JB and Margaret Blaugrund Foundation v. Guggenheim Funds Investment Advisors, LLC

CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware
DecidedMarch 17, 2023
Docket2021-1094-NAC
StatusPublished

This text of JB and Margaret Blaugrund Foundation v. Guggenheim Funds Investment Advisors, LLC (JB and Margaret Blaugrund Foundation v. Guggenheim Funds Investment Advisors, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Chancery of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JB and Margaret Blaugrund Foundation v. Guggenheim Funds Investment Advisors, LLC, (Del. Ct. App. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JB AND MARGARET BLAUGRUND ) FOUNDATION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. 2021-1094-NAC ) GUGGENHEIM FUNDS INVESTMENT ) ADVISORS, LLC, TORTOISE CAPITAL ) ADVISORS, L.L.C., RANDALL C. ) BARNES, ANGELA BROCK-KYLE, ) DONALD A. CHUBB, JR., JERRY B. ) FARLEY, ROMAN FRIEDRICH III, ) THOMAS F. LYDON, JR., RONALD A. ) NYBERG, SANDRA G. SPONEM, ) RONALD E. TOUPIN, JR., and AMY J. ) LEE, ) ) Defendants, ) ) and ) ) FIDUCIARY/CLAYMORE ENERGY ) INFRASTRUCTURE FUND, ) ) Nominal Defendant. )

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL WHEREAS:

1. Plaintiff is a former stockholder of the Fund. 1 The Amended Complaint

alleges unusual facts. According to the Amended Complaint and the public and

Section 220 documents incorporated into and integral to it:

• The Fund’s governance structure did not include exculpation for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care; • The Trustee Defendants managed at least 150 entities, including the Fund; • A Trustee Defendant testified that the Trustee Defendants barely reviewed the Fund’s financial performance before meeting to discuss the Fund; • The Trustee Defendants did not oversee Guggenheim’s investment strategies; • Guggenheim increased the Fund’s leverage to a point that surpassed the leverage maintained by nearly all the Fund’s peers; • The Moving Defendants had no internal controls to stress test the Fund’s portfolio or reduce the Fund’s exposure to a liquidity crisis; • Guggenheim responded to a liquidity crisis by selling $45 million of the Fund’s equity securities, which reversed all the Fund’s historical returns; • The Trustee Defendants were not aware of Guggenheim’s securities sales; • After recommending that the Fund be liquidated and wound-up by a trustee (the “Liquidation”), Guggenheim discovered that the securities sales caused recognition of millions of dollars in tax recapture gains; • The Moving Defendants understood that the Liquidation, although economically advantageous for stockholders, would preserve breach of fiduciary duty claims for litigation by a liquidating trustee, including claims based on Guggenheim’s tax error; • The Moving Defendants opted instead for the Merger, at least in part, to eliminate their personal liability;

1 Unless specified otherwise, capitalized terms have the meaning given them in my February 22, 2023 oral ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss (the “Ruling”).

2 • To achieve the Merger, the Moving Defendants valued Plaintiff’s then- pending derivative claims at $0, despite contrary valuations from advisors, and selected a buyer who agreed to indemnify the Moving Defendants fully for all fiduciary liability; • Along with the Proxy Statement, the Moving Defendants publicized a redacted version of the Amended Complaint that concealed portions of 119 paragraphs detailing their conceivably self-interested motivations for pursuing the Merger, which were gleaned from Section 220 documents; • The redactions seemingly caused Plaintiff’s claims to appear unfounded; • The Moving Defendants presented the Liquidation structure to stockholders as an option that would lead to uncertain returns, indefinite illiquidity, and incalculable tax expenses at the stockholder level; • Ten days before the Merger vote, the Moving Defendants issued Supplemental Disclosures indicating to stockholders that the Moving Defendants would pursue the Liquidation if the Merger were rejected; • To maintain the redactions to the Amended Complaint through the Merger vote, the Moving Defendants moved under Rule 5.1 for continued confidential treatment a few days before the Merger vote; • After the vote, and despite their Rule 5.1 arguments, the Moving Defendants then unredacted all but three allegations; and • One of those three allegations referenced an analysis by the Board’s financial advisor that calculated sizeable damages caused by Guggenheim’s tax error.

2. The Moving Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Count

VI of the Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). Count VI is styled under this Court’s

In re Primedia, Inc. 2 and In re Riverstone National, Inc. Stockholder Litigation3

decisions and challenges the fairness of the Merger process and price.

2 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013). 3 2016 WL 4045411 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2016).

3 3. The Motion relied heavily on Corwin. Plaintiff countered that, as a

doctrinal matter, Corwin does not apply to “Primedia/Riverstone” claims. Plaintiff

alternatively argued that Corwin cleansing would be unavailable on these facts

because the Merger vote was “structurally coerced” and not fully informed.

4. Plaintiff presented its doctrinal argument as an open question of law.4

The Moving Defendants characterized that framing as “perplexing” and insisted that

“[n]othing distinguishe[d] the application of Corwin” to Count VI. 5

5. Consistent with this position, the Moving Defendants never argued that

the concept of structural coercion was unsettled. Instead, they argued that the vote

was not structurally coerced because the proxy materials gave stockholders the

option to choose between the Merger and “the status quo.”6 Based on that

presentation of the concept, the Moving Defendants depicted the proxy materials as

offering “a simple up or down vote” based on full information about the economic

differences between the Merger and the Liquidation.7 Plaintiff, by contrast, argued

the proxy materials forced the stockholders to make an “all or nothing” choice.8

4 Dkt. 120 at 36–37 (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss) (“Opp’n Br.”) 5 Dkt. 122 at 21 (Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss) (“Reply”). 6 Reply at 16–18; Dkt. 133 64:1–5 (Tr. of Hr’g on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss) (“Hr’g Tr.”). See also Ruling at 27–29 (discussing this argument). 7 Dkt. 114 at 25 (Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss) (“Opening Br.”); Hr’g Tr. at 54:17–19. 8 Opp’n Br. at 38. See also Hr’g Tr. at 49:23–50:1 ([Pl.’s Couns.]: “Contrary to what [the Moving Defendants] argue in their brief, the status quo isn’t a real alternative here.”).

4 6. I denied the Motion (the “Ruling”).9 The Ruling assumed, without

deciding, that Corwin applied to Count VI. In other words, the Ruling accepted (for

analytical purposes) the Moving Defendant’s articulation of Corwin. The Ruling

then concluded that the unusual facts of this case supported a reasonable inference

of structural coercion. 10 In reaching that conclusion, the Ruling applied traditional

coercion principles. Those principles were cited in the parties’ cases.

7. The Moving Defendants have applied for certification of an

interlocutory appeal (the “Application”). The Application seeks review of the

Ruling’s pleading-stage coercion conclusion. Plaintiff opposes the Application. 11

8. The Application does not argue that the Ruling misconstrued the record.

Nor does the Application accuse the Ruling of applying the incorrect standard. And

the Application does not identify a case that examined the same or similarly unusual

facts. Nevertheless, the Application contends that the Ruling resolved a novel

question of law and conflicts with precedent.

9 See Dkt. 136 (Tr. of Oral Ruling Resolving Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss) (“Ruling”). The Ruling separately granted motions to dismiss filed by Tortoise and the Former Trustees. The grounds for granting those motions are not relevant to this decision. 10 Id. at 17–31. The parties did not present argument on the concept of “situational coercion,” even though the Moving Defendants cited the leading case.

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Bluebook (online)
JB and Margaret Blaugrund Foundation v. Guggenheim Funds Investment Advisors, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/jb-and-margaret-blaugrund-foundation-v-guggenheim-funds-investment-delch-2023.