1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.C.E.P., No. 1:25-cv-01559-EFB 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER AND NOTICE UNDER RULE 65(a)(2) 14 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the court is petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1); 18 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2); and Motion to Proceed Via Pseudonym (ECF 19 No. 3); and respondent’s Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance (ECF No. 17). For the 20 reasons set forth below, the court grants petitioner’s motion to proceed via pseudonym and denies 21 respondent’s motion to hold the proceedings in abeyance. The court also gives notice of its intent 22 to consolidate petitioner’s request for preliminary injunctive relief with the determination of the 23 merits of the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). 24 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 25 On November 14, 2025, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; a Motion 26 Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction; and a Motion to Proceed Via 27 Pseudonym. ECF Nos. 1-3. Respondents filed an opposition to the Motion for Temporary 28 Restraining Order on November 18, 2025, ECF No. 11, and petitioner filed a Reply the following 1 day. ECF No. 13. On November 18, 2025, as well, the District Judge reassigned the case to the 2 undersigned for all purposes, on the consent of the parties. ECF No. 12. 3 On November 20, 2025, the undersigned ordered Respondents to file an answer or return 4 to the petition within 14 days. ECF No. 14. On November 24, 2025, the undersigned granted 5 petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and ordered respondents to show cause why 6 petitioner’s request for preliminary injunction should not be granted. ECF No. 16. On November 7 28, 2025, respondents filed a brief opposing the request for preliminary injunction, indicating 8 non-opposition to the request to proceed via pseudonym, and moving for the proceedings to be 9 held in abeyance pending the resolution of the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 10 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). ECF No. 17. On December 3, 2025, petitioner filed a reply to 11 respondent’s opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the request 12 to hold the proceedings in abeyance. ECF No. 19. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Motion to Proceed Via Pseudonym 15 A party may proceed anonymously in a federal suit where he shows that nondisclosure of 16 his identity “is necessary . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal 17 embarrassment.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 18 2000) (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1981)). To meet this 19 standard, the party must demonstrate that his “need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the 20 opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068. 21 Specifically, the district court should consider “(1) the severity of the threatened harm, . . .; (2) 22 the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, . . .; and (3) the anonymous party’s 23 vulnerability to such retaliation,” and weigh these considerations against “the precise prejudice at 24 each stage of the proceedings to the opposing party, and whether proceedings may be structured 25 so as to mitigate that prejudice,” as well as the public’s interest in knowing the identity of the 26 party at issue. Id. at 1068-69 (internal citations omitted). 27 Here, petitioner has made an adequate showing to justify his proceeding via pseudonym. 28 Petitioner’s underlying immigration action alleges that he experienced threats on his life in 1 Mexico, leading to his asylum request, and that, if he is repatriated to Mexico, he is at risk of 2 repeated or retaliatory violence. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 11. These types of concerns are sufficiently 3 severe and reasonable to militate towards granting a request for anonymity, see Does I thru XXIII, 4 214 F.3d at 1069-70, which respondents do not contest. See ECF No. 17 at 2. Given that 5 petitioner’s identity is known to respondents, there appears no prejudice to his proceeding via 6 pseudonym, see J.J. v. Olympia Sch. Dist., No. C16-5060 BHS, 2016 WL 3597784, at *2 (W.D. 7 Wash. July 5, 2016), and the public’s interest in knowing petitioner’s identity in this proceeding 8 is minimal, given that, in all other respects, the public’s access to information in this case is 9 unfettered. See id.; Doe v. Penzato, No. CV10-5154 MEJ, 2011 WL 1833007, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 10 May 13, 2011). Accordingly, petitioner’s motion is granted. 11 B. Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance 12 Respondents request that the court hold in abeyance the remaining proceedings in this 13 case pending the resolution of the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. 14 Wash. 2025), which respondents represent will likely be dispositive to the issues of this case. 15 ECF No. 17 at 2. That request is denied. 16 A district court possesses inherent discretion to stay civil proceedings before it. See 17 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The court may, “[i]n the exercise of a sound 18 discretion . . . hold one lawsuit in abeyance to abide the outcome of another, especially where the 19 parties and the issues are the same.” Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937); see 20 also Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining district 21 court “may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the 22 parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which 23 bear upon the case”). In determining whether to stay a case and hold it in abeyance, the district 24 could must weigh “‘the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the 25 hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly 26 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and 27 questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.’” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 28 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). 1 “‘[I]f there is even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else,’ the stay 2 may be inappropriate absent a showing by the moving party of ‘hardship or inequity.’” 3 Dependable Highway Express v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) 4 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). The respondent “being required to defend a suit, without 5 more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’” within the meaning of this 6 standard. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112; see also Dependable Highway Express, 498 F.3d at 1066. 7 In all cases, “[t]he proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton v. 8 Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). 9 Here, respondents have not shown that a stay is appropriate in this proceeding. 10 Respondents argue that “the issues in Rodriguez [v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 J.C.E.P., No. 1:25-cv-01559-EFB 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER AND NOTICE UNDER RULE 65(a)(2) 14 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the court is petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1); 18 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2); and Motion to Proceed Via Pseudonym (ECF 19 No. 3); and respondent’s Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance (ECF No. 17). For the 20 reasons set forth below, the court grants petitioner’s motion to proceed via pseudonym and denies 21 respondent’s motion to hold the proceedings in abeyance. The court also gives notice of its intent 22 to consolidate petitioner’s request for preliminary injunctive relief with the determination of the 23 merits of the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). 24 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 25 On November 14, 2025, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; a Motion 26 Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction; and a Motion to Proceed Via 27 Pseudonym. ECF Nos. 1-3. Respondents filed an opposition to the Motion for Temporary 28 Restraining Order on November 18, 2025, ECF No. 11, and petitioner filed a Reply the following 1 day. ECF No. 13. On November 18, 2025, as well, the District Judge reassigned the case to the 2 undersigned for all purposes, on the consent of the parties. ECF No. 12. 3 On November 20, 2025, the undersigned ordered Respondents to file an answer or return 4 to the petition within 14 days. ECF No. 14. On November 24, 2025, the undersigned granted 5 petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and ordered respondents to show cause why 6 petitioner’s request for preliminary injunction should not be granted. ECF No. 16. On November 7 28, 2025, respondents filed a brief opposing the request for preliminary injunction, indicating 8 non-opposition to the request to proceed via pseudonym, and moving for the proceedings to be 9 held in abeyance pending the resolution of the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 10 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). ECF No. 17. On December 3, 2025, petitioner filed a reply to 11 respondent’s opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the request 12 to hold the proceedings in abeyance. ECF No. 19. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Motion to Proceed Via Pseudonym 15 A party may proceed anonymously in a federal suit where he shows that nondisclosure of 16 his identity “is necessary . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal 17 embarrassment.” Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 18 2000) (quoting United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1981)). To meet this 19 standard, the party must demonstrate that his “need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the 20 opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Id. at 1068. 21 Specifically, the district court should consider “(1) the severity of the threatened harm, . . .; (2) 22 the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, . . .; and (3) the anonymous party’s 23 vulnerability to such retaliation,” and weigh these considerations against “the precise prejudice at 24 each stage of the proceedings to the opposing party, and whether proceedings may be structured 25 so as to mitigate that prejudice,” as well as the public’s interest in knowing the identity of the 26 party at issue. Id. at 1068-69 (internal citations omitted). 27 Here, petitioner has made an adequate showing to justify his proceeding via pseudonym. 28 Petitioner’s underlying immigration action alleges that he experienced threats on his life in 1 Mexico, leading to his asylum request, and that, if he is repatriated to Mexico, he is at risk of 2 repeated or retaliatory violence. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 11. These types of concerns are sufficiently 3 severe and reasonable to militate towards granting a request for anonymity, see Does I thru XXIII, 4 214 F.3d at 1069-70, which respondents do not contest. See ECF No. 17 at 2. Given that 5 petitioner’s identity is known to respondents, there appears no prejudice to his proceeding via 6 pseudonym, see J.J. v. Olympia Sch. Dist., No. C16-5060 BHS, 2016 WL 3597784, at *2 (W.D. 7 Wash. July 5, 2016), and the public’s interest in knowing petitioner’s identity in this proceeding 8 is minimal, given that, in all other respects, the public’s access to information in this case is 9 unfettered. See id.; Doe v. Penzato, No. CV10-5154 MEJ, 2011 WL 1833007, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 10 May 13, 2011). Accordingly, petitioner’s motion is granted. 11 B. Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance 12 Respondents request that the court hold in abeyance the remaining proceedings in this 13 case pending the resolution of the appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. 14 Wash. 2025), which respondents represent will likely be dispositive to the issues of this case. 15 ECF No. 17 at 2. That request is denied. 16 A district court possesses inherent discretion to stay civil proceedings before it. See 17 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The court may, “[i]n the exercise of a sound 18 discretion . . . hold one lawsuit in abeyance to abide the outcome of another, especially where the 19 parties and the issues are the same.” Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937); see 20 also Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining district 21 court “may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the 22 parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which 23 bear upon the case”). In determining whether to stay a case and hold it in abeyance, the district 24 could must weigh “‘the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the 25 hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly 26 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and 27 questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.’” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 28 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). 1 “‘[I]f there is even a fair possibility that the stay . . . will work damage to someone else,’ the stay 2 may be inappropriate absent a showing by the moving party of ‘hardship or inequity.’” 3 Dependable Highway Express v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) 4 (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). The respondent “being required to defend a suit, without 5 more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’” within the meaning of this 6 standard. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112; see also Dependable Highway Express, 498 F.3d at 1066. 7 In all cases, “[t]he proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton v. 8 Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). 9 Here, respondents have not shown that a stay is appropriate in this proceeding. 10 Respondents argue that “the issues in Rodriguez [v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 11 2025)] are likely to be dispositive of the issues in this case,” ECF No. 17 at 2, but the record 12 belies this assertion. In Rodriguez, the petitioner alleged three causes of action: that the BIA’s 13 denial of a bond hearing violated 8 U.S.C. § 1226; that the denial of the bond hearing violated the 14 Administrative Procedures Act; and that the “BIA’s chronically delayed adjudication of bond 15 appeals violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the APA.” Rodriguez v. 16 Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). The district court granted the 17 petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction on the first of these grounds, finding petitioner had 18 raised serious questions as to whether his bond hearing denial was unlawful under section 1226 of 19 the INA. Id. at 1245, 1255-61, 1263. 20 In contrast, here, petitioner has alleged that his ongoing detention without a bond hearing 21 violates his procedural and substantive due process rights. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 96-106. In opposing his 22 request for a temporary restraining order, respondent asserted that petitioner’s detention was 23 lawful under section 1226 of the INA. ECF No. 11 at 3-10. The undersigned rejected this, 24 finding that petitioner had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his constitutional claims 25 because he had sufficiently shown that he was due certain process under the Fifth Amendment 26 prior to his detention, which he had not been given. ECF No. 16 at 9-13. As the undersigned 27 explained, whether section 1226 was properly applied to petitioner was only relevant to 28 petitioner’s constitutional claims insofar as (1) that statutory section was itself not constitutionally 1 infirm, and (2) the section, if constitutional, had been properly applied to petitioner. Id. at 5, 8-9, 2 11. The undersigned concluded that the section had not been properly applied to petitioner and, 3 irrespective of the statutory authority the BIA had invoked, petitioner had been deprived of the 4 process guaranteed to him under the Constitution. Id. at 8-13. 5 In light of this, respondent has not shown that the issues on appeal in Rodriguez are 6 dispositive to the issues pending in this case, such that the court should stay proceedings in this 7 case pending resolution of the Rodriguez appeal. The court in Rodriguez only considered the 8 statutory question of the scope of application of section 1226; it did not consider—and therefore, 9 on appeal the Court of Appeals will not consider—the additional question of whether the process 10 codified in section 1226 accords with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 11 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239. Hence, even if the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez eventually concludes 12 that section 1226, by its text, applies to persons situated similarly to the petitioner, that would 13 leave unresolved the specific issues raised in this case, viz., whether the process to which 14 petitioner was subject violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. This distinction 15 renders it unlikely that any particular judicial economy or efficiency would be served by holding 16 the instant case in abeyance pending the Court of Appeals’ decision in Rodriguez. See Am. Life 17 Ins. Co., 300 U.S. at 215; Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110. 18 Moreover, respondents have not shown that the balance of equities favor issuance of a 19 stay and holding the instant proceedings in abeyance pending resolution of the appeal in 20 Rodriguez. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 706. Respondents have made no showing that they will 21 experience any form of “hardship or inequity” without a stay of the proceedings. See Dependable 22 Highway Express, 498 F.3d at 1066; Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1112; Landis, 299 U.S. at 255; see 23 generally ECF No. 17 at 2. Petitioner, in contrast, has shown that the possibility of re-detention 24 without due process creates a risk of substantial, irreparable harm. See ECF No. 16 at 13-14. On 25 this record, therefore, respondents have not shown that the court should exercise its discretion to 26 hold the instant proceedings in abeyance. The motion is denied. 27 //// 28 //// 1 C. Notice Under Rule 65(a)(2) 2 In their response to the court’s order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should 3 not issue, respondents rely on the arguments they raised in opposition to the motion for temporary 4 injunction, ECF No. 17 at 1, and to date respondents have filed no answer or return to the 5 petition. See ECF No. 14. In the interest of judicial economy, the court finds it appropriate and 6 intends to consolidate the request for permanent injunctive relief with the determination of the 7 merits of the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). See Slidewaters LLC v. 8 Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 4 F.4th 747, 759 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting the court can invoke 9 Rule 65(a)(2) by giving “clear and unambiguous notice”). Respondents shall file an answer or 10 return to the petition no later than seven (7) days from the date of this order, and petitioner may 11 file a reply or traverse no later than seven (7) days from being served with respondents’ answer / 12 return. Absent a further order of the court, the petition will be taken under submission after the 13 filing of the reply / traverse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). 14 CONCLUSION 15 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 16 1. Petitioner’s motion to proceed via pseudonym (ECF No. 3) is granted. 17 2. Respondents’ motion to hold proceedings in abeyance (ECF No. 17) is denied. 18 3. Respondents are directed to file an answer/return to the petition no later than seven (7) 19 days from the date of this order. 20 4. Petitioner’s reply/traverse, if any, may be filed not later than seven (7) days after being 21 served a copy of respondents’ answer/return. 22 5. In all other respects, the court’s November 24, 2025 Order remains in effect until 23 further order of the court. 24 DATED: January 23, 2006 25 26 27 28