Jazmin Jones v. Aria Resort & Casino, LLC dba Aria Resort & Casino; MGM Resorts International, Inc.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 14, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01570
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Jazmin Jones, Case No. 2:25-cv-01570-GMN-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Aria Resort & Casino, LLC dba Aria Resort & 9 Casino; MGM Resorts International, Inc.,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and has requested 13 authority to proceed in forma pauperis (meaning, without paying the filing fee). (ECF No. 1). 14 Plaintiff has submitted a complaint. (ECF No. 1-1). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 15 application is complete and demonstrates an inability to pay the filing fee, it grants the application 16 to proceed in forma pauperis. However, because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not allege 17 sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint 18 without prejudice and with leave to amend. 19 I. In forma pauperis application. 20 Plaintiff filed the affidavit required by § 1915(a). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff has shown an 21 inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed 22 in forma pauperis will be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court will now review 23 Plaintiff’s complaint. 24 II. Legal standard for screening. 25 As Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, this Court will therefore 26 screen the complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if 27 the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 1 § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given 2 leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from 3 the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. 4 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a 6 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 7 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 8 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of 9 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. 10 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 11 allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 12 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 13 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 14 contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 16 allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 17 line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 18 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 19 drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 20 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 21 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 22 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 24 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when 25 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 26 necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 27 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the 1 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 2 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal 3 district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in 4 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of 5 different states.” Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete 6 diversity” among the parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each 7 of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 8 III. Screening the complaint. 9 Plaintiff, an African American woman, sues Aria Resort & Casino, LLC dba Aria Resort 10 & Casino and MGM Resorts International, Inc.1 for damages, alleging race and gender 11 discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 12 wrongful termination in violation of Nevada public policy. Plaintiff alleges that she worked for 13 Defendants at the Aria Resort & Casino between August 2022 through sometime in 2024. 14 Plaintiff alleges that despite her satisfactory performance, she was subjected to discriminatory 15 treatment, wrongful suspensions, and termination in retaliation for asserting her workplace rights. 16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants excluded African Americans from managerial roles, other than 17 one African American food and beverage manager who Defendants fired after two days. Plaintiff 18 also alleges that her advocacy on her own behalf and on behalf of another African American 19 woman employee “led to retaliatory actions by Defendant.” She claims that she was denied 20 proper wages and was denied tip allocations, pension contributions, and full backpay “owed 21 during the periods of wrongful suspension and termination.” Plaintiff also alleges that she 22 engaged in protected activity by reporting wage and labor violations, by filing grievances through 23 her union, and by filing Ethics Point submissions. Plaintiff claims that in retaliation, Defendants 24

25 1 This is how Plaintiff refers to Defendants in the caption of her complaint. However, in the body of her complaint she refers to them as MGM Resorts International dba Aria Resort & Casino, 26 LLC and MGM Resorts International, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that “MGM Resorts International dba 27 Aria Resort & Casino, LLC owns and operates Aria Resort & Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada,” where Plaintiff was employed. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3). In any amendment, Plaintiff must clearly 1 subjected her to adverse actions including wrongful suspension, termination, loss of wages, and 2 denial of benefits. Plaintiff asserts that in May of 2025, she received a right to sue notice from 3 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). 4 A. Conclusory allegations. 5 Plaintiff’s claims are too conclusory to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain 7 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Rule 8 pleading 8 standard does not require detailed factual allegations, “but it demands more than an unadorned, 9 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers 10 “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 11 do.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked 12 assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 13 Here, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her and retaliated 14 against her she does not provide sufficient factual allegations to support her claims. She does not 15 describe the discriminatory actions Defendants took against her, who within the companies took 16 those actions, when they occurred, or why Plaintiff believes those actions were discriminatory. 17 She also does not explain when she was suspended or denied proper wages and benefits, who 18 within the companies suspended her and denied her pay and benefits, or why those actions were 19 wrongful, discriminatory, or retaliatory. Plaintiff also does not describe the advocacy she took on 20 behalf of her and her coworker or the complaints she made about wage and labor violations. 21 Without these facts, Plaintiff’s complaint is too conclusory to state a claim upon which relief can 22 be granted. 23 B. Right to sue. 24 Title VII provides that upon dismissing a charge of discrimination, the EEOC must notify 25 the claimant and inform her that she has ninety days to bring a civil action. See 42 U.S.C. 26 § 2000e–5(f)(1) (“If a charge filed with the [EEOC] ... is dismissed by the [EEOC], ... the [EEOC 27 or otherwise appropriate entity] shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after 1 limitations period. Payan v. Aramark Management Services, Ltd. Partnership, 495 F.3d 1119, 2 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266–67 (9th Cir. 1992)). If a 3 litigant does not file suit within ninety days “[of] the date EEOC dismisses a claim,” then the 4 action is time-barred. Id. Therefore, ascertaining the date on which the limitations period begins 5 is crucial to determining whether an action was timely filed. Id. The Ninth Circuit measures the 6 start of the limitations period from the date on which a right-to-sue notice letter arrived at the 7 claimant’s address of record. Id. (citing Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d 380, 384 (9th 8 Cir. 1997) and Scholar, 963 F.2d at 267). 9 Here, Plaintiff does not allege the date she received the EEOC’s right to sue letter. She 10 alleges that she received it in May of 2025, but does not provide the day. So, the Court cannot 11 determine whether the action is timely. In any amendment Plaintiff must allege the day she 12 received the EEOC right to sue letter. 13 14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 15 pauperis (ECF No. 1) is granted. Plaintiff shall not be required to pre-pay the filing fee. 16 Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of 17 any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security therefor. This order granting leave to 18 proceed in forma pauperis shall not extend to the issuance and/or service of subpoenas at 19 government expense. 20 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to file Plaintiff’s 21 complaint (ECF No. 1-1) on the docket but shall not issue summonses. 22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send Plaintiff 23 a copy of this order. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is dismissed without 25 prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, with leave to amend. 26 Plaintiff will have until December 15, 2025, to file an amended complaint if the noted 27 deficiencies can be corrected. If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff is informed 1 complaint complete. This is because, generally, an amended complaint supersedes the original 2 complaint. Local Rule 15-1(a) requires that an amended complaint be complete without reference 3 to any prior pleading. Once a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint no 4 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 5 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each Defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 6 Failure to comply with this order will result in the recommended dismissal of this case. 7 8 DATED: November 14, 2025 9 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27