J&D Brothers, Inc. v. Finnegan, W.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided November 4, 2015·No. 1014 EDA 2015·Unpublished

Opinion

J. A25042/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J&D BROTHERS, INC., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant :

:

v. :

:

WALTER J. FINNEGAN, DIANE G. : FINNEGAN, OSCAR J. CRIST, : DOROTHY G. CRIST, WILLIAM SIMON, : CAROLYN SIMON, STEVEN SCHNEIDER, : CHERYL S. SCHNEIDER :

: No. 1014 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order March 13, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division No(s).: 2013-C-0310

BEFORE: PANELLA, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 04, 2015 Appellant, J&D Brothers, Inc., appeals from the order entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas providing, inter alia, that it, its agents and/or its lessees, have the right to unobstructed use of Beacon Road1 for any purpose related to the communications tower on Appellant’s property an unlimited number of times only on two days per month. Appellant contends

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that Beacon Road is a private road traversing residential properties owned by Appellees. Appellees Walter J. Finnegan, Diane G. Finnegan, Oscar J. Crist, and Dorothy Crist did not file briefs.

J.A25042/15

the trial court erred in limiting its unobstructed use of the prescriptive easement to two days per month. We reverse and remand.

We adopt the trial court’s findings of fact.2 Trial Ct. Op., 11/6/14, at 2-5. Appellant filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether an easement existed with regard to Beacon Road. A non-jury trial was held on July 15, 2014. The trial court entered judgment on November 6, 2014, finding, inter alia, that Appellant possesses a prescriptive easement over Beacon Road as it transverses over Appellees’ properties. Judgment, 11/6/14, at 1. The court found that Appellant “as owner of the dominant estate, has the right to unobstructed use of Beacon Road for any purpose related to the communications tower on [Appellant’s] property or for recreational activity up to two times per month.” Id. at 1-2 (unpaginated). Appellant filed post trial motions on November 17, 2014. Appellees filed post trial motions on December 12, 2014. The trial court entered a clarification order on March 13, 2015 which provided that Appellant had unobstructed and unlimited use of Beacon Road for the purposes of maintaining the road, for a reasonable amount of time for recreational use, and for two days per month for any purpose related to the communications tower. Clarification Order, 3/13/15. This timely appeal followed. Appellant

2 We note that the majority of the facts pertinent to the instant appeal are not contested.

J.A25042/15

was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

The trial court erred when it limited Appellants, its agents’

and/or its lessees’ unobstructed use of the subject easement to an unlimited number of times two days per month for any purpose related to the communications tower located on Appellant’s property.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant argues the trial courts clarification order significantly changed the frequency of use of Beacon Road during the prescriptive period. During the prescriptive period there were no restrictions on the use of Beacon Road. Appellant avers that although the trial court found that the communications tower provides emergency cellular services, cellular and telephone services, its limitation on access to make repairs could have catastrophic consequences. Appellant contends “such limited access during another Hurricane such as that which occurred in 2012, would cripple [Appellant] and its lessee from performing mandated repairs or maintenance . . . .” Id. at 26. Appellant argues that it “has not requested an expansion of its easement, but has always demanded the status quo, to insure that anything necessary with the communications tower may be addressed when and as needed consistent with its prior use over a period more than 21 years.” Id. at 31. Appellant claims that the limitations imposed on the

J.A25042/15

prescriptive easement may result in violations of the law with regard to the communications tower.

Our review is governed by the following principles:

Our scope of review is limited. We are bound by findings of fact which are supported by the record, but not the trial court’s conclusions of law. We must have due regard for the trial court’s superior vantage and its prerogatives to access credibility and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. Finally, we may not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law.

Waltimyer v. Smith, 556 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. Super. 1989).

An easement or right-of-way by prescription arises by adverse, open, continuous, notorious, and uninterrupted use of the land for twenty-one years. The scope of the use during the prescriptive period determines the scope of the easement or right-of-way obtained, except with respect to a reasonable evolution of the use which is not unduly burdensome.

Id. at 913-14 (citations omitted).

“A prescriptive easement, once acquired, may not be restricted unreasonably by the possessor of the land subject to the easement.” Soderberg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations omitted). Furthermore,

[w]e have recognized that “the degree of use of a prescriptive easement may increase in certain circumstances to accommodate the normal evolution of the dominant tenement where reasonable[.]” [(quoting Hash v. Sofinowski, 487 A.2d 32, 36 (Pa. Super. 1985).].

Nevertheless, “[t]he extent of an easement created by prescription is fixed by the use through which it was created.” Id. at 34 (quoting Restatement of Property § 477 (1944)). Consequently, expansion of such use and

J.A25042/15

the extent to which it may be treated as “normal evolution,” is necessarily limited. See id. at 34 (“[T]he scope of such an easement must necessarily be a function of the continued, adverse use by which it was generated and is thus limited to that of the prescriptive period.”). As recognized by the Restatement, to determine whether a particular use is permissible under a prescriptive easement “a comparison must be made between such use and the use by which the easement was created with respect to (a)

their physical character, (b) their purpose, (c) the relative burden caused by them upon the servient tenement.” Id.

at 35 (quoting Restatement of Property § 478).[3]

3 Section 478 of the Restatement of Property provides:

In ascertaining whether a particular use is permissible under an easement created by prescription a comparison must be made between such use and the use by which the easement was created with respect to

(a) their physical character, (b) their purpose,

(c) the relative burden caused by them upon the servient tenement.

Restatement (First) of Property § 478 (1944). The comment provides, in pertinent part:

d. Increase in burden. The asserted use may so greatly increase the burden upon the servient tenement that on that ground a conclusion that the use is not permissible may be reached. A prescriptive interest presupposes an assertion of privilege by the person whose adverse use created it and a failure on the part of the owner of the servient tenement to interrupt the use. An increase in the burden on the servient tenement beyond that caused by the adverse use by which an easement was created is an undue increase if it is such an increase as, it may reasonably be assumed, would have provoked an interruption in the adverse use had the increase occurred

J.A25042/15

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

J&D Brothers, Inc. v. Finnegan, W., (Pa. Ct. App. 2015).

J&D Brothers, Inc. v. Finnegan, W. (J&D Brothers, Inc. v. Finnegan, W.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Mann-Hoff v. Boyer
604 A.2d 703 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1992)
Loudenslager v. Mosteller
307 A.2d 286 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973)
Walley v. Iraca
520 A.2d 886 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
Humberston v. Humbert
407 A.2d 31 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1979)
Sentz v. Crabbs
630 A.2d 894 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1993)
McGavitt v. Guttman Realty Co.
909 A.2d 1 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Waltimyer v. Smith
556 A.2d 912 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
Sprankle v. Burns
675 A.2d 1287 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)
Regis Insurance Co. v. Wood
852 A.2d 347 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)
Burkett v. Smyder
535 A.2d 671 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)
Fairbanks v. Travelers Insurance
486 A.2d 469 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1984)
Soderberg v. Weisel
687 A.2d 839 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Bucciarelli v. DeLisa
691 A.2d 446 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Orth v. Werkheiser
451 A.2d 1026 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1982)
Tosh v. Witts
113 A.2d 226 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1955)
Phillippi v. Knotter
748 A.2d 757 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2000)
Hash v. Sofinowski
487 A.2d 32 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1985)
Matakitis v. Woodmansee
667 A.2d 228 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Tomlinson v. Jones
557 A.2d 1103 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)
Kaufer v. Beccaris
584 A.2d 357 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1991)