J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co. v. Internal Revenue Service (J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co.)

S.D. Florida

J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co. v. Internal Revenue Service (J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co.)

60 B.R. 499, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4700, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 969

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida.

DecidedDecember 26, 1985

Docket17-23578

StatusPublished

This text of 60 B.R. 499 (J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co. v. Internal Revenue Service (J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co. v. Internal Revenue Service (J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co.), 60 B.R. 499, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4700, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 969 (Fla. 1985).

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Opinion

ORDER

SIDNEY M. WEAVER, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter having come on to be heard on the motion to dismiss filed by the United States of America, the Court being duly advised in the premises and for the reasons set forth below determines that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

On February 3, 1984, debtor, J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co., Inc., filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On November 14, 1985, debtor filed an adversary complaint for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from pursuing collection of responsible officer penalty taxes assessed pursuant to Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code against debtor’s corporate officers, J.C. Williams and Ada Mae Williams. As a basis for the *500 requested relief, debtor alleges in its complaint that the corporate officers “are subsidizing the operation of the Debtor-in-Possession through their personal funds” and “without the personal participation of the Williams’ Debtor will be unable to reorganize and propose and consúmate a feasible plan of reorganization.”

The United States filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for injunctive relief which alleges, inter alia, that the debtor corporation lacks standing to maintain this action and that this proceeding is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, Section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.).

For the reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion of In re Driscoll’s Towing Service Inc., 51 B.R. 990 (S.D.Fla.1985), this Court is in agreement with the contentions in the United States’ Motion to Dismiss.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the United States is HEREBY GRANTED.

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ORDER

SIDNEY M. WEAVER, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter having come on to be heard on the motion to dismiss filed by the United States of America, the Court being duly advised in the premises and for the reasons set forth below determines that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

On February 3, 1984, debtor, J.C. Williams & Peeptite Paving Co., Inc., filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On November 14, 1985, debtor filed an adversary complaint for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from pursuing collection of responsible officer penalty taxes assessed pursuant to Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code against debtor’s corporate officers, J.C. Williams and Ada Mae Williams. As a basis for the *500 requested relief, debtor alleges in its complaint that the corporate officers “are subsidizing the operation of the Debtor-in-Possession through their personal funds” and “without the personal participation of the Williams’ Debtor will be unable to reorganize and propose and consúmate a feasible plan of reorganization.”

The United States filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for injunctive relief which alleges, inter alia, that the debtor corporation lacks standing to maintain this action and that this proceeding is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, Section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.).

For the reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion of In re Driscoll’s Towing Service Inc., 51 B.R. 990 (S.D.Fla.1985), this Court is in agreement with the contentions in the United States’ Motion to Dismiss.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the United States is HEREBY GRANTED.

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Bluebook (online)

60 B.R. 499, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 4700, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 969, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jc-williams-peeptite-paving-co-v-internal-revenue-service-jc-flsb-1985.

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