IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-KA-01124-SCT
JAYME LYNN TUBBS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/15/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LINDA F. COLEMAN TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: MICHAEL STEPHEN CARR AZKI SHAH CHRIS POWELL ALISON LESLIE FLINT JULIA GRAY STOWERS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: QUITMAN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TAMARRA AKIEA BOWIE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: DANIELLE LOVE BURKS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BRENDA FAY MITCHELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/01/2025 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., CHAMBERLIN AND BRANNING, JJ.
RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In 2022, Jayme Lynn Tubbs was indicted by a Quitman County Grand Jury along with
codefendant Keith Coleman Jr. for two counts of conspiring to commit the murder of April
Jones and Will Polk, two counts of first degree murder, and two counts of desecration of a
human corpse. Tubbs and Coleman were tried jointly. After the State rested its case-in-
chief, Coleman moved for a directed verdict, which Tubbs joined. The trial judge granted the defendants’ motions as to the two counts of conspiracy and dismissed those charges. The
jury found Tubbs and Coleman guilty on all other counts.
¶2. Tubbs moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a
new trial. The trial judge denied her motion. After Tubbs had perfected her appeal, the trial
court granted Coleman’s request for a new trial based on a discovery violation. Tubbs moved
to stay her appeal and remand the case to the trial court, contending that she was also affected
by the discovery violation. The Court of Appeals granted her request for the limited purpose
of conducting an evidentiary hearing on the alleged violation. See Order, Tubbs v. State, No.
2023-TS-00191-COA (Miss. Ct. App. May 2, 2023); see also Order, Tubbs v. State, No.
2023-TS-00191-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2023). At the evidentiary hearing, the trial
judge found that a Brady1 violation had occurred and remanded Tubbs to the custody of the
Quitman County Sheriff to await a new trial.
¶3. In September 2023, Tubbs and Coleman received their new trial on two counts of first
degree murder of Jones and Polk under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2019),
as well as two counts of desecration of a human corpse under Mississippi Code Section 97-
29-25(2)(a) (Rev. 2014). The jury found Tubbs and Coleman guilty on all counts. The trial
judge sentenced Tubbs to serve a term of life imprisonment as to the two counts of first
degree murder, running consecutively. In addition, the trial judge sentenced Tubbs to a term
of three years as to the two counts of desecration of a human corpse, running concurrently
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
2 with her two life sentences. Tubbs moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in
the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied her motion.
¶4. Tubbs raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict her of two
counts of first degree murder, and (2) whether Chief Deputy Peter Clinton’s testimony as to
Tubbs’s confession was inadmissible hearsay. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶5. In 2019, Keith Coleman Jr. was a local drug dealer in Quitman County, Mississippi.
Coleman resided on Butler Road in Lambert, Mississippi. Chelsea Golden also resided at
the Butler Road house, as well as Cierra Wheeler, who predominantly stayed with Coleman
and Golden during that time. Both Golden and Wheeler had children living with them at the
Butler Road house, each fathered by Coleman.
¶6. Coleman also resided part time at Dexter Ellis’s house in Crowder, Mississippi, where
he operated his illicit business to be closer to his clientele. According to Coleman, April
Jones dated Ellis at that time and resided at the Crowder house. Subsequently, Jones began
a romantic relationship with Will Polk, who would regularly hang out at the Crowder house.
Rachel Russell, another one of Coleman’s girlfriends, had a room at the Crowder house.
Jayme Lynn Tubbs was a frequent visitor of the Crowder house, exchanging with Coleman
sexual favors for methamphetamine.
¶7. On October 19, 2019, family members of Jones and Polk filed a missing person report
at the Quitman County Sheriff’s Office. Several law enforcement agencies helped
3 investigate, but the facts of Jones’s and Polk’s disappearance went unsolved for nearly a year
and a half.
¶8. In the meantime, Chief Deputy Clinton, a former Mississippi Bureau of Investigation
(MBI) agent, began working for the Quitman County Sheriff’s Department in February 2021.
Part of his duties included clearing out lingering cases. While Clinton went through the jail
list to garner each inmate’s status, he met Coleman, who was in the county’s jail at that time
for unrelated crimes.
¶9. Law enforcement had few leads as to the disappearance of Jones and Polk up to that
time. In May 2021, Clinton interviewed a potential suspect at the jail. Coleman heard that
his name came up during the interview in connection with the case. Coleman then escaped
from the jail. He was apprehended in Craighead, Arkansas, shortly thereafter. During the
transport back to Mississippi, Coleman asked to speak with Clinton.
¶10. Clinton interviewed Coleman in the Panola County Sheriff’s Office on May 28, 2021.2
During this initial interview, Coleman related to Clinton that he was present when Jones and
Polk were killed and that he would take Clinton to the location. The following day, Clinton
and another investigator for the Quitman County Sheriff’s Office, Darryl Linzy, had Coleman
show them where Jones and Polk were killed. Coleman provided Clinton with a hand drawn
diagram revealing the location. Coleman had the officers stop the vehicle when they
2 Both Coleman and Tubbs gave video recorded interviews with Clinton in this case. All parties possessed these recordings. None of the parties sought to introduce the recordings as substantive or impeachment evidence. The only objection Tubbs raised to Clinton’s testimony regarding the statements in her interview was to a portion of his testimony during redirect examination that Tubbs contended went outside the scope of the cross-examination.
4 approached a large agriculture field off Butler Road. Coleman described a drug deal gone
wrong—that supposed drug dealers shot and killed Jones and Polk, then forced Coleman to
cut up the bodies at gun point.
¶11. Coleman’s story was suspicious to the officers. They left the agriculture field and
drove back toward Coleman’s house on Butler Road. After a short distance, Coleman was
permitted to exit the vehicle and walk down a gravel road. When he approached two fallen
trees, Coleman called out, “[h]ey, this is the location where they was killed—I mean, where
the body was burned up in the woodlines.” Clinton took Coleman back to the jail while other
officers searched for remains.
¶12. When the two arrived back to the jail, Clinton was informed that a human skull,
hands, and a ring had been recovered. DNA from the skull was later compared with a swab
taken from Polk’s mother and revealed that “[t]he tooth’s DNA profile is approximately 42
thousand times more likely, if Amanda Smith is his mother, as opposed to a randomly
selected person in the population.” Polk’s mother also confirmed that the recovered ring
belonged to the victim.
¶13. Coleman then gave a second interview to Clinton. Coleman related that in early
October 2019, his drug stash, allegedly $18,000 worth of methamphetamine, as well as his
guns, had been stolen from the Crowder house. Clinton testified that “according to him, Mr.
Coleman, he alleged that April and Will stole his drugs and his guns, because he used to give
them drugs. . . . But now . . . they are no longer asking him for drugs, but they’re still getting
high.”
5 ¶14. According to Clinton, during Tubbs’s later interview, “[she] also confirmed this . . .
that she was part of this planning process, in which they agreed to pick up April and Will
from Katie Mae’s house.” Specifically, according to Coleman, “[t]he plan was to get April
off to herself and beat her up and let her know, you can’t steal from me.” Coleman needed
Tubbs’s help because “[Jones] knew [Coleman] was looking for her.”
¶15. Jones had started staying with Katie Mae after the burglary, whose house was next
door to the Crowder house. According to Coleman, whenever he would knock on Katie
Mae’s door to speak with Jones, she would inform him that Jones was not there. According
to Coleman, therefore, “[t]he plan was; [Tubbs] would use Rachel’s car to go pick up April
and take her off to herself. Meet up with me. I would beat her up and just leave her out
there.”
¶16. While Coleman sought revenge for the loss of his methamphetamine, Tubbs had
different motivations. According to Tubbs, she and Jones were best friends until Jones slept
with her boyfriend, Dustin Smith. Tubbs was also upset at Jones for allegedly “snitching”
to the police on an unrelated matter, but Clinton was unable to confirm this accusation.
According to Clinton, at the end of Tubbs’s interview, she admitted that during the planning,
she knew that there was a possibility Jones could die, but she did not care.
¶17. It was Tubbs’s role to pick up Jones in Russell’s vehicle under the guise of going to
Taco Bell. Jones felt uneasy because she asserted to Tubbs, “don’t start no shit.” Jones
acquiesced after Polk agreed to accompany her. Tubbs related that Polk would not allow her
6 to take Jones without him. According to the accounts of both Coleman and Tubbs, Polk’s
death that night was collateral to the ultimate goal of getting Jones to the ambush site.
¶18. While Tubbs performed her part, Coleman was back at the Butler Road house setting
up the ambush. According to Golden, Coleman informed her that he was going to kill Jones
and directed her to come with him. When Golden refused, Coleman aimed a pistol at their
four-year-old son, Keith Coleman III, and threatened to kill the child if she disobeyed.
¶19. According to Golden, it was around 11:00 p.m. when she drove Coleman out to the
agriculture field off Butler Road. Coleman had her stop the car. Both Jones and Polk knew
Golden. As part of the plan, Coleman popped the hood of the vehicle to stage it as a decoy,
appearing like Golden had broken down in the field. Tubbs would then act the part of the
Good Samaritan, pulling off into the field to help.
¶20. At the same time, Tubbs was in contact with Coleman via text message as to not alert
Jones or Polk that she was driving them to an ambush. After receiving a message while in
the field, Coleman told Golden, “[t]hey [on] the way, but they got Will with them. Just make
sure he don’t do nothing.” Coleman then went into the woods to hide while Golden stood
next to the car. Golden testified that she did not run away because she knew that Coleman
was watching from the woods with a gun.
¶21. Tubbs approached the decoy vehicle with Jones, Polk, and another individual in the
passenger seat, Dezimond Green, whose involvement was adjudicated in a separate
proceeding. She then parked Russell’s vehicle next to Golden’s. Tubbs exited the vehicle
along with Polk to help Golden. Jones still sat in the car. Coleman then came out of the
7 woods, dragged Jones out of the car, and began to beat her with his pistol. Tubbs handed
Golden a .22 caliber rifle that Coleman had brought with him in Golden’s vehicle and cocked
it for her, instructing Golden to hold the rifle on Polk in case he tried anything. Golden
refused and kept the rifle pointed at the ground.
¶22. Jones tried to run as Coleman shot at her. According to Golden, “he started shooting.
I don’t know how many times. And she walked into the field, and then he shot and she fell.”
Polk then stopped running around scene and put his hands over his head, pleading to
Coleman that he would not say anything. Coleman responded, “I know” and shot Polk in the
chest.
¶23. After the murders, Coleman rendezvoused with Tubbs, Russell, and Green at the
Crowder house. The four then checked into a motel. Coleman and Tubbs next went to
Walmart to purchase items to dispose of the bodies. Tubbs confirmed that they purchased
machetes, shoes, masks, some kerosene, and a blue tarp. According to Coleman, he and
Tubbs went back to the Butler Road house where they dismembered the bodies—chopping
off the heads and hands of Jones and Polk. According to Clinton, Tubbs wore a mask while
disposing of the bodies “because she feared that out where they killed them at and chopped
them up that they had Deer Cameras.”
¶24. Tubbs had formerly been in a romantic relationship with Polk. Regarding Jones,
Tubbs found dismembering her body funny and laughed while she did it. According to
Clinton, “I asked her something to the effect that ‘I have got to talk to the family members,
and what do you think I aught to tell them?’ She said something to the effect that . . . she’ll
8 do it again. She deserved it, ‘cause she was a snitch.’” But as to Polk, Tubbs stated that she
really loved him “and that she didn’t want to participate in cutting him up.”
¶25. According to Tubbs, she and Coleman next burned what remained of the bodies.
Tubbs confirmed that she and Coleman then put the victims’ clothes into bags, and Coleman
later gave them to another one of his girlfriends Cierra Wheeler to burn at a local
campground. Wheeler confirmed that, as she received instruction from Coleman, “[h]e laid
his phone on top of the trunk and told me to flip it over. And when I flipped it over, it was
a picture of a body.” Moreover, Golden testified that she later watched Coleman throw a
backpack containing Jones’s head and hands into a large slough behind the Butler Road
house.
¶26. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Tubbs moved for a directed verdict. The trial
judge denied her motion.
¶27. Coleman took the stand in his defense. Coleman confirmed that he suspected Jones
of stealing his stash of methamphetamine and that he “formulated a punishment for that
suspect.” Coleman’s trial testimony diverged considerably from his previous statements
regarding what had transpired in the field. Coleman testified that while he was beating
Jones, Golden, without any forewarning, shot Polk multiple times, and according to
Coleman, when he went to check on Polk, he heard Golden fire four or five more shots and
observed that Golden had shot and killed Jones as well. Coleman testified that there was
never a plan to kill anyone and that Jones had been just fine after her beating. According to
9 Coleman, he told Golden not to worry because he would take the blame for everything.
Coleman then developed a plan with Tubbs at the motel to “get rid of all the evidence.”
¶28. The jury was not convinced and convicted Tubbs and Coleman on all counts. The trial
judge sentenced Tubbs to serve a term of life imprisonment as to the two counts of first
degree murder, to run consecutively. In addition, the trial judge sentenced Tubbs to a term
of three years as to the two counts of desecration of a human corpse, to run concurrently with
her two life sentences. Tubbs moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the
alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied her motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Tubbs of two counts of first degree murder.
¶29. The Court reviews whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction de novo.
Green v. State, 269 So. 3d 75, 79 (Miss. 2018) (citing Brooks v. State, 203 So. 3d 1134,
1137 (Miss. 2016)). In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Swanagan v. State, 229 So.
3d 698, 703 (Miss. 2017) (quoting Fagan v. State, 171 So. 3d 496, 503 (Miss. 2015)). In
doing so, we determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient for a rational juror to
find each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Fagan, 171
So. 3d at 503).
¶30. Under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2019), “[t]he killing of a human
being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be murder . . .
[w]hen done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human
10 being, shall be first-degree murder . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Supp. 2019).
It is a longstanding principle that “[o]ne who acts with others in the commission of a crime
and aids and abets is responsible as a principal in the offense.” Wells v. State, 849 So. 2d
1231, 1239 (Miss. 2003) (citing Bass v. State, 231 So. 2d 495, 496 (Miss. 1970)).
¶31. “[T]o aid and abet in the commission of a felony, one must ‘do something that will
incite, encourage, or assist the actual perpetrator in the commission of the crime.’” Vaughn
v. State, 712 So. 2d 721, 724 (Miss. 1998) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting
Malone v. State, 486 So. 2d 360, 363 (Miss. 1986)). This Court has held that
“Aiding and abetting is defined to be ‘the offense committed by those persons who, although not the direct perpetrators of a crime, are yet present at its commission, doing some act to render aid to the actual perpetrator’. . . . And such aiding and abetting may be manifested by acts, words, signs, motions, or any conduct which unmistakably evinces a design to encourage, incite or approve of the crime, or even by being present, with the intention of giving assistance, if necessary, though such assistance may not be called into requisition.”
Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 915 (Miss. 1995) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quoting Wynn v. State, 63 Miss. 260, 264 (1885)).
¶32. Tubbs contends that the State failed to present evidence showing that she aided and
abetted the murders of Jones and Polk. She argues that the plan was for Coleman to assault
Jones, not to murder her. She further contends that murdering Polk was never a part of the
plan. Tubbs asserts, therefore, that she “did not incite, encourage, or assist Keith Coleman
in the commission of the crime.”
¶33. “[I]ntent may be proven . . . by showing the acts of the person involved at the time in
question, and by showing the circumstances surrounding the incident.” Lollis v. State, 373
11 So. 3d 1004, 1008 (Miss. 2023) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Thompson v. State, 258 So. 2d 448, 448 (Miss. 1972)). Moreover, the jury is
permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented based on common sense
and lived experience. Jones v. State, 252 So. 3d 574, 587 (Miss. 2018) (citing Bowser v.
State, 182 So. 3d 425, 430 (Miss. 2015)). Viewing the evidence presented in this case in the
light most favorable to the State, the jury could have reasonably found based on common
sense and lived experience that Tubbs’s unwavering participation before, during, and after
the murders of Jones and Polk evinced her intent to aid and abet Coleman in the commission
of the crimes.
¶34. Coleman would not have had the opportunity to murder the two victims in the field
without Tubbs performing her role in the plan. Evidence was presented that Tubbs assisted
Coleman in planning an ambush of Jones. Evidence was presented that Tubbs was upset at
Jones for allegedly sleeping with her former boyfriend and for allegedly “snitching” to the
police on an unrelated matter. Evidence was presented that Tubbs knew Jones could die
during the ambush but that she did not care. Evidence was presented that Jones was afraid
of Coleman and that Tubbs deceived Jones by hand delivering her to Coleman under the
guise of going to Taco Bell.
¶35. Evidence was presented that Tubbs did not alter the plan once Polk agreed to
accompany Jones. Evidence was presented that Tubbs alerted Coleman that Polk was with
them on the way to the ambush site. Evidence was presented that Tubbs was in constant
12 contact with Coleman via text message for the duration of her pre-planned back road route
as not to alert the two victims of danger.
¶36. Evidence was presented that Tubbs drove into the field, parked next to the decoy
vehicle, and pretended to get out to help Golden. Evidence was presented that, after
Coleman began beating Jones with his pistol, Tubbs retrieved a .22 caliber rifle that Coleman
had brought in the decoy vehicle. Evidence was presented that Tubbs cocked that rifle and
handed it to Golden, instructing her to hold it on Polk in case he tried to help Jones.
¶37. Evidence was presented that Tubbs rendezvoused with Coleman at the Crowder house
after the murders and went with him to hide out at the motel thereafter. Evidence was
presented that Tubbs accompanied Coleman to Walmart where the two purchased several
items to use in disposing of the deceased bodies. Evidence was presented that Tubbs
participated in dismembering the victims, burning the rest of their bodies, and disposing of
any remaining evidence at the scene. Evidence was presented revealing that Tubbs admitted
to laughing and having fun when she cut off Jones’s head.
¶38. The record in the case sub judice, therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, demonstrates that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain Tubbs’s two convictions
of first degree murder. Despite Tubbs’s contention that she only believed that she was taking
Jones to a beating and that Polk was merely collateral damage to that goal, a reasonable juror
could have found based on common sense and lived experience that Tubbs’s unwavering
participation before, during, and after the deaths of Jones and Polk revealed her intent to aid
and abet Coleman in their murders beyond a reasonable doubt.
13 II. Whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to exclude Clinton’s testimony as to Tubbs’s confession as inadmissible hearsay.
¶39. Tubbs contends that Clinton’s testimony as to her confession was inadmissible
hearsay. The objection that Tubbs contends preserved her claim of error on appeal was to
a specific question asked by the prosecutor during Clinton’s redirect examination that Tubbs
argued went outside the scope of the cross-examination. The trial court sustained that
objection. Tubbs, however, never objected to any portion of Clinton’s testimony regarding
her confession as inadmissible hearsay.
¶40. “It is well established that objections must be made with specificity to preserve for
appeal.” Scott v. State, 796 So. 2d 959, 964 (Miss. 2001) (citing Oates v. State, 421 So. 2d
1025, 1030 (Miss. 1982)). “A trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter which was not
presented to him for decision.” Holmes v. State, 798 So. 2d 533, 537 (Miss. 2001) (citing
Ponder v. State, 335 So. 2d 885, 886 (Miss. 1976)). Accordingly, Tubbs has waived the
issue and is procedurally barred from raising it on appeal.
¶41. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we will consider the merits of Tubbs’s contention
under the plain error doctrine in light of the gravity of the charges. See Ross v. State, 954
So. 2d 968, 992 (Miss. 2007) (citing Walker v. State, 913 So. 2d 198, 216 (Miss. 2005)).
“For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have been ‘an error that resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice or “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.”’” Hall v. State, 201 So. 3d 424, 428 (Miss. 2016)
(alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. State, 995 So. 2d 698, 703 (Miss. 2008)). “To
14 determine if plain error has occurred, this Court must determine ‘if the trial court has
deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear[,] or obvious, and whether that
error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.’” Conner v. State, 138 So. 3d 143, 151 (Miss.
2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grayer v. State, 120
So. 3d 964, 969 (Miss. 2013)).
¶42. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), a statement that is offered against
an opposing party and was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity is
not hearsay. Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). “Thus, statements made by a defendant to a
witness are admissible when offered by the State against the criminal defendant, because they
are not hearsay.” Jackson v. State, 245 So. 3d 433, 442 (Miss. 2018) (citing Miss. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(A)).
¶43. In the case sub judice, Tubbs made her confession to Clinton, and he testified to her
confession at trial. Accordingly, under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the Mississippi Rules of
Evidence, the trial judge did not commit plain error by failing to exclude Clinton’s testimony
as to Tubbs’s confession.
¶44. Lastly, for the first time on appeal, Tubbs contends that her “video taped interview
would have been the best evidence to present in this case, not hearsay testimony of Officer
Clinton that portrayed Tubbs in a bad light.” Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Tubbs’s
contention lacks merit. Under Rule 1002 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, “[a]n original
writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless otherwise
provided by law.” Miss. R. Evid. 1002. The best evidence rule would not operate to exclude
15 Clinton’s testimony regarding Tubbs’s video recorded interview because he participated in
the interview and had firsthand knowledge of it. See Quinn v. State, 479 So. 2d 706, 709
(Miss. 1985). Had Tubbs wished to use the video as substantive evidence of her own or to
impeach Clinton, she was free to do so. See id. Accordingly, the trial judge did not commit
plain error by failing to apply the best evidence rule to exclude Clinton’s testimony as to
Tubbs’s confession.
CONCLUSION
¶45. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶46. AFFIRMED.
KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., MAXWELL, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ., CONCUR.