced to leave.

Defendant also conceded he called the police on June 27. He claimed

plaintiff took the children to Maryland against their will. Defendant also

asserted he called the police because another aunt was physically abusing the

children.

Defendant denied hiring a private investigator or surveilling plaintiff. He

installed the cameras because there were automobile break-ins in the

neighborhood, and to keep an eye on the children. Although plaintiff was home

with them, defendant feared she would fall asleep and leave them unattended.

Defendant denied tracking plaintiff to the tire center. He stopped there

because it was on the way to his mother's house. Defendant argued he texted

plaintiff about not being at the tire center because she was always lying to him.

He also claimed she had an affair months, not years, before the marriage.

Defendant conceded plaintiff changed her telephone number and told him

to communicate with her only by email. However, he claimed he was the victim

A-3827-24 6 of domestic violence. He pointed to a prior domestic violence complaint he filed

because plaintiff was allegedly abusing drugs. Defendant dismissed it because

she sought treatment.

Defendant did not address the cut cable line allegation but admitted to

changing the Netflix password because he received an alert someone in

Philadelphia had signed into the account. Nonetheless, he claimed he gave the

password to his father to pass on to the children.

After defendant completed his direct, cross, and re-direct testimony, the

court questioned him about the recording of the July 9 incident and the events

that followed. For the first time, defendant added he installed the cameras

because plaintiff was abusing the children. On July 9, he enlisted the children

in the discussion because their daughter was allegedly afraid to discuss her

feminine issues with plaintiff.

The trial court found defendant committed harassment on July 9 and 10.

Discussing N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), it noted the recording revealed he was upset

and confrontational, which evidenced an intent to harass and control. The

surveillance cameras were also a part of defendant's desire to control the family.

The escalation of what was an argument between plaintiff and defendant, which

the court observed could have been a contretemps, turned into harassment and

A-3827-24 7 domestic violence once defendant involved the children and then attempted to

hurt himself. The court also concluded sending Maryland police to supposedly

check on the children was a part of the pattern of harassment.

The court credited plaintiff's testimony she was afraid of defendant and

needed an FRO. Her testimony about fleeing to Maryland was credible because

the children had packed their belongings into trash bags, evidencing their alarm.

The court also concluded plaintiff needed an FRO because defendant would not

leave her alone once she arrived in Maryland.

I.

Defendant argues the trial court's finding he committed harassment was

erroneous because the court failed to outline how defendant's yelling and self-

injury constituted an intent to harass plaintiff. He also challenges the court's

finding plaintiff needed an FRO, because the court focused on the children rather

than finding plaintiff was in immediate danger.

Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463

N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We owe substantial deference to the

Family Part's findings because of its special expertise in family matters. Cesare

v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Family Part judges . . . routinely hear

domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference

A-3827-24 8 between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between

couples.'" C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458,

482 (2011)). Our deference is especially warranted when the evidence is largely

testimonial and rests on a judge's credibility findings. Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J.

414, 428 (2015).

We will not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless "they are so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant [,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.

474, 484 (1974)). However, we review legal conclusions de novo. Thieme v.

Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).

The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence

the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453

N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492,

504 (App. Div. 2007)); N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. The PDVA authorizes judges to

issue an FRO against a person "after a finding . . . is made that an act of domestic

violence was committed by that person." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) defines harassment as: "Engag[ing] in any other

course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to

A-3827-24 9 alarm or seriously annoy such other person." "A finding of a purpose to harass

may be inferred from the evidence presented," based on "[c]ommon sense and

experience." State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997). "[S]erious annoyance

under subsection (c) means to weary, worry, trouble, or offend." Id. at 581.

Having considered defendant's arguments in light of these principles and

the record, we conclude there is no reason to disturb the trial court's findings.

Although defendant complains about the extent of the findings, "it is well-settled

that appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions . . . or

reasons given for the ultimate conclusion." Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway,

168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001).

The record readily supports the harassment finding because the incident

on July 9 was certainly not a contretemps. Defendant's behavior intended to

control plaintiff by using the children against her. When that failed, defendant

resorted to violent behavior by having the children and plaintiff witness his

attempt at self-harm. This conduct clearly fell within the ambit of N.J.S.A.

2C:33-4(c) because it objectively would "weary, worry, trouble, or offend"

anyone observing it. Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 581.

Defendant's attempts to explain his conduct by claiming he wanted to

address a child's feminine needs and that his medical condition caused him to

A-3827-24 10 fall into the refrigerator are unsupported by any objective evidence in the record.

The recording makes no mention of the child's alleged fear of discussing her

needs with plaintiff, and there was no medical evidence showing defendant fell

because he had a low blood oxygen level or red blood cell count.

There is no evidence defendant had a valid purpose to have Maryland

police check on the children, other than to attempt to exert control over plaintiff

from afar. As we noted, defendant conceded plaintiff changed her telephone

number and had asked him to communicate with her only by email. Plaintiff

told defendant where she and the children were headed. His claims of abuse

against her and the aunt have no support in the record. The court properly

concluded defendant's only purpose in calling Maryland police was to harass

plaintiff.

Finally, the trial court correctly interpreted the evidence when it

concluded defendant was controlling and plaintiff needed an FRO to stop the

harassment. Domestic violence "describes a pattern of abusive and controlling

behavior." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 246 (App. Div. 1995). It

is characterized as a cycle of abuse, apology, reconciliation, and a return to

normalcy, "until tension builds and the cycle starts again." United States v.

Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 757 (7th Cir. 2021).

A-3827-24 11 The glimpse provided into the parties' relationship by the record evidences

a pattern of abuse and control. Plaintiff characterized the July 9 incident as an

explosion. Having listened to the entire testimony, the trial court observed:

"Everybody's in the frying pan because of [defendant]'s conduct." It also

credited plaintiff's testimony she and the children fled to Maryland, carrying

their belongings in trash bags, as evidence of her alarm. The court's conclusion

"[d]efendant is of a[n] inherent need to try to control the situation regarding the

end of his marriage, which is forcing him to go out of control" is amply

supported by the record. The trial court understood the domestic violence

dynamic and defendant has given us no cause to second-guess its decision.

Affirmed.

A-3827-24 12